“We don’t have a proper national debate about strategy.” — The complaint seems universal. I’ve heard it in America, in Britain, in France, in Germany, and elsewhere. But here in Israel that complaint is even louder. The IDF is known for its “bitsuist” culture, preferring doing over thinking. And Israeli academia, leaning far to the left — so the cliché — shuns all things military like the devil runs from the holy water. Except, it’s not true. An impressive number of current and former officers write about strategy, academics too. In Hebrew as well as in English. And some are really impressive. Of course they have no shortage of questions to ponder.

One of the most difficult questions facing the State of Israel today is Iran. Should the IAF strike Iran’s nuclear program or not?

Now, many people outside Israel have very strong opinions about this question. So let’s start with some humility: Iran has not repeatedly threatened to wipe New York off the map. Iran is not delivering advanced weaponry to terrorist organizations a few miles way from London. And Teheran is not training infiltrators to sneak into Paris to kidnap soldiers there. Israel has far higher stakes in this game than the rest of us. So what do the country’s most careful strategic thinkers say?

One of them, as far as I can tell, is Ron Tira, a lieutenant colonel and reservist in the Israeli Air Force’s Campaign Planning Department. He’s also author of The Nature of War (2009), an excellent book reviewed by H.R. McMaster in Survival not long ago. Tira just published a paper at the INSS in Tel Aviv, “A Military Attack on Iran?” It is by far the best text on this weighty question that I’ve seen.*

The paper is densely written and there is no way I can do it justice with a summary. It starts off with some important assumptions (for instance that an attack could take place with a “red light” from Washington) and sober points of departure (“The attempt to generate internal processes in Iran is too unpredictable and unreliable to serve as the basis for a plan”). I’d like to highlight one point and one question.

Politically, Iran is shrewdly playing for time. Tira:

Iran conducts a threshold policy that renders the world accustomed to its positions, while red lines are eroded and Iran gains time. It adopts a defiant position, reexamines it, withdraws from it, returns to it in response to some Western move, and so forth. Thus, Iran’s position is — intentionally — unclear.

Militarily, Teheran’s potential seems to be overrated. Iran, apparently, has an outdated military “with limited operational capabilities and middling missile and naval capabilities.” Its indirect capabilities have been demonstrated by its proxies in Iraq and Lebanon. An attack would, Tira argues, undermine Iran’s shield of deterrence and expose the limitations of its military response, “probably.” He discusses possible response scenarios in some detail.

The point, and one of the main contributions of Tira’s text, is to connect the two arenas, the military and the political arena. An Israeli attack could create “desirable post-attack processes.” He compares the situation with what Sadat did in the Yom Kippur War, which turned out to be a significant political gain for Egypt. But this time, with respect to Iran’s nuclear program – unlike in 1973 —  Egypt and Israel are on the same strategic side, together with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf emirates. “This is one of Israel’s most important strategic assets today,” Tira points out. An attack, in short, might only delay the nuclear program — but it might upend Iran’s cat-and-mouse game with the West.

The note of caution has to be part of any consideration, of course:

it may perhaps be possible to sketch out the first developments that would occur after an attack on Iran or after it has become nuclear, but it is difficult to characterize the long term strategic trends that would be set in motion by each alternative. The [Israeli] leadership must choose which Pandora’s box to open while the contents and volumes of the two boxes are difficult to estimate.

Which leads me to the towering question: if Israel strikes, how would it demonstrate success? Iran would certainly not admit that a strike was successful. Third parties would not know if it was successful, we can assume. And even Israel might not be entirely sure. Demonstrating success, in short, will need extraordinary political skill, superb diplomacy, and first-rate international communicators, all in very little time. Given the government’s recent track-record in these disciplines, I’m afraid that Israeli leaders might not be able to pull this off, even if the IAF performs superbly. – If I would be sitting in one of these F16s, that would be my biggest concern. After returning home.

Again, keep in mind the stakes here. They may be far higher, I would venture to say, than the stakes in Afghanistan and Iraq next door. And not just for Israel. Again Ron:

A nuclear Iran that emerges in face of unequivocal American and Israeli opposition would undercut the strategic credibility of both nations, weaken their deterrence and power projection, hasten the waning of American influence in the region, and undermine the regional order we have known since 1991.

* Please read before commenting on this post.

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