Brexit and The City: A Security Question?

The 2017 referendum concerning the UK’s membership of the EU will turn on many factors, even if most sage observers think that the vote to remain will be won. Those factors splay across nationality and identity politics, the Scottish question, the cohesion of the Conservative and Labour parties, contested economic analyses and the various mystery x-factors such as the far more likely ‘Grexit’.

So, despite the received wisdom being that the vote to remain will be won (and Open Europe declared on the 5th June – with its methodological workings – that the chance of Brexit sits currently at 19% and the chance of the vote being lost as 28%) the City of London has begun to speak with a louder voice about why it sees its core interests being best served with a UK that sits in the EU. That the City feels moved to speak is both interesting and important: it is interesting because it implies that they feel that there is a chance of Brexit beyond that which they can reasonably sit back and ignore. It is important because 1) there are political and economic impacts to be endured by The City (and thus the wider economy) in a time of political uncertainty prior to December 2017, and thus potentially after that date too and 2) because there are other important sub-questions around Brexit too that deal with the type of economy the UK will continue to enjoy, and to whose benefit these sorts of political issues are settled.

The economic impacts to be endured are most likely to be felt as investment decisions. Uncertainty is the enemy of investment: the UK will already be being priced with a risk premium, and this will only get worse as we get nearer to 2017. As the pre-eminent financial centre in the EU (for mostly historical reasons initially, but now in terms of sheer weight of activity), the City carries great sway over the conduct of financial services in the Union. The proposed banking union (which the City and the UK government opposes) might be developed as a rival bloc to the City which would impact upon the UK’s global competitiveness, whilst the move to encourage EU level business activity away from bank-led finance to alternative forms of financial instrument would likely be led by the UK – who is the largest player in this field currently and who has the best developed understanding of the regulatory frameworks required for it in the post-2008 climate. Simple politics would dictate that European rivals will be quick to question why the UK should have an influential say over this area if it looks to be disengaging from the European project altogether.

The City and financial services amount to 9% of the UK’s GDP. Damage to this area of activity (particularly to a host of investment decisions) has a whole-economy impact. My question – as a security studies academic – is does the potential impact, and thus the roll out across the entire economy, amount to a security impact? Strapping on various different lenses – that of economic performance and the money to invest in key attributes to maintaining fighting fitness (and not necessarily military fitness) is one holistic way to assess an economic impact. Such an analysis fits closely to the far reaches of ‘hybrid warfare’, and looks at the maintenance of education and health as elements of holistic effect. The other is to look at the maintenance of the integrity of social fabric. We can draw simplistic correlations around a time of economic contraction and the emergence of complex threats generated by the disaffected.

In terms of ‘the business dimension’ to Brexit. The City wants to remain in. Small businesses, who are doing less and less trade with continental Europe, might reasonably want to leave. Large manufacturing concerns have welcomed the prospect of having more flexible regulatory conditions outside of the EU – and so divide reasonably equally. Looking at the question from a UK Plc perspective, where is our influence best felt? Where do we exercise most ‘power’? In an era that has seen and will continue to see us effectively winding down our military power (SDSR 2015 will need to do something radical to stop this rot), activities that we do that our globally important should be retained. Even in the context of the disaster of 2008, the City remains a vastly overpaid wealth generator for the nation, and a lever of power on the international stage. Looking from the outside the UK, if one was to do an assessment of what to try and undermine in the UK as part of a hybrid war, the City would be a large target. Where are the successor sources of wealth generation outside of The City?

The fate of the City in the question around Brexit is fundamental to whether the UK remains a mid-range power, or a small power with an expansive history. More particularly, it is a security question.


@BritishPolice: Research, Policy and Community on the Frontiers of Social Media

On Sunday I had the opportunity to chat, via direct message on Twitter, with a Chief Inspector from West Midlands Police. He had tweeted pictures and comments from his course on Public Order Policing, and I had some follow up questions for him. Over several exchanges he happily discussed with me official tactics and approaches, as well as a bit of his experience. For a variety of reasons I value this sort of first hand, practitioner based material in my research. This was not the first time I have used Twitter to further my understanding or sustain my interpretations, but the fact that I can do so speaks to something much more important.

Policing in the United Kingdom is in the midst of a quiet but revolutionary experiment to make itself proactively available to the public by way of social media, and particularly Twitter, in unprecedented numbers and across the chain of command, to include senior leadership. The prospects for this, for its influence on society and policing, are momentous. While its ramifications cannot yet be known, there are three areas in which this phenomenon highlight important opportunities across research, policy and community relations: the human element which emerges, the self-narrative or portrait of the institution and its character, and the engagement philosophy.

First, to the human element. Many of the police accounts, corporate and informal, are associated with an individual. Not just a role, but a particular character and human emerges from the communications. I am a memoir, experiential based military historian by training, and within that as well I value the quotidian and the little things that are said and done for the wisdom it conveys. Happiness, Limeade on Guadalcanal… was written in earnest, as it must be accepted that while seemingly irrelevant on the surface, from these details of the personal experience often emerge profound insights. [1] And the material in public and on social media is just the tip of the iceberg. The human element has a practical story to tell about the work, in general and in detail, and deserves more attention in the course of police research.

Turning to a more meta perspective, taken together this messaging creates the self-image of British policing. From both its personal and corporate accounts, in words and images, the characters of the forces and their constituent parts, as well as the broader national service, are created. Assessing this, in its grand vista and detail deserves attention as well for its influence in policy, practice or communications. At the practical level, for example, to understand that how the police conceive themselves in a particular situation or issue differs from how they are viewed by the public will help to identify areas for redress.

Finally, the matter of engagement and Police-Community Relations (PCR) has particular resonance in this discussion. Timely to do so, as BBC’s “The Met” has people talking. Having seen it, I would say the work is very interesting, definitely worth a watch. [2] Throughout, the participants confronted a host of hard issues about community relations, particularly those relating to race and policing. And they are discussing it today. Many of the individuals mentioned above are on Twitter answering questions and comments regarding the documentary. And as individuals it is clear that many of them are compassionately engaged with their work. On a purely social media front, thinking back to the disorders, it is a long way since the Met was overwhelmed by mass BBM’s, and one wonders how the police would use their new presence in similar circumstances today. More importantly, the documentary identifies the clear rift still to mend. Improving identification between police and disaffected members of the community will require effort across many fronts and over time. Nevertheless, what the Twitter activity of policing suggests, both online and in the metropolis (and the UK at large), is that the police themselves are open to, if not actively interested in, expanding and improving their conversation with the public they serve. It will be interesting to track how this philosophy of engagement will be taken up in and by the challenged communities.

Perhaps the recourse to social media is natural. Gregarious by nature, the British Bobby has simply taken up a new beat. What has changed is that this activity is now visible to a greater percentage and cross section of society. Subtly, 140 characters at a time, over the course of thousands of tweets, this will affect the shape of policing and consent, as well as the understanding of both.





1 Funny to discuss that blog in this one on social media and Twitter as its title was too long to tweet in its entirety. Sigh.

2 One point I would make, as it focused on the Duggan shooting, the riots, and the influence of the Inquest verdict, it was strange not to include something on the vigil the following Saturday. Its peaceful terms deserved highlighting.


Why chess is not the right metaphor for human conflict

Author: Giorgio Bertolin is a doctoral candidate in the Defence Studies Department of King’s College London.


