Raffaello Pantucci, a dear friend of mine, has penned a guest post for Kings of War on targeted killings (TK). The post is a lengthy response to a previous guest post on KoW, by Adam Stahl. Below, Raff hardnosedly (39th use of this word online) asks what the alternatives are to the current use of drone strikes. He seeks to move away from the discussion as to whether their use constitutes a strategy or a tactic, to consider instead how we have gotten to the situation we are now in, and what the options may be for the future. Engaging with this question, he makes the case for recasting the rhetoric surrounding the use of drone strikes, to take us back to talking and thinking about ‘war’, with all the gravitas implied by that term. Yet as Raff concludes, all may not be fair in war, and even in such a context, the continued use of drone strikes would require a serious investment in information operations so as to mitigate their potentially counter-productive side-effects.
My own take on this question is that the very logic presented by Raff in paragraph 3 is too compelling to the powers that be to prompt any real change, even in rhetoric. Changes surrounding the use of drones will be incremental and largely symbolic until such a day as it is demonstrated, in no uncertain terms, that they not only radicalise but that such radicalisation directly leads to terrorist attacks at home. And it is uncertain to me whether such a causality will ever be sufficiently stark to defame this ‘quick and easy’ fix to the problem of terrorism. That is not to say that change is not necessary. So, Raff, take it away…
Hand wringing over the strategic utility or definition of targeted killings is all very well and good, but if we are concerned with drone strikes (the current most prominent TKs), then a sensible idea would be to start to try to formulate some alternatives. After all, drone strikes have become the US default strategy in AfPak for a while now, and one could see how it might start to take on a similar role in Yemen or Somalia if, as appears to be the case, the perceived externally oriented threat continues to grow.
First of all, let us think about how we got to this situation. The rationale behind the deployment of drones in ever-increasing numbers was an awareness that key members of terrorist organisations or insurgent networks were operating in areas from where, for either a lack of forces or of local support, allied forces were unable to easily go and get them. Not wanting a political mess or a lot of dead soldiers, pilotless drones seem a safe option by which enemies could be dispatched without causing a messy political backlash at home. This is clearly not a perfect solution: aside from regular official complaints from the Pakistani government, there is now the case of a man who is suing the US government for $500 million for killing his brother and son in a predator strike in Waziristan on New Year’s Eve 2009 (a case that led indirectly to the unmasking of the CIA station chief in Islamabad). It has also angered some in Europe who are appalled at the notion of the US killing its citizens, with impunity, on the other side of the globe. A German MP in particular is making a lot of noise about a case where a predator strike may have killed a German citizen, and similar issues have been raised in the UK in the past and may again surface if the true identities of Abu Bakr and Mansoor Ahmed are uncovered. The US has its own domestic problem with the targeting of Anwar al-Awlaki, whose case was taken up by the ACLU. Finally, it is unclear whether this solution is resulting in too many civilians deaths and possibly inflaming the very rage that fuels the enemies later targeted in these attacks.
Clearly, the political solution that has been reached is not a perfect one, but for the leadership in Washington (whose finger is, in this case, on the trigger), the problems are manageable: they manifest themselves on the other side of the globe and not amongst a community with a vote in the US. There are some attempts to placate the discontents, but for the most they remain ignored by policymakers, who conclude that as long as domestic terrorist attacks are staved off and the body count for friendly soldiers stays relatively low, the public won’t really question government policy abroad.
What other solutions might there be?
One alternative is the deployment of units of soldiers to go snatch these individuals once they have been located, to whisk them away to places where they could be tried and convicted for their crimes. But this presents a number of problems. First, there is the likely death of friendlies, as the sought-after individuals can be expected to resist arrest. It is equally likely that these individuals would be retrieved from areas where civilians and hostiles are hard to distinguish. Any such action would likely hand a propaganda bonanza to the targeted enemy, who will loudly present any casualties resulting from the action as civilian victims (a claim that may be difficult to refute).
And even when the wanted individual is sequestered, what then? Interrogation and then presumably a trial leading to incarceration. Problematically, these interventions would often target culprits before they commit a readily convictable terrorist offense. Meanwhile, to gather evidence along with the culprit would add to an already demanding mission for the snatch team, particularly in an environment likely to be hostile. All of this would also cost money and time: court cases in the UK against groups of plotters linked to al Qaeda go on for years and cost tens of millions of pounds. If individuals are to be taken back to Europe or North America for trial, consider the costs of doing so at the frequency at which drone attacks are currently being launched. If these trials are instead held in, or near theatre, it is still going to be very expensive, and also involve additional security costs to guarantee the trial space.
Finally, even if a case was effectively carried out and a sentence passed, there is the question of long-term incarceration. Jails, presumably high-security detention facilities like Supermax, would rapidly fill up and need replacements. Then the possibility has to be considered that some of these people would live out their sentences and need releasing back into society: how would that work? Would it involve sending them back to where they came from? A lawyer may make the case that upon release a convict be naturalised as a citizens and granted the requisite rights and freedoms. We have already seen how problematic this can be with the US government’s attempt to close down Guantanamo.
The other solution is to go the other way and to ramp up strikes in the face of political opposition, on the assumption that this will be a short-term expedient to a temporary problem. This is the path currently pursued, but it is equally riven with problems. Aside from the political issues highlighted above, it is unclear whether it will resolve the situation in some permanent way. Predator drones have been deployed for over half a decade now and while they clearly instill fear in our enemies, they have not gotten rid of them, as evidenced by the continued need for drone strikes in theatre. If this tactic were a strategy by which to resolve the problem, then presumably at some point we would have run out of targets. Instead, it may be that despite, or because of these drone strikes, our enemy’s numbers are growing (something that may in turn explain their increased use and provide a worrying answer to Donald Rumsfeld’s question as to whether terrorists are being killed quicker than they are being produced).
So is there a third way?
