Apologies KOW readers for coming over all-Biblical in my first post for weeks but the debate over the war of late has me thinking of a line from Matthew 15:14 ‘Let them alone: they be blind leaders of the blind. And if the blind lead the blind, both shall fall into the ditch.’ There’s a famous illustration of the parable by Bruegel hanging in the Museo di Capodimonte in Naples in which you see six blind men following one after the other. The first has already fallen in the ditch and the second has tripped over him while the third, fourth, fifth and sixth all connected by staves don’t yet know what is happening but will also in turn end up arse over tit in the mire in the end. It’s a wonderful painting.
Well, you can probably guess where I’m going with this but nonetheless I recommend two recent articles which prompted the observation. The first in Der Spiegel by Rory Stewart The Real Reason We are in Afghanistan is not to be missed. In fact, the reason he argues is exactly the thing which I have been writing and saying for several years. The reason that Britain (and Canada, Norway, Holland, Germany, Denmark etc) is in Afghanistan is because our strategic thinking, such as it is, is predicated above all upon being seen as a good ally with the United States. However leaving aside self-congratulation I must admit Stewart states the case more eloquently than I:
Two years ago, I went to Tartu, for an Estonian government conference on Afghanistan. There were German generals, Italian diplomats and representatives from European think-tanks. The three Afghans, who had been brought up in California and Virginia, were practically the only native English speakers in the room. We were reminded that there was “no military solution,” lectured on the need for a “comprehensive approach” — including economic development and good government — and we were also taught about the intricacies of Pashtun tribal structures. I argued for my belief that we should have neither troop increases nor a total withdrawal but a light long-term footprint.
But why were we having this debate? The Estonians did not, it seemed, see Afghanistan as vital to their future. They were there primarily to deepen their relationship with NATO and particularly the United States. So why were the Estonians, or I, or any of the representatives of America’s allies — even those with lots of troops on the ground, such as Germany, France and Italy — producing power-point presentations on Helmandi government structures, papers on police training and principles for tackling Pakistan?
If we drew different conclusions to the United States, would we really be willing to present them or able to implement them? The European debate on Afghanistan seemed almost a ceremonial activity preserved to entertain the public and please visiting dignitaries, particularly from the US — a ritual which is preserved for the same reasons that the Horse Guards still wave their swords outside Buckingham palace.
I would guess that Obama felt trapped by his political position, by his generals and by abstract theories of contemporary foreign policy. He would not want to be perceived as weak on national security. His would not want to be distracted from his focus on health care reform. And he himself had long justified the withdrawal from Iraq on the grounds that Afghanistan was the “good war,” vital to US national security — one which could have been won had resources not been diverted to Iraq.
Maybe that’s all there is to it which would be a sad enough state of affairs if true. But, to get to the second article which I mentioned, I think we ought to consider arguments such as Ann Jones’ in Counterinsurgency Down for the Count: But the War Machine Grinds On and On and On:
Just as Obama sends more troops and a new commander to fight a fraudulent war for a purpose that makes no sense to anyone — except perhaps the so-called defense intellectuals who live in an alternative Washington-based Afghanaland of their own creation — Clinton presides over a fraudulent aid program that functions chiefly to transfer American tax dollars from the national treasury to the pockets of already rich contractors and their congressional cronies. If you still believe, as I would like to, that Obama and Clinton actually meant to make change, then you have to ask: How does this state of affairs continue, and why do the members of the international community — the U.N., all those international NGOs, and our fast-fading coalition allies — sign off on it?
You have only to look around in Kabul and elsewhere, as I did this month, to see that the more American military there is, the more insurgents there are; the more insurgent attacks, the more private security contractors; the more barriers and razor wire, the more restrictions on freedom of movement in the capital for Afghans and internationals alike; and the more security, the higher the danger pay for members of the international community who choose to stay and spend their time complaining about the way security prevents them from doing their useful work.
And so it goes round and round…
Reader, if you’re about to jump on me because Jones writes for the Lefty Nation and uses tired Lefty tropes like ‘corporate capitalism at war’ don’t bother–that sets my spidersense tingling too but the fact is her analysis of the facts on the ground seems pretty accurate to me (and moreover, unusually, is based on speaking with actual Afghans).
