“We don’t have a proper national debate about strategy.” — The complaint seems universal. I’ve heard it in America, in Britain, in France, in Germany, and elsewhere. But here in Israel that complaint is even louder. The IDF is known for its “bitsuist” culture, preferring doing over thinking. And Israeli academia, leaning far to the left — so the cliché — shuns all things military like the devil runs from the holy water. Except, it’s not true. An impressive number of current and former officers write about strategy, academics too. In Hebrew as well as in English. And some are really impressive. Of course they have no shortage of questions to ponder.

One of the most difficult questions facing the State of Israel today is Iran. Should the IAF strike Iran’s nuclear program or not?

Now, many people outside Israel have very strong opinions about this question. So let’s start with some humility: Iran has not repeatedly threatened to wipe New York off the map. Iran is not delivering advanced weaponry to terrorist organizations a few miles way from London. And Teheran is not training infiltrators to sneak into Paris to kidnap soldiers there. Israel has far higher stakes in this game than the rest of us. So what do the country’s most careful strategic thinkers say?

One of them, as far as I can tell, is Ron Tira, a lieutenant colonel and reservist in the Israeli Air Force’s Campaign Planning Department. He’s also author of The Nature of War (2009), an excellent book reviewed by H.R. McMaster in Survival not long ago. Tira just published a paper at the INSS in Tel Aviv, “A Military Attack on Iran?” It is by far the best text on this weighty question that I’ve seen.*

The paper is densely written and there is no way I can do it justice with a summary. It starts off with some important assumptions (for instance that an attack could take place with a “red light” from Washington) and sober points of departure (“The attempt to generate internal processes in Iran is too unpredictable and unreliable to serve as the basis for a plan”). I’d like to highlight one point and one question.

Politically, Iran is shrewdly playing for time. Tira:

Iran conducts a threshold policy that renders the world accustomed to its positions, while red lines are eroded and Iran gains time. It adopts a defiant position, reexamines it, withdraws from it, returns to it in response to some Western move, and so forth. Thus, Iran’s position is — intentionally — unclear.

Militarily, Teheran’s potential seems to be overrated. Iran, apparently, has an outdated military “with limited operational capabilities and middling missile and naval capabilities.” Its indirect capabilities have been demonstrated by its proxies in Iraq and Lebanon. An attack would, Tira argues, undermine Iran’s shield of deterrence and expose the limitations of its military response, “probably.” He discusses possible response scenarios in some detail.

The point, and one of the main contributions of Tira’s text, is to connect the two arenas, the military and the political arena. An Israeli attack could create “desirable post-attack processes.” He compares the situation with what Sadat did in the Yom Kippur War, which turned out to be a significant political gain for Egypt. But this time, with respect to Iran’s nuclear program – unlike in 1973 —  Egypt and Israel are on the same strategic side, together with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf emirates. “This is one of Israel’s most important strategic assets today,” Tira points out. An attack, in short, might only delay the nuclear program — but it might upend Iran’s cat-and-mouse game with the West.

The note of caution has to be part of any consideration, of course:

it may perhaps be possible to sketch out the first developments that would occur after an attack on Iran or after it has become nuclear, but it is difficult to characterize the long term strategic trends that would be set in motion by each alternative. The [Israeli] leadership must choose which Pandora’s box to open while the contents and volumes of the two boxes are difficult to estimate.

Which leads me to the towering question: if Israel strikes, how would it demonstrate success? Iran would certainly not admit that a strike was successful. Third parties would not know if it was successful, we can assume. And even Israel might not be entirely sure. Demonstrating success, in short, will need extraordinary political skill, superb diplomacy, and first-rate international communicators, all in very little time. Given the government’s recent track-record in these disciplines, I’m afraid that Israeli leaders might not be able to pull this off, even if the IAF performs superbly. – If I would be sitting in one of these F16s, that would be my biggest concern. After returning home.

Again, keep in mind the stakes here. They may be far higher, I would venture to say, than the stakes in Afghanistan and Iraq next door. And not just for Israel. Again Ron:

A nuclear Iran that emerges in face of unequivocal American and Israeli opposition would undercut the strategic credibility of both nations, weaken their deterrence and power projection, hasten the waning of American influence in the region, and undermine the regional order we have known since 1991.

* Please read before commenting on this post.

  • Share/Bookmark

{ 4 comments }

Exit Under Way

by Thomas Rid on 30 July 2010 · 2 comments

One of the hands-down best policy podcasts out there is “The Political Scene,” produced weekly — and superbly — by The New Yorker (iTunes link).  I’ve been listening to it for about two years now, usually while running in Rock Creek Park in Washington, DC. Now that I’m not in DC any more, it’s one of the things that, oddly, makes me feel most connected. Voices just feel more immediate than the printed word.

