The devil is in the devilly detail

On June 10th, the Foreign Secretary said this in Parliament:

“It has been suggested GCHQ uses our partnership with the United States to get around UK law, obtaining information that they cannot legally obtain in the UK. I wish to be absolutely clear that this accusation is baseless. Any data obtained by us from the US involving UK nationals is subject to proper UK statutory controls and safeguards.”

Which was all fine and good. There are not many ‘right thinking people’ who would try to suggest that modern democracies should be free from the ability to use intelligence mechanisms etc to protect their publics and core interests, but with appropriate safeguarding.

But I am left perturbed by how the June statement (both in its literal translation and the spirit of it) tallies with the story in today’s Guardian titled: ‘US and UK struck secret deal to allow NSA to ‘unmask’ Britons’ personal data’.

If anyone is intellectually fleet of foot enough to square these two things away convincingly, answers on a postcard to the normal address.

(Whilst it’s easy to call for public inquiries… I do think this whole topic is lending itself to one. And one in which the questions aren’t necessarily notified in advance… The need for a public dialogue about where the activities sit with public expectation is certainly worthy of exploration. )


UK intelligence chiefs go to Parliament

Not the title of a good, nor bad Enid Blighton book, but what happened yesterday in Parliament. Unprecedented no less. And in the context of the process of avowal yes it was a significant moment. Only twenty years ago there was no statutory footing for these agencies, nor was their presence formally recognised (although they were widely known).

So, there is a huge amount of media commentary this morning about this evidence and I don’t see a utility in merely playing back to these commentators what is already there. So, some off the cuff political science responses:

A technological hinterland: 

Two realities: the first is that every successive generation will say that the technologies and techniques that exist now are superior to those which existed a year ago, or a generation ago. And that must and will always be true. You’d have to run some interesting scenarios to get to a point where ‘it was more sophisticated a generation ago’. And the second is that the level of technology now is so sophisticated and gives such good eyes that – and this is an important caveat – the technology exists to maintain a ‘totalitarian, dictatorial’ system of control over the citizenry. The obstacles? Cash, and political will. Or cash, and the control measures in place. Depends on how you view the essential political/genetic make-up of those engaged in intelligence work, I suppose.

I’m happy to think that these are incontrovertible truths. And thus we must then observe that there is a tension in pacing between the range and scope of technological and technical advances and the legislation and oversight. As a lawmaker I might set up a raft of very precise legal measures (and this is the form of the UK Parliament) but without a general anti-abuse measure, and a question of enforceability, I am always playing catch up to the realities on the ground.

Again, I don’t think this is controversial.

But where it drives me to is a structural point – which again is basic political science – of where you sit determines what you see. For the three men giving evidence to Parliament they know they are decent folk in charge of decent folk doing a decent job. Yes, just like the military, their armaments are formidable but they are accountable and legally proscribed. For the Parliamentarians, they think they’re part of the intelligence community club (they’re not, but they want to be and they’re made to feel welcome etc, but they’re not and that is a problem for oversight… try criticising someone you’re very attracted to.. difficult, isn’t it? Try criticising someone who might make your life very difficult and who has the means to do so? Yeah, you’d rather not). So, tortured syntax aside, Parliamentarians are unlikely to currently be in a place to say ‘we need stronger powers’. They were frankly just pleased the three came to play. And then for those outside the intelligence community, who can see the technical ability and who might assess that it’s a capability which could cause major political problems I think it’s only right that they would want further scrutiny, checks, balances etc. All of these positions are logically consistent with the structural positioning. That’s not controversial, right?

So, why all the tension? Well, because the media – and really we’re talking about the quality press here – feel like they’ve got, via Snowden, the agencies on the run. They think they’ve found them with their knickers down being naughty. The essential line is ‘if you thought they lied in 2002, that’s got nothing on what they’re up to now’ and add in a bit of rendition history too. So, the three have a credibility problem or issue that is partly a product of what they do (we all are wowed and perturbed by intelligence activity), and because the very recent history is one which appears to be cases on the edge of legal acceptability and more recently of activities that diverged from public (and political) understandings of what the agencies were meant to be doing.

I wonder if Parliamentary appearances are aimed at the public, and if they are whether they are the correct forum for instilling public trust?

The other aspect causing tension – but it is unlikely to be on the public mind – is the agencies as political or norm entrepreneurs. The Guardian (yes, them) published material that demonstrated that European agencies were helping each other mitigate the political and legal sphere for these activities: ‘we did this way, you could do x, and y to see yourselves clear’, that kind of thing. This sort of cooperation always goes on across Europe, but often in less sensitive policy areas: no-one really objects to it occuring in labour market relations, or compliance on the number of hours someone is permitted to sit on a tractor. When it applies to the intrusiveness of surveillance across a mass population, it certainly ‘feels’ different.

