Unplugged
This blog has a small but loyal readership in Israel. If you happen to be in the country right now: I’m giving a talk tomorrow in Bar Ilan University in Ramat Gan by Tel Aviv, at the BESA Center, one of Israel’s finest strategic studies institutes, headed by the impressively prolific Efraim Inbar. At 5pm, here’s the invitation.
The pitch for the presentation — and the article — goes somewhat like this:
Israel and America today face a similar blend of threats, non-state militant groups and pariah states, sometimes acting in conjunction. In the closing decade of the 20th century, after the pivotal Persian Gulf War in 1991, both states were conscious of their own peerless conventional military might, the United States globally and Israel regionally. But the time of hope and confidence in the late 1990s was short. In the opening years of the 21st century, both countries were confronted with terrorism on a sweeping scale, with 9/11 and the second intifada respectively. Soon, on the western shores of the Atlantic as well as on the eastern shore of the Mediterranean, terrorism and political violence, fuelled by religious extremism, were identified as the main and most significant security risk. The war on terror united threat perceptions in Washington and Jerusalem to an unprecedented degree. Four days after 9/11, in a principals meeting in Camp David, George Tenet, then the head of the CIA, concluded that “Our situation is more like that of the Israelis.”[1]
But the opposite is true for the response to the common threat. America’s and Israel’s reactions to that situation could hardly be more different. In just one decade, it seems, Israeli and American strategic and operational thinking have parted ways. Politicians, advisers, and generals do not speak the same language any more when it comes to the most fundamental concepts of national security policy: they agree neither on goals, means, nor philosophy. This division has roots that go much deeper than the occasional row between a liberal American administration and a conservative Israeli government. How does this parting look like? Why is it happening? And what does it mean?
[1] Bob Woodward, Bush at War, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002, p. 89.
{ 18 comments… read them below or add one }
” How does this parting look like? Why is it happening? And what does it mean? ”
The democrats in the U.S. are more concerned with the economy, trying to cut the costs of war abroad – as long as terror remains outside american soil. The more conservative politicians (probably will grow mush stronger after the coming congressional elections) also face a wide-spread question among republican voters: “Why should we send our children to die in foreign countries?”
In Israel the threat is closer – under direct rocket fire from ghaza and hizbulla, and in the range of the Iranian cross-continent missiles.
Now, with Turkey switching sides to join in on the Iranian-Syrian policy, turning its back on the failing EU, and with the KSA trying to calmly absorb the effects of that policy by pushing towards peace, and with Egypt more concerned with internal issues (preserving the Mubarak regime), a more liberal Israeli government could have had better chances to meet the KSA half-way in the peace process and undermine the Turkish-Iranian-Syrian efforts to provoke confrontation and instability, UNLESS 27 of 36 senate seats (75%) are won by the republicans, gaining majority and restoring a more engaging U.S. policy in the middle east.
IMHO, your point is misdirected (“The democrats in the U.S.”). We are currently in the thrall of some very focused and serious masters who are not so much motivated by (or really beholden to in the traditional sense) the Democratic Party platform as they are by a much broader (and philosophically deeper) vision driven by post-modern progressivism. One might look on the use of progressives of the Democratic Party (and to a less obvious but no less real extent the traditional Republican Party) as in a sense like a parasite/host relationship whereby the former will use the latter merely as a vehicle to attain their ends.
It then follows that for progressives, any representative “democratic” government (whether a Constitutional republic like the US or a parliamentary democracy like Israel) is anathema to their world view that necessarily involves a ruling elite that is so “enlightened” and “wise” (by its own lights of course) that it will take care of the rest of us “great unwashed” even when it hurts.
As a consequence, our foreign policy is beginning to reflect this on many fronts, including our relationship with Israel.
So Cincinnatus Jr, you’re saying that “progressives [use] the Democratic Party (and to a less obvious but no less real extent the traditional Republican Party) as in a sense like a parasite/host relationship whereby the former will use the latter merely as a vehicle to attain their ends”.
Progressives = 5th column destroying America? By “progressive”, do you mean “liberal”? How about “pinko”? This is a bit McCarthy, isn’t it?
hmmm Cincinattus Jr.
You have taken the subject into a much deeper level.