A third way would need to maintain low casualties amongst friendlies and civilians while also capturing bad guys in a sanitised way that nonetheless takes them out of circulation. It would also need some way of addressing the political problems that plague the use of this tactic.
Maybe the solution lies in using the drones as eyes in the sky rather than as killers hovering above. Use the intelligence gathered from the drones to track enemies until they reach a location where they can be snatched by friendlies, and then placed before courts of law. The idea would be to have almost total coverage over a restricted space where the enemy was known to operate, and to grab them when they venture beyond this space – presumably on their way to carry out terrorist acts. This would keep down the amount of friendlies in danger’s way, along with the level of collateral damage.
There are a number of problems with this solution, however: first, it would require a considerable number of drones and of intelligence operators to monitor these drones. Secondly, it is hard to ensure complete cover. Intelligence is never perfect and a failure to focus on the right region or hot-spot may lead to a terrorist attack. Insurgents and terrorists are by their nature adaptive, and eventually they would figure out ways to avoid the watchers in the sky (doubtlessly they are already working on this and may already have made some headway). And none of this addresses the question of what to do once the suspects are in custody – if they are extradited to the US or a European country, we return to the problems of trials and incarcerations.
Another alternative is to focus instead on the killing capacity of the drones. Switch the weaponry on the drones; turn them into flying sniper rifles rather than flying missile carriers (I have to concede that this concept was first suggested to me by KoW blogger Tim Stevens). This would save on the collateral damage and on the number of friendlies in the line of danger. Yet aside from the technical aspects (of which I am no expert), what of the question of culpability and guilt, and the political issue of whether it is acceptable to launch assassination missions across the globe? Given the difficulties of ascertaining and proving whether it was a civilian or a terrorist who was killed, the narrative of civilians caught in the crossfire would continue. The Taliban have repeatedly shown how effective their information operations can be, and you need only have a brief conversation with people in the UK to see how effectively this message of civilian casualties spreads, often without a shred of evidence either way.
Maybe the solution lies in producing information packs to be published or released immediately after any strike, detailing who was targeted and why, including the evidence against them and of having hit the right target. This is the nightmare suggestion for intelligence or security professionals who would blanch at the prospect of sharing their jealously cherished intelligence (at least until Wikileaks gets their hands on it!). More seriously, it is of course likely that someone with a knowing eye would be able to identify informants from amongst the information released, something that would endanger their lives and probably stop the flow of useful information. It would also require the admission of local collusion in the strikes, on the part of host governments, which may complicate the political situation on the ground. The Wikileaks cables from Yemen, which show the government’s collusion with the US in masquerading drone attacks, is something that would put unsustainable pressure on any Western government found in a similar position.
Maybe the solution is much simpler: the conflict needs to be recast as a ‘war’. People die in wars, usually for a rationale that a majority of the population accepts, or which it needs to be persuaded of. NATO went to Afghanistan in the wake of 9/11 to get those who carried out that heinous act, in a move that most supported (in the West at least). Let us refocus the rhetoric and language on this fact and that the drone war is an extension of this conflict. This is not to advocate the conflict’s indefinite continuance, but let us phrase the debate about strikes within that context and continue the discussion along these lines. This framework would also force a serious public conversation on the war in Afghanistan, rather than a debate about a tactic. It would furthermore provide a better context for understanding the path that the West is now on: slowly withdrawing troops from Afghanistan while continuing with drone strikes against set targets.
Having refocused the rhetoric, the US should establish a high-level committee that includes at least one human-rights judge, a known independent (ideally foreign, UN-employed) judge or prosecutor, and another from the nation in which the strikes are taking place (probably therefore Pakistani). This committee should be given access to the targeting package information for each drone killing and should publish an annual report verifying and detailing what has taken place the year before in a fashion accessible to the public (and scrubbed of sensitive intelligence information).
There are problems in this solution: the Pakistanis (or whoever) would be admitting publicly to something they continue to condemn in rhetoric, and the recasting of drones and the Afghan conflict in the language of ‘war’ may once again inflame matters à la ‘Clash of Civilizations’. But, frankly, both of these complications are already in place. No one really believes the Pakistanis’ statements (and thanks to Wikileaks we can now see how the leadership in Yemen is also speaking out of one side of its mouth in public and another in private), and al Qaeda and the Taliban already think that they are at war (and at least for the Taliban, one they are winning). The only people who might get infuriated would be anti-war types at home, but then their anger tends to be a guaranteed byproduct of any military activity abroad. As for the argument about drone strikes deepening radicalisation: governments would need to conduct major information operations to ensure the committee’s findings are published and disseminated effectively. And clearly, drones and their impact is not the sole radicalising agent at play.
The question and permissibility of drones and targeted killings as a weapon in combat is one that the Israeli Supreme Court has wrestled with before. I would recommend reading its findings for a good debate about the issues at hand. Hopefully, all of this will serve to stimulate some more thinking on these questions, and I look forward to hopefully engaging further in this discussion on- or off-line.
Raffaello Pantucci is an Associate Fellow at the International Center for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR), his writing can be found here.
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My question on all of this is: if we had had armed UAVs available during the Northern Ireland conflict, would we have used them for targeted killing? And whatever the answer, why?
A British N.I. veteran has told me (unconfirmed) long ago that snipers were doing this kind of work. If so, they did not need to fly.
I’ve read many articles on British snipers working in Northern Ireland doing exactly this (yes, articles as opposed to first-hand accounts). Targeted killings, without wings.
What’s more controversial, sniper teams or drones? Either way, it’s targeted, with one having more chance of collateral than the other…
To me, the use of the word “drone” doesn’t accurately convey the technology involved or the mission/capabilities of these platforms. A better term would be “remotely piloted vehicles” (RPVs).
