Writing under the new license to be more carefree and not so serious, and recognising that this topic has been touched on already here before, I would like to offer my thoughts on the strangely discomfiting similarities between what is happening above Libya and what used to be called Humanitarian Intervention in those halycon days before September 11, 2001.
- It doesn’t matter whose hands they are, they all still wring the same. In the lead up to Western intervention in Bosnia, it was European dithering, wanting oh, so very desperately to ‘do something’ but not really sure what that might be or how it might work. Now it is the Arab League who would love an omelet but would prefer their eggs left uncracked. (The weasel words contained in the UNSCR–’all necessary measures’–were surely a clue?) This leads to difficult military missions, where things seem clear, but aren’t: ‘capture that hill’, ‘retake that province’–those are clear orders for soldiers. ‘Try and change a dictatorial regime’s behaviour’ may seem friendlier, but it is very much more fuzzy in the process.
- How little is just enough? Very few observers of the Kosovo affair were happy (then or now) when U.S. President Clinton decided to telegraph his intention by declaring that there would be no ground troops committed to the fight. More than a decade later we seem to have made the same mistake. We are (so far) lucky that this has not precipitated a move by forces loyal to Qadaffi to up the ante and change the ‘realities on the ground’. It is their limited capability, and not their good intention, that prevents it, I am quite sure.
- Airpower to the rescue agai…hang on. As if it were an advert for the F-35, the Libyan Air Interdiction Campaign again highlights the awesome ‘game changing’ power of those boys in the flying machines. But, alas, we can see, yet again, that if there is a cheap, casualty free solution to the use of force in the furtherance of your military and political objectives, airpower alone ain’t it.
- Humanitarian Intervention is nothing more than the name we give to the purposeful conflation of interests and values. Humanitarian intervention is an unavoidable contradiction. Humanitarian activity is based on four principles, none of which apply in this case:
- Humanity: requires the protection of life as the objective.
- Independence: complete autonomy from political as well as military actors.
- Impartiality: requires response according to need without discrimination.
- Neutrality: requires the avoidance of providing military or political advantage to any side over another.
I will state that again: none of these principles–the sine qua non of any humanitarian undertaking–apply to Operation Odyssey Dawn (just where do they come up with these names?). The objective is the ‘degradation of the Qadaffi regime’s military capability’, which is imminently linked–indeed constitutive of–political and military actors, and which is certainly not impartial: If rebel forces were spotted killing civilians, would they be bombed? As for neutrality, the entire operation is aimed at creating advantage for one side. It is, in fact, the lacuna in this criterion that drives all the others.
Now don’t get me wrong: I am not saying that this operation is a bad thing, or that it shouldn’t be done. What I am saying is that it is in no way humanitarian. It is an act of war: as such, its aim is to compel someone to do someone else’s will. As it so happens, it is duly sanctioned by the existing international legal organ.
It is not altogether altruistic, although, to me, that is not a reason to poo-poo it. France, for example, having already openly sided with the rebels, has a vested interest in how this little shin-dig turns out. The UK, for its part, may be looking for some way of proving that despite the deep cuts it has made to its armed forces, it is not yet relegated to ‘punching below its weight’. Canada’s slightly more than token involvement (perhaps to be followed by in a likewise manner by perhaps Spain, Denmark, and Norway) signal their solidarity with the US/West, even if the are winding down things in Afghanistan. [Invoking the Rid Principle, I will leave the Americans out of it--I expect the Usual Suspects will bring them up in the commentary that may follow.]
Perhaps the ‘boots on the ground’ that do exist, those of the Libyan rebels, understand the situation best. As the rebel spokesperson said to the World Service this morning in Benghazi, “If the West can take care of the supply lines [of the Libyan military forces], then we will take care of the rest.”
At last some plain speaking to go with somewhat wishful thinking.
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I’m not clear on the points you raise.
