We have on KOW previously commented upon the UK’s Strategic Defence and Security Review. In capsule form, we reckoned it to be pretty dreadful. The UK had reached its ‘strategic moment’ and the government blew it. Professor Michael Clarke, director of the Royal United Services Institute, put it more delicately in his chapter in the recent RUSI publication A Question of Security: The British Defence Review in an Age of Austerity:
Britain’s prosperous and free way of life deserves–and requires–defending. That can only be done with adaptation, new partnerships alongside traditional alliances, a great deal of guile and some strong political nerves. The problem is not that national policy-makers have failed to see any of this. They have grappled with the strategic environment and can see a world of 2020 and beyond with a consistent vision for the UK. The problem is rather that the immediate political and financial imperatives have meant that it is not clear that UK defence and security policy will reach 2015 in any sort of shape. The long-term may be difficult, but the short term has proved well-nigh impossible. Unfortunately, the strategic moment is already upon us.
Amongst the most desperately short-sighted decisions of the SDSR was the frankly inexplicable decision to jettison the country’s maritime air capabilities in favour of retaining RAF Tornados. I welcome the letter published in the Daily Telegraph today ‘Military experts warning over defence spending review‘ from a group of distinguished officers and academics, including my colleague Professor Andrew Lambert, urging the Minister to reconsider the decision and suggesting a more strategically sound and cost-effective alternative. Read the whole thing. The current government has shown strength of character and wisdom reversing course on policies such as the selling off of woodlands which did not stand up to sobre second thought. I applaud them for that and hope that they will show similar maturity and good judgment in this case.
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If the numbers hold up (and I’d be surprised if they don’t, given the names underwriting this), this suggestion appears to be the Goldilocks solution.
Sorry David and without being rude or disrespectful to its authors, that letter is a load of biased service centric wishful thinking typical of the lobby that thinks the answer to every problem is a dash of RN with a sprinkling of FAA, we are island don’t you know.
First off, they deploy the gnarly old Falklands argument, almost guaranteed to get one laughed off the park.
What follows doesn’t get any better, cherry picking arguments, ignoring reality and presenting a highly biased view. They say the Tornado is being maintained, is that actually true, it is being wound to 18 FE@R by 2015, possibly even earlier if the rumours are to be believed. They also fail to take into account the very real fact that the RN’s obsession with CVF has led them to this position, not some grand scheming by the RAF. Did the RN argue much when Sea harrier was withdrawn, no, not really. Was the FAA able to maintain the training and logistics for their GR9’s, again, look into the real facts and you will see massive support from the RAF, as unpalatable as that might seem.
Then the letter goes on to whine and whinge about harmony levels and how maintaining both types would reduce costs, no it wouldn’t, you achieve savings by eliminating types, not shaving them around the edges.
To round out this wholly biased nonsense is a load of unsubstantiated claims straight from the pages of the Phoenix Think Tank web site.
In short, the letter does the FAA and RN case more harm than good
If they really want to highlight the damage SDSR has done they should draw attention to the reduction in ISTAR, maritime patrol, surface vessels and RFA, not a capability that has only been essential once in the last 30 years.
I don’t know TD… if we’re going down the path of basing our means requirements on when last capabilities had been essential, then we may as well hold a fire-sale right now – everything must go!
After the draw down in Afghanistan, we’ll only need a couple of guards units for royal weddings and funerals (those Japanese tourists do love a nice uniform).
I think you’ve pretty much hit the nail on the head here. The RN top brass has allowed the fleet to be gutted in their relentless quest for the new carriers, when the last time fixed wing naval aviation was essential (as opposed to useful) was in 1982. The future operations that the UK will be required to undertake simply don’t require large fixed wing carriers. If you try to suggest this on any pro-navy website, however, the responses usually range from hostility to downright abuse. We need frigates/corvettes, 3 or 4 CVH-type vessels, SSNs and replacement of most of the RFA fleet. Early disposal of both QE and POW is a distinct possibility; what a scandalous waste of £6 billion!