On the cover of books and journals, or as the logo of consultancy firms and think tanks, chess is omnipresent when the topic concerns international security. A set of chiselled wooden pieces is indeed much more elegant than exploding IEDs or wounded fighters. After all, the game of chess seems to represent a battle between two medieval armies, as the presence of knights and siege towers (the rooks) suggests. But can chess really represent a good metaphor for human conflict? I contend that it does not, and that the use of chess to allude to the realities of war is little more than an insult to Caissa. Comparing chess to armed conflict is overly simplistic, and can lead us to inadvertently attribute wrong connotations to the latter.

In chess, the two sides enjoy the same amount of force. They can be said to be equal, even though white’s privilege to move first gives them the edge in the initial phase of the opening. On the other hand, perfect symmetry is virtually non-existent in the reality of warfare. There are just too many variables influencing the magnitude of the forces in the field both qualitatively and quantitatively. Therefore, archives of military history would be scanned in vain searching for such an unlikely event as a battle between two perfectly equal armies. So-called asymmetrical conflicts evidence this tendency even more starkly, in sharp contrast to the clash represented on the chessboard. Moreover, in chess just two players are involved in the fight. While this can be a realistic scenario, contemporary conflicts are often more complex. This is the reason why the US Marine Corps, for example, has added a “neutral cell” (green) to the planning of combat operations, an activity that previously used to contemplate just friendly forces (blue) versus hostile entities (red).

Deliberately giving the enemy more time is an option endorsed by doctrine in certain types of operations. This option is not available to the chess player, who can lose tempo but cannot avoid the obligation to move. This is particularly important in the endgame, when a seemingly winning position can result in a draw because of this rule. The possibility to hold back fire is particularly important in the contemporary landscape, where carefully conducted information operations can leverage the combatants’ actions to produce considerable psychological effects.

Chess is a zero-sum game. Many theorists, in particular those belonging to the school of classical realism, argue that international confrontations are a zero-sum game as well. While this is debatable at the political level, at the strategic level this statement is unconvincing. The influence of non-rational, cultural factors can be massive. Rationality limits choices in chess as much as cultural factors limit choices in warfare. There are no ruses of war in chess, whereas thinking outside of the box has enabled more than one commander to overturn a seemingly stronger enemy.

A flat battlefield, two armies lined up and tidily facing each other, each one waiting for its turn to strike. This situation can be applied to chess and to the skirmishes of the Seven Years’ War – and a very restricted number of other cases. Geography in chess is so abstract that it bears little resemblance to the geographies in which contemporary conflicts take place. Yet, geography is one of the most important variables in warfare. Urban operations, rural insurgencies, and space warfare evidence a broadening of the battlefield, and a crucial role for the peculiar features of the landscape in terms of physical and human geography.

In chess, decapitation strikes work by definition, since the ultimate goal of the game is to checkmate the king. It is moot whether this can be applied to the reality of warfare. Decapitation strikes came to the spotlight with the recent deployment of lethal UAVs – such as the Predator and, especially, the Reaper – in the fight against organised terrorism. In many ways the fight against terrorist networks is a fight against a Lernean Hydra, and decapitation strikes, while generally useful, are not decisive. In other conflicts they can be more relevant, but the situation is still distant from the mathematical clarity of chess. The main obstacle is the availability of viable substitutes to guide an organisation, individuals that sometimes prove to be more talented and innovative than their predecessors. The king is dead, long live the king.

It must be admitted that there are some interesting similarities between chess and human conflict. To begin with, pattern recognition has advantages and disadvantages in both activities. This process is useful to capitalise lessons learned, but at the same time patterns risk crystallisation into dogmatic assumptions that limit strategic thinking. Secondly, in both chess and war tactical actions can have strategic consequences. Mission command and the strategic corporal concept are expressions of this trend in contemporary warfare. Then, it must be noted how the value of chess pieces is subordinated to other factors, such as tempo and position. Again, this is mirrored in the dynamic reality of armed conflicts, where details make the difference, and material capabilities alone are not sufficient to guarantee victory. The presence of these correspondences, however interesting, does not justify the extensive use of chess as the signifier for a human phenomenon that cannot be reduced to a symbol.


The use of chess as a metaphor for war can be misleading. Both chess and war are far more complex than this analogy suggests. And, in other respects, they are simpler. They are qualitatively different, and not as correlated as it may seem on the surface. It would be useless to look for alternative icons. Liberating chess from war, and war from chess, is a sign of respect for activities that are otherwise being trivialised.


Beyond Deschamps: Addressing Sexual Harassment and Assault in the Military

Welcome to this week’s CCLKOW discussion piece. Former Supreme Court judge Marie Deschamps recently released a report condemning the extent of sexual harassment within the Canadian Armed Forces. This has prompted calls for change and the formation of a fact-finding mission to examine how cases of harassment and assault are handled in other countries, such as the United States and United Kingdom. This week, we reflect on the nature and extent of the problem in these countries and what can be done moving forward. Read the piece and join the discussion on Twitter at #CCLKOW.

Late last month, a report regarding sexual harassment in the Canadian Forces (CF) was released. Authored by former Supreme Court judge Marie Deschamps, the report is a damning indictment of how the armed forces address harassment.[i] Deschamps’ recommendations include changes to policy that would allow ‘victims to be able to either formally report incidents of sexual misconduct, or simply request support services without having to trigger a formal complaint.’[ii] In addition, she has called for the creation of an independent agency to investigate cases.[iii] The release of the Deschamps report has sparked significant controversy and further allegations in connection to cadets at the Royal Military College in Kingston.[iv] Major General Christine Whitecross has been tasked with spearheading the military’s efforts to address the report’s recommendations. Over the following months, Whitecross will travel to countries such as the United States and United Kingdom in order to assess how Canada’s allies have tackled the same problem.[v]

Throughout the past decade, the United States has made a number of key advancements in confronting reports of sexual harassment and assault. In 2005, Congress created the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office or SAPRO to, ‘provide oversight, guidance and accountability of sexual assaults within the Department of Defense.’[vi] Furthermore, US military units include sexual assault officers, ‘who are responsible for implementing policies as well as receiving complaints.’[vii] Finally, complaints can, ‘either be restricted, meaning they don’t trigger an investigation, or unrestricted.’[viii] Despite these developments, formidable obstacles to change remain. Former Marine Greg Jacob of the Service Women’s Action Network has pointed out that SAPRO primarily gathers data and does not have the power to change policy. Moreover, he has underlined that unit commanders remain responsible for deciding whether to proceed with the prosecution of cases. Jacob and others have argued that an external authority should deal with these complaints.[ix] The release of relevant statistical data has also made it clear that harassment and assault remain a major problem. A recent US Department of Defense study concluded that in 2014, ‘at least 18,900 service members—10,400 men and 8,500 women—experienced unwanted sexual contact.’[x] However, only around 10% of reported cases led to courts martial.[xi] In addition, a RAND military workplace study indicated that around 55% of respondents experienced some form of bullying or retaliation after reporting an assault.[xii]