As someone who has studied this area for just over a decade I am struck by the increased coverage of intelligence, and not just because of Guardian revelations. Unless the media coverage dissipates markedly it feels to me like this divergence of public view and official disposition does have some political dangers attached to it. If the core messaging of ‘we keep you safe’ has lost its traction, and it certainly appears to have, then a new compact or public understanding is required. Is that a fair playing independent set of eyes on this usage or activity? I have wondered for a while how close to the 1% doctrine (with the caveat of limited cash) the UK establishment is. Public pronouncements by people I like and trust on this subject made me wonder whether we’d moved to a 5% doctrine, perhaps 2005 is sufficiently long ag0 that the public are highlighting their own privacy over the security umbrella. But no-one wants a successful attack to prove the point.

Other opinions are available to this wrap-up thought: we British have always been quite comfortable about our security structures doing things to those people over there (and there have been many markers for what we meant by ‘them’), and decidedly dischuffed about them doing things to us. This is the golden rule of Britishness that seems to have been lost by the establishment, or they haven’t messaged that they understand it clearly enough… Reworking that compact, and moving away from a core message of ‘trust us, because we know stuff, and we protect you’ is the key transforming this current political-public impasse.



The ghost of Iraq past and Syria present

I don’t think David Cameron is a bad egg. His family policies (or those of his Chancellor) have caused me to agree with the Daily Mail on numerous occasions, which is not very usual to be honest… but by the by. I believed him yesterday when he said he wanted to be open and transparent and not to repeat the foul-ups of 2003. And so his surprise defeat was, I think, more about Iraq and domestic politics than it was about Syria.

So, why did he lose the vote?


According to opinion polls, and Lord Ashcroft’s tweets and website are actually becoming a good barometer (in the same way eurobarometer is for the EU) have strongly shown ‘the public’ to be opposed. MPs seemed genuinely reticent themselves, but had a clearer eye on a public who wouldn’t stand for 2003 again. So, no matter that a strong and clear document is published from the JIC, based on very strong JIO analysis, it didn’t have 100% tags on it (and it couldn’t have.. it was intelligence assessment), and so it wasn’t good enough for the post-Iraq public. Cameron isn’t Blair, but he got treated as if he was.

Bringing back Parliament to anoint action: 

Under prerogative powers Cameron didn’t need to ask Parliament, but he wanted approval. It’s difficult to gauge whether the ‘I’m seeking a rubber stamp’ urked Members or not. Either way, it was a self-inflicted wound, but it is inconceivable for Parliament not to have been involved in some form, even though the action contemplated seems to have been very small. There was also unease about the language used by the Foreign Secretary and luminaries like Malcolm Rifkind that we didn’t need a UN mandate – technically, not, but difficult to manage the political fall-out.

Pottery Barn rules: 

You break it, you own it. After Iraq and Afghanistan I don’t think there’s a huge appetite to be involved in longer conflicts or reconstruction. I don’t think the PM’s position that we wouldn’t be involved into the medium to long term was particularly tenable. I think MPs agreed.


The problem of blowback was addressed in the JIC report. They assessed it very differently to me (and I’m always happy to concede), but there are lingering concerns about radicalising new sections of the community here, and abroad.


The public have a higher regard for Cameron than his own back-benchers, who seem to variously see him as too Hawkish, too Dovish and/or just not quite right. A Thatcher in full cry wouldn’t have lost this vote. It’s a terrible slight on his political authority. Michael Gove might have been cursing rebels, but it provides him with a chance to topple Cameron before the election.

As many colleagues have pointed out though, this was not a reason to vote the measures down…


It’s difficult to see the UK as being isolationist when it gives so much money away in aid… but that’s how people like Lord Ashdown painted it. I think it’s the East of Suez debate, without the debate. Sensible spheres of influence, engagement where it makes sense. Ultimately, action will occur because President Obama set down a red line, and Syria crossed it. There has to be a response  or the authority of the US is questioned. Luckily for the Prime Minister the American administration don’t seem to have taken the news too badly, which means that their military response is likely to be limited and speedy.

None of this does anything to help the people of Syria, of course – not intervening, nor not intervening. It’s time – for once – for the UN to actually step up.

Whilst I didn’t agree with military action in this case, as per my previous posting, I don’t think Mr Cameron lost his vote for the ‘right reasons’, and it sets the decision to go to war now firmly with Parliament, where it –  perhaps-  should always have been.


