Self-Inflicted Wounds

Today the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point will publish an absolute must-read report, Self-Inflicted Wounds: Debates and Divisions within al-Qa’ida and its Periphery (pdf). Vahid Brown was so kind and passed on an advance copy. The report features some of the world’s finest experts on jihadi thought: Steven Brooke, Vahid Brown, Mohamed Hafez, Bernard Haykel, Brynjar Lia, Marc Lynch, Reuven Paz, and Anne Stenersen. It will be published later as a book by Routledge — and please, dear editorial board: don’t charge the ridiculous standard hardback price of £65.

Two snippets from the summary and the introduction:

Self‐Inflicted Wounds examines the internal, or endogenous, reasons that have hastened the decline of the jihadi movement. In doing so, it exposes the jihadi movement, with al‐Qa’ida at its helm, as one that lacks coherence and unity, despite its claims to the contrary. The report divides the jihadis’ endogenous problems into two categories: internal divisions plaguing al‐Qa’ida and the jihadi movement proper; and fault lines dividing the jihadi movement from other Muslim and Islamist actors.

[...]

[G]iven al‐Qa’ida’s inability to achieve its policy goals, how has it managed to maintain a movement with sustained operational capability? The answer suggested in this report is that internal divisions have an ambivalent impact on al‐Qa’ida and the jihadi movement. On the one hand, these divisions generate operational resilience. Variation in definition of enemy, targets and ideology, for instance, allows for tremendous flexibility in the face of pressure or setback in a single area. On the other hand, these divisions limit the group’s ability to design or implement a coherent strategy to achieve core goals.

The findings are sharp, counter-intuitive and they face head-on the almost paradoxical nature of the threat — to put it bluntly: al-Qaeda became stronger and weaker at the same time. The report should raise a humbling question for the objectives in the war in Afghanistan. What can actually be achieved there against jihadist militancy?  – The authors add a note of caution at the end. Recognizing internal divisions enables weakening jihadi groups, they write, but it will not lead to “a grand solution” to the problem of Islamist militancy. “Indeed, acknowledging the divisions means acknowledging that the challenge posed by jihadis has accompanied us since long before 9/11 and will be with us long after.”

But before jumping to conclusions, read the report. The editors, Brian Fishman and Assaf Moghadam, will present the report at 9.30 at the New America Foundation in Washington. If you’re in town, free, and read this in time: go there.

We’ll post a link later.