Of course as I’ve been trained to do I could explain why any nation goes to war as Thucydides did, out of one or more of ‘fear, honour and self-interest’. It’s curious how self-interest has been applied in this instance. In the eyes of many what made Afghanistan the ‘good war’ early on was that we had no economic self-interest in the place (i.e., no oil or other valuable stuff there to distract us from pure unadulterated and selfless do-goodism); while latterly the argument has been made that it’s worth fighting on because Afghanistan is brimming with Vast Mineral Riches. Colour me skeptical on the ‘Aladdin’s Cave is near’ theory. It would appear that the war rationale therefore rests on fear and honour, now as it did in the beginning. And this for me is the thing. If the reason America is there is still credible fear of Al Qaeda and the preservation of the honour and dignity of the United States then they are right to be there and we are right to be there with them. But if America is there because the President fears that appearing weak on national security imperils his party’s electoral prospects upon which hinges his ambitious domestic agenda and the honour and dignity of important generals is at stake, well… then we should be shot of the place.
* I like the way that Thomas Rid describes his thinking on going to Washington expecting bad beer and really good strategic debate only to find really good beer and bad strategic debate.
{ 25 comments… read them below or add one }
It startles me how little debate on Afghanistan actually covers the real strategic issues confronting the region–Pakistan’s interplay, the virtual absence of AQ in Afghanistan, the immense cost, the list goes on.
The arguments for the war are looking about as rational as those in the later stages of the Vietnam War. I particularly love the alarmist “Domino theory” rhetoric that Victor Davis Hugo puts forth in bullet #10:
I was holding my breath through your entire post… Hoping that I wasn’t going to see Britain say that we’re not in AFG for a good reason. We’re still here because of 9/11. Full stop. All else is secondary. The GWOT started here, and we must win.
Though, the definition of ‘winning’ has changed over the years, when was the last time someone said we’re after Osama?
I do not completely agree that the more Americans/security personnel in AFG the greater the violence. Here in Kandahar, rocket attacks began in 2004, right about at the time where everyone forgot about AFG to focus on IRQ. IEDs migrated to AFG back in 2007-ish, as did shaped charges.
The strings of violence in AFG are being pulled from Pakistan and Iran. There is where the OPTEMPO is being driven, and it is there that we will be able to really change the realities on the ground.
I hear A LOT of talk about “I talked with Afghans”. Do you know where most Afghans get their news from? Each other, their opinion is no more valid than asking an average American about the crime in their town. They may know part of the answer, but more so, you’re going to get their perception of it. You need look no further than the protests that start over rumors constantly in Kabul and Kandahar. The Taliban have a hell’ova psy-ops campaign. They use it effectively.
All the best,
H. L. Gauthier III
Petty Officer Second Class, USN
Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan
An informed and credible post. Thank you.
There is one thing I failed to mention in my last post.
The sacrifice each of our allies is making is not lost on those of us out here. Without hesitation, I would give my life of any of my allies out here today. I will never forget what all England, and every NATO Nation (as well as the UAE and S. Korea) have done in being in this fight with us.
I hope this part of the GWOT will be over soon.
Your point about the Western self-congratulation over our altruistic motives is well put and deserves more attention.
When the German President was run out of town for suggesting that Germany might be so bold as to contribute troops for some kind of national or material interest in Afghanistan, the observation that the German reaction was not “what interests?” but “how dare you suggest we pursue such interests?” is a telling sign of the state of strategic thinking.
I admit to being very sympathetic to the COINdanistas, but I’m not optimistic. And similarly because the US “leader of the blind” don’t seem to have any debate over what its strategic interests are, many of the alternatives that American politicians and pundits propose are similarly bereft of strategic clarity. Everything seems to come down to how well killing terrorists and the timetable of commitments are polling, and not much else.
What’s also distressing is that the infamous Afghanistan PowerPoint slide makes little, if any, mention of al-Qaeda or Pakistan, despite the fact that they make up two key factors in our actions in the region.
The Pakistani issue seems beyond the usual toolkit of US foreign policy. American politicans cannot credibly sanction or threaten Pakistan at this point, and the fracas over Kerry-Lugar shows the country cannot be co-opted (or bribed, depending on your level of cynicism) easily either. We hear a lot about how we spend so much money on Afghanistan versus Pakistan, but few concrete suggestions about what we would do with that money. We don’t even have a clear picture of our broader interests involving India and Pakistan, which makes formulating strategy towards Pakistan even harder. So most discussion of Pakistan generally leads to either vacuous discussions of “engagement” or “toughness,” but not much said about real options, since the complexity and difficulty of the Pakistani issue do not lend themselves to either side of the argument in the Beltway debate.