1. My understanding was that “all necessary measures”, rather than being “weasel words” was a broad grant of authority.
2. If Qadaffi loyalists lack the capability to “up the ante”, then what is the mistake in declaring no ground troops?
3. -
4. I see some truth to the assertion that humanitarian intervention conflates interests with values (assuming they do not overlap). But in regard to two of the four principles of humanitarian activity that you list – and you claim are not met – I think that either you are wrong or I am completely misunderstanding you (the latter being well within the realm of possibility)…
Humanity: requires the protection of life as the objective.
That doesn’t apply to this undertaking? Run a search for “protect” in the UN Resolution.
Neutrality: requires the avoidance of providing military or political advantage to any side over another.
I guess. But Qadaffi’s actions are deemed by the Security Council to be possible “crimes against humanity.” Does lack of neutrality when fending off a crime against humanity impugn our neutrality? If so, then what is the significance of that principle?
TFB, I found this to be spot on. Well put.
Humanity doesn’t really apply. Excuse me for being overly Schmittian or reactionary or what ever, but it is not possible to make a political decision in favor of humanity.
To be more specific (and relevant, too), whatever Res 1973 says, the intervention is clearly not about protecting humanity, it is about a very specific targeting of Libyan military capabilities. For example, if this war is like any other, artillery and ground troops are probably responsible for far more casualties, but most of the ordnance headed downrange is for airbases, air defense facilities, and C3. Additionally, the no-fly zone applies indiscriminately to use against combat aircraft, whether they are targeting rebel combat formations or not.
And in the long run, yes, neutrality does matter, or perhaps more precisely, impartiality. For example, if the rebels win and reprisal killings begin against Gaddafi supporters, or if the rebels commit war crimes during the civil war (as often happens in such conflicts), do we start shooting at rebels? Do we work to bring them to justice?
Dan/TFB:
To be clear, I was inquiring into…
- how the author squares the assertion of “weasel words” (which I understand to mean some attempt to avoid taking certain measures) with the text of the document he was discussing, which states “all necessary measures.” This seems to be the exact opposite of “weasel words.” Though I may be unclear on the author’s point.
- why the declaration of “no ground troops” was a mistake in light of the author’s assertion that this creates a vulnerability to a threat that, by his admission, Gadaffi has a quite limited ability to pose. If Gadaffi doesn’t pose a significant threat, then what vulnerability did we just err our way into?
- how he can claim that protection of life is not the objective (is this simply asserting that it is not “the” objective, rather than “an” objective?)
- A more thorough explanation of neutrality. I don’t see how it is possible, using his definition, to ever be neutral if a state performs any military or political action. There are always winners and losers.
That was the extent of my post. I agree with Dan’s 2nd and 3rd paragraphs.
Thank you for engaging with the original post. I welcome the opportunity to clarify what I wrote [itself perhaps the by-product of too liberally applied Ridism on my part ;-)]
1. The ‘weasel words’ in question are ‘all necessary measures’. One way of interpreting them is, as you say, that they constitute a broad mandate. To me, though, this phrase (and there are many others in the world of diplomacy*, such as ‘those most responsible’ when dealing with the mandates of international criminal proceedings) are a dodge. They allow drafters to get an agreement quickly, but because they are a dodge, they contain within them problems for later on (usually outside the negotiating room, and therefore, on someone else’s watch!). For instance, we need to ask, ‘What is necessary? Decided on by whom?”, etc. Now, the West (referred to in journo weasel words as ‘The Allies’ or ‘The Coalition’) is having to reap that which they sowed. Perhaps it is the best around which they could get consensus (or at least non-vetoed concurrence), but it is causing almost as many problems as it solved.
2. The point I wanted to make is that the declaration of ‘no ground troops’ may make sense in terms of a humanitarian objective, but it makes no sense in terms of a political/coercive one. If, as I believe (see point 3 below), the real intent is, and must be, a coercive one, telegraphing that we will not have ground troops is counter-productive. But, the problem is (and was in the 1990s, too) in order to get agreement, you need to introduce fuzziness into the resolution. What you end up with is akin to a houseboat: not much of a house, and not a great boat either.