Syria and the Parliamentary recall

The UK shouldn’t be involved in military action against Syria, no matter how horrific the original use of chemicals was. And here’s for why:

  • The responsibility to protect is not the responsibility to punish. Leave that to the ICC. The war crimes commission can act in due course. That’s of course unless the government wish to give the Russian and Chinese government the press release that says ‘the west doesn’t give a monkeys about international process’.  The same should be the case for the need to secure UN resolutions.
  • The unintended consequence of action is to alienate those within the regime who might have been sought out to negotiate. Or who might have been alienated by the use of the chemicals in the first place. All action solidifies the resolve of the regime.
  • You might hit Russian advisors. That would be ill-advised.
  • You might get dragged into something expensive and difficult (and let’s not forget that the Syrians have decent kit). There’s no will of the people to engage. The Iraq legacy persists. Scepticism about evidence and nice rhetoric also persists.
  • You shouldn’t want anything other than a stalemate here. The analysis done on the ‘rebels’ doesn’t make them look particularly friendly/acceptable to the west. So, don’t do anything to radically tip the balance, and remember Egypt just went bad. Syria will be way worse and less containable.
  • Our military is no longer geared for this. The SDSR did not provide for us to Libya (not really) and it certainly does not provide for this. Put the battle charts down, warm the diplomats up and leave it to someone else.
  • Attacking Assad is likely to have consequences for the UK. Let’s not invite on consequences. Instead, let’s read Baroness Manningham-Bullers’ evidence to the Chilcot Inquiry and conclude that she was a wise sage, with transferable advice.

On the less edifying end of the scale:

  • We’re just coming out of recession. Don’t rock the international oil boat. Don’t spend money we don’t have. It’s bad enough giving huge quantities of international aid money away, when the food bank in my local church is over-subscribed. When people cannot get the treatment for health problems that is a clinical need because there’s no money and when the schools have to beg for contributions from parents.. Our national security is currently not found in Syria. Don’t invent connections when there aren’t any.
  • We are no longer a global policeman. We are no longer a medium sized power. We are a key component of a European security community. Let it be for others to lead.

So, on Thursday, when Parliament is recalled, I hope they put the battle maps and the war drums away. Patience, influence and other tools are required here.

Of course, they will do the complete opposite.. and then there will be a cottage industry in writing and broadcasting about why it was such a complete cluster….. plus ca change?


Prism and the making of our idiocracy.

This is not the time for cliché or sound bite, but to paraphrase Tony Blair, I feel the hand of history (or the all-seeing electronic eye) just to the right of this keyboard. And your keyboard actually. And your webcam. Oh, and your telephone. Indeed, if your toaster has acquired the ability to engage in two-way communications, the all-seeing electronic eye probably knows how you like your toast. And your crumpets.  It has probably told its all-seeing master (or mistress). And they have made a micro-judgment about the fact that your toast is underdone (an unsound choice unless matched with slightly underdone bacon) and that your crumpets are ever so slightly rubbery.

If outed by a former contractor with an overdeveloped sense of global citizenry and a keenness to stop enjoying the liberties of a free man, the all-seeing electronic eye’s master (or mistress) would tell you that you had nothing to worry about if you are merely going about your business in a law abiding way. Afterall, a small detail about your toast (and crumpets) going to the all-seeing electronic eye is a small price to pay for all this security you are enjoying. And you are enjoying it, right? And you might hopefully respond to the representative of the all-seeing electronic eye that they were talking total rot. Because this is only in small part about being law-abiding, it’s mostly about creating and enforcing obedience and compliance.

It is the beigest political paint that dries the quickest, and Prism is set for maximum beige.

Its effect on politics is so beiging it might have been painted on the panels of a British made car of the 70s

Being a useful idiot…

Of all the things to be miffed about with Prism one of the most random (and least important) is that nearly all of the IR scholars who write through the ‘inspiration’ and, er, prism of Foucault are probably right. And this is not good. Because I’ve only ever met several ‘Foucauldians’ who haven’t been eminently irritating, and painfully certain that they have seen the one-true light of a bald French bloke who was good at re-historicisation. In their world the rest of us are pre-Foucault. If only we had seen that one true light too. (I exaggerate slightly for effect: I know a few Foucauldians who I strongly admire, and who live far enough away now to make it a really large effort to beat me about the head). Anyhow, necessary caveats in place… these buggers are right. The dead-hand of the state is not dead at all. It’s alive and desperate to create passive political bodies. The frightening tone of Richard Aldrich’s brilliant book on GCHG has been transformed in my mind from a frightening dystopia into underplay of the agenda at hand. But people like me are useful idiots because we tend to see the strengths in bureaucratic, political and judicial oversight mechanisms (and lecture about these strengths in glowing tones), and in assuming that just as the ordinary soldier sees themself as a reflection in their enemy, then security officials see themselves in those they serve. And if they do, it’s a poor reflection of the Biblical maxim do unto others what you’d have done to yourself. (I can feel the tautology of ‘if you’re law abiding’ coming on again… tell that to the select many who ran into certain British police forces during the 70s and 80s.. but by the by).   There’s also an endless amount to be said about the quantity of data we voluntarily contribute to that mystical place ‘the internet’, which has evidently contributed to our own surveillance…. But that’s also by the by.

