The comments of SecDef Gates regarding future US military operations, force structure, ethos, and so on, have been much in the news of late. On this side of the pond, with few concrete signs of who’s going to run the country for the foreseeable future, thoughts are turning once again to what the forthcoming defence review might look like.
The Royal United Services Institute is holding a one-day conference next month, The Future Defence Review: Time for Trade-Offs: SDR 2010, which looks to be asking most of the right questions:
Whether SDR 2010 will be a strategic defence review or a security and defence review, the current fiscal constraints dictate that the UK is at a watershed moment in its strategic history. In setting out parameters for a review, the Defence Green Paper addressed the UK’s global position and national priorities. In the coming months of the defence review, however, as a consequence of the financial crisis the UK government may find itself forced to make trade-offs over critical national strategic principles and priorities. This conference will debate such trade-offs which, among others, may include:
- Retaining appropriate national autonomy in defence capabilities versus providing capabilities to make a contributory commitment to coalition operations. This raises issues such as whether some capabilities are relevant to both tasks, and at what point along the scale of balance between either option there are capability consequences for one option or the other. A fundamental issue within this particular trade-off is the extent to which political desires to protect sovereign capacity may be limited by the realities of the financial circumstances
- Developing defence capability to support enduring and sustained engagement in interventions versus capabilities optimised to deliver strategic and operational agility. This trade-off could take the form of a ‘today’ versus ‘tomorrow’ or continental versus maritime trade-off
- Prioritising ‘home’ commitments (including contributions to NATO and European Union operations close to Europe, as well as domestic national priorities) versus interventions further afield on the international stage, ‘away’ from such domestic priorities
- Sustaining sovereign defence industrial capacity versus increasing collaboration with – or buying ‘off-the-shelf’ from – overseas partners. A critical issue here is any risk to the security of supply
- Maintaining forces with sufficient readiness levels versus force regeneration in times of crisis – in the latter case understanding the difference between ‘regeneration’ by surging capability from within the existing force structure, and the challenges (and risks) of ‘reconstitution’ after giving up a capability
- Focusing on commitments of national obligation, and the demands for national autonomy, versus operations of choice, and examining the extent to which capability options are defined by matters of obligation and to which obligation defines the need for national autonomy in capability
The conference also will address the question of whether the current political circumstances and requirements for fiscal consolidation will see the generation of a review which – in terms of its timescale, priorities and consequences – is inevitably tactical rather than truly strategic. This raises the question of whether a quick review dealing with the short term and driven by financial considerations will precede a more substantial review – and perhaps a more regular series of reviews – over a longer time-scale.
What would you add to this list? Have you any comments on the RUSI agenda? You know that the Ministry of Defence pays close attention to this blog, so perhaps here’s a chance to throw a few more thoughts and opinions into the ring, for policymakers and practitioners to chew over in the months ahead.
{ 85 comments… read them below or add one }
I think we have to address how ‘Strategic’ the review is now likely to be given the UK political situation. The Liberal views on Trident are not compatible with the two main parties and will make a White Paper very difficult to press through.
Would we have to wait for another election to have a true review?
Given that we could decide to not replace our ICBM missiles with NEW ICBM’s but could perhaps, following the suggestion of one of our admirals lately, save lots of money by going down a “nuclear armed cruise missile” road, I think it’s possible to shift the debate. Instead of one where the focus is ‘leaving Britain without nuclear weapons’ (cue lots of flag waving and comments about loss of power) we could start debating ‘do we really need submarine launched multiple warhead nuclear missiles when we can have a cheaper option AND still be a nuclear super-power’ – which would perhaps be a good thing?
Yes I know this is terribly simplistic, but the LibDems statements on Trident have been somewhat covered in ‘value for money’ rhetoric. Due to the savage nature of cuts coming, a cheaper nuclear weapons deployment system could possibly allow all sides save face.
I think even with the current political compromise, the MoD is about to have serious budget cuts. I believe it’s still possible that everything will be on the table. Just my take.
There’s a number of issues that LibDem and people overlook: developing a cruise missile with nuclear warheads risks to be very expensive.
Again, cruise missiles have a range of 1800, perhaps up to 3000 kilometers if you can design such a missile. But that means you’ll need more submarines out on patrol, far nearer to the coast of a potential enemy, to be able to strike back or at least have a credible deterrent. Keeping our sub in patrol in the North Sea wouldn’t be feasible anymore: what could it strike from there???
More subs means more money. Subs on patrol far from Uk and near the potential enemy may always be in the wrong place at the wrong moment, and anyway it would be at risk of being stalked and sunk.