As a non-US citizen, resident in the middle east, i judged – not according to in-depth political philosophies of the two-parties in the US, but on the general US politics, especially in the middle east… where we can “live” the difference between Republican/Democratic US presidents’ policies…
To us, for the last 40 years, whenever the US president is a Republican, the US policy is more engaging… whenever the US president is a Democrat, the US policy here is just static.
Well of course it is my view and there are no doubt others who will think me an alarmist, conspiracist, or even (gasp-but correctly) a participant in the so-called tea-party movement here in the US.
I certainly do not wish to confuse our friends abroad with the intricacies of domestic politics, partisan or otherwise, but my personal study of these matters persuades me that anyone who fails to perceive these larger (and deeper) dynamics at work in America as to both its domestic and foreign policies and actions runs the risk of coming to erroneous, or at least incomplete, conclusions. While it is true that many of these have been operating for the last century or so, the confluence of myriad factors today (e.g., the many “crises” and “emergencies” that we are told are unprecedented and thus require unprecedented (and apparently extra-Constitutional) actions, the ascendance to near total power (elected, or more troubling, unaccountably appointed by elected officials as “tsars” and the like) of many life-long “activist’ progressives etc.) make for a “veritable” perfect storm of “transformative change.”
Returning to at least part of your point, this means that the shift in the tone and substance of the relationship with Israel should not be wholly attributed to the vagaries of the US political system that waxes and wanes with changes in Democratic and Republican control. Rather, I think there is a more profound dynamic reflected as well of progressivist elites within the federal government (politicians and their apparatchiks (predominately but not exclusively of the Democratic Party), a fawning and complicit media that has deteriorated to the point it is effectively their propaganda organ and well-funded and powerful non-governmental elites that transcend the periodic partisan changes in administration.
These in turn, especially now we are supposedly in a “post modern” world where “outmoded” and ignorant notions of Judeo-Christian values are rejected or ignored, have a long term “corrosive” effect on the extent to which the American “people” feel a kinship with and desire to support Israel. It is this latter point that I think needs to be watched very carefully by Israel since it can be in turn used by future American progressivist governments (perversely since they largely orchestrated it) as a basis for even more isolation of Israel.
The last 9 years or so have seen gigantic increases in US federal spending, and debt, and the executive grabbing lots of power. I won’t even mention at least one totally unnecessary, reputation-destroying war. It is no doubt only a coincidence that the heroic tea-party patriotic movement has only started taking issue with these matters once a Democratic president is in charge. IOKIYAR?
Cincinattus – I think the progressive problem with Israel has less to do with being a democratic state and more with its interpretation of what being a “Jewish state” means. The “post-modern progressivism” you identify is that of the majority of American Jews, and for many, social justice and progressivism is an integral part of their religious upbringing. Now, this was not inherently contradictory with Israel, for the Zionist project was from the start a very left-wing one, and many still look back today on the more social democratic or socialist Israel-that-was-to-be.
The problem is that many American Jews look at Israeli actions today and are disturbed by what is being done in the name of Judaism. I have heard some American Jews describe, without prompting, that they had certain experiences in Israel that reminded them of the Holocaust.* And while Israel is a democracy, it is easy for American Jews to have trouble looking past the walls, settlements, and religious right in Israel, with which many American Jews find as little in common.
So a good deal of the flagging enthusiasm and support for Israel and the Zionist enterprise is not an inherent result of progressivism clashing with Judeo-Christian values as much as a clash between two very different visions of Judaism and Zionism (J-Street and AIPAC, in beltway terms).
*I am not trying to push this comparison, only illuminating how alienated and disturbed some American Jews feel in what is supposed to be a Jewish homeland.
Excellent sharpening of my broader point. All of this of course goes to show the problems in terms of Israel/American relations not to mention Israel’s relations with its neighbors are multi-faceted and consequently intractable, if not unsolvable (some are after all, literally of “Biblical proportions”–notwithstanding our ever so much better post-modernism).
The divide to which you allude in terms of the selective support of Israel (over time and issues) by “liberal” Jews in America (I suppose some might label them “JINOS”) and other Jews (and their avid “Goyim” supporters in various quarters including (gasp) evangelical Christians) is not at all new of course.