PO Gauthier refers to the GWOT. The “T” stands for “Terrorism”. How can you fight, never mind win, a war on a tactic? It seems the US strategic thinking on AQ (sic) is that they use terrorism as a state of being, rather than as a tactic to achieve an end. Does the US strategic thinking even address what ends AQ seeks?
In the spirit of a chess master (as quoted by Stephen Fry, and misquoted by me since I can’t find the reference), victory comes not from doing what you want to do, but doing what your opponent doesn’t want you to do. What moves does AQ not want the US to do?
Dave, brilliant.
Picking up on the ‘why are the others there’ line, I would add two things.
First, to amplify with a anecdote. Canada’s contribution has been significant (on its own terms) and required a fair amount of soul-searching and spin in order to gain enough support to sustain the effort. At one point (although it seems to have faded into disuse abit with a new governing party in power) the Canadian version of the ‘comprehensive approach’ was entitled ’3D’: diplomacy, development and defence. When I returned from Kabul in 2004, I had the following exchange with a high ranking official from the Canadian department of foreign affairs:
FB: I see how we have a defence contribution to make, and certainly a development one, but why do we have a diplomatic contribution to make in Afghanistan?
Other: Well, we diplomats need to leverage the contributions of the other departments.
FB: Hmmm…okay. But what are we leveraging anything for? Why are we there in the first place?
Other: Alliancemanship.
You can imagine my response. We are just pitching in because the team is involved? If this is so, Canada hasn’t progressed much since 1914 and its entry into WWI (it pains me to admit).
There is a very Realist angle to this though. When, as is the case of Canada, a country on whom you rely on for 79% of your export economy (approximately 22% of your overall GDP), says “What say we go and thump some guys that I don’t like very much, on account of what they helped others do to me?” you don’t dilly-dally. As the Athenians told the Melians (and Realists have been telling us ever since): “…Right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”
Second, and leading on from the first point, while the strategy may indeed be dictated (‘participate’) the manner in which this strategy is carried out is not so narrowly constrained. Here the weak are able to put their own stamp on what they do, in order to save face, sustain domestic public support, square pesky ideological circles, etc. Here junior ‘partners’ get to put their flag on the letterhead, while maintaining caveats, emphasising reconstruction, linking to traditions of peacekeeping, etc.
Again, in the Canadian case, the Canadian army deployed very quickly to Afghanistan (SOF in 2001), originally contributing an infantry battatlion under US command in early 2002. It left after about 9 months or so, having proven its point (standing shoulder to shoulder with Uncle Sam and all that). However, in early 2003, with pressure mounting on Canada to participate in the liber-vasion of Iraq, Canada knew it had to avoid participating at (almost) all costs. Domestic opinion would not brook such unalloyed support for the Bush administration, but Uncle Sam would not tolerate abject disloyalty. So, Canada conducted its own pre-emptive strike: it deployed 2000 troops to Afghanistan, ensuring that its cupboards would be bare when the call came (which it did) to come along to Baghdad.
So, why is Canada there? Because the US is there, absolutely. But, at the same time, it is also in Canada’s best national interests to be there? Why because the Americans want us there and they dominate our economy, that’s why.
This reminds me of Chamberlain’s statement regarding the abandonment of the Czechs, “they are a little nation, of which we know little, far away.” It is always easier tyo rationalize staying out of harms way rather than confronting danger. I notice while decrying the war you offer no alternative.
Perhaps because it is clear what the altrenative is.
Perhaps because it is clear what the altrenative[sic] is.
I’m afraid that the alternative is not quite clear to me Thomas. I for one, refuse to believe that the choices in an intricate environment such as Afghanistan could be aggregated down to two options: War and “something else – not further description”. As I’ve argued in a previous thread, the strategist defends against suffering untenable situations (brought about by the opposing strategist’s method of applying means of coercion), by identifying and exploiting options. When the strategist reaches a point in execution where he is faced by a Boolean option set, usually “yield or die” – but in this instance, apparently “fight this war, regardless of the outcome or something may happen”, then it is an end-play.
The effort here is not to decry the war. It is to ask a question as simple as this: Why are we in Afghanistan? We do not ask it only because we’re apparently “losing the War”, we ask it because the moral foundation for the War is possibly shifting. If this is indeed the case, then we are obliged to ask: Is our Cause still just? If the answer to that question is anything but a resounding “YES”, then we have to stop whatever it is we’re doing in Afghanistan and do something else.