Across the Atlantic, the conviction of Sergeant Edwin Mee for, ‘16 sex attacks on nine female recruits,’ has served to draw attention to this issue in the British armed forces.[xiii] The 2014 Armed Forces Continuous Attitude Survey, commissioned by the Ministry of Defence (MoD), noted that roughly 10% of personnel stated that, ‘they have been the subject of discrimination, harassment or bullying in a Service environment in the last 12 months.’[xiv] Figures secured by BBC reporter Sima Kotecha through a Freedom of Information request also revealed that, ‘75 allegations of rape and 150 of sexual assault were made to military police between 2011 and 2013.’[xv] Although there have been calls for change in the media, a spokesperson for the MoD has argued that there is no evidence to suggest that these problems are any more prevalent in the military than in wider British society.[xvi]

Sexual harassment and assault are often presented as issues that only concern servicewomen. This is not the case. These problems can seriously impact the lives and career paths of both female and male soldiers. The vast majority of service personnel in Canada, the US and UK serve honourably and represent values of both integrity and respect. Consequently, it is vitally important that allegations of harassment, assault, bullying or violence of any kind be dealt with swiftly. However, these problems cannot be solved through policy change alone. Brigadier Nicky Moffat of the British Army has argued that some officers rely too heavily on, ‘equality and diversity statements,’ to address the matter and believe the ‘job done.’[xvii] Instead, Moffat suggests that, ‘every leader needs to make clear that this sort of behaviour is unacceptable. It’s about speaking out and making sure your voice is heard and understood.’[xviii] The authors of a Human Rights Watch publication on the subject have also identified strong leadership as a central driver of change. The military can begin to encourage this process by recognising both senior and junior leaders who respond effectively to abuse.[xix] This will create a safer environment for all soldiers, both present and future.

The question for this week is:

 How can officers at all levels encourage lasting change?

[i] Paul Koring and Bill Curry, ‘Canadian Forces turn to US for advice on combating sexual harassment,’ Globe and Mail (1 May 2015), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/canadian-forces-turns-to-us-for-guidance-on-combating-sexual-harassment/article24229697/.

[ii] Lee Berthiaume, ‘Canadian military looks to US counterpart on dealing with sexual misconduct,’ Ottawa Citizen (14 May 2015), http://ottawacitizen.com/news/politics/canadian-military-looks-to-u-s-counterpart-on-dealing-with-sexual-misconduct

[iii] Bill Curry, ‘Canadian Forces to create independent agency to handle misconduct complaints,’ Globe and Mail (1 May 2015), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/canadian-forces-to-create-independent-agency-to-handle-misconduct-complaints/article24223640/

[iv] James Cudmore, ‘Royal Military College facing new cadet assault allegation,’ CBC News (27 May 2015), http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/royal-military-college-facing-new-cadet-assault-allegation-1.3089634

[v] Koring and Curry, ‘Canadian Forces turn to US,’ (1 May 2015).

[vi] Greg Jacob and Estefania Ponti, ‘Learning from our Allies: Reforming the US Military to Stop Sexual Violence,’ Service Women’s Action Network, http://servicewomen.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/Learning-From-Our-Allies_Final.pdf

[vii] Berthiaume, ‘Canadian military looks to US counterpart,’ (14 May 2015).

[viii] Ibid.

[ix] Ibid.

[x] United States Department of Defense, Department of Defense Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the Military Fiscal Year 2014 (22 Apr 2015), RefID: D03CD9B6, http://sapr.mil/public/docs/reports/FY14_Annual/FY14_DoD_SAPRO_Annual_Report_on_Sexual_Assault.pdf

[xi] Koring and Curry, ‘Canadian Forces turn to US,’ (1 May 2015).

[xii] Andrew R Morral, Kristie L Gore, Terry L Schell, Barbara Bicksler, Coreen Farris, Bonnie Ghosh-Dastidar, Lisa H Jaycox, Dean Kilpatrick, Stephan Kistler, Amy Street, Terri Tanielian, and Kayla M Williams, Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment in the US Military: Highlights from the 2014 RAND Military Workplace Study, http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9841.html

[xiii] Sima Kotecha, ‘Army must “speak out” against harassment, says brigadier,’ BBC News (19 May 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-32780009; ‘Army sergeant Edwin Mee guilty of more sex attacks,’ BBC News (6 May 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-london-32610403.

[xiv] Ministry of Defence, Statistical Series 6-Other Bulletin 6.03—Armed Forces Continuous Attitude Survey 2014 (21 May 2014).

[xv] Kotecha, ‘Army must “speak out” against harassment,’ (19 May 2015).

[xvi] ‘Male rape prevalent in UK army, Ministry of Defence figures reveal,’ IBTimes (20 Dec 2014), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/male-rape-prevalent-uk-army-ministry-defence-figures-reveal-1480413

[xvii] Brigadier Nicky Moffat, as quoted in, Kotecha, ‘Army must “speak out” against harassment,’ (19 May 2015).

[xviii] Ibid.

[xix] Human Rights Watch, Embattled: Retaliation against Sexual Assault Survivors in the US Military (Washington DC: HRW, 2015), http://www.hrw.org/reports/2015/05/18/embattled-0


The Gathering Storm? Brexit and the Future of European Defence and Security


Following the recent UK election, Britain seems poised for a referendum on EU membership as early as 2016. This will have long-term implications for the defence and security landscape at a time of exceptional instability. This is an opportune moment to reflect upon and consider Britain’s relationship with its continental European partners and government priorities moving forward.

During the recent UK general election campaign, Conservative leader David Cameron promised to hold a referendum on EU membership if re-elected as Prime Minister. Following Cameron’s surprise victory at the polls, the country now seems poised for a vote on the issue as early as 2016.[i] Leaders in the financial sector have expressed concern that such a referendum will pose a significant threat to Britain’s economic stability. Bank of England Governor, Mark Carney recently echoed these sentiments when he called for a ‘speedy resolution of the European question.’[ii] Brexit also poses equally great challenges for defence and security.

The United Kingdom has long had a complicated and problematic relationship with continental Europe. Over the centuries, Britain has relied on its position as an island nation in order to remain aloof from unnecessary continental entanglements and alliances. As a global superpower, the UK was able to draw upon its colonial possessions to help bolster its defences. During WWI and WWII, manpower and resources from the Dominion countries and colonies helped Britain to punch well above its weight. With the decline of empire, the UK has fostered strong political and military ties to the United States. However, Britain has never been able to remain wholly detached from its European neighbours nor can it afford to do so now.

The British Armed Forces are the smallest that they have been since the mid nineteenth century.[iii] The defence budget has also been subject to severe cuts. In light of the recent Conservative landslide, Professor Malcolm Chalmers of the Royal United Services Institute has predicted that the, ‘Ministry of Defence (MoD) might get a real terms increase in its total budget of up to 1 per cent per year over the next Spending Review period.’[iv] Be that as it may, defence spending is still set to drop below 2% of GDP over the next few years.[v] Britain’s failure to meet its NATO commitment has strained relations with the United States. Earlier this year, US Army Chief of Staff General Raymond Odierno expressed, ‘his concerns about the impact of UK defence cuts on the level of UK-US military cooperation.’[vi] In an interview with BBC Radio 4 in early 2014, ex-US defence secretary Robert Gates similarly commented that, ‘With the fairly substantial reductions in defence spending in Britain, what we’re finding is that it [the UK] won’t have full spectrum capabilities and the ability to be a full partner as they have been in the past.’[vii] These developments come at a time of exceptional instability, both within Europe and globally.

