A new report on the United Nations’ contracting of Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) was published last week. Authored by Lou Pingeot, programme coordinator at the Global Policy Forum, the report ‘Dangerous Partnership. Private Military & Security Companies and the UN’ finds that the UN is increasingly contracting PMSCs for security services – armed and unarmed – and that contracting is “unaccountable and out of control”.
The report calls for the UN to reassess its approach to security generally and contracting of PMSCs specifically, but preempts such a measure by reaching “the likely conclusion (…) that the UN should end its use of PMSCs – so as to safeguard its reputation, its mission and its fundamental values”.
A few important issues surrounding PMSCs and humanitarian actors are mentioned in the report and worth highlighting here: that contacting still needs more and better oversight and regulation. That the ‘bunkerisation’ of the UN can run counter to the intended aim of increasing security as it cuts UN staff off from the local population and works against acceptance. That integrated approaches continue to make it difficult for the UN to be seen as helping not occupying. (The last two points are true for humanitarian NGOs as well by the way.) These are actually important issues for civ-mil coordination in warzones.
It is too bad they are clouded by the report’s rhetoric and selective approach to sources. Without wanting to sound like a stuck up academic, has anyone looked at the footnotes and bibliography? It is a ‘select bibliography’ in every sense of the word and contains a whole of six books and journal articles, some of them quite outdated.
Unfortunately, big parts of the report are not a discussion and investigation of the issues, but an ideological crusade against PMSCs. That makes for nice headlines. PMSCs are a hot topic anyway. Mix that with some innocent humanitarians (the UN), a couple of, admittedly appalling, sex scandals (those of PMSCs, not the UN) and throw in a picture of a mysterious armed man on the report cover and it is going to sell. What’s my point? My point is that critical engagement with PMSCs is good, ideological blindness is not.
As David Isenberg notes in his Huffington Post comment on the report, PMSCs have argued for their involvement in peacekeeping missions for many years now. While that still seems a long way off, the GPF report suggests that they had more success with security service contracts. According to their (incomplete) data, the UN apparently spent $76 million on contracted security services in 2010, an increase of 73% compared to the previous year. That’s a whopper, especially when accompanied by bad contracting policies and oversight. The report not only questions the benefits of the UN using PMSCs, e.g. the rightly contested issues of cost-effectiveness, no-bid contracts and intransparent decision-making, but it denies that there are any benefits at all.
It doesn’t help that it takes the UN so long to develop a PMSC policy. I wondered for many years why the UN insisted on seeing PMSCs simply as mercenaries and not as a related but separate phenomenon that needs its own regulations and policy approach.* You can think of PMSCs as mercenaries as a personal opinion, but that is a) not helpful in dealing with such a diverse, global industry that operates in warzones where oversight is messy at best and b) not true in legal terms. Take a look at Article 1 of the UN Convention on Mercenaries. All 5 criteria need to be fulfilled at the same time for someone to qualify as a mercenary. Unlikely in the best of cases, almost impossible for PMSCs (or their employees). Especially the private gain aspect is very hard to prove – it’s easy to claim to have been motivated by patriotism, religion, humanitarian motives etc.
Also, being a mercenary per definition involves fighting. Combat is not what PMSCs are hired to do. Sure, quite a few of them are armed and it is undoubtedly these armed services that pose the biggest challenges to regulation. But there is no data on companies offering combat services so it could be more, it could be less than the 1% mentioned previously on this blog. For proper oversight of the other 99 or so percent of services a good deal of responsibility lies with the client, in this case the UN. So good if the UN is challenged by the GPF report to take some action in improving its contracting policies – that seems overdue. But I haven’t seen arguments as to why the UN should stop using PMSCs altogether if that is properly regulated.