 The myth of absolute security:

So, how did we get here?

External stimulus (but not one more dramatic than the Cold War, cue post-colonial thinkers to explain this missing gap) + defence of budgetary territory + technical capacity + functional creep – politicians without the wit to say no = the myth of absolute security and all that goes with it.

So, 9/11 and 7/7 in the UK were seen as ‘wake-up’ calls, and were immediately labelled as intelligence failures. But this was unfair. Intelligence agencies had never said that they offered blanket protection, and why should they: they can’t. But it was quite clear that the press (and however you read the reflect><lead function of the media) and a large part of the public assumed that they indirectly paid into this national security slot machine, the security wheels whizz round, and as regular as clock-work security comes flying out in a clattering din of happy contentedness. But in the real world of real people, intelligence and security is a clever system of processes and people that gets lucky more often than it gets unlucky: ‘we only have to be lucky once, you have to be lucky every time’ as one of the Brighton bombers was quoted as saying.

So, the myth of security began with a massive public misunderstanding of what intelligence is and does. It was then compounded by weak politicians who either misunderstood it themselves or decided it would be mighty funny and/or convenient to confirm this myth and avoid some issues that are firmly parked in the ‘too difficult’ box. Political science point: how, narratively, do we now row back from this misunderstanding? No-one who wants to get elected again is going to point out that the security-slot-machine is a game of chance, and you might lose your money. Time and time again.

The agency response appears to have been many-fold, but we can tell a two-fold story: 1) a desire to avoid being tarred as having failed to meet up to (unreasonable) expectations, 2) a desire to expand budgets and political turf at a permissive moment. These have dovetailed with the ease and speed with which ELINT/SIGINT/SOCMINT can be collected and stored.

So, whilst we can all see why such a response is rational, or at least explicable, it maintains a critical bind, which can be illustrated via part of the response to the disgraceful attack on the soldier Lee Rigby. Investigative journalism then suggested that the accused had been known to intelligence, some even suggested that one of them had been recently approached to spy on Jihadists.  The security slot machine appeared to have stopped spitting out security coins, instead it looked like in some circumstances like it didn’t know when it had three of a kind showing. Again, this is unfair, but the narrative exists, and does so because it is useful and helpful in some respects.

The European rescue of the all-seeing-electronic eye

No, I don’t actually think there’s a European rescue, but there will almost certainly be a lot of European resistance and friction to what we have learned about Prism. When I wrote a paper and gave evidence to the European Parliament in 2010 about the Passenger Name Record issue, there was a great deal of anxiety about how this information would treated, stored and used. And more widely and philosophically about the merits of a foreign power having such a wide array of EU citizen’s data. But let’s be clear: PNR is the smallest sprat in the sea compared to the revelations about Prism. In the light of Prism, the debate we had about PNR was so pointless it almost wasn’t worth the trip to Madrid to discuss it (cough). And it will have no doubt amused the Russian government to see that the response to their request for PNR data (which mirrors the arrangement the EU has with the US) was laughed out of the room (and I am sure the Russian government were not disappointed nor surprised by this) whilst the news of Prism loomed large on the horizon. Whilst such views are not popular in these parts, the EU underplays the strength it has in big-data, and the ability it would have to act as its own security bloc, if only it could line up in something of the same direction.

Where do we go from here?

Well, nothing will change. So forget any notion that this seismic event will generate change. It will generate a lot of political hot air, and a lot of protests. But no-one will dare challenge the myth of absolute security, and it is on that premise that the whole system sits.

Security is created by economic growth, and the access to the benefits of and means by which economies grow. There will always be those who want a fight. No matter how good life is. We should pay these people negative attention. But we won’t need to worry about the mass of population if we know that there is an absence of grievance. And economic growth cures most grievances. Just as in COIN, the aim should be to reduce the fighting core to the smallest number, not to label the largest number of people as combatants. The best thing the politicians of the US, UK and the rest of Europe could do in response to this crisis is get their economies motoring again.