Since Russia’s intervention in Ukraine, the stability of Eastern Europe has come into question. The authors of SDSR 2010 did not predict that state on state conflict would pose a major threat to European security in the foreseeable future.[viii] However, British authorities have been forced to rethink these conclusions in light of Russia’s actions. In a recent report, the members of the House of Commons Defence Committee argued that, ‘For the first time, since the Second World War, a technologically advanced European power has expanded its own territory by force, rejecting international borders.’[ix] As spending declines elsewhere, the Russian government is also committed to investing heavily in the military with a projected defence budget of close to 100 billion dollars in 2016.[x] Fearing for their own security, the Baltic states (Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia) have appealed to NATO for the deployment of a permanent contingent of troops to be based in the region.[xi] These demands come at a time when the UK already faces significant security threats such as foreign and domestic terrorism.

Moving forward, it seems more than likely the UK will become increasingly reliant upon a network of strong political and defensive relationships. Many of these alliances will include key European countries like France and Germany. In Rethinking defence to meet new threats, the House of Commons Defence Committee concluded that while, ‘the UK must build on its strong alliance with the United States,’ it is crucial that, ‘European NATO allies are operating at maximum effectiveness.’[xii] Consequently, many commentators have expressed anxiety about a possible British exit from the EU. On the eve of the British election, author and journalist Alex Preston contemplated such an eventuality. He speculated that Brexit could undermine existing intelligence sharing relationships between Britain and its European partners.[xiii] On the other hand, Eurosceptics have argued that leaving the EU would allow the UK to function more effectively and independently both financially and in terms of defence.[xiv]

The British political establishment and the wider public need to think carefully about the UK’s place in the world and how to redefine and re-establish an effective working relationship with Europe. With the growth of nationalistic feeling in both Scotland and England, this will undoubtedly be challenging.[xv] However, decisions regarding Europe are long overdue. For better or worse, there is no doubt that a UK referendum on the EU will have a lasting impact on both the European and global defence landscape.


[i] ‘Philip Hammond seeks fast settlement on EU,’ Telegraph (14 May 2015), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/eureferendum/11607163/Philip-Hammond-No-treaty-change-needed-for-EU-reform.html

[ii] Ibid.

[iii] Tom Rutherford, ‘Defence personnel statistics,’ Social and General Statistics (26 Sept 2014).

[iv] Malcolm Chalmers, ‘Defence and the Election Outcome,’ RUSI Analysis (12 May 2015),


[v] House of Commons Defence Committee, Rethinking defence to meet new threats (London: Stationery Office, 24 Mar 2015), pp. 12-13.

[vi] Ibid., p. 18.

[vii] Robert Gates, as quoted in, ‘Military cuts mean “no US partnership” Robert Gates warns Britain,’ BBC News (16 Jan 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-25754870

[viii] House of Commons Defence Committee, Rethinking defence, p. 3.

[ix] Ibid., p. 13.

[x] Ibid.

[xi] Daniel McLaughlin, ‘Russia decries Baltic states’ plea for NATO brigade,’ Irish Times (14 May 2015), http://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/russia-decries-baltic-states-plea-for-nato-brigade-1.2212944.

[xii] House of Commons Defence Committee, Rethinking defence, p. 3.

[xiii] Alex Preston, ‘What would happen if Britain left the EU?’ Guardian (19 Apr 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/apr/19/what-would-happen-if-britain-left-the-eu-consequences-of-exit

[xiv] Ibid.

[xv] Malcolm Chalmers, ‘Defence and the Election Outcome.’


Charm to the front: some thoughts on public order policing


The days that followed the general election did not lack for frustrated emotion, with dissatisfaction across the political spectrum. That Saturday London’s streets played host to two significant events, in North London and Whitehall. Responding to StrifeBlog’s piece on the 9th May’s anti-austerity demonstration at the latter location, I would like to amplify the points raised regarding behaviour, particularly focusing the attention on the police and the role of theirs within the swirl of protest. Recent research on crowd behaviour and perceptions of police legitimacy suggest this is an area ripe for critical attention.


Protest is a fraught event. The passions which drive citizens to the streets in common voice are not to be trifled with. However, while the emotions of distress are an expected part of such events, my observations from 9th May solidified the conceptualization of the tactical relevance of another emotion, charm, and I would like to discuss here a place for it in British public order policing. It is not news to suggest that polite chat – if not outright charm – is a feature of British policing. If current research is correct, that characteristic is a significant strength against the landscape of policing practice, an asset at the strategic and tactical levels. Moving forward into a period of uncertain funding and even more uncertain political and security challenges, the need to effectively use that strength exceeds that which is merely good practice. While putting a premium on charm in public order situations might accord with the best of emerging scholarship on the subject, in fact these more critical issues may argue for its necessity.

It is first necessary to set the terms of public order policing. For the British police especially, the emotional context of protest places their role on a knife’s edge. On the one hand, there is the policing standpoint on protest. Whether any individual officer or force agrees with those passions, British policing adheres to the standard that the first objective of their efforts is to facilitate the right to protest. Before going further I should point out that I think that this is an excellent starting point for the police role in protest. On the other, hand, the “toe to toe” tactical approach means that they do so at closest proximity to the participants. That is, British public order policing is designed to operate in the face of society’s distress. The challenges of such an approach are significant and it is not unexpected that the police at times struggle to get the balance correct. Much work has been done within policing in the last several years to refine their implementation of the facilitative approach as part of their public order doctrine in response to official critique and public concern. HMIC’s reviews following the 2009 G-20 demonstrations focused on the relationship of that approach with the culture of British policing. Within that framework, and in support of facilitation at close proximity to the protest, increasing consideration is being given to how force, communications, appearance, and other markers of the policing approach to protest influence events and rights. In sum – and it is no small task – British police aim to facilitate protest within the intimate emotional space of the protesters while balancing their actions against a culture which relies upon public consent. Influencing all of this is a growing body of literature regarding the police role in crowd behaviour. The damaging correlation between police hostility and discord or disorder is becoming clear, whereas the banner of respect is linked to positive shaping of events. [1] Events at Whitehall offer an excellent perspective on the role of demeanour – of all involved but especially for the police on the frontlines – as it was a dominant theme of what I saw over the last two hours of the day’s events. Through that frame I would like to consider a few key points which were defined by the interaction of police and protester emotion.

To begin, the onset of the disorder sustains the focus on the interaction between police and protester across emotion and action. From the videos widely circulated online it is possible to form several impressions. Key among them was that whereas the police intention at the start was to facilitate the march decrying the politics of austerity that aim was derailed by events. A minor incident which should not but does often alter the course of events, the “snatch,” (4:05), was the immediate spark to the day’s extant tinder, unleashing the disorder which rightly or wrongly has characterized impressions of the event. In itself, the arrest did not merit the response it invited. But this is the nature of such events and large groups, that simmering passions await the least inspiration. It is the sort of phenomenon which led the United States Marine Corps to imagine the character of the Strategic Corporal. That is, under the right circumstances even minor tactical actions can have significant strategic and political effect. I do not suspect that the officers involved in the arrest intended to unleash the havoc which followed, but rather were simply focused on the task at hand. And what the video fails to show is the act which had led these officers to decide this individual needed to be apprehended at that moment.