RPV is a recognized term that covers a wide spectrum of aircraft that are autonomous, semi-autonomous, or remotely operated. Calling an RPV a drone implies to the uninformed that the drone is some mindless entity, roaming around like “machine sharks,” Major General Marke Gibson, USAF Director of Operations Dec 9, 2009, UAV Conference, Tyndall AFB, FL. In fact, RPVs “are remotely controlled by a qualified pilot who is in control.”
Now, for a few comments:
“Maybe the solution lies in using the drones as eyes in the sky rather than as killers hovering above.”
Actually, RPV’s were first used specifically for ISR purposes and weaponization of the RPV came later. They are still used primarily in that capacity. We have many different types of RPVs, as well as autonomous platforms under development. They are not blind bombers. They are truly eyes in the sky for the commanders use when collecting intel, intel that may well indeed be used to detect and identify targets for destruction. Arming an RPV shortens the kill chain, and that usually is a good thing.
The problem I see with suggesting RPVs be used for tracking enemies “until they reach a location where they can be snatched by friendlies, and then placed before courts of law” negates the whole issue of using RPVs in the first place, and that is to remove friendlies from the threat area.
While our RPV technology does allow us near total and continuous coverage, it would not take an enemy very long to decide to conduct his war from “safe” areas, to use the internet as a tool for communicating with embedded terrorists. I think we see that now, actually. The beauty of an RPV is that is allows us to attack the enemy where he lives/works, while at the same time not expose our troops to added danger.
“Switch the weaponry on the drones; turn them into flying sniper rifles rather than flying missile carriers”
We have. JDAM and Small Diameter Bomb, to name a couple of very precise weapons. And with the Small Diameter Bomb Focused Lethality Munition (FLM) version now developed and fieled on manned platforms and weapons integration testing on RPVs underway, we are very close to the RPV “sniper rifle” capability. With the SDB remarkable precision and shaped charges, the target gets vaporized and everyone else in the room gets an ear-ache.
Lasers are about as precise as you can get when talking about airborne weaponry, and with the chemically-based Airborne Laser (ABL) nearing completion of its research and development, and the digitized Airborne Tactical Laser (ATL) under development, we may have such an operational capability very soon.
The use of an ABL/ATL-type of weapon against specific targets would substantially reduce collateral damage. For sure the question of “culpability and guilt remains, as does the political issue of whether it is acceptable to launch assassination missions across the globe.”
First, in my opinion, culpability and guilt via the use of an RPV is no different from any other covert operation. Sometimes nations freely admit to the deed, sometimes not. No difference if it was an RPV or a manned platform. Send in a B-2 fully “cloaked” and take out a high-value target, who’s knows where the sudden explosion came from? Same with the use of an LO RPV.
Oh, and the attack would not be an assassination, per say, but an attack that conforms to US targeting policy and in accordance with LOAC.
No matter the war, no matter the scenario, whenever you have armed conflict you will have unintentional collateral damage. Even if using Special Forces to sneak up and poke a dagger into some terrorists black heart doesn’t guarantee 100% accuracy on the target.
Regardless, is there any real difference between the use of a manned system flying overhead and the use of an RPV platform? The effects are the same, after all.
Is it because we have some people wrestling with the “morality” of the pilot sitting in an easy chair back at Creech AFB, NV, far removed from the threat? In that case, what do we want? A fair fight? Do we think it better to have a pilot flying overhead and more exposed to the threat? Would a manned platform strike be any better? The intel feeds to the manned platform or the RPV operator are the same, regardless, so the decision to pull the trigger or push the pickle-button is the same, regardless.
So, basically, I don’t see a problem with using RPVs.
But that’s just me.
I don’t disagree with much you say, but is your conclusion therefore that we need to simply continue as we are?
The risk is that this will become the long-term solution, and this seems dangerous as we are unclear as to what degree it may or may not be exacerbating current problems. But even if we assume it is not making them any worse than they already are, what about the fact that we become nations that squash people on the other side of the globe on the basis that we conclude they are up to no good? Might this not create a narrative which can be fed on to make things worse?
But maybe this is all hyperbole, and we can in fact continue as we are. Maybe we have to simply wait out a 20 odd year period before the ideas/problems at the root of the issues UAV strikes seem to address simply run their course. But how long is that going to take?
And when tribal elders get access to their own RPV’s, we will be fine with them shooting at our RPV pilots when they end their shift and go pick their kids from school, right?
…or to their own snipers?
Will we be Ok with this, or would TK then simply be murder? I read Hugo Slim’s book about the difficulty to distinguish between civilians (the innocent ones) and combatants. Would a RPV pilot after his shift be a combatant or a civilian – on his/her way collecting the children from school? And what if this school carries a name that sounds like “Berslan” or so?
I wonder whether TK will lead to a limitation of war – there are some signs it does – or to an escalation of terrorism?
“Would a RPV pilot after his shift be a combatant or a civilian ”
Combatant. However, reference the children, LOAC applies, and given the wide areas in the US, especially Nevada, it would be impossible to argue the legality of attacking a pilot while at a children’s school. In this universe, there is no military gain to justify an attack of that nature.
But then again, we are talking about thugs/terrorists, the same thugs/terrorists that see nothing wrong with using innocent civilians aboard a civilian jet to attack and murder thousands of innocent civilians.
Naturally, the children of jihadists killed by airstrikes are fair game.
Apparently you missed the LOAC component.
Apparently the CIA missed it, too.
No, “they” didn’t.
It is clear you are being obtuse, as no one believes you accept a morale equvalence between legitmate targeting efforts based on proportionality, military gain, etc (i.e., LOAC), to actions of foul black-hearted evil terrorists murdering the innocent.
Or do you. . .hmmm. . . one wonders. . . .
So, just to clarify. “We” kill targets, plus collateral children, as a tragic but legitimate act of war. If “they” killed a US pilot at home and his children were also killed, that would be evil, black-hearted terrorists murdering the innocent.
I think I’ve got it. The morality of the action depends on who does it?
“The morality of the action depends on who does it?”
Yes.
Terrorists are immoral, that is why they are terrorists.
