A quick thought for any Argentinian friends who might be angry about a nearby British nuclear submarine: Distance from London to Buenos Aires = 6913.5 miles … publicly estimated range of Trident D5 SLBM = >7,000 miles.
…back of an Argentine envelope
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I’ve got some other numbers that go with that:
Chance of Britain nuking Argentina: 0
IQ of British commander/politician who thought it was a good idea to put Britain’s nuclear deterrent in the middle of something completely irrelevant to it: Also 0
Yep, it’s not credible as a deterrent because it represents too much escalation. The Argentinians also know that it’s not credible. And they know that they’re in range at all times anyway (in fact the minimum range is 1,500 miles, so there is precisely no point in having a boat sitting off their coast).
But it’s a nice way to paint the Brits as nasty aggressors – which is the point.
Hehehe, excellent point.
I have a figure of my own, if I may… likelihood of the Argentinians really knowing where our boomers are at any point in time: -0%
Absolutely.
I’m curious: how much is it costing to send this submarine for the time intended, and how does that compare to sending other HMS vessels? Basically, is this the cheapest option for muscle-flexing, as opposed to actual capability?
Hi Charles – they’re not ‘sending’ it – it’s continuously at sea. The point is that its got range of half the planet.
Is hanging around the Falklands part of it’s normal patrol route? If not, I would consider that sending it there specifically.
While it may have range of half the planet, the point I’m trying to make is that of physical presence in the waters around Argentina and the Falklands: it’s a symbol to the UK public and Argentina that the government is doing something, despite the reality that they would never launch a nuclear attack over this issue, however as far is symbols and an image of still flexing it’s naval muscle, would this be considered the cheapest option available?
Hi Charles,
I do not think this will be the best possible application for these resources.
First of all, though the obscurity of it all piques my academic interest, I am immediately struck by the futility of having knowledge of Vanguard patrol routines, even if only based on (semi-)educated guesswork. This is a block of data that I will never be able to do anything with, mainly due to a patriotic (there, I said it) side that would not like to present the slow kid of a foreign intelligence agency with a starting point. Are they ever assigned patrol areas in the south Atlantic? Shrugs. Dunno…
In addition to this, (and as the second point), an SSBN cannot be used as a traditional show of force. It cannot ‘show’ – showing is counter to its primary purpose. If we had to say: ‘look, we present you with the HMS Vanguard’, then some tool may come along with an anti-ship missile or torpedo and turn her into an artificial reef (and a glowing one at that): if only because by herself, she represents the ability (when loaded to the gills) to turn a medium-sized country into a dam. And if played right, we would not even know whodunit (the uncertainty around ROKS Cheonan being a case in point). Even if none of this had to happen, sending an SSBN into the area is like dropping the Terminator in on a wet t-shirt contest… Regardless of the physique, he’s just not going to compete well.
Which brings us to the final point: if (God forbid), things had to heat up in the south Atlantic, you specifically do not want an expensive piece of kit that cannot contribute to the scrap with its primary ability just ambling about. The Vanguard class is reported to have torpedo tubes, but these are defensive abilities – it is so that she can protect herself against opposition attack boats if, for some or other reason, she is not accompanied by an attack boat herself. But those means do not serve her primary (deter) or even secondary (retaliate) purpose… It is at best a tertiary means – a shooting back, if you like. In short, she was never designed to kill other boats or ships, and as a result, she’ll probably be able to hold her own, but I doubt whether she’ll make for a great attack platform (such as boats designed for that purpose are – Astute class, for instance). So, if the shooting had to start, the Vanguard class would be more of a liability in this kind of match than an asset.
Just wanted to applaud the terminator in a wet t-shirt contest line… : D
Ahem… yes of course, you are welcome – on the proviso that you accept unconditionally that my attendance of such events are purely for the purpose of research on nuclear posturing in the south Atlantic.
Some basic observations:
The value of the SSBN lies in its delivery abilities, linked to its invisibility. The moment that the location of an SSBN becomes known, it has lost its immediate value. Therefore, the SSBN is not suitable for a traditional show of force – exactly because it cannot show.
Given the delivery means of the SSBN, it is therefore assigned a patrol area that enables it to reach such targets as may be deemed valid in events where a ‘second strike’ may be warranted, such as after the destruction of Britain. Given its reach (and the minimum range restrictions of the Trident), the only thing that can be derived from such a patrol area assignment, is that it will not be next to the target.
Since the locations of the vessels are secret, the government will not comment on the location – even if an adversary publicly guesses it wrong. What is more, should an adversary be able to pinpoint the location of an SSBN, it’ll spark a mole-hunt of unprecedented magnitude within the administration. This is not the type of information that is allowed to ‘just lie about’.
Finally, if the Argentineans really knew where these boats are, the value of the asset that can deliver such intelligence to them is far greater than the kudos they may receive from making the intelligence known. In other words (and as a simple rule of the thumb), if you know where your opponent’s SSBN are, the last thing you’d want to do, is to alert him to the fact that he had been cracked.
In summary: this is a cheap shot by Argentina in a desperate attempt to manufacture a claim out of mist. They know that they can state as they please and we cannot confirm or deny. At least, they’ve convinced President (for Life) Ububu of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Mongawanga (and 50% of the British population) of this. But it is not true – it is a porky.