The fact that Israel now has a right-wing government with Shas and Yisrael Beiteinu has certainly exacerbated that problem, though. Even the ardent neoconservative groups had their origins in Social Democratic or Trotskyite movements, so anti-rightism and anti-fascism have always been a strong part of American Zionism. Though obviously some things have changed, with a right-wing government in coalition with the religious right and the nationalist right, it’s easy to see why left wing American Jews would feel uncomfortable – these are very far from the people they would vote for in the US.
“Our situation is more like that of the Israelis.”
The split is widening because sentiments such as these have proven to be false in the past decade. America does not have anywhere near the siege mentality of Israel. Americans might keep guns in their home for sport or break-ins, when Israelis keep firearms in their homes, it is because Israel is at war. America does not have major military tensions with any country in its hemisphere, Israel’s enemies are on its borders and can reach the country daily. In Israel, terrorism is more norm than exception, in America, it is simply not the case.
Additionally, the US has a far more liberalized, idealist view of its security. Where Americans, who have no deep local knowledge or experience with Middle Eastern states, see Middle Easterners as potential democratic individuals in need of liberation, Israelis are inclined to misperceive in the opposite direction – that Middle Easterners only understand force and will not stop supporting terrorism until they are defeated.
Israel’s enemy-centric military philosophy is increasingly antithetical to the US vision of COIN and diplomacy – and now you have CENTCOM complaining about Israeli military actions precisely because it makes the US look bad and makes COIN more difficult. Of course, the problem is that from the Israeli perspective, their strategy is actually working to reduce attacks on Israel, even if it is, at least in my opinion, ignoring the underlying problem of a growing Arab population and frustrating the two-state solution that would help solve it.
Can you enlighten me as to examples that support your contention that Israel “misperceive[s] in the opposite direction that Middle Easterners only understand force and will not stop supporting terrorism until they are defeated.”?
Whether accurate or not, this is why many Israelis have the view, as one of my good friends in the IDF had put it, due to its relative isolation in the region and the historic, political, cultural and sectarian chasm between it and its neighbors Israel cannot be content with “an eye for an eye” but instead must exact an “eye for a tooth.”
Are you asking of examples of Israelis having this perception, or evidence that this perception is inaccurate?
And certainly I understand why – my point was that Americans were never in the same position as Israel, being geographically distant and historically removed from the Middle East, and so the huge differences between Middle Eastern culture and their own are not readily apparent, which is not so with the Israelis, where proximity, history, and the violent character of relations make it difficult to see beyond the differences.
Sorry-if I knew how I would have underlined the operative word–”misperceive.” I realize many Israelis (and others) have such a view. I am curious as to what makes you say it is wrong? To save you some time, I realize that there are some examples (individual “Middle Easterners” or certain policy decisions of some “Middel Eastern” governments) where this may not be “true” in all respects but my curiosity is focused on what makes that perception “wrong” or “incorrect” for those who hold it based on an overall appraisal of history of these issues since 1947.
I think it is wrong to the extent it is exaggerated as a reason to conduct very politically counterproductive operations. Middle Easterners understand force, sure, but so do Israelis, Americans, Chinese, and hill tribes in Papua New Guinea.
All humans understand force, but we understand other things, too, and force is, in Arab cultures as in European ones, an expression of, or instrumental to, politics. So while diplomacy should never ignore, and indeed should be founded upon, an understanding of force and its utility, it cannot be beholden to those considerations alone. I don’t think you can explain events such as the 1979 treaty or the failure of the peace process since the ’90s purely in terms of Arab peoples receiving enough or insufficient coercive discipline from the IDF.
The recent flotilla fiasco is an example of an understanding of IO and public perceptions by Middle Easterners. They knew that even if their objective of “breaking the blockade” would be militarily refuted, they could influence regional diplomacy and global perceptions enough to put pressure on Israel. If the people in FGM only understood force, they would have considered sending vessels with little but axes, knives and metal rods (and, even if we give the IDF the benefit of the doubt, no more than a handful of small arms) against the Israeli navy totally naive and pointless.