Omitting negativity and judgement, it is worth consideration of the balance of value in taking such actions during protest. There is very obviously a trade-off in costs and risks for certain activities in public order policing. Where crowd perceptions of legitimacy and police action matter, especially with regard to their behaviour in the moment and the hair’s breadth difference between calm and disorder, how arrests are carried out is a matter for discussion, with minimum distress a necessary element of success.

But if the early afternoon’s events sustained the negative consequences of the relationship between police behaviour and crowd dynamics in protest, the evening offered a glimpse at the potential of the positive influence. Having spent the afternoon trapped in the office, listening wistfully to the sound of NPAS London circling nearby, when my day’s writing completed at six I made it to Whitehall for final act of the day’s drama ending at Westminster Bridge.

Things had gone to disorder earlier, but by this time in the day the mood had calmed considerably. Although many of the police were in public order kit at that point, this was not how the policing had begun the day. Despite the earlier disorder, there still remained on the streets officers in nothing more than their hi-viz jackets, stab vests and soft caps. Nevertheless, the tone along the lines was at least polite, if not friendly, most officers in helmets had the face shield up and were perfectly willing to engage members of the public. [2] I will admit that in support of my research I take full advantage of the opportunity this presents. But even some of the protesters were enthusiastic with their engagement, and these interactions of the police and protesters was instructive to watch. One exchange stands out. When challenged to confront what had happened there earlier in the day and whether what the police had done was right or fair, one officer smiled and replied “I don’t know, we came down from Walthamstow an hour ago.” The failed attempt to burden the officers with blame was poignant and defused somewhat the protester’s confrontation with the officer. It also was a moment to consider what sort of cognitive impression the day’s contrasting and similar activities would leave on some of the officers.


Protester chats with an officer.


After an hour or so, the decision was taken to end the protest in front of the MoD. I was made aware of this with a polite notification by one of the officers. Although tempers had moderated he did not expect the remaining protesters to take the news well. As I was stood in the path of the intended police movement, it was clear that members of the public wishing to do so would be allowed to pass around the police lines. The officer’s assessment of the temper of the crowd was not inaccurate, and in response to the effort to disperse the lingering crowds the police again had to contend with emotion. Meeting police instructions for the crowd to step back, the chants of “Fuck the Police” echoed down Whitehall. Finding myself behind the police line of march, as they began to walk the crowds west I was able to observe the process from this perspective. The struggle here was not only to move the protesters but to keep control over the metal barriers which had been deployed along the streets. Used by the protesters to confound police efforts to move them along, it was a mildly frantic effort to move the barriers to the rear. Of the many things which the public order leader on the street must consider in such moments, even when the disorder is minor, this is not likely to enter the mind of anyone save those with practical experience. This effort was handled by every officer present and possible, rank notwithstanding.


Following the police line.


Perhaps I followed a little too closely, because at one point, a rather flustered Chief Inspector turned and noticed I was right behind their lines. Finding that I was not a member of the press, she requested that move off to the side a bit. I am relentless about my research, but equally I do not wish to become part of the problem, so to the sidewalk I went. The view was just as good, if not quite as direct. From there I watched the last push to move the protesters towards Parliament Square. Not long after, with the remnants of the protest finally arrived at Westminster, the police quickly regrouped and dispersed them across the bridge.

Observing at close range, across a variety of interactions and emotions, the contours of British policing practice and scholarship on crowd psychology and public perceptions of legitimacy merged conceptually. Watching the exchanges between police and crowd, the strength of this culture of policing which provides ample space for individual diplomacy to shape events should be reckoned as a strength against the academic findings on legitimacy, compliance, and consent generally. [3] And it seems to me that public order policing specifically could harness the influence of this geniality. Without being flippant or unserious, it is worth considering what value there would be in the first line of action in public order policing was chat. Echoing the ancient Roman military principle of placing experience to the rear to shore up the resolve of less experienced troops, in this case we would call for charm to the front to minimize the friction between police and protesters, moderate the latter’s distress of the protesters and public, thus lessening the public order burden overall. The police position in close proximity with protesting crowds is a challenge, but it offers as well an opportunity. Arrayed as the face of protest policing in its first effort, chatters and charmers could do much to maintain the equanimity of those they confront. The most recent protest was not the first I had seen of the value of such efforts. During the Guy Fawkes demonstrations last November I stopped to watch a line of officers manage the flow of demonstrators. You cannot see it in the picture, but the officers have their visors up and are smiling [4] and talking to several of whom they are keeping from heading towards Westminster and Trafalgar Square. The effects were palpable. At the tactical level in the moment, although thwarted in their attempt to join the fray, the individuals were largely mollified to have at least an open “ear” to their sentiments and reasons for protest. More broadly, considering the terms of legitimacy, by treating these individuals with respect, explaining the police reasons for stopping their progress, and listening to their cause, these officers served the legitimacy and perception of policing.


Smiling officers chat with protesters.


Balancing the needs of protest and expression against those for order and safety has never been easy and seems only to be increasing in complexity. The British police will have to confront this, as well as the broader challenges to their relationships with communities and ability to work effectively as a function of that. Seemingly out of place within this world, it may be that charm is a necessary part of the public order kit.




1 See, eg, Lawrence Singer, “London Riots: Searching for a Stop,” Policing, V7, No. 1, pp 32-44.

2 The number of times I watched an officer ask politely several times for a protester to do something was remarkable. Nothing anyone was asked approached onerous, but the mood was simply to oppose.

3 See, eg, Andy Myhill and Paul Quinton, “It’s a fair cop? Police legitimacy, public cooperation and crime reduction,” NPIA, September 2011.

4 This accords with research on kit, as a reduction in force can signal positively to a protest crowd and facilitate communication. See, eg, Stephen Reicher, Clifford Stott, Patrick Cronin, and Otto Adang, “An integrated approach to crowd psychology and public order policing,” Policing, Vol 27, No. 4, 2004.

The Salvage and Repair of Army Boots, Somerset, England, 1943 Rows of shiny army boots await distribution after their repair and rebuilding at this shoe factory in Somerset.

Colonel Panter-Downes: The Army Foot

Our Colonel returns this week to inspire the conversation. In this installment he considers the decline and fall of the foot inspection. Once a regular part of British Army leadership practice, he views its demise against the backdrop of the changes it represents for service and officership. As well as any soldier, the military historian is familiar with the practice, as well as the foot’s larger influence in war. The Romans built their empire upon the Legion’s march. And even in this age of high speed travel, the foot manages to retain its influence upon events. However, as a metaphor for the creeping technocracy within the armed forces, the changing terms of its care as a matter of military concern is illuminating. Read the post, consider the questions, join the discussion on Twitter at #CCLKOW. — JSR 


The Royal Military Academy Sandhurst issued us many things in our year long sojourn there. Some would prove invaluable (our copy of Sidney Jary’s book “18 Platoon”), some would prove tragic (our unfeasibly bulky purple polyester track suits) and some just muddled in between. In this latter category there sits a slim blue pamphlet that still haunts a box in my attic, “The Army Foot: Its Conditions and Cures”.

I do not think that I have ever had recourse to use said pamphlet although the subject is one of acute interest to most infantry officers, for the infantry foot in particular is both an ugly and indispensable object. I have however carried out an inordinate number of foot inspections. Sandhurst was very good at foot inspections, and feet were inspected after exercises and after road marches and this habit carried through to when I was a platoon commander. Feet inspections were the norm and the platoon commander carried them out. When I left my last command some seven years ago however, foot inspections were not the norm. Indeed when, after our first road march, we warmed down and I briefed my command team “Right – foot inspection! I’ll do the HQ you do your teams, let me know when you’re done!” I was met with incredulous looks by the assembled officers. Foot inspections it seems are no longer the norm in the British Army.