* There is finally a draft of a ‘possible UN Convention on PMSCs’ since 2010, but that will probably still take many years to come into effect
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Hi Birthe,
Thanks for writing a piece on the report. I’m happy that this is starting a discussion and I just wanted to follow up on some of your remarks and the good questions you raise:
- With regards to the bibliography: if you look at the report itself and the footnotes, you’ll see that we base our research on dozens of other journal articles, books, media articles and reports from NGOs, governments and the UN, not to mention interviews with UN staff and representatives from the PMSC industry. The “select” bibliography was primarily meant to showcase reports that look at UN use of these companies (i.e. not many)
- Unfortunately the questionable record of PMSCs is not limited to a “couple of, admittedly appalling, sex scandals.” It involves many cases of human rights abuses (including torture and the killing and injuring of innocent civilians) as well as fraud, non-performance, overcharging, labor law violations, etc. And this involves a large number of companies, not just a few “black sheep,” including industry-leader G4S, DynCorp, Caci, Titan, Blackwater, Wackenhut, ArmorGroup, Saracen, etc.
- If you agree that the cost argument is flimsy and that “‘bunkerisation’ of the UN can run counter to the intended aim of increasing security” (which you seem to), then I’m struggling to see what could possibly be the “benefits” of hiring PMSCs, since they would cost more than in-house options and are an integral part of the bunkerized policy (they provide the services that enable it and through their consultancy – which the UN uses extensively – they may be pushing the organization in that direction).
Best,
Lou (author of the report)
Dear Lou,
Thank you for your comments on my post. Here’s my reply.
- You say you are ‘struggling to see what could possibly be the “benefits” of hiring PMSCs’. Well, I am not advocating that the UN should do so under all circumstances, but I was missing balance in your report. I think the main disagreement is that you think the UN shouldn’t use PMSCs ever and I think they shouldn’t if there are good reasons not to. I read the whole report and all footnotes so I understand that at the whole, you use more than 6 sources. My point was that I find your sources quite selective as to only support your argument.
- You are criticizing the UN’s ‘bunkerisation’ policy and argue that PMSCs could be driving the UN in that direction through consultancy. So what was first, the chicken or the egg? I agree that as a security strategy, bunkerisation might be counterproductive. But if that is the UN’s preferred strategy, why not use PMSCs – if contracted according to clear guidelines and with proper oversight.
- That links to the ‘questionable record’ you are mentioning. Some PMSC employees have committed gross human rights violations, that is well known. But seeing that as the only argument not to use PMSCs would be like saying the UN can’t ever work anywhere again because of its failure in Rwanda, human rights abuses by peacekeeping troops and poor accountability of the organisation. The cases you mention emphasise the need for even better regulation, oversight, and of course judicial consequences for human rights violations – and that quickly please – but not for ending contracting indefinitely.
Best,
Birthe
Ms. Anders offers some thoughtful discussion on an interesting, if rather ideologically driven, work from the Global Policy Forum. As a strong supporter of the UN and a realist, some points should be clarified.
From my own academic research in the field it is clear that international peace operations are only marginally better than the total war they are supposed to replace. Mafia and sex crimes are endemic to these missions, and always have been. Nevertheless, the missions are better than the alternative and generally lead to a permanent and peaceful resolution.
My experience demonstrated that the private actors, while few in number and overwhelmingly utilizing local talent, were significantly better behaved and accepted by the local population than the international militaries they were supporting. This was a fundamental reason why we founded the International Stability Operations Association (ISOA) more than a decade ago – to vastly improve international peace operations through greater utilization of the capabilities of private services.
Both Ms. Pingeot and Ms. Anders are correct that the UN can do much to improve their contracting capabilities. UN procurement decisions can be baffling and apparently random, payments can be delayed for months, oversight and guidance can be spotty. Nevertheless, the critical services the stability operations industry provide – including water purification, base construction and support, training, refugee/IDP camp security, medical services, heavy air lift and helicopters, fleet management services, unexploded ordnance removal and a myriad of other services – all have contributed to improving international missions. Potentially much, much more could be done in the future.
With hundreds of thousands of industry employees working in conflict, post-conflict and disaster relief operations around the world, problems are going to occur. The mark of a good contractor is how they respond to those problems. This was another reason the ISOA was founded, with our own Code of Conduct (designed and updated in cooperation with the NGO and academic communities) and enforcement mechanism. International efforts may soon supersede the ISOA Code with more robust and independent capabilities (see the excellent DCAF web site on the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (ICoC) ).
Students of the industry should check out ISOA’s web site and our (recently renamed) Stability Operations magazine and feel free to contact us for additional information.