It is my guess that people who employ IO also understand and themselves can be made susceptible to IO…
I take your points and would clarify one a bit further. You said “Arab peoples receiving enough or insufficient coercive discipline from the IDF.” I agree in general with this as in many other cases where “merely” the application of violence and terror on a population generally and directly is that such an approach will not necessarily achieve the ends that are sought by this approach and in fact can often have a rebound effect of actually hardening the target population’s resolve. I suppose the only instances where one could argue that it has “worked” may be those where it is applied in the extreme, without exception, restraint or mercy as well as “up close and personal” (as opposed to a strategic bombing campaign for example) such that the target group is thoroughly and individually terrorized. Even then, I would argue such a thorough-going domination cannot be sustained forever such that either the oppressor loses zeal or resources and/or the targeted group begins to resist even if “only” morally.
With respect to this approach in the Middle East, I think it is not necessarily the “Arab people” in general that live by or respond to the “might it is right” philosophy as it the elites (sectarian, governmental, terrorist, and/or other factions) who live (and die) by it. The “Arab people” in general are usually not the intended (or desired) targets of this approach but rather usually end up the true victims of the actions of their ruling or influential elites either as collateral damage or as a “lever” to force compliance or concessions from a given elite that derives its power from popular support.
Well said – though I once again see no evidence that Arab (or other Middle Eastern) leaders are very exceptional with regard to the idea of might making right – the Middle East has some callous dictatorships, yes, this is not unique to the region. In any case, you bring up the interesting point about the attacks on the population as a lever to extract concessions – it illuminates what is already a growing divide between IDF and US military doctrine.
In its latter day conflicts with Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas and Gaza, the IDF’s casualty aversion and its adversaries use of civilian buildings has lead to high latitude for use of airpower in civilian areas, and even in some cases encouragement of striking select civilian targets for sybolic “effects.” Though EBO was tarnished in Lebanon, Cast Lead was not much of an improvement.
The US, on the other hand, has just appointed Mattis, who abolished the doctrine and terminology of EBO from JFCOM, to CENTCOM. I have trouble seeing the Israelis purging it from their way of war, particularly given its domestic political advantages.
Indeed, I do not think EFO (in the context of our discussion) really make much sense in contemporary military (at least “western”) usage. The blowback through instantaneous internet and other communications really makes such an approach very likely to be counterproductive.
As to your assertion that the penchant of many of the Middle Eastern elites for a “might is right” approach (whether in their own use or in their “respect” for it when applied by others), I think there is a common thread that must be adequately taken into account and that is the role and effect of “Islam” in assessing this aspect of the attitudes, policies and behaviors of the nations (and sub-national actors) in the region.
I purposely use quotes to both account for my admitted lack of expertise in the intricacies of its theology etc. and to rather use it generically to encompass those cultural (even tribal), political, religious, customs etc. that appear to me at least to be involved in one way or the other (whether “legitimately” through recognized organs of Islam (or a given branch) or as is so often asserted since 9/11, as “hijacked” by various individuals and groups who use it as a legitimizing “cover” and recruiting tool for other baser motives).
I suppose it is not that surprising that this aspect gets relatively little attention, whether substantively or certainly by the media given the hyper-sensitivity that usually is evident in that region and beyond when even the word “Islam” is used. I believe there has been a very effective campaign waged by various Islamic groups (for example in America by the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC) and the Arab American Institute (AAI)) that has largely silenced or at least suppressed and “neutered” this critical aspect of the discussion.
Thus in the specific context of the Israeli discussion, I think it impossible to fully discuss much less understand the complexity etc. if we do not recognize (whether some in their post-modernity believe in such “superstitions”) the importance of the sectarian issues.
Ed:
If you will fight the temptation to assess these matters throught the lens of partisan politics and in particular look into the progressive “movement” you may see things are a bit more complicated than your post suggests. Further but in the same vein, your post likening the “tea party movement to McCarthyism yells me you are letting your own biases cloud your ability to evaluate what is actually occurring (as opposed to how the media and our current masters spin it).
Those who merely see these matters as the usual partisan bickering and “pay back” as your posts reflect are missing the substAntive aspects that represent paradigm shifts. I would also note that while I think some of the tactics of McCarthy and his ilk were wrong, history has proven that there was indeed fire amidst the rhetorical smoke.
Those who conflate progressivism with “liberalism,” “marxism,” and otber such “isms” whether seriously or, as you appear to do in the manner of Saul Alinsky, to make light of and marginalize a contrary view demonstrate a rather shallow appreciation of what is really taking place.