Also, whatever reservations you may have (and I share those), we should recognise that option (c) exists, especially as it is currently being employed. I may have been unclear: I wasn’t referring to using PMCs for security, but contractors for building work. Still, independent contractors (local or US-based) exist to provide both “military” type functions and “civ” type functions.

1) WoG = Whole of Government

2) Yes, I am speaking in the US context (directly linked to the last sentence of the entry).

3) I am leery of contractors as a solution. While I fully concede that they are part of current and future operations, I am reluctant to think of them as a viable solution for civ counterparts. While they would be a capable asset I would have issues with their ultimate responsibility/accountability to the American populace.

I interpret your option (a) as meaning US (etc) civilian government employees.

It seems that (b) is the only viable option, especially in an environment where shooting (etc) could start at any moment. The only alternative is to use private contractors, possibly locally-engaged, with the military providing at most an enabling project-management function to replace what the civ govt employees would have brought to the table. Perhaps that could be option (c).

Agree completely. I posed the similar point on SWJ in “how do we enable civ capacity to operate in a less than ideal security situation (ideal being no threat resulting in security being provided by HN security forces/police)”?

If we can’t – then do we abandon a WoG concept? If the security situation is ideal, then the military isn’t required to provide security and the civ can function with liminted or no interaction with a military component.

Does it:
a) overhaul the civ capacity/structure to effectively enable a civ lead during Phase IV/V transition?; or
b) increase military capacity/specialties to mirror those civ requirements and enable a military lead throughout Stab Ops?

The ideal solution is “a”, but in the near term you are going to see “b”. At what point to you reach an almost irreversible trend in militarizing civ capabilities; and to what detriment of acutally achieving an organization/structure to counter its current limitations?

I posted a similar inquiry on SWJ with respect to civ-mil relations in response to the article “The 800-pound Gorilla and Stability Operations”. http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/06/the-800pound-gorilla-and-stabi/

http://jedibeeftrix.wordpress.com/2010/05/18/britain%E2%80%99s-future-strategic-direction-8-%E2%80%93-what-should-our-nato-allies-expect-of-us/