Whoa. . .

http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/TwoLetters/TwoLetters.htm

Chapter 9 of Book VIII of On War also has practical strategizing.

He might not know much about Afghanistan per se but I guess that if he applied his thinking he would still have a logical approach to the problem. One most likely as you point out in the real more of grand strategy/politics than trying to fight it on the ground.

Which in this age “battle” does need to be up skilled to suit the reality and not the dim memory.

To illustrate the the conflict within, I propose that we need to visit the definition of War, which (according to Clausewitz) is:

the mere continuation of politics by other means

Clausewitz is emphatic in his content that the purpose of War is to render the opposing military force incapable of conducting the War by disarming it. His “other means” is therefore the application of Military Force to break and disarm an opposing Military Force – and therein he relegates those dimensions of conflict beyond the confines of a Theatre of War.

To this effect, we experience a fundamental problem, since War (even in his times) is not restricted to the application of Military Force. It is anticipated that the conduct of a war would also include the continuation of the other dialogues within the inter-state manifold:

a. Diplomacy (even if pursued indirectly)
b. Espionage (we could anticipate a heightened occurrence in the absence of peace-time constraints)
c. Trade (embargoes)
d. Research and Development (in response to, or to head off technological advances by the opponent)
e. NGO’s (suspension of services, etc.).

In a state of War, it could be anticipated that these other dialogues will assume a coercive nature. And while they generally do, such coercion is not exclusive to the state of War. For instance, it could be argued that the US, UK and other interest states are applying Diplomacy as a means of coercion relating to Iran and it’s Nuclear Programme. None of these states are at war with Iran, but they are applying means of coercion in order to bring an untenable situation about for Iran – using Diplomacy as the method. By drawing on a definition of Strategy:

the method of using means of coercion to create an untenable situation for an opponent,

whilst by no means perfect, we can show that these states are pursuing a Strategy (or Strategies). But not a War. As a further example, consider current Strategies of Deterrence.

This is in sharp contrast with Clausewitz on Strategy. In his On War, as well as Principles of War, Clausewitz only recognises that what could currently be described as “Operational Strategy”, (or “Operational Art”) as Strategy. He deftly rolls Grand Strategy up into Politics and does not include the concept of “General Strategy”, or “Strategic Doctrine” in his definition of Strategy, being:

the employment of battle as the means towards the attainment of the object of the war,

– though the irony of this omission will not be lost on the critical reader. As it may, Strategy for Clausewitz is about battles and Wars are about the application of military force.

Is it therefore advisable to develop a Clausewitzian Strategy today? I am of the opinion that, relevant as his thoughts on War and Strategy may have been at the time, the bulk of it did not survive the onset of the Steam Age. Strategy (and War) is more complex than this.

I won’t speak for Clausewitz, but Boyd was very explicit in his call for a “counter-guerrilla” strategy, to wit: “. . . a vision rooted in human nature so noble, so attractive that it not only attracts the uncommitted and magnifies the spirit and strength of its adherents, but also undermines the dedication and determination of any competitors or adversaries . . .”

Boyd adds a footnote to his 300-word slide on the counter-guerrilla campaign: “If you cannot realize such a political program, you might consider changing sides!”

Blue skies! — Dan Ford

In developing a Clausewitzian strategy, would that not require a strategy in line with what Andreas Herberg-Rothe and others describe as Clausewitz’s general theory of war? Could not a Boydian military strategy operate within that?