‘Terrorists are immoral, that is why they are terrorists.’
circulus in probando
…”it would be impossible to argue the legality of attacking a pilot while at a children’s school. In this universe, there is no military gain to justify an attack of that nature. But then again, we are talking about thugs/terrorists”
You are right, in Our universe there is no military gain to justify such an attack. What about the “other’s”, the thugs’ universes? A military gain is relative to the strategic objective, which in turn is relative to the political aim – no matter if this is rationally or irrationally motivated. Then, as Hugo Slim argues in ‘Killing Civilians’ there are those civilian targets that are not “innocent” from the perspective of a fighter…especially if he is all right and the enemy is all wrong. How else could one justify the siege of Leningrad, the Rwandan massacres, or the attack on the twin towers?
I understand that targeted killing can be a successful tactic – with good results in Gaza and Lebanon – but I doubt that it is a successful strategy. The problem is to do tactically sound things without letting loose the dogs of madness. If TK helps to limit war, and to keep as many people out of the line of fire as possible, then it is small impact attritional warfare…something that takes time but eventually works…if, however, one is not able to limit war by such means, because the enemy uses TK as a countermeasure in order to escalate the war, then the frontline could run through our schoolyards – if not in Nevada then in perhaps in Colorado.
btw…to offer a reward for the killing of Salman Rushdie and Kurt Westergaard was aready a call for TK, wasn’t it?
The Law of War has evolved since WWII, and it is baffling to me to understand, let alone, justify Rwandan massacres.
“btw…to offer a reward for the killing of Salman Rushdie and Kurt Westergaard was already a call for TK, wasn’t it?”
Indeed, in a way it was. But it also was illegal by civilized standards and a direct assault on the free speech rights exercised in a sovereign nation.
‘Law of War has evolved since WWII, and it is baffling to me to understand, let alone, justify Rwandan massacres.’
Yes, there would be something wrong with us if we could understand such crimes. In Rwanda 1994 Mrs Habyarimana and her Interahamwe gangs rationalised, and justified the mass murders as part of their self-defence against the RPF ‘alien invasion’ and an alleged planned genocide against the Hutu population. The true reason was to prevent the sharing of political power – the weapon of choice was the genocide.
‘ “btw…to offer a reward for the killing of Salman Rushdie and Kurt Westergaard was already a call for TK, wasn’t it?” Indeed, in a way it was. But it also was illegal by civilized standards and a direct assault on the free speech rights exercised in a sovereign nation.’
I agree completely with your assessment. One problem is that some Muslims don’t think that non-believers are part of the civilised world. International law of war is becoming a hollow shell if the number of actors respecting it decreases further. TK is a difficult issue in this regard. Are we hollowing out the civilised law if we continue doing things we are not convinced that they are right? TK as a tactic of defence is one thing – sometimes even inavoidable…if it becomes a habit, however, I see a problem.
Cheers
Tit for tat? On the basis of that logic, should we not be flying aircraft laden with civilians into their skyscrapers?
Good luck with that, as these RPV pilots operate out of an Air Force base in the desert. . .north of Las Vegas, Nevada. . .way out in the desert. Kind of hard to sneak up on them.
What you are suggesting is akin to attacking US servicemen back in the states after (or before) they serve in Afghanistan or Iraq.
We have been to war many times and always the enemy tries to infiltrate, attack and disrupt. This is nothing new.
Heck, why stop at the servicemen? Why not include the CIA as potential targets. Oh, that has already been done: http://articles.cnn.com/1997-06-18/us/9706_18_cia.shooting_1_cia-shooting-mir-aimal-kansi-judge-j-howe-brown?_s=PM:US
We are already in the states dealing with broad terrorist threats to/in the US.
Op-Sec prohibits me from further discussion on this subject.
This has been one of the more interesting threads to follow on KOW for a while and while it looks like the arguments are well covered I will add my own two cents.
RPV, Drone or whatever they wish to call them what is being discussed in the larger sense is the questions “is the strategy really working” and that strategy is not so radical as to be something wild and new. The US has used its airpower in the past where it couldn’t or didn’t want to send its troops, nothing wrong with that per se and compared to something like carpet bombing the strikes do not have as much collateral damage as those did.
The point being made by Mr Pantucci seems to me to be not questioning the need or use of drones as part of the effort but the degree to which they are being used and relied upon to try and do things for which they are not really able to do (ie win the war) which does call into question why drones/RPVs are featured so prominently.
The number of US airstrikes using conventional aircraft has increased since Pretraus took over the war perhaps that should also be taken note of, which mirrors is some ways the use by the US of Rolling Thunder and the like in Vietnam to keep the north at the table and talking. Is the US planning to do the same while it slowly finds a way out of the mess its in?
The core of the question is more about the use of airpower to fight an insurgency. How useful is it? And as always history shows that it can be useful in facilitating the fight but is not a tool to win it.
The Rhodesians used airpower to great effect to move troops and to hit sites but the ultimate effect on the conflict was negligible.
Vietnam showed that it could support troops in battle or again provides mobility and intel but it was useless for dealing with an insurgency (unless you count chucking prisoners out the doors of a plane or chopper ala Phoenix Program).
And in places like Malaya and Borneo to Iraq and elsewhere its been a tool with tactical utility far more than any strategic utility.
Even if the US could achieve clean kills with their RPVs will that actually win over the populations, has it in Afghanistan, or will it just force the command and control underground and make it harder to target (literally and physically). I think after 10 years the answer is somewhat obvious and the notion that up the tempo is upped to a certain point that it can tip the conflict over is not backed up by any facts or results.
And of course there is the larger question is the US even winning in Afghanistan?
Also lets not hope anyone gives those on the ground stingers or the likes (as the CIA did to the forerunners of the Taliban) which could suddenly make the argument a lot more moot as what helps keep those craft up in the sky and able to do what they do is that there is little those on the ground to do to take one out even if they can see it, a few MANPADS in the right place could change a lot of that.