This passing of an era seems to me a great shame on a number of fronts. It also seems to me to reflect something of a gradual change in command ethos within the British Army. The reasons for this change are complex but ultimately boil down to two primary factors.  Primarily changes in the character of the society we are drawn from and whom we serve, exacerbated by the steady erosion of the British regimental system in successive defence reforms since 1990.

When I joined it seems to me that the leadership ethos was somewhat paternalistic in nature. As junior officers we were expected to care for our men and it was made clear to us that their problems were very much our problems. I advised on finances and relationships as well as courses and careers, the approach seemed almost Edwardian in character. Despite being a mere slip of a lad myself, my soldiers were referred to affectionately as “my boys”. Not only was I expected to know what was happening in their lives I was expected to be actively involved. I would attend court if they were up on charges (officers still do), write to the bank manager on their behalf if needed and consult (or console) on their marriage plans as required. If the leadership ethos was strongly paternalistic, the character of the unit and sub-unit was equally familial.

This familial character was reinforced by the nature of my battalion, a close knit county regiment with strong local and family links amongst both officers and men.  In my first platoon I found myself commanding one distant cousin, one school friend and two men from my village. People had grown up together and families had served together over generations. Not only did the regiment have a history and character, but it shared regimental families in both the Officers’ and Sergeants’ Messes; families who had grown up and then served alongside each other over the generations.

It is the case today that not only have the geographical and familial links been strained by successive eroding of the British regimental structure (which has been most acutely felt in the line infantry units), but also that the ethos of command has moved away from its former paternalistic nature. Partly this is as a result of legislative change (I am not qualified to give financial or relationship advice and therefore would be liable if I did so) and partly because society has changed; the Baby Boomers generation has given way to Generation X and now we in turn are ceding to the Millennials. Perhaps today’s soldiers see a clearer delineation of responsibilities than they did 20 years ago and what was appropriate then is no longer appropriate now? I sense that today junior officers still care for their men, but that perhaps their willingness and definitely their latitude to get actively involved in providing care is more limited than in my time.

Now barring National Guard and Reserve units US Army units have no geographical affiliations for recruiting, and so while there are a great many ‘Army families’ where generations have served in turn this is not necessarily expressed in unit character for Active Component units. Bearing this in mind there is not a direct read across from my experiences of the familial nature of the command care relationship to the US Army.  However US officers will have seen the changes over the years over what they used to do and what they do now, between what was appropriate and what is no longer appropriate.

So my questions for this week are:

What are the parameters of care to which a leader should adhere?

How has the practical application of leadership care changed since you joined and what does this say about your organisation and people?

When did you last do a foot inspection?

Despite the changing times, I remain a firm fan of foot inspections, not only on a pragmatic basis but as a tangible demonstration of care to those under command.  You can learn a lot about a man by how he cares for his feet and what state they are in, you can also learn a lot about a leader through the care and attention that he gives your feet.




UK Election 2015: Chaos, Disengagement and the Hunger Games

In 2010 I ran a series of short pieces on these pages about the General Election (and the image is from the 2010 result). Back through no popular demand at all… some thoughts.

This election will have four main head-lines on May 8th, and a big mess of two significant minorities to hack about trying to form a government:

1) The SNP wiped the floor with Labour in Scotland.

2) The LibDems melted down

3) UKIP were second in over 100 seats, but gained only 5 seats, and thus – ironically – have become the new LibDems…

4) Both the Conservatives and Labour can mathematically form a minority government, and that leaves the Queen with a somewhat large constitutional headache.

So, let’s start with Scotland. Lovely place, one day I will live there. Well, Nicola Sturgeon (leader of the Scottish Nationalists) was the stand-out winner of the televised debate of all seven main party leaders. Indeed, the people I watched it with (who all live in England, and aren’t known for socialist tendencies) all wanted to vote for her by the end of evening. This was partly because she sounded competent (‘knows what she’s doing’), and partly because didn’t seem as ‘male and smug’ as the other ones. So, on an unscientific poll in the Midlands, the leader of a party no-one could vote for, had a clear majority. In more scientific polls, she is set to lead (despite not standing for a Westminster seat herself) an absolute drubbing for Labour north of the border. For Labour’s chances of forming a majority government this is catastrophic. Well, it has ended the chance of a majority. For Jim Murphy (the Scottish Labour Party leader) this will be – if it comes about – a disaster, which is a shame because he is both a competent politician and by most accounts a decent man too. So, whilst the SNP has been making strides to dominate Scottish politics for a good number of years it is the catalysing effect of the Scottish independence referendum that is catapulting the party ever higher in the polls. The notion that the independence referendum was the end of the matter ‘for a generation’ seems fanciful. The mode of exit for the Scots seems painfully clear: the 2017 EU referendum provides them with the perfect opportunity to jump a Brexiting ship. Expect to see to Nicola Sturgeon looking very pleased on May 8th, and her former mentor Alex Salmond restored to Westminster and full of the joys of holding someone over a barrel.

The LibDems are having what is known in cricketing circles as ‘a total mare’. There appears to be nowhere in the land that they are currently safe – bar Eastleigh – according to an aggregator poll yesterday, and the lack of local support (their traditional strength) will be particularly concerning for them. The LibDems have – by dint of their internal constitution – always been very close to their membership, but they seemed to forget this during Coalition and frankly didn’t spend enough time saying how they had held back the Tories from doing whatever it is we assume they would have done if given free rein. And that’s the LibDems problem in a nutshell: what did they provide the Coalition, short of bodies to form a majority? If Clegg is lucky he’ll be offered a seat in the European Commission, a job he’d do fabulously well. As for those LibDem MPs that survive next Thursday, theirs might be a cosy and lonely existence. Back to the drawing board, and the sort of localism that saw them as ‘the’ party of local government for 20years.

UKIP and the irrepressible Farage will be disappointed on 8 May. They’ll be disappointed because – ironically -we don’t have a European system of voting. If we did, they’d be laughing. Nige would be all over the papers guzzling warm beer and basking in the joy of 1953 (cards on the table: as a europhile, I’m not a fan, but I do think he’s a nearly-brilliant politician). So, in line with the Ashcroft polling, I’m also happy to think that UKIP will come 2nd in over 100 constituencies, but fail to win outright in many. The act of coming second in a large number of seats (although they’ll feel like it’s a cup of sick) is actually a very strong result, that they’ll need to work hard, and more coherently, to build upon. For me, the really interesting point is who they are taking votes from: I had assumed years ago that they were the militant wing of the Conservative Party, but there’s good evidence that they’re taking working class Labour votes (which will see Tory MPs saved) and I’ve heard a number of LibDems in the midlands saying they’ve switched to UKIP too (which is interesting, when you compare the platforms). What Farage does very well, is tap into the concerns of actual voters. Not the issues that the mainstream think we ought to be bothered about, but what the ordinary voter is actually bothered about. That makes him a bit of a mystery to people.. well, like me. But after May 8, if he can actually build a party machine and match populism to policies that don’t get automatically shredded by the majority of the press, he’ll cause electoral chaos.