Argentina’s vulnerable commodities based economic growth is liable to fall off a cliff in the current downturn- wage growth is low and inflation is high – estimated at 25% by independent economists (who are being fined by the govt as they refuse to massage their figures in line with the official 9% – sounds like the Greek statistical reporting office has a new home), plus foreign capital is flying out of the country. She has left herself with very little room for fiscal manoeuvering. Therefore what can she do to avert the attention of the poor and the middle class electorate who swept her back to power last October…hmm?
What was it they did in 1982…? Ah-ha, I’ve got it! Now how to avoid the nasty ending….hmm?
And cleverly, she’s doing a fairly good job of diverting domestic attention towards the Falklands. Plus gaining a degree of Latin American political support via Mercosur, even if some is only so much lip service (Brazil et al), in line with the region’s louder voice as ‘emerging economy’ power.
She’s doing the right, and frankly obvious thing, by keeping it ‘political’ and avoiding ‘other means’. There’s nothing to gain and all to lose vice versa. My hat off to you Mrs Kirchner for good politiking! (but come off it, the Falklands were settled in 1833, twenty years before Argentina existed as a constitutional republic. Frankly, Mrs. Kirchner, don’t you think it’s an insult to some very heroic Argentinian soldiers, sailors and especially airmen who died 30 years ago? But then again whenever did that bother a politician).
Just don’t expect Hague to be doing what the principled Lord Carington did anytime soon.
hi guys,
forgive my simpleness but from what i have heard / seen in the media, could this whole kerfuffle about nuclear submarines be more of a cock-up on the argentinian side (whether poor translation or poor understanding …), of having a nuclear-powered submarine in the area, not a nuclear-equipped one? as many have pointed out it makes no sense having a vanguard anywhere near, when its missiles have such range. it just strikes me as a very odd line of argument, relying on the british stand of not confirming or denying where the ssbn vessels are at any time. are other governments / the argentinian people that gullible? saying that, our majority of public, reality-tv obsessed drooling morons, (apologies) probably have about as much idea concerning our nuclear deterrent as our overseas ‘friends’.
personally, i just can’t understand the current cock-waving … it’s bloomin’ obvious if oil was found in area it would have to be shipped / processed fairly nearby, and argentina would stand to make a big old pile of cash on this, admittedly to be shared with the islanders and presumably a uk gov cut, but still, 30% of something is a lot better than 100% of nothing, which the current belligerence is encouraging.
finally, and again apologies, but fuck sean penn. grrrr.
Clever. Maybe a bit much.
I think the response of sending a SSN and modern destroyer to the Falklands is very smart. Together, with limited air support, the combined capability produces legitimate, credible deterrence to any potential aggression considered by Argentina – regardless of how likely, or unlikely.
The problem the Royal Navy faces is that these 2 assets alone consume considerable resources relative to the Royal Navy’s current fleet size in the context of sustaining this basic level of protection for the Falkland Islands for any extended period of time.
The rule is, if you need one then you better have at least three, and the real number is four. Counting destroyers and nuclear attack submarines, and considering where else the world the Royal Navy can’t be to sustain this level of basic deterence (1 modern warship and 1 modern attack submarine) for the Falklands, one might wonder if the Royal Navy is only a stopgap response, not a realistic long term response? Argentina might ponder that question.
That gives me a bitter taste to point out, but it needs to be said by someone a bit more often IMO. Like 1982, the UK government cannot expect the US to overtly help with a Falklands military challenge.
“Clever” maybe the wrong choice of adjective (the Kirchner era does attest to a number of ill advised policy decisions). But nonetheless the Argentinian Falkland’s policy it is still clearly a very sensible one.
The reality is that this is just good old fashioned geo-politics – Grand Strategics. Nothing to really get hot under the collar about, just keep playing the game. The media of course will like to make a big song and dance and no doubt ask all the wrong questions.
Historically (pre-Antarctic Treaty) the Falklands were the springboard for our Antarctic territorial claims. Which incidentally also conflict with Argentina and Chile’s Antarctic claims to this day. From both a geo-strategic and a source of potential treasure, the Falkland Islands, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands are important to our national interests, both in the South Atlantic AND Antarctica (as a staging post for power projection/influence and potential economic benefit from deposits of oil, rare earth metals e.t.c. That’s before you even consider the potential of those retreating ice shelves). Whilst this remains the case the Falkland Island overseas government will receive strong support from the U.K. government.
Argentina would be a poor brain befuddled nation to sit idly by without so much as raising a finger. In their national interest they’d like the lot – 100% of the influence & treasure – but if needs be they can probably do an adept back track and become a ‘port of support’ to industry whilst still keeping a level of a territorial claim going.
As for the current escalation, well who wouldn’t !? U.K. financial crisis, huge debt burden, Euro on our doorstep, SDSR, Afghanistan commitment, dubious excursions such as Op Unified Protector, growing Latin economic power projection… The only question left to ask is who is the modern day Sir Eric Geddes wielding the axe over here and how will we shape up at the start of the next conflict?
Sending HMS Dauntless and the debate about any SSN is good politics. Message: yes we have debt, yes we have SDSR, no we are not toothless militarily just yet.
Result – Kirchner gets domestic brownie points, a pat on the back from Hugo and the game continues…
UK sent a Nuclear equipped sub down to the South Atlantic before trouble started in 1982, it sunk the Belgrano. Read ‘We come Unseen’ for a full account.
As the Astute class is not fully built/ sea worthy/ still trying to get off a sand bank in Scotland and other more Morbid problems. A Vanguard class still has the ability to deter vessels. Its nuclear capability is as mentioned not its primary asset in this case.
However imagine as mentioned above that its all much to do about nothing. A cheap shot of politics.