Good comments.
Small point regarding your reference to Rolling Thunder as the air campaign used to keep NVN at the negotiating table. I think you meant Linebacker I and Linebacker II, as Rolling Thunder was the (ineffectual” graduation escalation of the air campaign in South Vietnam. Linebacker campaigns were aimed at forcing the NVN to negotiate and stop.
For many military planners and strategic thinkers, the lessons of the Linebacker campaigns were clear. Use airpower correctly and victory may be achieved quickly and efficiently. Indeed, the Gulf War I air campaign planners used the Linebacker lessons to help produce an historic air campaign plan that for the first time, ever, resulted in a war where airpower was the primary fire and landpower played a supporting role.
This brings me to your allegation that history shows that airpower is “useful in facilitating the fight but is not a tool to win it,” I think I disagree.
In the Vietnam War, airpower was ineffective when limited to blowing up shrubbery and suspected truck parks (Rolling Thunder). Contrast this with the stunning effect the Linebacker campaigns had when airpower was employed against North Vietnam’s strategic targets, such as senior military leadership, command and control nodes, infrastructure, key manufacturing, lines of communication and logistics depots.
Consequently, in my view, we can look towards the Vietnam experience as early proof, and Gulf War I as more immediate proof, that airpower, when properly applied, can achieve exceptional success on its own. Its effect against the elusive terrorists is less clear.
What does this mean to the discussion at hand?
To me, it means manned or unmanned airpower is a very useful tool when supported by insightful intelligence and precise targeting and may be the decisive edge when we employ a proper strategic campaign, backed by sound doctrine and executed by appropriate technology.
We now have a new weapon in our quiver—the unmanned system. To mix metaphors, when the time comes to shoot, we have the airpower arrow from which to choose. It is just as flexible, if not more so in some cases, than any other military instrument. Selecting which airpower weapon to use, manned, unmanned for example, is like deciding on which golf club to use. One doesn’t use a putter for driving.
With the impressive ability of manned or unmanned airpower, combined with exceptional intelligence and targeting, we now have a full golf bag. We can now break airpower par, if not break par.
So, basically, as I mentioned in an earlier post, the use of RPVs as a weapon is not new to warfare beyond the technology employed. To me, there are really no substantive differences between a manned system flying overhead and the use of an RPV.
I think the real issue is perception; is it “fair” to fight a war from half a world away?
I think, yes, as Just Wart doesn’t demand we shed our own blood when fighting.
A more suitable question may be; does having the capability to attack remotely make the decision to pull the trigger that much easier?
To me, I think not, at least not any more of a factor than the affect the bow and arrow had on warfare when early man figured out he could shoot farther than someone can chunk a rock.
I don’t see a problem with using RPVs.
Now. . .off to hunt for my dinner. Why is Bristol so cold and wet when I visit? Brrrr. . . .for those in London, I expect good weather when I get there next week. Make is so.
Yes, airpower was what brought the US decisive victory in Vietnam.
…and “accomplished the mission” in Iraq 2003, short of victory though.
Rolling Thunder. . .not so much. A total waste.
Linebacker I and II. . .especially Linebacker II. . . yes, it did.
From the jaws of victory, the democratic congress ensured defeat.
Thanks all for the interesting back and forth, it pries apart in an interesting way the issue of what role RPVs might play/do play – what I must say I didn’t see was much consideration or offers of what alternatives might exist? This was my intention in writing the piece, and I freely admit that I did not necessarily do this successfully myself. However, I suppose the response from Gunrunner would be: it ain’t broke, so no need to fix it. But I remain uncertain that the tactic is going to definitively end the problem it is trying to address, and while airpower may play a positive role in pounding our enemies far away so that they are not able to do things at home, it is unclear to me that it is going to in any way bring this conflict to a close, or whether it might actually have an exacerbating effect. Are we simply resigning ourselves to this fact?
With the relocation of RAF reaper operations to the UK next year….RAF Waddington….Lincoln…plus another squadron…My question is this…. Does the RAF crew on duty at 9 in the morning, taking a lunch break at 12, shopping in Lincoln town centre now become a worthwhile target for home grown sympathisers of whatever nation we are using Reaper squadrons in? Does this now place the local folk in Lincoln in more danger than they were before…The crew it can be argued are always a target no matter
where they are, but now so too are the locals in Lincoln? More so than before, As for the crew themselves, kill in morning birthday party for the kids in afternoon…PTSD nightmare of the future.
Revisiting this after a while, I see Tom Murphy’s comment. I agree this is another problem, with such operators at home seen as a potential target. In some ways, we have already seen the direct impact of drones in US with the attempt by Faisal Shahzad, who cited drone strikes in Pakistan as one of his main reasons for his decision to leave a car bomb in Times Square. He may not have targeted drone operators specifically, but he thought he was targeting the population that let it happen.
Hi Raff,
I see your point. But with a population of 7 billion (and counting), there will always be the Faisal Shahzads of and in this world. If not drone strikes, it’ll be something else… they’ll find something to be outraged about (such a glut of that going around nowadays as it is) – so appeasement is pointless. Somebody will always be upset, feel disenfranchised, or somehow hard done by. We may as well give them a good reason in the abject form of a demonstration of the Melian Dialogue.
A bizarre argument. “Let us make the world a worse place since someone will get upset anyway”.
Bizarre indeed. Almost as bizarre as the belief that you can reason with men like Faisal Shahzad – a person dedicated to the establishment of an international Caliphate (as it transpired during his trial) and prepared to employ terror towards the realisation of that aspiration. And almost as bizarre as the description of a world with less people like these, as somehow a ‘worse place’.
