In a recent op-ed piece Steven Metz stated that he believes the current American strategy in Afghanistan “totters on a dangerously flawed foundation.” The piece is worth examining on that basis.
Metz points out that despite rhetoric to the contrary, “the [Obama] administration [has] adjusted U.S. troop levels and shifted some operational methods but accepted the most basic–and questionable–assumptions of the Bush strategy. Unfortunately, these do not hold up under close scrutiny.“ He goes on to state that the basis for American intervention is to deny Al-Qaeda the use of Afghanistan as a base, and that this is incorrect: “…we reasoned eradicating bases and and training camps will cripple al-Qaeda. Yet there is no evidence to validate this idea.”
Based on this conclusion, Metz makes some indirect suggestions regarding changing from the current strategy to one aimed at preventing al-Qaeda from re-establishing itself. He says that if that were to happen, the U.S. should “quickly destroy it.”
What can we make of this op-ed piece?
First, the piece itself is based on an assumption, that may or may not be valid. While intervening in Afghanistan may have been about denying sanctuary to al-Qaeda in 2001/2, and while rhetorical references to this as the objective continue to this day, I am not sure that this can be taken at face value. Eight years on, Afghanistan is about much more than AQ or Bin Laden. It has become a problem in and of itself. (This, of course, is the inherant danger in ‘risk based management’: the solutions carry with them their own problems.) However the U.S. decides to stay or leave the country, basing its decision on some declaration of victory over AQ would be spurious.
Second, Metz does not come out and directly suggest a new strategy, although, between the lines, the article carries the familar theme of ‘counter-terrorism’ over ‘counter-insurgency’. That may or may not be fine as a goal, but the devil will be in the details of any kind of exit/transition. What will that look like? How will it be managed? What are the implications and which are acceptable?
Third, Metz raises an interesting point about basing strategies on unvalidated premises. Does COIN work? Does reconstruction contribute to stability? These are but some of the unvalidated pieces of conventional wisdom that masquerade as ‘strategic thought’ these days. Leaving aside the particular case of Afghanistan, Metz’s point can be applied to the wider issue of strategic formulation. How should we conceive of strategy, if not by hypothesis? Most strategies are based on hypotheses and not concrete facts, at least initially. Take, for example, air power or nuclear deterrence. Ideas, and not data, were the genesis of these approaches. Douhet claimed that bombing civilian populations would end the stalemate of land warfare that plagued WWI’s Western Front. John Warden believed that hitting ‘nodes’ and ‘centres of gravity’ would force regimes to collapse. In some cases, post facto, it is possible to say, “yes, that seemed to work”, and in others, the answer is either “no”, or something more ambivalent. Nuclear deterrence was a gamble at its outset, and to be honest, even given the lack of a nuclear exchange to date, we cannot be sure that it is not a case of a post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy. Do the challenges posed by North Korea and Iran validate or invalidate the hypothesis of nuclear deterrence? The jury is divided and still out, but the topic is relevant nonetheless.
Getting our assumptions correct is important, but against which benchmarks or criteria do we align them? Witness the ongoing, and somewhat elliptical, debate between Nagl and Gentile over the role of the U.S. armed forces in a post-Afghanistan/post-Iraq world. Who is correct? Whose assumptions are more appropriate?
It appears that, once again, Colin Gray is correct: strategy is difficult.
Amazing hammer? Cheeky monkey!
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“John Ward believed that hitting ‘nodes’ would force regimes to collapse”
I believe you mean Col John Warden, the former chief of Checkmate and the true architect of the air campaign in Gulf War I. (And we can’t forget it was Dave Deptula that actually ensured Col Warden’s strategic air campaign was fully developed and implemented in spite of Gen Horner’s ignorance and resistance.)
Also, he advocated attacking centers of gravity, not merely “nodes,” and his five rings strategic theory was fairly proven within the context of Desert Storm—the first time, ever, where air power was the primary fire with ground power supporting.
Just to be clear.
Thanks for pointing out my typo and incomplete thought re: nodes. Both are now corrected.
With respect, you have good points but I think you malign Dr. Metz. Yes, his solution is “containment” with applications of CT, assuming the target is AQ and that AQ does not need Afghanistan to effectively plan against US interests. Given the current assessments of progress in Afghanistan, certainly continuing the Bush strategy isn’t working.
Re: nuclear deterrence, I would suggest that after 55 years, the “hypothesis” has held up well. The purpose of strategic nuclear weapons is not to deter other nations from creating nuclear weapons, it’s to deter other nations from USING them. Viva la difference.
I don’t think I maligned Steve Metz anywhere in the post. I merely engage with and make comments on his op-ed.
I love the way this debate continues to be framed in framework of conventional militaries and not in the wider realm of Security.
I would be rude and incorrect to suggest the conventional militaries are obsolete but what this debate highlights by its absence is the fact that the means have stayed the same (apart from the small changes wrought through sheer necessity by places like Iraq and Afghanistan) but the situation has changed.
If the debate is centred around the basic arguments of COIN vs Conventional then thats a very narrow spectrum for the Gordian knot of the security situation facing the US in Iraq and Afghanistan, which for the moment ignores the larger concerns elsewhere. How will the US deal with the border situation with Mexico for example? Can COIN or Conventional fix that problem?
Metz makes the basic but very sound point at the end of his piece by simply talking about “balance”. COIN sounds more balanced at first but experience has shown that its not, certainly not when carried out by military organisations (not sure who else could do it per se but give me time) and driven by political rational which show no understanding of balancing the risks vrs the rewards but instead simply plough ahead blind to the effects (does anyone have a metric for then and now in terms of risks to the region? I know its been commentated on but are there any real measures?)
Metz’s other point (also noted by the OP) is that AQ (if that really is the threat any more) is now well beyond just Afghanistan or Iraq. Again the costs of shooting the region up do not seem to have been balanced out with the effects of said shooting up (or at least not by the US if the various things you hear about AQ’s plan to drag the US into an unwinnable war are to be believed).
And if I may be so bold to run with and ad lib my way through the thoughts of Mr Grey, is the situation more strategically difficult now than then (before 9/11) or is it as Grey comments that if strategy is the “bridge” between politics and military action then is the bridge out?
This I think is more the problem in the debate today, strategy is not going to provide a wonderful series of answers for the future or for the hard decisions of the now if its not doing its job (bridging the gap) and instead is being used as some sort of super-military strategy only.
I think the arguments here get very mixed up.
We have firstly the debate about how to win in places like Afghanistan and Iraq (the here and now) and the the what will future wars be like debate (the Future debate). Both have connections but are not one. Also there is the argument that places like Iraq and Afghanistan are not winnable which brings in the larger arguments of things like the RMA and such (which despite having been maligned in its current form still raises its spectral head in Afghanistan and Iraq – just not its expensive hardware head).
Which leads me back the ideas of balance or bridging. The situation as it stands is a reflection of a lack of these two things. And the debate is also indicative of this with the narrow framework of arguments made about it. Can we not widen it to look at the nature of the situation and the tools being used.
I finally add that I attended a lecture a few weeks back by Hugh White (one of Australia’s leading defence intellectuals) who despite making many interesting points about the situation in Asia between the US and China still had to boil it down and define things in military terms first and foremost, stating that a battle for primacy was brewing and the only real solution was to prepare for the coming conflict in military terms with any larger political or strategic considerations as adjuncts to be considered after.
I know this is my favourite drum that I bang on this blog when I post but I do find it frustrating when posts are always framed in such narrowly strategic/military terms. I know this blog has “war” in its title but surely its not just being taken literally.