Doug Brooks
ISOA President
I really enjoyed reading your blog and thought you raised some very interesting points objectively. As for the author’s comment about PMSCs committing human rights violations, this is well documented and yes it needs to be addressed urgently by holding companies and individual employees/contractors to account for their actions. Unfortunately, state militaries working for the UN also have a record of committing appalling human rights violations against the very people they are suppose to be protecting, while all that appears to happen to them is they are sent home. Neither situation is acceptable, while the UN needs to address both urgently
Contractorisation of certain UN functions can work, but it needs greater effort on the part of the organisation to make it happen. Moreover, it will only be achieved once the right management mechanisms and processes are in place. Something the UN needs to work at to get it right. Nor is the UN reliance on contractors unique. Many governments are facing similar challenges with contracting for logistics/security. At the same time, returning to the old system of the UN relying on state militaries for its logistics/security is not an option with the continued cut backs in state military capability and manpower. Unless someone can come up with a better solution the market for logistics/security is here to stay, at lest for the time being. Something the UN needs accept, if it hasn’t already.
Dear all,
Thank you for your comments. I’d like to address a couple of points:
- With regards to the “chicken and egg” conundrum of bunkerization: I think this is turning the issue into a slightly absurd rhetorical question. If we agree that bunkerization is a bad policy, then we should say so, whoever implements it (UN staff, troops from member states or PMSCs). My critique is as much of the UN’s recent policy evolution as of these companies. Considering whether PMSCs might be appropriate to implement a bad policy is rather beside the point.
- The idea that peacekeepers from member states also commit human rights abuses is, to me, a red herring. Indeed, there have been numerous cases of abuses by peacekeepers in the past, from Rwanda to DRC to Haiti, and people have seldom been held accountable. However, if the concern really is to improve accountability within the system, then moving to PMSCs is definitely a step in the wrong direction. At least in the case of troops from member states there are mechanisms to hold peacekeepers accountable (through national courts), and actually we’re seeing some progress on this front – Uruguay is currently prosecuting peacekeepers involved in sexual abuses in Haiti, for instance. But in the case of PMSCs there is currently no avenue to hold perpetrators of human rights abuses accountable, as has been demonstrated in many cases in the past – how many contractors have been charged so far, even in cases where abuses have been well-documented? We all agree that the UN has an accountability problem, but hiring PMSCs makes accountability even more difficult.
- Saying that the UN should not rule out PMSCs if they are properly regulated is also pushing the debate in a confusing rhetorical direction. Currently there are no international legal standards that apply to these companies, and unfortunately I do not see any coming up in the near future. With all due respect to the ISOA, codes of conduct are no substitute for binding international rules that mandate states to carry out due diligence and enforce the law. Allowing an industry – be it the food industry or the PMSC industry – to police itself is not the solution. It’s one thing to promise to adhere to a set of obligations with no legal consequences and another to be legally held accountable for this promise. There is currently no international binding regulation and none is forthcoming, so saying that the UN could use these companies if such regulation existed is rather like saying that we could time-travel if we had the technology, and then pondering on the pros and cons of time travel – a fun conversation for sure, but not exactly relevant to present concerns.
Best,
Lou
This is just an absurd polemic argument.
Having read the entire report, it’s really not certain if the author understands that PMSCs do more than carry weapons, and look hard in their “tattoos and sunglasses.”
It’s the usual fluffy academic argument that obstacles make an entire strategy redundant. The UN does not have the in-house capability (and will not have) to carry out the types of peacekeeping and peacebuilding that the world empowers it with. In that sense, you can either waffle on about how it should and how it would be better if it could have those capabilities, or you can acknowledge the reality that PMSCs (with all their blemishes) enable UNPKOs — from airlifting the troops to building bases, providing catering services, perhaps MEDEVAC/CASEVAC etc., basically much much more than the actual trigger-pulling the author focuses almost solely on.
It’s a horrible world out there and a cold argument – but what’s better. A genocide in eastern DRC that rages unchecked or a PMSC deployment with blemishes that stops some of the violence?
Dear all,
Great to have this discussion here.
A quick point on regulation. ‘There is currently no international binding regulation and none is forthcoming, so saying that the UN could use these companies if such regulation existed is rather like saying that we could time-travel if we had the technology, and then pondering on the pros and cons of time travel – a fun conversation for sure, but not exactly relevant to present concerns.’
