Comments on: Britain in Iraq, A Ship in Search of a Rudder

By: Andy Salmon

Andy Salmon — Sat, 07 Aug 2010 12:56:09 +0000

To answer Thomas Rid’s serious question: no sour grapes, no personal disappointment – just objective reality.

Andy Salmon

By: Mike Chapman

Mike Chapman — Tue, 27 Jul 2010 08:36:00 +0000

Childish too, in the complete inability to remain focused on the task in hand. Forget Afghanistan after the 2001 invasion, stick with Iraq for a while then, when it gets tricky, focus back on Afghanistan. All the while trying to impress the big boy when really you’re too weak.

Just maybe if British forces had been committed to one country for a decent period they might have been able to carry the job through to a satisfactory conclusion. As it is, they’ve never been given the chance.

By: mike wheatley

mike wheatley — Sat, 24 Jul 2010 09:10:04 +0000

I agree.
I find this monograph on the subject compelling:

“Alien: How Operational Art Devoured Strategy; Authored by Brigadier Justin Kelly, Dr. Michael James Brennan.; September 16, 2009; Available for download at: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=939”

Summary: the West has wrongly chosen to give the military the whole job for the strategy of war, which they can’t do, since war is a continuation of politics, and not a seperate activity spawned by politics.

By: Thomas Rid

Thomas Rid — Fri, 23 Jul 2010 11:55:40 +0000

Yes, an impressive post. I wondered how much of General Salmon’s remarks could be sour grapes? Or personal disappointment? (This is a serious question, not a hint.)

Just on a side-note: there is probably no country with more experience with terrorism, insurgency and political violence than where I live right now, Israel. And there is probably no democracy that has a higher ratio of flag officers-turned-politicians. But despite of an impressive level of military expertise in the political echelon, Israeli politicians are impressively inapt at managing military operations, and consistently so. The frustration among some of the brightest IDF officers is palpable. The last two wars should illustrate the point.

What does that mean? I’m not sure. Perhaps some of our dear ideas about civil-military relations need to be rethought in a more fundamental way.

By: David Ucko

David Ucko — Fri, 23 Jul 2010 10:09:30 +0000

Great post.
I would suggest that the ‘overall strategic plan’ in 2008 and 2009 was the same as it had been since around 2006: to get out and transfer responsibility either to local Iraqi institutions (regardless of their integrity and ability) or, as it happened after Charge of the Knights, to the US brigade that took over following Britain’s withdrawal. That, however, doesn’t make the analogy you make in the final paragraph any less salient.

If I may piggy-back on this post, I tried to elaborate on this point in a recent article on British operations in Basra, which may be of interest.