Leave the toasters to do their business in peace….


The mediation of unmet need

We tell young children to be tolerant of their classmates. Fights are unacceptable. As is unreasonableness. It is part of the ‘early years foundation’ material that all schools adhere to in the UK, and so it should set people up for life. All children leave school with a plastic folder ‘evidencing’ their achievement of these simple goals. Dignity at work messages are designed to do the same with us grown-up children. You may disagree, but only in certain prescribed ways. To paraphrase a scene from the French crime drama ‘Engrenages’ ‘we have laws, to prevent vengeance’. And yet conflict abounds. Be it dust ups over who is sitting with who, or the minutiae of workplace governance, resource allocation or committee membership, right up to whose religion is the one true voice, or who should run a country… human kind seems desperate to perpetuate the sort of bickering that would drive any parent wild with despair.

And part of the brief reflection that went into thinking about this post came from a conversation I had with my new colleague David Roberts. He works on post-conflict zones, and peace-building, and he’s a fantastically enthusiastic, committed (in the right way) and interesting chap. But we were talking about a particular friction we had observed and he urged that we thought about the ‘unmet needs’ of those displaying the behaviour we were discussing.

It is such a simple, and therefore elegant thought. If the unmet needs of those seeking friction can be accommodated, acknowledged or met, then positions of tension might be unwound. It is not rocket science, nor is it a million miles away from standard COIN thinking around bringing the largest lump of insurgents you can to the negotiating table, to unlock the intractability of conflict.

But the original elegant thought then tied into several security studies seminars I have recently been to, in which defining a unitary account or object of study of ‘security’ proved very difficult. Much like it is impossible to define sanity, and only to define sanity in partial opposition to insanity (which is easy to locate, define and describe), security is best defined as the partial resolving of conditions of insecurity.

And what a word insecurity is. Because it nicely resonates with the vast majority of what we discuss as security problems: insecurities and assumptions around the intentions of the ‘other’. And many of these assumptions are based precisely in the black-hole wilderness of ‘otherness’: Huw Gusterson’s excellent book ‘People of the Bomb’ highlights this point far better than I could ever do. So, the fight over school seating is really the insecurity of loneliness, the bust up in everyday work settings over resources and paperclips around conveyed prestige, resilience of employment or such like. Threatening nuclear conflagration is partly an expression of the unmet need of domestic security, for those who are currently doing it. These three diffuse thought-examples have obvious routes to satisfaction. Not capitulation, but satisfaction. The two are different.

I was interested in the piece on Radio 4 this week or last that said that schizophrenia was still awaiting physiological markers. An observable condition that – scientifically -is not yet known to be physiologically based, but literally ‘all in the mind’. An acute disjuncture from societal norms, expectations, relations and yes, unmet need. So acute, in fact, that a single and whole personality can appear to break in two, and the public presentation of this is ‘unacceptable’, ‘alarming’ or ‘dangerous’ behaviour.

We arm ourselves – as nations – to provide a seriousness behind our efforts to mediate and to provide a fail-safe position if that mediation fails. By that rationale the use of armed force should be a rarity – it should be big stick carried quietly and deliberately. By a slightly extended rationale, we should also figure that the greatest threat to our security, is failing to understand the unmet needs of others and in failing to recognise, locate or address the emergent seriousness of their anxiety.

Our own insecurity is, therefore, the realised aggregation of many insecurities. A Rumsfeldian construction if ever I read one!


The red-line of chemical weapons and Syria.

Softly confirmed reports are of the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian government in a small town in the Allepo region. As the western powers sought to confirm the contested accounts of these developments talk of ‘red-lines’ and ‘responsibility to intervene’ emerged.

Some brief thoughts, in no particular order:

How we know what we know: given the debates around the intelligence on Iraq (see the Panorama programme on Monday night) as well as the reports that will and have come out of Butler and Chilcot, the burden of proof that ‘the west’ will need to have will need to be strong. Another campaign under false-flags will play very badly, and exactly where is the money and capability to prosecute a difficult war?

Real threats: one of the real threats from chemical weapons in this operational environment is the unsecured use. Secured use at least has a clearer set of influence metrices that could be used to mitigate or prevent its use – in an unsecured use, these influences are diffuse, obscured, and fluid – it makes them more unpredictable. It also makes them more portable – and therefore uncontained. That puts them into the global threat orbit.