This week, Jeffrey Toobin hosts Raffi Khatchadourian and Steve Coll on the WikiLeaks reports. Coll said something noteworthy in his closing words on the war in Afghanistan. It may be repeated and quoted here. Keep in mind the context: the summer has been hard. This July is now the deadliest month of the entire 9-year war so far, for the United States at least. 63 soldiers were killed, surpassing last month’s record of 60.

Now try taking a step back. “A new phase of the war has already begun,” Coll tells us. He’s not sure American decision makers always recognize and acknowledge that we’re in a transition phase — I certainly know the feeling from Europe. “The exit strategy is already under way,” he says. The date is not certain yet, but certain is that it will be some time between 2011 and 2014. That is not far off, mind you. “Every actor in the war knows it’s coming.” And “everybody” is “hedging for a post-NATO combat role in Afghanistan.”

Now, here Mr Coll might be a bit too optimistic. There can be little doubt that some actors are preparing for a post-NATO — read: post-counterinsurgency — Afghanistan: yes, the Taliban are patiently preparing; many among the local population are preparing; probably the current regime in Afghanistan is preparing; certainly Pakistani intelligence is hedging its bets in the shadows. But what about Washington? What about London and Berlin? In the past month I took part in two pretty high-level off-the-record workshops on irregular war and Afghanistan, one in the United States and one in Germany. In Berlin I asked a colonel, a diplomat, and a development expert about the government’s plans in case the current strategy does not work in the next year or two. First was silence. Then they said it will work. Hoping seems to be the West’s choice, not hedging.

Most informed observers – some seem stuck in 2006 — would probably agree with Coll, the big issue is not: “can [Washington, or NATO for that matter] achieve a military victory, but can it manage this transition so that Afghanistan does not collapse back into civil war or produce a second Taliban revolution.” What a heavy dose of realism. I’m not used to it any more. Feels like a dirty vodka martini after years of abstinence (another reason for missing DC there).

Then, yes, let’s have more of it. And just to be a little more creative, how’s doing that exercise without using the word counterinsurgency?

  • Share/Bookmark

{ 2 comments }

I like making reading lists. Actually, I don’t like it, I love it. Name the occasion and I’ll make the party-mix. How much do I love making reading lists? As much as these guys like making music top 5′s. 

High Fidelity Top 5

So I was pretty excited to see General James Mattis’s reading list posted on Small Wars Journal. I met the man a few years ago at the RUSI Land Warfare conference and was very impressed. It’s easy enough to be impressed by a Marine general in full dress uniform but I found him particularly enthralling. I invited him to come join the War Studies Department after he retired and we spoke for a few minutes about books. It was rapidly very apparent that this guy knows his books. I had a fleeting ‘I’m not worthy’ moment when he graciously and diplomatically said that he could think of nothing better than spending a year or two at King’s as a scholar. Which makes me wonder about how much he really had to do with this list because, well, it’s pretty mixed. There are, in my opinion, some absolute must reads in there alongside, frankly, a fair bit of blah. Anyway, my point is not to dissect the list–have at it in the comments here or at SWJ, if you wish.

A few years ago a more senior colleague was explaining to me his philosophy when putting together a course reading list. His were minimal. Basically a handful of books, his theory being that students got far more out of reading, really reading, just one excellent book than they did out of reading a dozen mediocre ones. He taught international relations so his students really read Hedley Bull’s The Anarchical Society. Now here’s my suggestion for CENTCOM. The static reading list feels kind of stale; what I think would be absolutely fascinating, what I would pay money for, would be to hear General Mattis talk about his top 5, or even his top 1 in the categories already on the list. Half an hour to an hour of his time then put it out as a podcast. What does he think people think should read and why. What did he get out of reading it? What does he hope that they would get out of it? That would be pretty illuminating and it would probably also tell people a lot about commander’s intent. (General Mattis, we’d love to have you here at King’s War Studies! Stop by when you are next in London. I also know where all the best pubs are to be found). 

Anyway, for what it’s worth here’s my Top 5.