This is overestimating the effect of international regulation which, we all agree, is 1) needed and 2) will take years to come into effect if at all. The point here was not that the UN could use PMSCs if there was international regulation. The point was that the UN could use PMSCs better if it had clear policies on when and how to outsource and an oversight mechanism for companies it contracts.
No single regulation (international or otherwise) can be expected to effectively hold PMSCs and their employees accountable everywhere. Let’s think this through (and this is not a pointless rhetoric exercise I think, but deals with who can be held legally accountable where and how):
There are different legal levels in regard to PMSCs. There is national law in the company’s home state, there is international law, there is national law in the country of operation and national law in the employee’s home state. What is the problem with all this? That few laws were written specifically with PMSCs or their employees in mind. That those that were, e.g. in South Africa, simply lead to companies and individuals’ relocation. And even if there was an international convention, states did not only need to sign on to it, but also to take action for actually prosecuting crimes (and how many convictions were there again under the UN Convention on Mercenaries…?).
Oversight in warzones (for law in countries of operation) and the option of relocation (from companies’ home states) are a problem for national law, enforcement for international law. Self-regulation is not a bad idea as such, but must be joined by legally binding and enforced regulation on the national AND international level. It also matters what is written into a contract, e.g. the client can request adherence to existing standards.
My own view is that at times using PMSC might be a good choice for the UN and at other times not. In reality, it always depends on the details and circumstance. Not all peace operations are the same and neither are all PMSC
But in regard to the comments by Mr Brooks let me just make a few observations. He writes
“Ms. Anders offers some thoughtful discussion on an interesting, if rather ideologically driven, work from the Global Policy Forum. ”
This tries to position Mr. Brooks as some disinterested academic, which, of course, and to his credit he will admit, he is not. He is the founder and well-paid head of an organization whose purpose is to advocate for greater use of PMSC. No harm in that, of course, but to believe that he is not as ideologically driven as those he strives to cast in that light is sheer pretense. Nice chutzpah though!
He also wrote, “As a strong supporter of the UN and a realist, some points should be clarified.”
Since when is he a strong supporter of the UN? He has often publicly stated that PMSC can do the job better than the UN. That doesn’t sound like support of the UN. I’m not saying that he has to be. I’m sure we all, myself included, can find valid points of criticism about UN peace operations. But his public utterances to date indicate that Mr Brooks is far more of a critic than a supporter.
He wrote, “From my own academic research in the field it is clear that international peace operations are only marginally better than the total war they are supposed to replace.”
Really? The second Congo war has, as of 2008, killed over 5 million people. Is Mr Brooks seriously asserting that the UN operations there have only killed a little less?
Try mounting any of today’s humanitarian missions without PMSC logistical support – most will simply not be doable. Period.
The basic problem with PMSCs is that the industry is an oligopoly. The solution is to have clients that demand more accountability – i.e. a UN that credibly changes its vendor if its requirements for say base construction are not met. Only with that level of competition will companies credibly self-regulate – with the incentive still being profit.
ALONGSIDE regulation (and there should be more regulation) the goal should be to weed out the bad PMSCs and create norms that lift the industry, not blanket denounce them and call them names like this report did.
Excellent discussion! Just a couple of follow up points:
The UN has certainly managed some progress on the accountability issue, but Ms. Pingeot may have overly optimistic expectations about addressing a problem that has existed since the beginning of UN peacekeeping. UN contributing states have been reluctant to penalize their own troops and the UN has been reluctant to prod them too hard since they can easily withdraw their contingents, hamstringing a mission. Private firms utilize mostly local staff for their operations thus minimizing both their footprint and the problems associated with foreign personnel in conflict regions. Further, they operate at the discretion of the client, and misbehavior or poor results can mean replacement by a competitor.
Yes, we can do more to ensure private individual accountability through improved extraterritorial laws (local employees are always under local law), but the reality is that private sector individuals who are alleged to have committed crimes or violated rules are fired and removed from the mission at the very least, *especially when clients pay attention to quality.* Extraterritorial laws have been used many times to prosecute private sector personnel from a number of nations. MEJA – the U.S. Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act – is worth looking at in particular, and it is unclear why it was not even mentioned in the GPF report. At one point, close to 100 MEJA cases were at some stage of investigation and prosecution by the U.S. Department of Justice, and that law can be expanded and improved. In fact, CEJA, the Civilian Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, is currently working its way through Congress and like MEJA enjoys industry support. These laws can be reproduced in other countries.