The cruise itself could be rather easily shot down by modern air defence (SA21 and the future S500 of the russians for example, that chinese and even iran are already dreaming and copying) making your deterrent useless.
Again, you can’t design a nuclear Tomahawk, either: the US’s ones have been long retired, and re-make it would pose a big problem. When you launch a Tomahawk, how can people know if it is nuclear or conventional? The risk is massive, and politically it cannot be accepted. The US themselves would probably put a veto on such a design option. You’ll need to start from white paper, with all the cost implied, and design a whole new missile. Think that the UK can embark on such an enterprise along, when the last british engineered missile has been the Avro Blue Steel in the cold war, and that was air-launched…? Answer: i’m sure it could, but the cost would likely be incredibly high.
And with a new missile you’ll need new logistic, new equipment, new training, new everything. And still you’d have to re-engineer the Astute subs, because you can’t just put a nuke on it, much as people seems to think it can be done.
Believe it or not, the cheapest and most viable successor to Trident D5 still is Trident E6, if that’s going to be its true name as it seems. Because you already have the support infrastructure. You have the US to share the design workload and the price with. And you can lease the missiles at a relatively very low price.
It may be possible to make economy by stepping down from 16 to 4 Trident tubes on each new sub. Smaller subs, less missiles, less warheads: economy, compliance with a commitment to less nukes in the world, and a secure, effective deterrent still in place.
A better balance, more acceptable in a world that may not be in the darkness of the Cold War anymore, but that has far more nuclear-capable states than there were back then, and that is, no matter what kind of fairy-tales they tell us all, far more unsure than it was back then.
An impressive and thoughtful analysis. Let me add to your point about mixed loads (conventional/nuclear). The US has an aversion to the idea of submarine mixed-loads precisely because of the reason you mention. Congress initially added language to the draft defense bill a couple of years ago prohibiting a “bi-conic” ICBM prompt global strike (PGS) capability because of ambiguity of launch concerns. Bi-conic PGS eventually was addressed to allow land-based deployment—different missile and flight profile—but congress to this day recoils at the thought of a sub-launched conventional ICBM-type of missile. When we talk about launching platforms (subs) it must be clear at every step what is being thrown downrange—error of intent cannot be permitted.
Gabriele- thank you. A thought provoking reply. The smaller number of missile tubes is an idea I had not heard of before. Rather elegant solution all things considered.
My pleasure to share reasoning. Actually, thought, the idea of a lower number of launch tubes is apparently being considered already by the top brass and designers. Americans seems content with stepping down from 24 tubes of the Ohaio to 16, and it makes sense that the UK considers fitting only four tubes. More than enough, overall, to cause a serious armageddon already.
Appologies for getting a bit away from the primary topic, however: it is my understanding that the largest part of the cost of a Trident replacement is in having a dedicated SSBN designed and built for it, that has no other use.
Am I currect in thinking this?
Difficult to say it for sure. The Trident replacement program is a join effort of US and UK, that is now focusing on a new launch tube and mission system, an upgrade to the missile itself, apparently going to be named Trident II E6, and a new design for a successor SSBN launcher submarine.
Accepting that the missile is going to be very similar to the current one, and thus most of the mainteinance, training and support structures would need only updates, it is reasonable that the greatest part of the cost comes indeed from designing the successor submarine.
For the UK, it actually makes sense to start designing from the Astute class SSN if this is possible. Though, it is not half as easy as the press thinks. The redesigning risks to be very extensive and pretty complex.
As to the limits in the use of SSBNs, it is hard to express a though. The SSBNs missions are obviously one of the best kept secrets, and while it is probable that so far the SSBNs mostly just cruised silently hidden in the depths, it is reasonable to assume, for the future subs, a larger share of missions other that just the deterrence.
Especially in the RN, cronically short of submarines, that risk to go down to a total of just 6 Astutes.
The large launch tubes for Trident missiles could be used to carry reconaissance drones (both underwater drones, surface drones or even small planes, already in design stage, that can be launched from dived subs. The tubes could also house special-forces equipment, and be used for the missions of the Special Boat Service (Uk had a couple of ex-Seal SDVs mini-subs, but obviously i don’t really know their operational status). And again, the Trident tubes are so large that they can contain an all-up round canister with 6/7 Tomahawks missiles for land attack.
Besides, it has been said that the new launch tubes will be larger than the current ones, exactly for their future use in different missions.