Killing norms: an estimated 60,000 people have already lost their lives in Syria in the contest over who can rule the space. Very few of these deaths are likely to have been ‘nice’ and it might just be me, but I struggle to see the radical difference or escalatory effect of deaths by unconventional ordnance as opposed to conventional ordnance. If we are going to intervene because of the use of chemical weapons, we should have been intervening before: people were still dying unpleasantly over a political struggle. No-one is going to the pearly gates more pissed off that they died one way or another. It also sets a precedent – given that in the 80s and early 90s the international community were unkeen to intervene in Middle Eastern chemical attacks in Iran/Iraq/Kurdistan.

The means to an end: is to secure Russian influence in the Middle East. Without this, the removal of Assad is all but impossible. If the Russian government sees that it is no worse off, or even better off with a replacement, we could reasonably assume that their position would move. To try and write Russia out of the Middle East will be to create a Syrian conflict that cannot be contained.

The safety of friends first / fracture lines: looking at a conflict map of the Middle East makes it quite clear that the Israeli Prime Minister is quite correct when he talks of their being massive threats in the region. Increasingly he has them stacking up on his borders. The old mantra of ‘solve the Israeli-Palestinian question and you’ve solved peace in the Middle East’ is now a historical relic. There are far bigger problems in the Middle East, they’re all across religious/ethnic identity lines and they are not contained by the Westphalian niceties of boundary lines. Therefore, a plan for the security of the Middle East has to include our own allied bulwark of democracy – Israel – as the protected red-line. And for the rest of the region (which now in terms of joined up insurgencies – be they dormant, a little active or fully-fledged spreads all the way across to west Africa) greater attention needs to fall upon demilitarisation and trade-aid. The disconnect of insurgent from his base of support lies in satisfaction and economic growth – no-one goes to war on a full stomach as the adapted phrase goes. Poverty, strong and historically mal-formed rhetorics, and an abundance of conventional weaponry is making a very significant part of the globe ungovernable. No wonder some folk argue for a wider Atlantic community, a pivot towards Latin America.

If you break it, you own it: The new first rule of interventions is that if you break the country, you own it. And walking away (a’la Iraq and Afghanistan) is possible, but doesn’t really help anyone. An intervention in Syria (which is predominantly broken in governance terms) would still trigger the maxim, I think. Whilst the historical resonance is poor or problematic, a Syria-under-mandate might be the smartest way to proceed – think Bosnia under Paddy Ashdown, but with more people involved. Perhaps the role the UN should be playing is in being able to step in as a collective civil service/government with a core remit to ensure that the four governance strands are improved and that the outcome should always be a return to local rule when stability is in place: it would be the best way of dispersing financial and operational risk and responsibility.

Be wary of those who want immediate interventions, be wary of those who say trust the intelligence, and have no sustainable and viable plans for stability – these are 30year plans, not 5years twitchy and out.  In this war, the competition is potentially our best friend….


Defence Acquisition: the wisdom of elders

Fresh some several years of hyper-active reforms, and a lot of intensely reflective thinking, the MoD would have been disappointed to read the Defence Select Committee’s mauling of its industrial strategy, or to be more accurate, lack of strategy.

This is a little unfair. The MoD has a strategy and it’s a clear response to several factors that come from Whitehall (internal debates around institutional design, the place of the UK in the world, stance etc) and external sources (mainly the economy), but the problem is in its radicalism. In a recent article for World Defence Systems, that I think is imminent, I said the government’s defence reforms had been typified with a radicalism born of conservatism – they’re spinning ever more rapidly to achieve a very stable set of end-goals that can be tracked over time. SDSR (and its foundational NSS document) could be seen as a radical reining in of the UK’s overseas role, but then Libya happens and it looks like salami-slicing and strategic disjuncture etc etc. And the evidence that Mark Phythian and I provided to the Select Committee began its intellectual origin at this point: that SDSR reoriented the UK into less interventionist activity, and – more importantly – a sticking plaster pathway to get through to 2015. So, in our Defence Studies piece (behind the publisher’s wall until April) we noted that Libya effectively buried the SDSR because of this critical disjuncture in aims, whilst in our Political Quarterly (which is free to access) piece we noted that the follow-on activities after SDSR might change the nature of bureaucratic governance in the UK. The Defence Select Committee’s report also raised questions about how effectively the government would keep control of procurement under a GoCo arrangement (where the company is owned by the government but run by a contractor, or a consortium of contractors).

The classic arguments used to justify a GoCo arrangement locate themselves around private industry being able to drive down costs, and drive up efficiencies. Fine. But there’s very little evidence of this happening across the full spectrum of government activities. The comprehensive work of the NAO to look into the financial models the government uses highlights the problems of needing incredibly precise contracts to nail down a financial arrangement and the punitive costs of deviating an inch from it, which seems to happen with monotonous regularity. After all, it’s a complex world with complex needs. So, the wisdom of going down an internally outsourced route, which is what the GoCo amounts too, relies on a truth to the maxims that private is cheaper and industry knows better. Smart procurement felt a more comfortable concept, in all honesty. Why are our public institutions immune from more efficient rationales? There are no inherent reasons… but strangely it persists.