Hi Quintin, no, that’s not what I am saying but defence has a finite budget and preparing for every last eventuality when there are more pressing matters does not a sensible strategy make. It is all about priorities, so keeping carrier fast air at a time of higher priority needs elsewhere is fundamentally wrong, blinkered and wholly service centric.
This kind of service centric thinking is the type of thinking that has got us into the mess we are in now, more of the same isn’t going to help
Of course you are right TD, service partisanship is the last thing we need right now. And the reason why these topics are still on the table (so to speak), is because SDSR had foregone any sort of prioritisation (apart from the obvious ‘let’s save money and quickly’). So we can expect more of the same type of discussion in the near and mid-term.
The doubt that I have (and I confess that mine is a morbid curiosity, based as it is on a casual and somewhat bored observation) – did anybody involved in SDSR try to answer the question on how long this down-turn is going to last? It is obviously only a conjecture, but a critical one at that.
If the estimate is that we should be in ‘blue waters’ within a year or two, then clearly the nature of the cuts made to date will represent a knee-jerk reaction (one that we will pay dearly to correct at a later stage).
If the estimate is 5 to 10 years, then we’ve probably cut about the right amount (although not in the right places).
If longer than that, reaching all the way out to ‘never’, then we should reconsider our stance in the international community now, declare neutrality and sell our assets while there are still countries with the financial means to buy them. (How do you spell ‘HMS Queen Elizabeth’ in Mandarin?)
My money is on the first scenario, hence the ‘bored’ assertion of earlier. This has the inevitability of a train-smash written all over it.
But whatever the future holds for us, please, please, pretty please: could we all agree not to have super-carriers without aircraft? Either get aircraft, or get rid of the carriers? It is embarrassing to say the least, and a galactic waste of money.
Yes, that keeps making me scratch my head, too.
On one hand, the Government seems to be planning on a hard but short economic downturn, so as to allow a recovery well in time for the next elections – rather important for winning it.
(Perhaps 2.5 years from 1st Jan 2010?)
On the other hand, the SDR cuts are planned out over a 10 year (2 election) timeframe, with it taking that long for all removed capabilites to have some form of replacement.
Why the discrepancy?
Of course, if you are trying to to save 15%, but still need the same number of ships / planes / AFVs, etc. then you probably need to cut by 30%, and spend half your savings on a cheaper alternative to what you have lost.
That doesn’t seem to explain the timescales, though.
I’d like to think that the Government was being smarter than they seem in the SDR, and have a plan. Call me a wild optimist.
Perhaps there is an intent to put a lot more money into Cyber, and other indirect warfare methods, (economic, information,) in the belief that this is more usable?
7.5% cut back loaded towards 2015.
real-term increases from 2015 onward.
> The UK’s defence budget will be cut by 7.5% in real terms over four years. UK defence spending is likely to fall to 2.2% of GDP in 2014, down from 2.7%. If all operational spending has ended by 2014, the defence/GDP ratio is projected to fall further, to an estimated 2.0%. Despite this cut, defence’s share in total departmental expenditure is due to rise from 8.7% to 9.1%.
> If projected savings prove impossible to achieve, the MoD may be forced to look at further cuts in front-line capabilities in order to balance its books. The SDSR was careful not to claim that it has identified all the savings that will be needed to close this funding gap, even for the next four years. The SDSR has only just begun to identify where savings can be made.
> By 2015, land forces will account for around 65% of total service personnel, compared with current levels of around 55% in the US and France, 53% in Canada, and 50% in Australia. The main determinant of the outcome of the SDSR, beyond the need to make substantial financial savings, was the decision to ring fence capabilities that were required for support of ongoing operations in Afghanistan.
“The current government has shown strength of character and wisdom reversing course on policies such as the selling off of woodlands which did not stand up to sobre second thought. I applaud them for that and hope that they will show similar maturity and good judgment in this case.”
This rather accepts the notion that the government were not intent on a radical change in direction post afghanistan.