Anyway, i think the press’s report of 100 billion price for Trident replacement and mainteinance is overrated and excessive, personally. But even if it was in that region, we have to assume an operational life for the new subs in perhaps 40 or more years. 100 billion over 40 years wouldn’t be too absurd an expense for the security and political advantages given by the nuclear deterrent.
I do not think that we should consider reducing the number of tubes on the new boat design though – if any thing, I would recommend that the number of new boats and the number of tubes should be increased. My reasoning is as follows:
The UK is already stretching the basic requirements for deterrence to a breaking point. The “Continuous at Sea” doctrine (based around 4 boats) will see us with either one or two boats ready for use in times of need. The 4 boat configuration works as follows: one boat in Faslane, undergoing long term maintenance. one boat on training, one boat either on training or on sortie to the deployment station, and one boat on station or on a return leg to Faslane.
In a worst case scenario, with only one boat available, we have 16 tubes with a total of 48 warheads under the water (even though the Trident is a 10 head MIRV, we do not load to capacity). There is an excellent reason for this, and we’ll get to that in a minute. Point is, no matter how good your boat and it’s crew – one boat doesn’t cut it for continued assured deterrence. It is feasible that one boat could be hunted down and killed (leaving us with no tubes or heads under water, and no deterrent – a complete waste of £100 billion). You may not agree with this – if you’re thinking of here and now. But this is a 40 year programme. Who will have space-based launch-detection in 30 years time? Once our lone boat had launched, our potential opponent may know where it is. So, one boat? No! We need at least 2 boats out at all times, or not bother. And that means at least 5 boats.
The second point (alluded to earlier). We need to be able to structure a response – using MIRV’s. The Trident can carry 10 warheads (if loaded full), that means that 10 targets will be destroyed on launch. It is not practical to start removing warheads from the vehicle before launch – these things are best done before deployment. So the boat should be capable of multiple configurations to deliver from a “full punch” (a Trident with 10 heads), or a more subtle (if this word is at all appropriate), “1/2 inch punch” (a Trident with only one head) – and some options in between. And we need the ability to “do it again”. So, 4 tubes? No! We need more – 24 tubes should do the trick. And I know that this is not what the Americans are doing. But it is what the RN should be doing.
The point with deterrence is – you either do it with commitment, or spend your money on something else. Deterrence is a psychological effect that we’re attempting to establish within a potential opponent, to affect his strategic thought. The moment that the enemy strategist reaches a point where he thinks he may have a counter-plan, the money on deterrence is wasted (and we may end up facing some hard choices regarding “use or lose” – effectively painting ourselves into a nuclear option corner).
Fascinating. But it goes against politcal will to”smile to the world” and “speed up towards a world without nukes”. And it is not economically feasible in a time when four boats already are considered too great a burden.
Britain does not have 5 SSBN from years and years. Not even the Cold War still in place was a strong-enough push to obtain from politicians the money for more than 4 Vanguard subs.
Think now you could do differently?
It is already a luck if all 4 are built.
There’s the risk to have just 3. Or, maybe, 0.
And anyway, with the range of Trident II being over 8000 or perhaps 10000 km, the sub can stay well away from the enemy. The chances of it being found and sunk are so low they are almost none.
And that’s the reason why SubLaunched Ballistic Missiles became the ultimate deterrent as soon as they were developed.
A valid point…
I’d like to reiterate mine though – either do Deterrence properly, or don’t do it at all. The key is what we need to deter a potential Nuclear Club opponent (assuming we sign up and adhere to the principle of no use against non-Nuke states), not what can we afford. There are times and places to risk short-cuts… Nuclear Deterrence Strategy is not one of them.
If we embark on the pursuit of an Asda deterrence, it’ll be a fool’s errand. It’ll cost us money that we can hardly afford, yet not achieve the primary objective. In short, it is not going to create that mindset we seek to invoke – especially within international actors that are prepared drop 25 million of their population in some goofy-named 5-Year Plan. We may as well have a cardboard cut-out of a missile boat. It’ll have the same effect.