3. The problem of neutrality is precisely my point. As you correctly point out, it is impossible “to ever be neutral if a state performs any military or political action. There are always winners and losers.” The definition of humanitarian action, on the other hand, requires neutrality. Therefore, by definition, there can be no humantarian military or political action. It is not humanitarian intervention, but rather intervention, full stop.
*Maybe, readers, we could have some fun with this. What other diplomatic weasel words exist in international legal instruments? (‘Without prejudice to final status’, ‘We take note of’ as opposed to ‘we acknowledge’, as opposed to ‘we undertake to remain seized of’, etc.) And what grief do they lead to down the road?
Just a point of clarification–as one of the few lawyers (insofar as I am aware) frequenting this forum, I hasten to point out that while such “weasel” language is usually the product of lawyers’ drafting, not all lawyers are weasels.
I would suggest that the allegedly weasel words used nicely captured what had been agreed, to the extent that it had been agreed. In my view, that’s a pretty useful thing to do. It is not possible to usefully iron out all possible details. Should the UNSC also vote on each airstrike? I consider it to be adequately clear.
*Only the greatest weasel words ever: ‘The US has no greater friend or Ally than (insert country here)’
FB,
Thanks, that clarified each of my questions.
And as someone 2 months from a JD, I agree with Cincinnatus.
While I realize this makes ma a bit of a dinosaur on here, my specific subject for my post-graduate legal degree was “humanitarian intervention” (“HI”) (at least as it was known in the mid 1970′s) under the tutelage of the rather unlikely pair of professors, the late Dean Rusk and John Norton Moore.
From this perspective, in large part I agree with your post and would add the situational evidence certainly supports the assertion that this has little to do with “humanitarian” (in the traditional sense of HI) concerns but much more to do with other considerations, the nature and details of which (from the many conflicting and even self-contradictory media reports and statements of various officials) seem to depend on which nation is trying to justify the action and which day and hour one looks.
At least for now, the US is stumbling over itself as to its mission objectives doing all it can to avoid the dreaded phrase “regime change” while France and other “willing” coalition members contend the effort must result in Qaddafi’s ouster. as the post points out, the US also has repeated its past error in stating there will be no US boots on the ground.
Again, from my “Usual Suspect” perspective, this is yet another of the ever-increasingly stupefying political and diplomatic mis-steps of our current Masters who seem hell-bent on proving their lack of will, inability to make timely decisions and general ineptitude at every turn.
I will await with bated (and jaded-I know it doesn’t fit but you get the idea) breath the usual mission-creep or mission-morph that will follow the realization that the “surgical” air effort cannot achieve the objectives–whatever they may be at a given moment. As an old infantryman, it seems we will never learn that such things as kinetic intervention from above will always be self-limiting without coordinated efforts on the (gasp) ground.
Regardless of the means the “coalition” adopts, however, the real problem remains (echoes of Iraq?) what is the reason for doing so and what is the desired (or more to the point the likely) end state?
Interesting.
What we are seeing in the air campaign is nothing new, though not, as FB states, an advert for the F-35.
More an advert for Tomahawk missiles and the B-2. . .just to make sure I don’t overly agree with FB (must maintain my distance, ya’know).
Absent airpower the ground situation would be lost, or at least heavily invested in unnecessary friendly lives lost. In either case, too costly a price to be paid if we do not own the skies.
“As an old infantryman, it seems we will never learn that such things as kinetic intervention from above will always be self-limiting without coordinated efforts on the (gasp) ground.”
Indeed, and because of advances in technology, targeting, strategy and doctrine, again we are seeing an example where airpower is the primary fire and ground power may be supporting fire, if it is necessary at all.
We shall see.
With deference to those magnificent men in their flying machines and as augmented by our vaunted technology reflected in Tomahawk, I remain skeptical that very much of substance (in terms of the political end state) will be attained without some effective military presence on the ground. It has ever been so.
Another more abstract though profoundly important question raised by this and other similar attacks over the last 15 years or so with the advent of such relatively accurate cruise missile and other technology is the extent to which it encourages nations with the capability to violate the sovereignty of the targeted nation when they would not otherwise due to the necessity to “get their hands dirty” and the concomitant effect this has on international legal norms since Westphalia.
