In the New York Times today, an article titled with studied understatement ‘Afghan Army’s Turnover Threatens US Strategy‘. Read the whole thing. Or maybe just consider this line: ‘“We’re not concerned about getting enough young men,” General Ahmadzai [Deputy Commander of the National Recruiting Centre] said, “just as long as we get that $4.1 billion a year from NATO.”’
Get it? Of course you do. The general is refreshingly honest. I salute his candour. My question is for our politicians and generals. If this is the sort of thing which Afghan generals are openly telling the NY Times now what were they telling you two or three years ago? ‘Afghanisation’ of the conflict has been the cornerstone of our strategy for how long again? Let’s recap:
Plan A: defeat Taliban, ‘stabilise’ Afghanistan, leave in triumph.
Plan defeated by rise of neo-Taliban and, um, reality.
Plan B: give Taliban a bloody great thrashing, build up Afghan security forces, leave with heads held high and hope for the best.
Plan defeated by ‘green on blue’ attacks and the apparent emptiness of the security force build-up.
According to a recruiter, despite good pay, many candidates are scum of the earth, or Taliban supporters, or both. And the good ones? Read and weep: ‘“I wanted to serve my country, my homeland,” Ghubar said. “But after I joined, I saw the situation was all about corruption. The officers are too busy stealing the money to defeat the insurgents.”’ They desert.
What, pray tell, is Plan C?
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Plan C: ISAF withdraws, Afghan “government” staggers on for a couple of years, warlords, Taliban.
Plan C
Raise an “Afganistan Company Army”, privates are well paid afghans, NCOs and Officers are Brits/Americans/Australians ect on long term detached service.
But it is much too late to try that now.
I believe I once wrote up such a plan (well, I did my best).
480 Afghan riflemen and 238 British Officers / NCOs
Make a (slightly) oversized Rifle Battalion.
After six months, some of the Afghan riflemen are promoted in Lance Corporals, after another 6, into full corporals, then Sergeants, and so on
After two and a half years, a slightly under strength battalion of 480 men is entirely manned by Afghans, none of whom were appointed based on tribal patronage.
Think Defence were nice enough to air my views more widely
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2011/07/what-is-a-global-guardian/
“Vietnamization” is working about as well as it did in Vietnam. That is to say, it isn’t working and won’t work.
Declare “Peace with honor”, withdraw all foreign forces, and let the locals sort it out.
How about Plan D: NATO pays me $4.1 billion and we take it from there…
Plan C starts with basing any plan on more than one NYT article, let alone one comment from one man in it – a NYT which a couple of weeks ago put out a morally compromised, shoddily argued, factually dubious editorial calling for immediate withdrawal, and can safely be assumed to be seeking to justify it for the next few years.
God knows there are problems enough, and I wouldn’t like to predict the outcome, but the media ‘zeitgeist’ is to be as grey as the establishments has been to be rosy. I am also reminded of a recent comment from a senior general in ISAF, “I don’t need yet another brilliant analysis of the problems, but I am open to suggestions on solutions.”