And here is a question: if the moral foundation had shifted, and if our Cause is no longer just, and if we had to suggest alternatives, would these be considered by the decision-makers? Or would they be so blinded by their own interpretation of the original (but now invalid) moral justification, that they cannot be seen to deviate from their current option?
My regretful (because of the tragic repercussions) answer to your last question is: consider what the Asian quagmire did to LBJ’s Great Society programme. Obama has to keep doubling down because Dems have to act tougher than tough so as not to be painted as girly-men by the Repugs, and never mind the second-order consequences.
More immediately, consider what happened to the American protectorate in Indochina. Were the 55000+ US soldiers’ lives in Vietnam wasted? Will the thousands of lives in (the latest iteration of) Afghanistan be wasted? O tempora. O mores.
While I followed and agreed with your first premise (“It is to ask a question as simple as this: Why are we in Afghanistan? “) I am afraid I cannot go along with the subsequent reasoning. The ‘justness’ of the Cause cannot be the sole determinant of action, especially over time. Otherwise we end up with a fairly sad approximation of Don Quixote: his causes may have been just, but his means of prosecuting them were ineffective.
This is where I see things having gone a bit of track, and the good Petty Officer suggested so in his earlier comment: “We’re still here because of 9/11. Full stop. All else is secondary. The GWOT started here, and we must win.”
Any accountant (shiver) will tell you: don’t throw good money after bad. Just because you are into a failed enterprise for a million bucks, don’t keep investing, hoping to get out of it somehow. Casino parking lots (and Wall Street i-Banks) are filled with people who follow this logic. Of those, some can walk home, some get buckwheats.
Militarily, this is not an alien concept either. Sun Tzu reminds us across the millennia: “…you must reinforce success and starve failure.”
The trick is knowing–and admitting–the difference.
@FB
Thank you for your response, but I must confess that it has left me somewhat puzzled. I think that perhaps my post requires further clarification, so if I may…
My post was deliberately kept clear of any reference to method of execution or any judgement thereof. It was simply to point out that if we are no longer in the position to motivate our methods in Afghanistan (regardless of what that may be or how effective it may be), on the basis of our original Cause, then we need to pause and reflect on our options. This is along the same lines with David Betz’ closing:
But if America is there because the President fears that appearing weak on national security imperils his party’s electoral prospects upon which hinges his ambitious domestic agenda and the honour and dignity of important generals is at stake, well… then we should be shot of the place.
…no more and no less.
Ultimately, should we determine that we are still in Afghanistan for the right reasons – being that our cause is just – then (and only then) should we turn our attention to our methods and intent. I agree with you that it does not require a keen eyesight to spot the problems in Afghanistan. But these problems are not insurmountable.
Some of the work by Siverson and King and more recently the “bandwagoning” notion of Mark Beeson (http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/117980989/abstract?CRETRY=1&SRETRY=0) are also instructive in this discussion.
Also kudos to PO3 Gauthier for joining in so eloquently. It is a nice addition to have the perspective of one currently “down range.”
I neglected to include Stephen Walt’s work on the effect of unipolarity on military alliances. (Alliances in a Unipolar World)
Well, that is the strategy isn’t it? Fighting against terror, regardless of whether it is a tactic or not. Not allowing those who would commit terrorist attacks the latitude to plan, organize and execute their attacks? Dismantling the networks which support the attacks, and even going after the Nations that would allow their territory to be used to such ends?
In Afghanistan creating a government where one hardly existed before, denying the use of Afghanistan to those who would plan further operations?
I agree with you all, that the strategy is not well defined. But, the whole point to coming into Afghanistan was once to find one man and destroy the Taliban and Al Qaeda. 9 years and a different war later, we’ve mostly forgotten that. Understandable–but not good.
As far as Afghanistan is concerned a population centric strategy makes sense. We need to give the Afghanistan people ownership in a way of life outside of radical Islam. Give them (not just their government) a major stake in not allowing the Taliban, the proxy groups, drug cultivation and the like to flourish in their land. How I would like to accomplish this is through micro-loans, similar to how Kiva works. Until they have a vested interest beyond just survival and hedging their bets as to who will win, nothing will change.