ISOA has been clear that Codes of Conduct are important but are a supplement and not a replacement for effective governmental laws and courts. Nevertheless, the industry should do what it can to police itself as well if we expect to earn the confidence of clients.
Ultimately good contractors come from clients who value quality and ethics. Low-end companies are squeezed out when rules and regulations are monitored and enforced, and Ms. Pingeot and others have correctly made the point that the UN would do well to improve its ability to do exactly this. The private sector is an essential partner that the UN needs to support its vital missions and the GPF report is welcome in highlighting this aspect.
I will leave Mr. Isenberg’s non sequiturial comments for more appropriate forums.
Regards,
Doug Brooks
ISOA President
Mr. Brooks asks why MEJA is not used more often in regard to prosecuting any PMSC personnel on a UN PK operation who may have done wrong. An obvious answer is that MEJA applies to U.S. personnel accompanying U.S. armed forces, and not all PMSC personnel on a UN op are U.S. military personnel, U.S. citizens or even from U.S. companies.
As for my alleged “non sequiturial comments” my points in my previous post are all easily verifiable by anyone who does some casual browsing. The fact that Mr. Brooks avoids addressing substance pretty much says everything you need to know.
Clearly this is a polemic topic and questions of PSC use can go in many directions, from accountability to legitimacy to human rights abuses. However, one of the most forgotten parts of all of this is the UN’s primary mission to “end the scourge of war” and what, specifically and in general, can be done to accomplish this.
Peacekeeping of the nineties is not the same as today; just as clearly, “mercenaries” of the sixties and seventies are not the same as PSC employees today (as Ballesteros may have painted them with his broad brush years ago).
The UN needs to come up with new definitions and new rules with regard to the hiring and use of PSCs. Rules that apply to “mercenaries” just aren’t applicable – or maybe more aptly, are just too hard to make stick. I believe Doug Brooks and Ms. Pingeot would both agree with this.
Legitimate PSCs want clear contracts and I think folks like Laura Dickinson and Benedict Sheehy would argue that one of the best ways to control a PSC (or any contractor for that matter) is a clearly written contract. One of the problems, however, is that there is no unitary policy at the UN on hiring PSCs. Even with clear policy guidelines in place, there will be problems as we’ve seen with the U.S. experience in Iraq and Afghanistan and contracting. The massive growth of the industry and the limited amount of oversight (few numbers of Contracting Officer Representatives, misunderstood contracts, etc.) resulted in waste, fraud, abuse, and contracting and control issues that had not been experienced on the same scale before (see the Commission on Wartime Contracting report, POGO report, Isenberg’s book, “Shadow Force,” etc.). From those lessons, the UN should learn HOW to contract properly, since, as Kinsey put it above, “the market for logistics/security is here to stay.”
However, what is most important? I hold that it is “ending the scourge of war,” protection of civilians (PoC), prevention of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) atrocities, and human security. Finding the best mix of resources to accomplish the UN’s primary aim should not be to the exclusion of any assets or resources which can promise to assist in achieving these primary goals. The focus needs to be on the “peacekept” and peacebuilding and this will necessarily involve private companies, whether they be in logistics, or laundry, or security. Peacebuilding (and it is all really “peacebuilding” from a UN point of view) requires an integration of the international with the local through the use of NGOs, IOs, regional organizations, politicians, governments, and private actors. Better integration of the vast array of actors, enforceable contracts, clearer regulation, more specific to PSCs and not “mercenaries,” — and acknowledgement of actors’ roles throughout the process — rather than exclusion seems to be the way forward. In the end, ending violence and increasing human security needs to be the one light at the end of the tunnel guiding the use of peacekeepers and PSCs.