Let us return to Faisal Shahzad for a minute. Born in north Pakistan (a Pashto), he travels all the way to the US for the purpose of education, is granted student visas to that effect, hangs in there for long enough to be granted leave to stay, and then becomes naturalised – pledging his allegiance to the United States of America in the process. An enormous amount of effort for someone a long way from home to undertake… Why, one could almost imagine that this was something he wanted. But then something bizarre happens. Faisal develops the belief that his new-found host society is wrong. All of it. And he sets himself the objective of fixing it – no, not to go home, but to fix it. And he will do so by using terror as a tool. Go ahead, negotiate with him if you are so inclined. I, on the other hand, recognise the futility of that and refuse to factor people like Faisal and their unreasonable aspirations into my thinking.
The constant drone attacks in a(n at best) legally murky undeclared war are making the world a worse place. I don’t know what you thought I was referring to. As far as I know, Mr Shahzad is still with us, rather than the world having fewer people like him.
For the avoidance of doubt: while many Pashtun might think the USA is all bad and whatnot, giving them personal reasons to act on that thought by blowing up members of their normally large, extended families, whether “justly” (following the rigorous legal process that the US doesn’t) or by accident, is not a winning strategy.
In other words, to painfully spell it all out, the drone attacks are making the world have more angry nutters like Mr Shahzad. Not fewer (not “less”, by the way).
Ed,
In the simplest possible terms… you cannot tailor your policies, practices and procedures in the hope that everybody will be happy with it. You will never achieve that – no matter how hard you try. Least of all with the likes of “Mr Shahzad” around. And I know he is still “with us” – if the US Federal Bureau of Prisons do their job right, he will be with us for many moons to come. But I bet you that he’ll never see Times Square again.
As I have mentioned to you on a previous occasion: wars do not have to be declared. Declaring or not declaring a war has no bearing on the legality of it.
And there is that term again: legal? In relation to which legal system? That of the United States of America? Or that of Pakistan? The international legal system? In a world where Realism co-reigns with Pragmatism, what do you call a legal system that cannot be enforced?
I am also struggling with the logic of “large, extended families”, and I am struck by the expediency of this. The Pashtun are known for their violent feuding. That is right up to the point when some distant cousin gets killed. All of a sudden, it is Jihad time. This is similar in concept to the porosity of the Durand Line – everybody in the region brags about it and exploits this porosity for fun and profit. That is, right up to the point when a UAV crosses the Line. Jihad time again.
Hasn’t it occurred to you that it is always Jihad o’clock for a certain personality type from this region? You state that drone strikes cause the world to have more angry nutters. I state that Shahzad thought he would take the US workplace by storm with his brilliance. When he realised his own mediocrity and lack of prospects in this domain, two things happened: he became home-sick (where he had personal secretaries and bodyguards) and this led to displacement. Shahzad may have quoted the drone strikes as the reason for his actions, but as he betrayed his fellow mujaheddin as soon as he was in custody, I can make this observation: the practice of UAV strikes is a MacGuffin for Shahzad – he is angry – yes, he is a nutter – yes, but he doesn’t know why. Always Jihad o’clock – and to ensure that it remains justified, have some unobtainable aspiration.
Yes, Quintin. The Pashtun’s tendency to declare jihad has “occurred to me”, because that is the point I am making. How much “jihad” have they declared against Ecuador? Or Swaziland? Or Japan? The phrase “poking a wasp’s nest” will no doubt mean nothing to you.
The phrase “poking a wasp’s nest” will no doubt mean nothing to you.
It does. And they did. I was as shocked and angered as you were when I saw those two aircraft hit the Twin Towers.
I’ve seen the light. A Saudi Arabian man’s acolytes succeed in a terrorist atrocity, so we now have a blank cheque to bomb Pashtun people forever.
As I hope you actually understood, the “wasp’s nest” I referred to was the inhabitants of the “graveyard of empires”. A label you should have a ponder over. In order to more efficiently manage this discussion, Quintin: are you American?
Do this august blog’s readers think that al-Qaeda leaders would prefer: a) that the drone attacks stop; b) that they continue? In other words, do you believe AQ feel helped or harmed by the attacks?
By the way: when the Twin Towers were attacked for the second time (the first was 8 years previously, without starting an unending war), I was shocked but not angered.
I’ve seen the light.
I doubt that very much – still tilting at the “peace in our time” windmill, hey Ed? But as always, when high on opinion, there is always that sarcastic little rejoinder that you can resort to.
First of all, there is no ‘blank cheque to bomb Pashtun people forever.’ If that is what you believe, then you have specifically not seen the light. The name of this activity is Targeted Killings – before UAV’s we’d do this with snipers or even with cells of B52 bombers. UAV’s are far more precise.
I am familiar with the “graveyard of empires” and it strikes me as unique how selective the development of such expressions can be. One could almost imagine that the Pashtun are invincible – never lost a war, so to speak. That is not exactly true.
I would not describe myself as august, nor would I claim to have access to primary sources in this regard. But I will venture this: if I was an AQ leader, I would feel inhibited by TK. I would dread it and I would feel at least a reduction in my initiative as a result.
Regarding the Twin Towers: now that is a surprise. Not even when those poor people chose to leap to a certain death – rather than face the inferno? Not even when the Towers collapsed (something they did not do after the first attack)? I find that odd Ed… and I would like to take the moment to explain why:
In all the time that you and I have crossed pens here, you stuck me as a person who wishes for an end to war. Would that be a fair assessment? Noble as such a wish is, as you stand there with your penny in your hand on the edge of your self-cleansing realisation, you are confused as to where you have to turn to for the final step – the direction of your anger. You are angry, are you not Ed? The Gaza blockade angered you – that was the first time that I crossed paths with you here. Israel angers you. So does Afghanistan, Iraq, perhaps Libya? We certainly do.
So here is something I would like you to reflect on Ed… given all that anger (and assuming rationality), why did you not feel anger when the Twin Towers were brought down (yet the TK of an AQ leader prompts you to burst into sarcastic prose)? Did you reason that the stockbrokers had it coming to them?
Quint,
Well stated.