“If the reason America is there is still credible fear of Al Qaeda and the preservation of the honour and dignity of the United States then they are right to be there and we are right to be there with them”
Firstly its nice to see the OP list the work of people who are questioning COIN and even the logic of why the war in Afghanistan exists. Credit to OP.
Secondly the US keeps saying that AQ is down to 100 or so individuals in Afghanistan, does the huge US troop presence reflect that? no it does not, AQ has been replaced by the Taliban and anyone else under the catch all moniker of terrorism. So is there really a credible fear of AQ and if so do the 100 individuals in Afghanistan represent that threat?
Thirdly has anyone considered that the attempt to maintain US honour and dignity (through ongoing war in the Middle East and elsewhere) may in fact be undermining it. Since the GWOT started the US has not been wining many popularity contests in the Middle East or elsewhere. Various invasions, torture, Gitmo and a host of other behaviours have not helped the US look honourable or dignified. How will behaving in the fashion it does bring it honour and dignity? Unless the only people who are going to feel honourable and dignified are the politicians.
Next when your down to fighting for ‘honour and dignity’ your are scraping the bottom of the barrel of ideas and motivations for maintaining the fight, this is not a sports event, people are out killing and being killed and I doubt that many, if any, are fighting for honour or dignity as their primary reason for the fight. Most would be fighting for survival, to drive out the invaders, because of the perceived threat of Afghanistan or the Taliban or something slightly more tangible than honour and dignity.
The motivation to “stay the course” in Afghanistan looks more and more like the bunker mentality of the last days of the Third Reich, blind faith as the whole situation crumbles around you. The US couldn’t get Marja to work but is now planning to make it happen in Kandahar. What really is different between this form of illusion and Hitler ordering paper armies around while the reality is very different
America is in Afghanistan through few means of its own. Empires get sucked along by the logic of empire and Obama couldn’t stop it any more than Bush could. As noted in the articles there are many factors at work and many players in the game, most out to get rich and with little consideration for how that happens.
Finally and sadly if the UK has to be there like the rest of NATO it should accept this logic and not try to put some heroic label on what are essential base motivations or factors beyond their control. The UK will leave when its told to leave by the US or when the US leaves itself (however that is).
I dont want to always sound like I am negative on this issue but where does the blind optimisem start and the reality take over?
I note someone above mentioned the Melian Dialogue from Thucidedies, the irony of quoting such a thing in a discussion like this, with the emphasis on real politik is that Athens triumphed against the Melians (a small island) but fell in the larger war with Sparta through its own hubris and inability to see that ongoing war was leading them down a path to ruin.
Using any justifaction to attempt to shore up an impossible situation is cutting very close to what John Raulston Saul wrote about in the Unconscious Civilization, societies which are unable to rid themselves of the illusions which they have created and therefore are unable to deal with the pain of the situation they are in and as such simply continue down the road to ruin.
At what point does it end? What kind of victory can be won in Afghanistan?
DD,
I share your ‘non-optimismistic’ (don’t say the p word, don’t say the p word) viewpoint, but would take issue with one thing you said:
“America is in Afghanistan through few means of its own.”
That, I am afraid, doesn’t make much sense. If not on its own terms (originally and now), then how? America got itself there through a series of instrumentally rational (please note the adverb*) decisions. And each day, it stays based on a series of similarly instrumentally rational decisions. If American wants to leave, it can do so, and then it will have to, uh, well, like, ‘deal’.
No one forced the US to go there and no one forces the US to stay there. The buck stops in Washington, I am afraid. There is no inevitable set of circumstances, no deus ex machina, no invisible hand at work here.
There is agency here, for sure. As Marx reminds us, though, while agency is indispensible for action, things do not always turn out as we may like:
“Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under circumstances of their own choosing, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past.” [Karl Marx, Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, 1852]
*Instrumental rationality: A specific form of rationality focusing on the most efficient or cost-effective means to achieve a specific end, but not in itself reflecting on the value of that end. (wiki-dictionary or some such toss) [yes, crappy source, but you get the point].
Hi FB
I suppose I should expand on my point a bit.
Im not a big fan of rationality when you look at the actions of nations, I understand we all have a “rational” basis of sorts and I spent a lot of time going over the theories of those who worked in that area long ago as an undergrad (as I suppose most Pol Sci undergrads do) but quantifying that at the level of individuals is one thing at the level of states and nations (democratic ones more so than the more authoritarian/dictatorial ones) seems to me to be ascribing just a bit too much “rationality” to what essentially has been (in Afghanistan at least) a very unrational and short sighted series of manoeuvres dating back to the to the 70s.