The second major criticism levelled by the committee was about a lack of strategic direction – that equipment savings, job protection, and protecting the British research base could be better secured if the MoD knew what equipment was critical to national security. If the MoD knew this, they would have a better idea about what they were going to ring-fence and protect. The committee went on:

“We believe the absence of a strategy which supports appropriate national sovereignty puts the UK at a disadvantage against competitor countries. Furthermore we do not understand how we can have confidence in a national security strategy which does not show a clear grasp of what is needed for the defence of the United Kingdom and how this can be ensured.”

So, the idea of buying-off-the-shelf was effectively scotched as a panacea option. Which is a bit of a blow to the National Security Through Technology white paper released in February 2012, which broke the historic link between the UK defence industrial base and UK security.

So, where to go now? The SDSR was unusual as a defence review in as much as its review point was established from the outset (2015) and thus one could reasonably assume that it would be reviewed in, er, 2015. But two years on, it is still receiving a monthly drubbing in the press, and by Parliamentarians and by humble academic scribblers. It seems unconscionable that it won’t be revisited before 2015.. but how can it be? For instance, the sort of inter-service row that was had in the run up to the SDSR will look like Aunt Sally’s quiet picnic on Ditchling Beacon compared to a middle-of-the-cuts version now. And Tory MPs who are feeling cross about bleating middle Englanders like me moaning on about reforms to universal benefits and married tax allowances etc,  disappointed with the angst in Parliament over gay marriage, Europe, triple-dips etc are unlikely to want to see their government robbed of the ‘friend of the military tag’ so soon after nabbing it back from Labour.  The Prime Minister is one of the government’s biggest assets, but he’s collecting problems for fun at the moment.

We normally talk of salami-slicing vs radical surgery in defence reform. The problem is that the radical surgery keeps coming in slices. And the sensible retreat from overseas commitments was rapidly replaced with renewed interventionism (which intellectually I’m not opposed to). Whether the current suite of policies are underpinned by good sense or not, defence policy looks like a badly thought out mess. Most of the stakeholders involved in it seem as pleased as Porsche owner being given a moulding Mini-Metro as a courtesy car.

Intellectual and practical incoherence, stakeholder disaffection and continual bad-press from all quarters need to be thought about clearly and perhaps in the following blank-paper terms:


  • Who owns strategy?
  • Are these people in the best institutional or workload place to be doing it (all sorts of factors mitigate for and against strategic thinking. From my own perspective it requires time to reflect and play with ideas, and it requires the right sort of information at the right quality to be put in front of people. Is this happening?)
  • Who is responsible for managing and including stakeholders?
  • Is there a clear 5, 10, and 30 year vision?
  • Do we know how to get to each of these markers?
  • What kind of head-room is defence operating with, and what issues does that pose? (and let’s be clear, we know that the budget is under serious pressure despite the promise of increases in equipment monies. So, can we guarantee if we cut something that we can keep the saving to make something else better? If not, then the government needs to think about how it is incentivising reformists.


There are plenty of answers to these questions already out there in various literatures. But many of them (most of them) sit within the ‘yes, but’ mould of thinking. Defence policy doesn’t need ‘yes, but’, it needs ‘here are the expected, anticipated or known-unknown threats and now here are the capabilities that we think best match these threats exist, with the money we’ve got or can reasonably ring out of the Treasury’.

Select Committees are getting good at holding government to account. It’s time for government to match them with good answers.


Ps- the wisdom of elders title is a little random. It refers to an expert witness cited next to Phythian and I, who is both very wise and of distinguished service and years.


Syria, Mali, Algerian gas-works and ‘Open Source Everything’

Read any government security document, any of the national security strategies produced by a now large number of states and you will get a feel for the proliferation in the number of threats they feel they face. The preamble will normally contain a paragraph explaining that after the Cold War or after 9/11 everything got a little more complex, a little less explicable.

Heightened complexity in the international system appears to have coincided (and is only partially causally linked) to the increased levels of activity/ improvements in technology, social media etc. The rate at which information can be collected has increased, even if the sort of information being collected is broadly the same.