Anyway, apology for falling out of sight for so long. Been busy as I recently retired from a very nice position with a major US defense contractor and now, yes, joined the ranks of college lecturer.
Hah. That bit of news just gave most on KoW a major shock, I am sure.
It appears anyone can be a college lecturer these days. . .and I just proved it. *Snicker.*
;-)
Welcome back on the air G-R,
And yup, there goes the neighborhood. I shudder (hehehe).
I see I have stirred up a nest myself here awakening this comment chain!
It is clear that drones have some tactical utility in taking players off the battlefield and groups have had to adapt to survive around them. But are they conclusively eradicating the problem? I think the answer there is clearly no – aside from the fact that we continue to have people to target or people out there, we also have the fact that there has continued to be a steady patter of attempted attacks directed from the region. So it is not a complete solution. Furthermore, I am uncertain it is clear who is being droned each time – in some cases, maybe, but in others very uncertain. All of which is worrying when we consider that this tactic seems sometimes to be the only game in town in trying to end this problem.
A note on Faisal Shahzad: he did indeed say he was in part driven by anger at what he saw drones were doing in Pakistan. I don’t think we can completely discount this, especially as others who have visited out there have told me that the anger at the strikes and the impunity with which America breaches Pakistani space is something which has an inflammatory effect. This cannot be discounted in our considerations about how we want this “long war” to end.
Hi Raff,
By chance, I came across the following by Brodie in his War and Politics on Sunday night*
In the kind of war that North Vietnam could impose on us because of their sanctuary status, there was something reminiscent of what Francis Bacon had said about the nation that commands the sea, one of the sagest remarks in all literature of strategy: “But this much is certain, that he that commands the sea is at great liberty, and may take as much and as little of the war as he will.”
From the above quote, there is a bigger issue at stake – by accepting the enemy’s sanctuary, we are allowing him a breather – and that is never a good idea… not strategically, nor operationally, or tactically. The enemy should never be given respite. The application of TK is therefore not merely tactical – it is an expedient manner in dealing with much larger issues relating an ‘ally’ that seems to have difficulty deciding whether to pee or get off the pot. In addition, it addresses that great liberty of the enemy – it chokes his initiative. It impacts his choices. It inhibits his freedom of movement. And it does so at all levels.
It is natural that people will become upset during war – it is an emotional business. And let it not be said that in fighting, we did not at least hurt the enemy’s feelings.
Relating to Shahzad – it only takes a drizzle to flood a soaked lawn. Adjusting our policies, practices and procedures to accommodate the likes of Shahzad will, in my opinion, not achieve that what we would be hoping to by doing so.
* Brodie, Bernard (1973), War and Politics, (New York: Macmillan), p.178.
Quintin,
1. I think I see a key point over which we differ. It seems you are positing that killing senior AQ/Taleban/whomever will have a serious impact on their organisations. I propose that they are much more decentralised than you imply, such that the impact is much smaller. (I am proposing that they are much more of a network than a hierarchy) However, the collateral impact is not thereby diminished.
2. To assist in further debating this matter, what do you think of the proposition that the final status of Afghanistan will be strongly influenced / determined by the civpop? (In other words, do you think the “war” will be won in the hearts and minds of the people?)
I would appreciate you addressing, however briefly, both of these points.
Hi Ed,
In reverse order if I may:
If I could spend a moment ruminating on “Heart and Minds” – and it strikes me that it is really 99% “Heart” and perhaps 1% “Mind”, and understandably so: war is an emotional business; war is a political business; politics is a value-laden business; values are by and large an expression of preferences – more often than not based on emotions rather than rationale. I would posit that the portion of the population that talk about war, state opinions about war, debate war, analyse war – within a domain of reason, is really very small and even that reasoning is value-laden and directed by a Grand Narrative (as Faceless’ recent post alludes to – or at least, I think it does). So we are really talking about “Hearts” mostly, and as you propose, “Hearts” play a significant (if not overarching) role in the determination of outcome – by way of perception. But which “Heart” should we really be concentrating on? The “Heart in Jalalabad” or the “Heart in Dagenham”? It occurs to me that concerning ourselves with the state of the “Heart in Jalalabad” while the “Heart in Dagenham” may already have been lost, (and perhaps have been so for some time), is more or less the equivalent of the lookout on the Titanic peering over the stern at the wake of the ship as he scans for icebergs.
Now students of war are often drawn to Clausewitz during their reflection on the topic – and I have a book case filled with his works as well as the works of others on him. When reflecting on war, we incline to focus on his maxims, definitions and his observations relating the “wonderful trinity” (JJ Graham translation). This is all fair and well, and represents “Clausewitz Read”. However, one of his most valuable statements on war is from that section of Clausewitz that I call “Clausewitz Unread” (or perhaps more positively: “Clausewitz Seldom Read”): he starts Book VIII, Chapter Four by stating:
The aim of war in conception must always be the overthrow of the enemy; (JJ Graham translation).
Or if you prefer a more modern translation:
The aim of war should be what its very concept implies – to defeat the enemy. (Howard & Paret translation).
Or if your German is not too rusty:
Das Ziel des Krieges sollte nach seinem Begriff stets die Niederwerfung des Gegnes sein; (Original text).
As the meerkat on TV tells us: “simples…” but apparently not: of the scores of maxims, axioms, comments, and definitions on war and strategy that I can spew forth here (Beatrice Heuser’s recent “The Evolution of Strategy” is a good read on this), the majority do not even mention “enemy” – let alone that some poor sod should at some point fix a bayonet and at the sound of a whistle climb out of his trench into withering fire; and so set off to “do something” towards the overthrow of that enemy. Given this abyss: how can we explore this “overthrow”? How do we determine Victory or Defeat?