As I said originally, we’re already stretching the concept to breaking point. In order to claim ‘real’ independent Deterrence, we need the following:
a) We should maintain an independent and reliable launch detection – to determine the smoking gun within seconds of the launch event. We should know who was responsible for the strike, almost instantly – and certainly while the missiles are still in the air.
b) We will need to retain the ability to respond to the strike appropriately and immediately, irrespective of the damage inflicted by the attack on us.
c) Related to the above, we should have defences against an attack. C3 & I, berths and supporting facilities should be secured against any type of attack (including terrorist) and hardened to the point of requiring a direct hit, possilby surrounded by ABM defence networks.
d) We not only need to retain the ability to strike back at will, but also need to retain the intra-bellum means to escalate, drawing in the process on a wide range of possible responses, layered in such a way that to provide post-strike deterrence (as opposed to be limited only to a full assured destructive response). We need a range of options available to cherry-pick an appropriate nuclear response from.
e) We need to demonstrate the will to respond – in a manner of the “Chicken” Games Theory. Responses should be highly automated and linked to “trip-wires” – leaving little room for “alternative” responses. We need a commitment to the defence of allies, and an immersion with the same to create that required “trip-wire” effect. We need clear statements by our statesmen regarding “an attack on our allies” (think Berlin Airlift) and “an attack from this location” (think Cuban Missile Crisis) – clear statements of intended response in the event of a strike. On the other hand, we need a degree of ambiguity when required – (think of the vagueness of the Soviet stance on First Use – up to a point).
This is real Deterrence. A little bit more than “hey, let’s have 4 Trident boats”. We’re missing some key elements of the above, relying on strategic partners to render certain of the services. That is all fair and well – as long as we recognise that an alliance does not only import strengths, but also weaknesses. And recognise that 40 years is a long time. In the previous century, we’ve had 2 world wars in less than 40 years. A lot can happen in 40 years. If we say: “Let’s blow £100 billion on a 40 year programme”, it had better work for all of the 40 years, not only a part of it. Otherwise we need to be more conservative regarding the lifespan of the programme.
Still, it is a moot point. I know it will not happen – but feel much better for wagging my finger.
Oh, yeah, i remember that proposal. A conventionally armed Trident or Minuteman armed with guided, conventional warheads for rapid global strike.
It was admittedly a fascinating idea, and perhaps the ultimate way to destroy time-sensitive strategic targets literally in the first hour (more like 30 minutes) of a crisis.
It impressed me… But the problem, actually, was that the reaction to a military launch of a Trident missile would be hard. Fear would race up high, for obvious reasons.
A nuclear tomahawk isn’t more feasible than a conventional Trident: at launch, you can’t say if it is nuclear or not. What if they decide to retaliate with nuclear weapons?
It is a completely not feasible idea. And the Tomahawk is too precious to be flawed by such events… so there’s zero chances to be allowed to use it as base for a new missile.
Instead, i think it would be feasible to have the future SSBN acting in far more flexible way: i foreseen SSBN taking on the role of deterrence and of missile-platform at once. One or more tubes for the Trident could be fitted, instead, with recon drones, special forces and their means of infiltration, or simply with a seven-cell canister for Tomahawk missiles, like in the SSGN Oahio conversion that the US have already carried out on 3 boats.
The vital requirement is to have nuclear and conventional missiles absolutely SEPARATED and RECOGNIZABLE. This is not a field where you can make errors and go away with it.
“The vital requirement is to have nuclear and conventional missiles absolutely SEPARATED and RECOGNIZABLE. This is not a field where you can make errors and go away with it.”
Indeed. That is why RDT&E efforts are focused on making sure the PGS solution could not be mistaken as a nuclear launch. This is accomplished by using the Minotaur missile (different plume than a nuclear launch), launching from a non-nuclear missile field (such as Vandenberg), and the flight profile is a depressed trajectory with a max altitude of about 120nm and “skipping” across the outer atmosphere (nuclear ICBM’s max out at around 700nm and are totally ballistic). Of course, PGS missiles and silos would be open for inspection.
Testing is on-going, with an HTV test launch recently (Lockheed Martin as prime, a failure) and more planned.
PGS is an interesting idea and one that would not be viewed by US National Command Authorities as an option other than under the most demanding and time-sensitive times. It would not be considered a warfighting option.
I hope I am not speaking out of term here, but the subject is important, and you have asked for our input, so…
(1) Perhaps today/COIN/land vs. tomorrow/conventional/maratime is a false dicotomy, in that choosing not to have a capability will make it more likely that an adversary will pick the opposing terrain? That is: declaring that we don’t want to fight COIN deep inland, will encourage adversaries to base themselves deep inland, and adopt guerilla tactics that would require COIN to defeat.
(2) Perhaps it is just me, but considering the last 30 years:
Non-elective wars:
Cold War; Ulster; Falklands; Afganistan (due to NATO).
Elective wars:
Kuwait; Sierra Leone; Kosovo; Iraq.
Conclusion:
Even the non-elective wars come in all types: we don’t get the option to avoid certain types of war.