“It has ever been so” is not much of an argument (stated nicely, of course). This is especially true especially when we have all sports of game-changing developments in the world of weapons and targeting, etc.
Once a decision has been made to engage in battle, what is the compelling reason to put at risk your own troops rather than use stand-off, especially when you don’t have to?
Throughout history, one of the primary aims of weapons development has been to remove your own forces from the reach of the enemy while simultaneously retaining the ability to strike the enemy, either by using the sling, the bow and arrow, all the way to JDAMs and Tomahawk missiles.
Why the concern now over expanding “reach?” Isn’t this a natural evolutionary step in warfare, to have the ultimate reach?
Yes, I understand the “encourages nations” to violate sovereignty argument, but I really don’t see it that way. War is the ultimate violation of sovereignty, be it by tossing rocks over the wall to launching Tomahawks, the violation is the same.
Some think reach might make the use of force more palatable, but I think not, at least not more so than before. Bad politicians making ill-advised decisions to go to war will always make that bad decision, as they (in my opinion) don’t much think of possible friendly losses when it comes down to it. However, one must never underestimate the “Mama Factor” when discussing the use of force.
To me, the bigger threat is the “do something” mission. That is the real problem we face. With do something as the objective, regardless of weapon choice, the decision to do something will over-ride sound judgment.
Just my thought. . .
Nice highlight of this little piece of realpolitik that is playing out in the desert. And I guess from the UK perspective, it doesn’t harm to show that we’re not run by multi-national oil companies after all?
“It is not altogether altruistic, although, to me, that is not a reason to poo-poo it.”
Nor I, but Britain’s enthusiasm is probably more tempered by the desire not to see BP kicked out of Libya by a tenacious Gaddafi, rather than insecurity over how virile we remain post SDSR.
“… Operation Odyssey Dawn (just where do they come up with these names?).”
I was always of the understanding that there were two people, kept in two separate rooms, both of whom suffer from Tourette’s Syndrome. I’m sure you see where I’m heading with this, and it seems like that’s how we get a lot of the names for our Ops and Ex’s…
Sounds like someone starring in ‘blue movies’ if you ask me…
Wait…do mine eyes deceive me, or is that GR, CJ, and FB more or less in agreement with each other? (at least for a while, anyway. As an old(ish) infantry guy myself, I tend towards CJ’s view on things that fly…) Nice one.
All part of my kinder and gentler approach to life as one of my New Year’s Resolutions. Join me in a chorus of Kumbaya anyone?
Given my current infectious medical condition, I think a manly embrace with FB is in order.. . you know. . .sharing the luv.
Cheers, “I’m not dead yet, just in Texas”
Having kind of enjoyed the movie “The Patriot”, I am brought to believe that a bunch of freedom loving militias fighting for their land could easily do that with success and go on conquer the sky if they feel like it. The role of the NFZ in this scenario being somewhat similar to the unfamous one played by the french navy in the “patriot” days.
Regime change might hide behind the stated humanitarian commonplaces, but it was the stated goal of several countries after Feb. 17, well before the NFZ. If time is working for the “patriots”, this well defined political objective will be achieved. (By the way I wonder what Afghanistan could have looked like if the urge to use ground troops could have been withstood).
Recognizing that the film you cite was just the slightest bit biased (not surprising since Mad Max produced and played the leading role), the area of operations loosely portrayed in the film produces a cautionary element to your comparison to the “freedom fighters” in Libya.
For example, if one considers the Kings Mountain battle that occurred in our revolution and aspects of which were very loosely used in the “Patriot,” it bears noting that most historians and at least this infantryman nunc lawyer would characterize the actions of the “freedom fighters” (largely the rough and tumble “over the mountain boys” who, probably like their Muslim Brotherhood led contemporaries in Benghazi, cared little for the niceties of decent society) as butchery of their misfortunate Tory opponents.