I have picked this example carefully, since I would now like to return however briefly, to the “Heart in Dagenham” and how it grimly and stoically soaked up those enormous losses that this example represents – to the point where it shouted: “Never again!” Now Georges Clemenceau may have opined that war is too important to be left to the generals – but that is a cop-out: that is part of the blame-cycle as politicians blame the generals, generals blame the officers and troops, officers and troops can no longer reply – they are silently represented by poppies only. Politics, it would seem, is too important to be left to the politicians; and the War in Afghanistan is yet again a case in point.
In their work “Failing to Win”, Johnson and Tierney draw on a number of case studies to prove their main framework: match-fixing – which is essentially a reflection of the above. For each of these case studies (Cuban Missile Crisis, Tet Offensive, Yom Kippur, Restore Hope and GWoT), they show how the event was perceived by the relevant “Heart” in polls taken at the start, the middle and towards the end of the event. The one observation that I have made on this, is that the “Heart” no longer has the capacity of dealing with drawn-out conflict. Duration may vary from “Heart” to “Heart”, and there is an argument to be made that the tolerance for protracted conflicts diminishes by the year. Now I am in the process (or should I be more honest and admit that I am merely trying) to construct a theory around this – to perhaps show how various drivers contribute towards this. Perhaps, one day, I’ll be able to tell you that I’ve cracked it. Until then… it no longer matters if we really win or really lose this war – the “Heart on Dagenham” has already decided that outcome, and by and large not on clinical assessment or evaluation, but because of what he feels in his bones.
Where is all of this heading? An observation: if the “Heart in Dagenham” had already decided, and the “Heart in Jalalabad” is still pissed with us for burning down the Grand Bazaar during the Second Anglo-Afghan War of 1878 (how do they even remember this crap any way?), I’d argue that any pursuit of “Hearts and Minds” is a folly; that is, a complete and utter waste of time, treasure and blood. Does this mean that I am proposing a policy of murder, rape, pillage and burn in its stead (ahhh, those were the days)? No, I am not. A short while ago, Rob Dover published an article in KoW under the title of “In Macapaca world, the HTS reigns supreme”. The underlying message of this post was that regarding Afghanistan, there are objects that are clean, and objects that are waiting to be cleaning. I happen to agree with that general sentiment, in particular these two sections:
What? No mention of democracy? No, don’t care. If the locals want it they’ll find a way. They’ve had ten years to think about it.
What? No mention of thriving education systems or economic prosperity? No, again, the locals will need to mobilise, and find a way. You can’t save everyone. We’ve given it ten years.
Yes! Bravo Rob! We do not beg people to accept that what we believe to be virtuous. If you do not want it… if you prefer to stick with your way… so be it! Please stay in your lane and we’ll overtake and move on.
But that still leaves stuff to be cleaned – regardless of the “Heart in Dagenham” and the “Heart in Jalalabad”, the job is not done – and that (hopefully) brings me neatly to your first point:
The structure of an organisation is largely a product of its environment. By that, I do not imply total determinism – there is a strong element of “strategy” (if you will) involved: a “how do we survive and prosper” question that should be answered and this answer also reflects an evolution: the organisation will continuously tinker with its own structure to accommodate and facilitate and ensure adherence. The Base, in particular (as you have pointed out), have opted for a de-centralised and networked structure as an expression of redundancy and thereby their resilience.
But this, as with any structural change, has a down-side as well. It impacts the C3 & I (or is it C4 & I, soon to become C5 & I), making it exponentially more difficult to plan and execute complex designs (as opposed to that what is possible within a more centralised and hierarchical structure). Colin Gray points out in his “Another Bloody Century” that whilst 9/11 represented a fantastic tactical victory for The Base, it was strategically myopic and naïve. The Base had lost so much of its ability to forge a cohesive command, control, communications and intelligence entity and whilst there is no shortage of recruits, there is a reason why we have not seen repeats of operations with the complexity of 9/11. There is also a reason why (in my opinion at least) The Base is essentially a non-actor in the unfurling of the Arab Spring. In this same KoW, a couple of years ago (how time flies when you’re having fun), a contributor observed that The Base had somehow grown into two organisations – the professionals and the “Keystone Cops” – and it is my argument that Gray is right… it is not that they no longer have the will to pursue 9/11’s – they no longer have the organisational means. It is further my opinion that this is to our advantage: the moment that they have the opportunity to centralise within their structure (even if it is under a ceremonial figure such as an unfettered Bin Laden), then buildings start falling down in the West. Therefore, it is my contention that in terms of Rob’s “Macapaca Razor”, we should incentivese The Base to remain de-centralised. The question is: how do we do that?
I vote drones (sorry G-R)… if someone else has a better idea (but remaining within the construct of the Macapaca Razor), please shout out. We could do with some ideas.
“Drones”. . . .argh. . . .”RPV’s,” “RPV’s,” RPV’s”. . .sigh. . .I give up.
;-)
So… drones. Why didn’t you say so?
Thanks for setting out your position so extensively (!)
I think we probably agree on the principles of analysing the situation. However, I disagree on a couple of facts:
* I doubt strongly that the locals are really driven by things that happened in the 19th century; I expect they are far more animated by things done in the last 5 years. In your version of things, there is no point in trying to tread lightly, as they made up their minds 134 years ago; in mine, there is a point.
* I believe AQ was never as centralised as I understand you to be saying.
* I believe that AQ’s one big success was due to “the West” being a soft target previously, and frankly a bit complacent given AQ’s first attempt on the WTC in 1993; and their lack of such success since then is due to the West’s security apparatus being much more effective (albeit at a high cost in civil liberties).
If I am correct about our disagreeing on those facts, then in the absence of strong evidence that can prove either (or neither) of us right on those points, further discussion will be moot.
If I am correct about our disagreeing on those facts, …further discussion will be moot.
Agreed.
Raff, I was trying to get ahold of your email address, I’m thinking of setting up a workshop of some sorts on the topic at kings, drop me a line! jack dot mcdonald at kcl dot ac dot uk (I get enough spam to the kcl address as it is!)