I know a lot has been made of the short sightedness of US foreign policy and I suppose that’s the basis of my comment, that short sighted policy A lead to unintended consequences B which then lead to another short sighted policy C and to unintended consequences D and so on, to which the US is in the position its in not through any rational actions on its part, no decision but instead a series of short ranged political manoeuvres at best (more designed to satisfy the political situation in Washington DC) and at worst what Chalmers Johnson called euphemistically as “blowback”.
So in that sense I dont see men (the US) making their own history, in Afghanistan at least (although Marx was a shrewd observer of human nature to be sure) but people adrift in the currents of history (I suppose another analogy in line with the “blind leading the blind” title that heads the original post).
Of course I should admit my bias and I do not really buy the whole instrumental rationality thing because when you start to boil people down looking for indicators of certain behaviours (such as self interest or efficiency acted in a “rational” manner) you will find them and as many of these theories have done assigned them the prime place in the matrix of how things work and relegated all else outwards to become secondary inputs.
This is why economics looks so wonderful in theory but instead rests on a series of semi unproven assumptions (as all sciences essential do – ie the its happened in the past so it must continue to happen in the future theory) which hide the real nature of the “game” (as the US and the world are finding out as many economies fall afoul of the greater realities of what we might call “True Reality based Economics”).
I instead seek more holistic and less dominant strains of thought, particularly in my main area of interest, Insurgency, COIN, terrorism and warfare in general; as being able to adapt and seek answers with the best intellectual tool for the job seems to be more able to work with what can only be described as a fluid environment than attempting to mould somewhat simple and linear theories to highly complex realities (as the US and the COINistras are trying to do).
And in this case there are decision being made in Washington and as Marx vis yourself point out constrained by the limits of the previous. But thats just my point, the previous has so constrained the situation that the availability of potential decisions has been reduced to almost nothing, the same kind of buker logic in Berlin circa 1945.
And in that sense no one is making any real decisions, its micro management to be sure but the much larger reality has long since spun away from any force the US can bring to bear on it, where the tipping point was I dont know for sure but as the popular example points out the turning point for Vietnam was in the wake of the the Tet Offensive in 68, no matter what the US did after the tide had turned, and obviously it had been running against it from a lot earlier but after Tet the course was clear but it still took another four years for the US to remove most of its troops and only after the rationality of the “Best and the Brightest’ in Washington had been hammered by the reality that even with the weight of US fire power the North Vietnamese were going to keep fighting and win.
I think the US has passed such a point in Afghanistan and in its greater struggles in the region, hence my comment about the Logic of Empires, rise and fall, ascend and decline, that which made the US strong is now the very same that made it weak, which in the case of almost all Empires is unrestrained and uncontrolled warfare, the dogs off the leash, and run wild.
The US has a military industrial complex that cannot just be dismantled and cannot be just phased out and it is now joined by an economic and corporate system which has and continues to make immense profits of the proliferation of war and weapons which if you want logic, or some sort of instrumental rationality that is where you will find it, war makes money for some and that some have controlled the situation to their best advantage in making US foreign policy and in how the US sees its world, and in that there is a logic but its a short term one and one which history looks unfavourably on, rise and fall.
I dont think its Deus Ex machina any more than you might but I think that it might as well be when you look at the narrow and confined spaces in which the argument for and against is being framed, honour and dignity become albatrosses around ones neck, weights which do nothing but drag ones thoughts down and when those weights are attached to those who lead the rest have little option but to follow which is why the Uk is in Afghanistan, which is why NATO is in Afghanistan and why others are in Afghanistan.
911 didnt set the course it was, like the assignation of the archduke in 1914, the trigger which has set off a major world conflict and as we slug though such a war, we find that, like the madness of the Great War, logic and rationality get reduced to “attack, attack, attack” although this time its not men going over the top, although we do seem to have our own versions of the château generals, but an idea that sooner or later if we just cast enough men an material into the fire (snatching “Victory from the bayonets of the enemy” I think it was called) we will surely prevail. Such a logic, such a rationality ignored anything which was not satisfactory to its inputs and in doing so sent millions to their deaths, I see such a logic in Afghanistan and In Iraq and in most other places where the US and NATO are seeking to fight “terror”.