One further note on regulation: Although they may sometimes be difficult to enforce, and some may need to be amended, the laws are on the books to hold perpetrators accountable (Geneva Conventions (comprehensive); Hague Convention IV; (U.S.: anti-torture statute; MEJA; UCMJ; Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000; IG Act of 1978; Gun Control Act of 1968; Defense Base Act; National Firearms Act; Arms Export Control Act; ITAR; DFARS – “Contractors Supporting a Force Deployed for Contingency, Humanitarian, Peacekeeping or Combat Operations (June 05); DoD Instruction 3020.41; “Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the U.S. Armed Forces” (Oct 05); General Order #1 of the COCOMs)). It takes political will to use them. Just as Ms. Pingeot points out, for example, the Uruguayans are prosecuting their offenders; certain other countries have chosen not to prosecute theirs, whether they be peacekeepers or PSC employees.
I have read these comments with great interest and am pleased to see a vibrant dialogue between diverse communities.
I would like to make a number of points.
First, let’s dispel the enduring myth of objectivity (alluded to above by David Isenberg in the case of Doug Brook’s contribution). All contributions here (and elsewhere) come from particular normative positions. This is true as much of the academic community as anyone else. Mainstream academic debate is built on the (spurious) foundations of detached objectivity in order to lend ‘scientific’ credibility to this form of knowledge, though in the final analysis, value judgement is unavoidable.
In wider debates (academic/otherwise) around PMSC, we can identify at least 3 normative positions and these could include (1) that the industry in and of itself is a problem (those advocating this position might strive to have it outlawed altogether, however unlikely that is), (2) there exist problems of the industry (to be resolved through regulation and so forth), and (3), which is where I locate myself, following Colonel T.X. Hammes, contractors roles should be limited to work ‘within the wire’, and they should not be permitted to operate in an armed role for strategic reasons. Regulating the use of weapons under challenging conditions is not only a non-starter, but also stands as one the most controversial aspects of the industry for those looking in from the outside.
Second, having conducted field-research with the both the UN and NATO peacekeepers over the last decade – including those implicated in the sexual abuse of local women and children – and contractors from the industry over the last 3 years, what I would argue (hardly novel perhaps) is the most important factor in contractor conduct is not regulation, international/domestic law, codes of conduct, oversight and such, but rather, the values, attitudes and overall social calibre of the contractor in question. This is influenced by his culture, background and peer-group (amongst other things). This is not to say regulation and decisive response to transgression has no effect on behaviour, but rather should caution against defaulting to these ‘structural’ aspects of the industry in debate, where accountability mechanisms are seen as the ‘answer’ to the problems in the industry.
Third, and linked, there remains little in-depth research into the contracting community themselves. Much is written, much assumed yet little known. What do regulations, codes of conducts and laws mean to them? How are they interpreted and responded to (or otherwise)? Until we know more about what makes people on the ground tick, interventions of the kind we see today are but a blunt instrument of reform.
Think on this: rather than deploy 15,000 peacekeepers or contractors to the DRC (as an example), what might we expect to be the impact on the local (particularly female) population if we send 15,000 male academics?
Don’t know where to start in this paper. But here’s my favorite line. I think it says it all really.
“Foot soldiers are not the ideal source of security protection in any case.”
There are a hundred such lines in there that show gaping holes in knowledge of how security operations are actually conducted. Really not worth going into this at all – very disappointing effort.
Hey Lou,
Love the report. Have one question though?
Does the UN use, hire, or contract PMSCs every year, or how often they use them?
Best
Andrew
Christopher Kinsey states in his 18 July post “Unless someone can come up with a better solution the market for logistics/security is here to stay, at lest for the time being.”
Based on the demand side of the equation, the “time being” is likely to last far into the future. I propose that the debate on the use of contractors by government entities is over. The issue has shifted to how do governments gain the most efficiency from the use of contractors. And PSC’s are a subset of the overall debate.
The most recent use of PSC’s occurred during a time of nearly unlimited resources and almost very limited practical experience using PSC’s on the demand side. Government entities had little experience creating requirements, hiring companies, or overseeing contracts. The entire demand side was inexperienced. I believe the demand side is now much more educated and experienced with the use of contractors on the battlefield, to include the use of PSC’s. Add in the pressure of constrained resources, and I see governments moving to create the policies and tactics, techniques, and procedures that will improve the overall system at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of employment.
COL Bill Fuller
The Eisenhower School
National Defense University
Interesting points. It is always fascinating to read what academics and others have to say about my industry. As a security contractor that has worked for several PMSC’s in various war zones, and as a blogger that covers the security contracting industry specifically, stuff like this is interesting to me. I am also keen on bringing up that in which is missed in these discussions.