As noted by RUSI’s Malcom Chalmers last October:
> But there will be a strong case for a new ‘interim’ SDSR once substantial progress has been made on withdrawal from Afghanistan. Indeed, on one influential reading, the government has been content to leave a large funding gap after 2015 precisely because it knows that it will want to rebalance the force away from land capabilities post-Afghanistan, but does not believe that it would be politic to say so now.
Further explored here:
http://jedibeeftrix.wordpress.com/2011/02/22/sdsr-part-deux-%E2%80%93-further-reductions-to-come/
sorry – comment was badly formatted and delete/edit function is borked on linux.
“I applaud them for that and hope that they will show similar maturity and good judgment in this case.”
This rather accepts the notion that the government were not intent on a radical change in direction post afghanistan.
As noted by RUSI’s Malcom Chalmers last October:
> The UK’s defence budget will be cut by 7.5% in real terms over four years. UK defence spending is likely to fall to 2.2% of GDP in 2014, down from 2.7%. If all operational spending has ended by 2014, the defence/GDP ratio is projected to fall further, to an estimated 2.0%. Despite this cut, defence’s share in total departmental expenditure is due to rise from 8.7% to 9.1%.
> If projected savings prove impossible to achieve, the MoD may be forced to look at further cuts in front-line capabilities in order to balance its books. The SDSR was careful not to claim that it has identified all the savings that will be needed to close this funding gap, even for the next four years. The SDSR has only just begun to identify where savings can be made.
> By 2015, land forces will account for around 65% of total service personnel, compared with current levels of around 55% in the US and France, 53% in Canada, and 50% in Australia. The main determinant of the outcome of the SDSR, beyond the need to make substantial financial savings, was the decision to ring fence capabilities that were required for support of ongoing operations in Afghanistan.
> But there will be a strong case for a new ‘interim’ SDSR once substantial progress has been made on withdrawal from Afghanistan. Indeed, on one influential reading, the government has been content to leave a large funding gap after 2015 precisely because it knows that it will want to rebalance the force away from land capabilities post-Afghanistan, but does not believe that it would be politic to say so now.
Further explored here:
http://jedibeeftrix.wordpress.com/2011/02/22/sdsr-part-deux-%E2%80%93-further-reductions-to-come/
Hi Jedi
I think I have explained why relying on percentages demonstrates a complete lack of understanding as to why they are different and also fails to take into account the distortions caused by USCG, USMC, RFA, contractorisation, PFI etc etc
My post on the subject was a bit back of a fag packet, so I might dig deeper into the figures and see where it goes.
My hunch is, its not as bad as RUSI make out, which would not surprise me given the maritime bias that they seem to be showing of late
Hi TD,
“My post on the subject was a bit back of a fag packet, so I might dig deeper into the figures and see where it goes.”
I would of course always be happy to see a broader comparison between the forces than merely manpower.
“My hunch is, its not as bad as RUSI make out, which would not surprise me given the maritime bias that they seem to be showing of late”
What must be remembered is that RUSI starts from the position that a maritime/continental choice is essential if Britain is to remain in the strategic power-projection game.
So while you might not agree with the premise, it is worthwhile considering the possibility that RUSI sincerely hold that view, and when they recommend one over the other it is because a choice ‘must’ be made rather than a desire to exhibit irrational bias as you suppose.
All there literature presupposes a desire to preserve strategic political effect, completely outside of traditional defence-of-the-realm stuff, and they apparently lean towards maritime even though they recognise the validity of continental.
You need to accept that “bias” and “rational-analysis” are both concepts that can be exercised in the absence of your approval, the lack of which does not automatically signal an unfavourable opinion or feeling formed beforehand or without knowledge, thought, or reason.
I don’t think I do need to accept bias, it’s OK taking a position and arguing from a position of fact, but distorting those figures and presenting them as fact is in my humble opinion, bias.
As I said, there are many many reasons why the personnel figures might actually look biased but that does not make it so, even accepting the Afghanistan effects.
So however genuinely held their view that a maritime centric strategy is the best option (and it may well be, no matter what my rambling on the subject) the appearance to me at least, is biased.
Sorry
Had a go at delving into the balance question a bit more here
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2011/03/another-look-at-balance/