The problem of accounting for events like the Algerian gas-plant siege a few weeks ago (or the development of the insurgency in Syria, or in the hijacking of the state in Mali) for state-based security organisations is that their resources allocated in such a way that it logical for them to be looking the wrong way when this happens. It would be unlikely – although we can’t be sure, obviously – that there’s a bod in every security community across Europe pondering the safety of gas-plants in the ME and Maghreb. So, when this happens the information required to rapidly come down the pipe needs to be hastily scoped and drawn in. And this got me thinking about Robert Steele’s ‘open source everything’ manifesto (I declare the interest that Robert has written a chapter for the Routledge Handbook on Intelligence that I, Mike Goodman and Claudia Hillebrand have compiled and which will be in a good bookshops from August, and that he and I have corresponded at length about these issues), and how it could be used or applied in these circumstances. I have my own take on this, and I’ve provided the link above to the source: Robert also has a good search on his name I think so I’d guess he’ll correct me in comments too! But my wonder is more in the aggregation of huge quantities of information.

If we assumed that insurgents or terrorists leave an electronic detritus of chatter (be it closed loop phone or some other form), movement data, financial data, and the chatter of their associates, family etc and local media reports etc etc, then the actual ‘intelligence’ required to identify, contain and roll-back a threat or ‘black-swan’ event should be there, right? No-one – it seems – can totally avoid leaving the sort of trail that could be used in anticipating an event, so the issue is in collecting the data in a way that makes sense, and making predictions on it (lenses through which we understand the world). And that made me wonder about how one could translate this kind of regional or localised intelligence into a western European perspective: does it need expert ciphers to do so? Or can it be done with generalists? This fits into one of my side projects, which is thinking through how to make better use of scholarship in the ‘real world’. Would a more open source arrangement provide the sort of information to be better resilient to these black-swan events? This is not to say that the current arrangements are ‘bad’ or ‘failed’, but just like in defence it seems that there’s a constant circle to be squared of ‘more’, ‘more diverse’ and with relatively static methods or money.

Relatedly, some years ago Milja Kurki (who might be the smartest person I’ve ever met) and I wrote a paper about the intersection between intelligence studies and IR theory. We never published this paper and for their pains my final year students get to read it as a tiny part of the reading list for my final year option. Whilst we felt that the field was under-theorised, the paper we wrote never really connected up to the reality of intelligence work adequately enough. The two communities or endeavours seemed immune from each other – indeed to try and overlay one on the other seemed to produce an immune system response. But with the benefit of some years to cogitate on it, and having thought about the work of people like Steele, Fuller, Cairney (as above), I think the missing element from this paper was the realities of complexity:

  • Things in the international system tend away from equilibrium and not towards it as most IR theory suggests
  • The international system tends to chaos and not order (and the level of chaos might be reduced to the level of individuals, making generalizable lessons problematic)
  • Man-made uncertainty shocks, or ‘black-swans’ to use other language, are mostly resistant to accurate advanced prediction. Thus one main function of theory – to predict – is always likely to fail. Using a different approach we could learn lessons quickly enough to be able to deal with a problem or series of problems close enough to the source that in effect it looked like prediction and pre-emption.

The issues all fall-down to how to best use (in terms of creating the right institutional frameworks and having the right cultures) the information available, and in that we need more thinking work into whether alternatives genuinely stack-up.


Our enemy’s enemy, is never better…

I’d like to go further than the Faceless Bureaucrat did an hour or so ago.. I should also know that amongst my students he has become ‘the freelance bureaucrat’ for no good reason at all (my first years just read the FB-Betz exchange on freedom of speech as alternative reading on the reading list).

Anyhow, my proposition and provocation is simple:

The enemies of our enemies have universally proved to be more problematic than the original enemy. Certainly in the last fifteen years.

* Saddam was decidedly horrid, but after Gulf War I was also decidedly stable. The situation that followed him, the influence of Iran in the country, and the new leadership are no improvement (if you can see past some flawed elections).

* The Taliban were not to our taste, and a threat via the harbouring of training camps, but the situation that has followed is a dysfunctional money-pit and a rapid return to the 1980s…

* In Zimbabwe, the international clamour to replace Mugabe went quiet when it was assessed that the military and security hierarchy that sits to his left and right were even more dangerous than he is/was.

* Egypt looked promising, then Morsi got excited and decided he was Mubarak-redux, and from a international politics perspective, Mubarak was a force for stability and constructive engagement with Israel (contested, for sure).

* Libya.. we got excited about the opposition, but we didn’t know who they were or what they were intending and that’s gone badly too.

* And now Syria, where the opposition groups we’re all officially quite excited about have allegedly massacred Alawite’s (who have broadly supported Assad).

So, like an emergent isolationist from my previous muscular liberal past… I say again, all of the enemies of our enemies, are worse devils than the ones we know… We should have moved for strategies of containment.