So here are some thoughts to add to this post. I noticed that there was no mention of the UN and their dealings with Executive Outcomes–probably one of the most famous and controversial PMSC’s in the history of the business.
That Kofi Annan actually approached EO to contract their services to end the genocide in Rwanda? And does anyone here know why the UN did not use EO to end that genocide? Anyone? Well, low and behold, I have it straight from the CEO of EO–Eeben Barlow–as to exactly why the UN did not use them. Here is his quote:
“Rwanda was a horrific UN failure where lives were equated to dollars. Doug’s comments aren’t entirely correct: EO wasn’t “between assignments” nor were we on our way to New York. The UN turned it down because we were “too expensive” – even though we were several hundred million dollars cheaper than they were.”
Eeben was replying to a comment that Doug Brooks made about the UN’s dealings with EO. Here is that quote:
“IA-Forum: Kofi Annan floated the idea for Rwanda, but it landed like a lead balloon.
Mr Brooks: The UN contacted [Executive Outcomes] and said, “Could you end the genocide in Rwanda?” This was probably about two weeks into the genocide when nobody else in the world was willing to go in there, to deploy their military. And so EO is sort of between assignments… They said, “Yea, we could do that.” …They got the tickets and were about to head to New York and got another phone call saying the deal’s off.
Shortly afterwards Kofi Annan would famously say, “Maybe the world’s not ready to privatize human security.”
Here is the link to that interview that Doug gave.
http://www.ia-forum.org/Content/ViewInternalDocument.cfm?ContentID=6625
Even David Isenberg wrote about Kofi Annan contacting PMSC’s to end the genocide in Rawanda. Quote:
“But beyond that, the subject of contractors being used as soldiers in peace operations, and not just providing support, is getting increasingly serious consideration. Remember that at the height of the Rwanda crisis, the Undersecretary-General for Peacekeeping Kofi Annan became so desperate for troops that he even considered hiring DSL to stop the genocide. Not one of 19 states then participating in the U.N. Standby Arrangements System chose to contribute military forces. Ultimately, Annan did not hire a private firm, saying, “The world may not be ready to privatize peace.”
And here is that link.
http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2009/02/27/Dogs-of-War-Blue-helmets-and-bottom-lines/UPI-23121235775226/#ixzz2ARYKb5eb
But probably the best article I have ever read about this UN/PMSC relationship was written by Eeben Barlow himself. He even provides how much EO would have cost versus the UN’s costs to do the same mission. Pretty damning if you ask me, and definitely worth your time to read…
http://www.homeland1.com/homeland-security-columnists/the-counter-terrorist/articles/781646-un-peacekeeping-operations-in-africa/
Finally, Doug Brooks pointed out the obvious of all of this. Quote:
“The much maligned South African PMC, ‘Executive Outcomes’ (EO), actually brought two African wars to an end, and they did it cheaper and faster than would have been possible using multinational organisations. In Sierra Leone, ECOMOG (the Cease- Fire Monitoring Group of ECOWAS) spent hundreds of millions of dollars over several years, losing a war that EO had won in ten months for only 35 million dollars. Before that, in Angola, the UN spent 1.5 billion dollars in its failed attempt to solidify a peace under the Lusaka Protocol that EO had created in a year’s fighting, for only 80 million dollars. In both cases, the PMC had done the hard combat, but the subsequent peace was lost because the international organisations were unable to provide the effective post-conflict security necessary to establish a long-term settlement. In both cases, EO. . . Could easily have continued to provide the necessary security that would have permanently ended those wars.”
http://www.accord.org.za/publications/conflict-trends/downloads/436-conflict-trends-20001
So after reading all of this, it is interesting and puzzling to see the various UN positions on PMSC’s go from bash them in public and in reports, but quietly use them to support their operations in places like Somalia, or ask them to stop genocides in places like Rwanda.
But hey, we will continue to cook your food, train your troops, set up your camps, fly your goods and people, and stand guard at your gates–because that is what we do.