It’s been noticeable that defence and security have been almost totally missing from the election debates. There was half a day on trident, and the debate centred on 4 boats, 3 boats, no boats, and what is trident? But by lunchtime, it was as if all the parties had come together and agreed that trident and defence in general was a bad topic for all of them, and it was better not to talk about it. What I took from this is that defence is going to suffer further irksome cuts after the election no matter who wins, and none of them wish to point out the emperor has his fundamentals dangling in the breeze. We must surely be at the point where the next SDSR needs to have a strong element of public engagement – we are moving from full-spectrum to limited spectrum capabilities and the public are only just beginning to wake up to it. Miliband’s attempt to engage on foreign policy – at Chatham House – was met with howls and protests, and the modification of what went out from the Labour press office the night before rather indicated that the language had been loose. It would have made for a more interesting foreign policy debate if Miliband had gone for the strongest interpretation of what he said – the debate around interventionism and isolationism (a false dichotomy in my view) would have been worth having. But all the parties decided this was bad karma for them too. Even the debate on economics has swirled around, with Cameron’s job’s miracle not landing properly, nor Labour’s swipe at zero-hours jobs and food banks misfiring – you’d have to wonder what carnage Blair and Campbell would have caused with this.

So, on May 8th (and then for probably a month) we’ll witness the moving of the chairs as two credible minority governments vie to actually form the government. Who’d be the Queen in those circs: unenviable! Cameron has seemed – unfairly, so he keeps saying – disconnected and without gusto. But he’s done the job as a Chief Exec rather than a vision thing, whilst Miliband – in not setting fire to anything or falling over in public – has exceeded popular expectations. His brand of geek-immunity from social pressure allows him to rock up with Russell Brand and not be intimidated by the coolest kid in the playground, whilst meandering into a hen party and looking appropriately geeky. Weirdly, Miliband is becoming the Labour party’s secret weapon… six months ago, you’d have laughed to see it written.

This election of disengagement and the race to the deadheat of 33% makes me almost nostalgic for the crushing certainties of electoral domination of the 80s and early 00s. Almost….



4/29: When Casualties Come Home from War

When the casualty incident described in this piece occurred, it fell to me to tend to the unit’s “family.” Beyond the families directly affected, the rest experienced these events through my messages. They chronicle a small piece of what happens on the home-front when casualties come home. [1] These events unfold regularly in our midst, more so in the last decade of conflict, but most in the general public have no experience of this aspect of war; they should.


Reflecting upon the conflict and mayhem that has been unleashed in Iraq since the instigation of the military operations to end the regime of Saddam Hussein, there are many issues to confront the scholar. As a military historian, most fundamentally for me I never believed regime change in Iraq was a good idea. Breaking states should only be a strategy choice of last possible resort, and even then it is probably best avoided. But as the spouse of a Marine Officer my professional and intellectual opposition would be challenged by personal obligations.

I was not unfamiliar with this internal conflict between scholarly and real world obligations. In 2004, as a Fellow in their Summer Seminar in Military History, I watched the veterans among the West Point uniformed historians experiencing both cognitive dissonance as well as resonance as they confronted their intellectual material. I could tell that they were comparing their experiences with their scholarship, but I did not understand what that meant at the time. Years later, humbled by my own small experience, I have a sense of how they must have felt and thought. My hope is that this glimpse into the wider experience of war and conflict will offer a similar bit of enlightenment for others.

The vagaries of the personnel system meant that my former husband missed the first several years of OIF. He spent its first year “Stop-Moved” in Okinawa – a one year unaccompanied tour doubled at the commencement of hostilities in 2003. Then a B-Billet tour in Newport, RI, followed, because the alternation between line units and administrative jobs is relentless in the Marine Corps, no matter the state of conflict. At the first opportunity, after only two years in Newport, the Fleet Marine Force beckoned once again, specifically for Iraq. After a three months’ preparation, in January 2007, as a Major, he deployed to Iraq in command of a Military Training Team (MTT). As a training cadre the team was small, giving the families in support an intimacy and closeness that would colour the experience of the deployment. Furthermore, I was the unit Key Volunteer, which made me the point of contact between the unit/Marine Corps and the families of the serving Marines and Sailor. For the most part this meant I was responsible for providing official and correct information about the unit’s movements and activities to the families on a timely basis. Secondarily, as possible, I tried to offer some measure of additional information and support, as well as to coordinate any assistance the unit or the families might require. [2] It is the sort of responsibility that anyone not afflicted with terrific arrogance will feel that they have done inadequately.

By way of background on the context of the deployment, Fallujah in the first half of 2007 was roiling. At the time of the casualty event the Marines and the Iraqi Army battalion they were training had already seen significant and regular combat action. Their AOR, an area of the city known as the “Pizza Slice,” was particularly dangerous, with regular and daily insurgent activity. The Lieutenant Colonel commanding the Iraqi battalion was experienced and educated, having served during the Hussein regime. [3] Pragmatic and hopeful that a new start could be made for his country, he was a willing and able partner in the rebuilding of Iraq. The battalion and its training team would endure several months of sustained attacks until the insurgency broke – of its own stupidity and the civilian population’s shifted allegiance – early in the summer.

However, before that break occurred, a sniper ambush towards the end of a day’s activities took the lives of one of our Marines, and wounded two others. On the afternoon of 29 April, an element of the battalion and its trainers had been conducting a dismounted patrol of Marines and Iraqi soldiers with vehicles in support. As the last task of the patrol, they had stopped to conduct a search. With the units’ vehicles deployed along narrow and twisted streets, the dismounted elements cleared a building which had been identified as a potential insurgent base. Finding nothing in the building, as the Marines made their way to their vehicles the attack opened with precision sniper and general supporting fire.

Within short order, no more than five minutes of fighting, the three casualties were taken. The remaining 15 to 20 of minutes combat was fought as the dismounted Marines struggled to safely remove the fallen to the vehicles while those in the vehicles provided cover. Unable to safely extricate from the killing ground on their own, the timely arrival of the QRF (quick reaction force) ended the engagement. It was a close run thing, as the Marines engaged on the ground were running out of ammunition to continue their fight.

I remember the day clearly. I was probably munching bagels and driving home to Newport with my son and dog after a weekend visiting family in New York, while these events were occurring. (Yes, you do stop to note the surreal aspects of such moments.) Or maybe I was reading the Sunday New York Times, which had a story on the turning tide fighting the insurgents in Ramadi. Although the deployment was not easy, things were not terrible, and I had just returned from the annual conference for the Society for Military History conference and was energized for my research. [4] We arrived home, safe and sound. And completely oblivious.

It was later that night when the Major sent me the following email:

Do NOT say anything/tell anyone.  The worst happened.  Notifications are being made.  I’m still alive.

Brevity enhanced, rather than diminished, the impact of the news.

The identity of one of the casualties was the first detail I would receive regarding the incident. Shortly after the email arrived the phone rang. On the other end was the brother of the unit’s corpsman (Doc) who had been wounded the ambush. As awful as it was in its brevity I was now happy to have received the message. While there is no way to prepare for such things it was better not to be caught completely unaware. I spent hours on the phone with the brother that night, talking through what was happening to Doc and trying to get what information I could from the unit in Iraq. This effort was complicated by the fact that when casualty incidents happen a unit goes into communications lockdown – “River City” [5] – so as to avoid the unfortunate circumstance where rumour gets ahead of the official notification procedures of the service. Technically the Major should not have been in email contact with me. But as I was conferring with him on behalf of the family of a wounded service member, judgment and discretion were exercised to provide every support possible.