And in the end someone did win the “Great” war, but the costs were such that it was a hollow victory, bereft of all honour and dignity and leaving a trail of ruination in its wake and leading to greater catastrophe and suffering which is why I oppose such thoughts and say and will always say that the conflict in Afghanistan is lost, over, bankrupt and doomed, its a battle to the last man with no real right or wrongs.
The GWOT has elevated itself with such logic to the level of a Global Blood feud, Hatfields and McCoys, Nato vs Terrorists, Good vs Evil, Christians vs Muslims and when such absolutes have been reached there can be no victory that will contain any honour and any glory except the small scraps that individuals will take in the wake of shattered armies and nations.
I salute those who fight but I pity them also as the lucky few who do pull something worthwhile from their time will be like few compared to the many who adorn the cenotaphs, monuments and walls which dot the west bearing the names of the fallen and the places they fell, very silent testaments to the logic of the wars they fought in, very painful reminders that when you abandon all other human qualities (love, creativity, compassion, emotion, art etc) in favour of blind logic and rational thought you are doomed.
Very eloquent reply. I agree with your arguments. My point was that choices do exist and ‘decisions were made’ along the way to the current situation. Choices still exist today, although as you mention, they are not easy ones. When I said that intrumentally rational processes led to where we are, that is not a comment on their ‘goodness’ or their ‘morality’. To be clear: those things, to economists, are externalities, but they are, in fact, the very essence of our humanity.
As usual a thoughtful and thought-provoking post. I have but one quibble where you said “… (although Marx was a shrewd observer of human nature to be sure)…” I realize this was an aside to your main thrust but I must add that while Marx may have in some sense been such an observer, IMHO his starting premise as to such “human nature” doomed his socio/political/economic model for which he is more widely known. He, as many other such “great” minds who have postulated “the” answer to the “right” way to organize and govern human beings failed to take into (adequate) account that this “nature” will always manifest itself eventually in self-interest, greed, hunger for power ad nauseam.
As a consequence, those who consider themselves “more equal than others” will acquire, consolidate and expand their control over their fellows “through all means necessary” until there is effectively totalitarian control, regardless of the label (marxist, leninist, national socialist, etc. etc.). Since the results are largely the same (loss of individual thought and freedom, lowest common denominator treatment of the non-elites, suppression of entrepreneurism and individual ambition and the like) it is cold comfort to the oppressed if the elite is characterized by “true believers” motivated by their sense of their own “good” intentions and superior wisdom and abilities that are needed to “care” for the great unwashed (proletariat?) or or baser less “enlightened” motives.
This is one of the dangers of some aspects of post-modernism in that the extent to which “human nature” is even considered, it too often fails to account for the largely Judeo-Christian construct that such “nature” must be “ring fenced” to the extent possible (admittedly this itself is inherently limited since humans are inevitably–at least until we cede all to AI, the creators and agents of any political system). This is reflected in at least the original intent of the founders of the American experiment through their incorporation of structural tension (checks and balances) in the Constitutional framework that hopefully would sufficiently restrain this “human nature.”
Given the trajectory of American politics and “culture” over the last 100 years or so, however, this experiment appears to be heading for the proverbial train wreck experienced by previous efforts as “human nature” continues its corrosive effect on the girders of the Constitutional superstructure. I suppose it suggests that all such “noble” experiments have a built-in “shelf life.”
Hi FB
I see your point; I am a big believer in externalities also.
@CJ
Would it help if I said I was a fan of Nietzsche also? ;)
After spending 7 months in Kandahar Province, staring at herds of goats and dodging IEDs, I can’t help agree with the sentiments. Not once in my 100+ patrols and few dozen shuras did I ever hear “Arab”, “Al-Qaida” or “Caliphate” mentioned, so I don’t buy the specter of 9/11 so much. I heard “Pakistan” lots, but I sense the terms “Pakistan” and “Afghanistan” are of dubious meaning to the Pashtun.
As Churchill said when Chamberlain faced evil in the face, he had the choice between dishonor and war. He4 choose dishonor, now he shall have war. When we face evil the choice is black and white. It is not an infinite set of probabilities. History onl records who was the victor or the vanquished, it matters little what policy considerations the lords of Carthage selected prior to their demise. History does record they also choose dishonor until they were prostrate at the feet of a Roman Senate that only wished their demise.
Our enemies wish us nothing less. If the reason for the war is not clear to you perhaps you best leave the faculty lounge and ask the troops in the field what they think.