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By the way, for those academics that think there are not enough resources aboutt the guys on the ground who work in PMSC’s, my blog and Eeben Barlow’s blog are two resources that have been available for several years now. And both resources are easily searched and categorized.
http://eebenbarlowsmilitaryandsecurityblog.blogspot.com/2008/11/failures-of-un-in-africa.html
Mr. Jundi’s points (and links) are exceptionally revealing and helpful in seeing the view from the other side. The majority of research, reports, and academic writing does present a sour picture of the role of PSCs, yet privatization in general, and the privatization of security in particular, is an integral part of transitioning from international intervention/occupation to a state regaining security when the government lacks sufficient resources to create/maintain that security themselves. The arguments for NOT using PSCs almost always fall along the lines of accountability, legitimacy, human rights, waste, fraud, and abuse, but fail to fully evaluate efficiencies and effectiveness that can be found through privatization of certain functions, especially when time is of the essence, e.g. positive: Angola, Sierra Leone; negative: Rwanda, DRC.
I have chosen to write my PhD dissertation on this very subject (Entitled: “Outsourcing Human Security: The Pros and Cons of Private Security Companies in Peacekeeping”) and have found Mr. Barlow’s book to be exceptionally enlightening as the view from the other side. Mr. Jundi has noted that there is a gap in the literature (and a great deal of misinformation) on EO’s actions in Angola and Sierra Leone; I have found the same thing, and as a result, have focused a good deal of my dissertation looking at EO’s actions (among other PMCs/PSCs) in Sierra Leone and Angola. In evaluating the fitness of PSCs to conduct peacekeeping, I discovered one inescapable and repeating theme: “One cannot evaluate whether or not PSCs can be used for peacekeeping because they’ve never done it.” (I was originally going to use the question of whether or not PSCs could conduct peacekeeping for the UN but was told that not enough evidence supports any conclusion I could draw.) I believe that sufficient evidence exists such that the question can be answered, but that is beside the point.
In many cases, one can directly compare incidences that Mr. Barlow describes with incidences that the UN describes in its reports, and what I have found is NOT that the “answer lies somewhere in the middle,” but that entire sections of activity by PSCs like EO have been omitted from the UN record. No credit given for the creation of stability which enabled UN troops (or officials on mission) to “intervene” in the first place. (Just so I am clear, I am not saying that EO missed out on “credit” or pats on their backs; what I am saying is that, had the UN or other international agencies/coalitions worked closely with firms such as EO or Sandline (or even GSG early on in SL), and established transitional boundaries (i.e. when will EO stop and the UN take over), things would most certainly have been different.
There are parallels that can be drawn between MPRI’s involvement in BiH and EO’s involvement in both Sierra Leone and Angola; however, the similarities seem to end there. EO, as one of the first PMCs/PSCs was an anomaly not easily accepted by the UN, and as a result, for myriad reasons, there was poor coordination between the UN and EO (and zero collaboration). Had EO had the support of the international community (or coalitions of nations) that MPRI or DynCorp (for example) enjoyed in BiH, the extended conflicts in Angola and Sierra Leone (conflict effectively ended at the termination of EO’s contracts, but renewed following their departure) could possibly have ended much sooner, saving hundreds of thousands of limbs and lives.
Of course there has to be accountability by PSCs. The actions of many PSC employees have damaged reputations of PSCs in specific and in general, but what I found from my research is that the human rights abuses perpetrated by UN peacekeepers FAR outnumber the human rights abuses perpetrated by PSCs, both in number and scale. Unfortunately, perception caused by a few PSC employees or incidences (Nisour Square, Bosnia, Abu Ghraib, etc.) has resulted in the effective elimination of a valuable resource that could be used in peacekeeping and stability operations by the UN. (Don’t get me wrong, I know that PSCs are used as security for the UN, to protect themselves, but there is an attitude that, “the UN will NEVER use PSCs for peacekeeping.” I heard this sentence in different forms from officials I interviewed at the UNDPKO and the UNDSS, as well as from academics or NGO practitioners in the field.)
I understand that the above is a relatively simple coagulation of polemics and that there is much more to this issue, but I think it is imperative that if truly ending the “scourge of war” as the UN proclaims is to happen through engagement, peacebuilding, and intervention, then coordination, collaboration, and cooperation between ALL available (and willing) agencies must be considered.
CDR Dan Straub