That night we settled the first round of issues and for the moment Doc’s situation was stable.


Continue reading


CCLKOW: The 2% Doctrine

Dr. Hugo Rosemont is Assistant Director of the Centre for Defence Studies at King’s College, London.

This week Kings of War and CCLKOW are happy to introduce a new author to the audience and participants, with Dr. Hugo Rosemont discussing British security policy, budgets and priorities as a key part of the impending General Election. Marking something of a departure from the usual, in this case our conceptualization expands beyond defence to consider the implications for policing as well as other facets of the security machine. Although the most obvious nexus lately among these worlds is in the unfolding stories of citizens leaving to join foreign extremists, the wider universe of human and contraband smuggling, money laundering, cyber crime and other transnational “crim-sec” activity is demolishing the neat sense of separation between these state functions which had arisen under modern administrative practices. While it is folly to redefine every problem according to a security framework, it is equally dangerous to ignore the relationship among these sectors and their influence upon the broad terms of security because of bureaucratic boundaries. In governmental policy, I think Hugo is correct to identify the absence of more holistic thinking and approaches as a serious gap in thinking on security. And although the focus is, at the moment, upon the United Kingdom, with an election impending in the US next year these issues will resonate as well. So, enjoy the article, give a thought to the questions, and join the discussion on Twitter at #CCLKOW. — Jill S. Russell  


Whilst some people might look at the treatment of foreign policy, defence and security issues during the 2015 UK General Election campaign as a farce, is it not now becoming something much more akin to a tragedy? Several commentators have rightly pointed out (for example, here and here) that, with the exception of only a few issues, these topics have not featured prominently during the campaign. This is disappointing for a few reasons.

First, where it has taken place, debate in these areas has focused almost exclusively on the status of the UK political parties’ varying (non?) commitment to allocate 2% of UK GDP to defence expenditure, in line with the country’s stance on the associated NATO guideline, with a sprinkling of discussion emerging more recently on the national security credentials of party leaders, and on the prospects for renewing the country’s nuclear weapons capability. Most notably, the Prime Minister received a high profile grilling on the first issue in a BBC leadership interview last week – his performance was subsequently critiqued by many analysts, including the editor of The Spectator.

The 2% question is a critical issue and it is important that both politicians and public opinion are flushed out in particular around their level of commitment to the UK meeting the NATO guideline (full disclosure: the present author shares the belief of many people – including the 33 Members of Parliament to have signed an Early Day Motion on the issue – that the next Government should commit itself to the NATO figure). But the current, understandable emphasis on this matter is now beginning to do us all a disservice because it leaves little room for consideration of the parties’ approaches to other national security issues. In particular, it is striking how little contemplation there has been to date around some of the more eye-catching security policy ideas to have been proposed in the parties’ manifestos, and indeed on their relative silence towards some of the most urgent issues. With respect to the former, for example, why has there not been a deeper level of interest or more mainstream media attention towards such issues as:

– The Conservatives’ plan to ‘hold’ a National Security Strategy later this year

– Labour’s proposal to abolish elected Police and Crime Commissioners

– The Lib Dems’ belief that intervention is justified by a legal ‘and/or’ humanitarian case

– UKIP’s proposal to establish a new Director of National Intelligence for the UK

– The Scottish National Party’s idea that nuclear weapons are morally offensive

Second, whilst opinion will be likely to split on whether any or all of these ideas are good, bad, or even ugly, unfortunately there is an even bigger problem. It is the apparent lack of detail (consideration?) from the parties on how under their leadership – or as a result of their involvement – the next UK Government would approach such serious current issues as winning the battle of ideas underpinning the radicalization of British ‘foreign fighters’ inclined to travel to Iraq and Syria, and notably in respect of other ongoing crises in, for example, Yemen, Ukraine and Libya. Additionally, a serious connection has seemingly not yet been made by any of the leading contenders in respect of how they propose to handle what Professor Vernon Bogdanor calls ‘The Crisis of the Constitution’ and the impact that policy in this area might have on national security – including the integrity of the country, and its long-term economic prospects. Judging by the manifestos, there also appears to be an ongoing failure on the part of all parties to develop creative solutions for engaging the private sector in addressing many of the most complicated issues the UK faces, upon whom it now depends in numerous areas of national security.

Third, it is concerning that more attention has not been paid in the pre-election discussions to how the next Government should develop its overall approach to national security considered in the wider sense. In other recent election campaigns, most notably in 2010, UK voters were spoilt for choice in being provided with detailed and creative new thinking from the parties (should they want it) around how policies, structures and processes would be developed and implemented by way of a genuinely ‘joined-up’ approach to national security. There have been few such discussions this time but, happily, Charlie Edwards (the author of National Security for the Twenty-First Century, an important pamphlet that originally advanced the need for a ‘holistic’ UK national security strategy) and Calum Jeffray of the Royal United Services Institute have recently co-authored an excellent new paper that adopts such a broad perspective with its analysis on the future for research and development for security and intelligence purposes. It must be hoped that this prompts the UK security and political community into again considering alongside defence the importance of what the coalition Government has called ‘wider security’ issues. For now, it is worrying that, with the possible exception of some attention to limited aspects of police reform and the future powers for monitoring digital communications, deeper discussion on non-military security issues has been largely absent from this campaign to date.

There is clearly very limited time now before 7th May, so the emergence of a renewed emphasis on security issues might be difficult to achieve. It also has to be recognized that, in contrast to high profile proposals on domestic priorities such as health and education, it has often be observed that policies on defence, security and foreign affairs are simply not the same kind of ‘vote winners’. But a case can also be made that two straightforward changes in approach would help to improve the level and quality of the discussions. Firstly, in parallel to any ongoing scrutiny of their policies on defence, the parties could be encouraged (if not pressured) by national security journalists, academics, and any other interested parties, to clarify whether (and how specifically) they would propose to work with partners to develop and fund their approaches to non-military security risks such as terrorism, organized crime and cyber insecurity, at home and overseas. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly at this stage, all those with an interest or voice in the current UK defence funding debate should consider resisting the temptation to add further fuel to the fire on the 2% issue, as important and tempting as it is, or at least contemplate raising in the debate the merits (and importance) of discussing other proposals and obvious (often non-military) security priorities facing the UK.

The reality is that we now have a good idea of where the parties stand on the 2% defence spending issue, however satisfactory or unsatisfactory positions on this matter may be seen to be. Clearly this will need to be revisited after the Election but, in the meantime, it is imperative that answers are also now sought on how the parties would approach other pressing security concerns, including in respect of how (if?) non-military security risks would be genuinely considered in any Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) process held under their watch.

It is against this backdrop that it is hoped that the following questions will help to stimulate some more varied discussion on the future shape of UK defence and security policy in the remaining few weeks of the 2015 General Election:


1 How useful is the 2% NATO guideline as a measure of UK national security capability?

2 How much should the next Government spend on other security capabilities (e.g. cyber, counter-terrorism policing, intelligence etc.)?

3 What ‘security’ issues should/shouldn’t be covered in the 2015 SDSR?

Join the discussion on Twitter at #CCLKOW.