  1. On War by Clause… Naaa, too easy! It’s not that kind of list. My first choice is C.S. Forester’s Rifleman Dodd and I choose it for three reasons. A/ it’s under 150 pages and a ripping read that any private who can manage Penthouse Forum can get through in a weekend. B/ the Rifleman in question is one of Wellington’s troops who gets stuck on the wrong side of enemy lines hanging with the Spanish insurgents fighting against Napoleon during the Peninsular Campaign–a useful insurgent perspective. And C/ I think that Dodd exhibits what I reckon is one of the supreme soldierly qualities–equanimity, the quality of being even-tempered and calm despite crisis. Unfortunately, the latter is at the moment even more vital than usual because the chances are good that this war is not going to end well.
  2. For reasons stated on KOW earlier, John Mackinlay’s The Insurgent Archipelago.  
  3. Either Manuel Castells, Information Age trilogy or just his Communication Power. Insurgency is the quintessential bottom-up form of warfare; it naturally reflects the society from which it emerges. If you want to understand insurgency in the Information Age then you need to start by understanding the precepts of the Information Society in which it operates and upon which it preys. This is hard. So far, Castells is your best guide.
  4. Quintan Wiktorowicz, Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach. Not all social movements are insurgencies but all insurgencies are social movements. Your enemy is not so much Al Qaeda, or the Taliban, as it is the mood of sullen resentment that animates the peoples who these groups purport to represent. Understand that mood. Learn about ‘social capital’ and what makes messages resonant; study how successful social movements work, it’s not all that different from successful insurgencies.
  5. Clifford Bob, The Marketing of Rebellion: Insurgents, Media and International Activism. Of all the books I’ve read in the last year this is the one that I found the most consistently thought provoking. ‘How do a few Third World political movements become global causes célèbres, while most remain isolated?’ The Taliban is not one of the case studies in the book (if you’re looking for a PhD topic, hint, hint) but it well could be. A very mature, balanced and non-hystrionic analysis of the insurgent-media-NGO nexus, particularly notable for dealing with NGOs which are normally forgotten about. I have to say that Bob’s book has helped me more than any other to understand why groups like Amnesty International, at least the UK branch, have cozied up with Islamists and people like that creepy egotistical prat Julian Assange of Wikileaks act the way that they do.

I could go on but I won’t. Make your own list! We can have a mature debate about in comments. Like these guys:

Monday mix tape

  • Share/Bookmark

{ 12 comments }

The Drone and the Bra

by Thomas Rid 29 July 2010

Today, again, is one of those days where reality seems like satire. Lawmakers in Europe and America are debating the damage done by the leaked Afghanistan logs and the merits of Special Forces and drones in the fight against Islamic extremists in Afghanistan. The U.S. Congress just approved $59bn (£45.4bn) to pay for ongoing operations. [...]

  • Share/Bookmark
1 comment Read more →

‘Are Soldiers Human?’

by Rob Dover 27 July 2010

Now then, now then…. If I could have found a web link to this workshop, I would have just posted that, but instead I’ll cut and paste the notice I received by email. I think it will be of interest to Kings of War readers, so I hope you’ll indulge my sharing it. I should [...]

  • Share/Bookmark
7 comments Read more →

Round One in the SDSR

by Kenneth Payne 26 July 2010

The ‘knife fight in the telephone phone box‘ is underway in earnest, with coverage in the dailies likely to keep us entertained all the way to the SDSR later this year. I’ll leave the detail to others, but there’s one, rather large, fault line running through this. Some in the army apparently want to prioritize [...]

  • Share/Bookmark
6 comments Read more →

Does my leak look big in this?

by Rob Dover 26 July 2010

So, wikileaks have done it again! I wrote a month or so ago about the website wikileaks, and reflected on whether this site was a public good, or just a nuisance to governments. The revelation this morning of a raft of classified military documents on the conduct of the war in Afghanistan is another example [...]

  • Share/Bookmark
13 comments Read more →

Britain in Iraq, A Ship in Search of a Rudder

by David Betz 23 July 2010

It’s feast or famine here at KOW, slow-posting for weeks and then three posts in a day. Bad form, but hey, when the muse strikes… As Rob notes in his post below the press has latched on to former MI5 head Lady Eliza Manningham-Butler’s testimony to the Chilcot enquiry on Tuesday. Pretty electrifying stuff,  the US and [...]

  • Share/Bookmark
4 comments Read more →

Reds under the bed, spooks coming out of the closet…

by Rob Dover 22 July 2010

The news wires certainly have been full of stories about espionage in the last month. Every time something lends itself to greater attention, something new comes along to trump it. So, in rough order: The Russian spies – Aside from pictures of the spy formerly known as Anna Chapman in various states of undress – [...]

  • Share/Bookmark
10 comments Read more →

Counterinsurgency and Its Discontents

by David Ucko 22 July 2010

As I hear more voices join the chorus against counterinsurgency, both its theory and its practice, I get the sense that the ‘counterinsurgency era’ that began some time after the invasion of Iraq is now reaching its end. Yes, NATO will retain a presence in Afghanistan for years to come, but there is little enthusiasm [...]

  • Share/Bookmark
23 comments Read more →