(3) Sovereign Industrial Capability:
What are the parts of this that we are really interested in?
- Skills (the engineers must be British)?
- Tax (the costs must go back the exchequer in taxes)?
- Design ownership (if country X embargoes us, we must be able to get the parts made elsewhere)?
- Production ownership (we must be able to make it here, even if we don’t always choose to)?
- Customisation (it must be made to fulfill our precise needs, not just be the closest match)?
(4) Obligations:
Can we do a better job of getting our allies to be obliged to assist us? E.g. there is a feeling that perhaps America is not being as helpful re: the Falklands as we would like.
What if the Falklands applied to be, and was accepted as, a directly administered territory of the EU? Such that any invasion would be a “theft of land” (er, fisheries) not only from Britain, but also France, Spain, Germany, etc.
Or a Territory of the US? (Or of some sort of re-imagined Commonwealth, I guess, though that seems even less likely.)
what I know of
1) the Falklands are British territory according to the Treaty of Lisboa
2) the Falklands dwellers are full British citizens, which make them EU-citizens.
3) the Falklands are not formally EU-territory (but that could be fixed if wanted. Plenty of European oversea territories are EU-territories).
So if EU-citizens were threatened it would be very difficult for other EU countries to deny assistance, if assistance was required.
Actually there have been French proposals of an independent EU-defense with a solidarity clause. These has been repelled by a horrified MOD. But this independent EU defense exists anyway in form of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and its chairman is a British Lady.
The common security and defence policy shall include the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy. This will lead to a common defence, when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides. It shall in that case recommend to the member States the adoption of such a decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.
The policy of the Union in accordance with this article shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain member states, which see their common defence realised in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, under the North Atlantic Treaty, and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework. (Treaty of Lisboa)
this above has been ratified by the UK. And the EU has already been very active in independent oversea deployments of which the one in Somalia is the most prominent one in the naval area.
Anyway the old solidarity clause (WEU) still exists :
The Mutual Assistance Clause and the Solidarity Clause
With respect to the mutual assistance clause, Article 42(7) of the Treaty foresees that, if a Member State suffers an armed aggression on its territory, its partners shall have an obligation to provide aid and assistance “by all their means in their
power” (presumably also military), in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter. Member States have an obligation to provide aid and assistance on a national basis, and they would be the ones to decide, again nationally, what exactly their helping hand would offer. Theoretically, the EU as a whole would not be involved, although one cannot imagine that Member States would run to the rescue of the victim of aggression simply after having watched the news on television. At the very least, an extraordinary session of the External Relations Council would likely be convened at the request of the Member State directly
concerned or of the High Representative / Vice President of the Commission. Moreover, it stands to reason that an attack against a Member State, which is any case seems highly unlikely, would never come today as a bolt from the blue.
Consequently, one could also assume that the EU as a whole would pursue some efforts to prevent such an event.
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&ct=res&cd=4&ved=0CCUQFjAD&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.irri-kiib.be%2Fpaperegm%2Fep.21.pdf&rct=j&q=solidarity+clause+european+defense&ei=2f_pS7vVBYuy0gS2sIzLDA&usg=AFQjCNFyQsZT75FXM4v0xInLifafUImsUQ
So as long the Falklands are British territory (even if not EU-territory) the UK can always claim it is an attack on its soil and require assistance.
As I see it, there is no need to “oblige” anybody, the legal requirements are already there. But of course it would be easier to prevent any attack, by enforcing mutual agreements of “presence”.
And regarding the US, forget about it. Ever heard about Monroe ? That’s why the US is “neutral” in the Falklands conflict and Hillary reminded the UK of it while visiting Argentina recently.
Appologies if I am being overly cynical about politics, but I would prefer not to rely just on the wording of a treaty. Rather, I would regard it as more effective to engineer a feeling of “ownership” and “entitlement” amongst the voters of (in this case) France, Spain, Italy, and the rest of the EU, such that their governments would feel personally and directly motivated to assist.
I would not say it is my “objective”, since I think this is something that only the Falkland Islanders themselves should choose (or not) to do: but a “perfect” implementation would cause Argentine “hawks” to consider not the balance of forces of Argentina vs. Britain, but rather of Argentina vs. the EU – an equation that seems to me much safer for us.
Based on budget constraints it is clear which direction MoD needs to take. Land wars are the direction UK forces need to be focusing on. Strategic transport, infantry modernisation, C4ISR, helicopters and all the associated kit. What is clear that is not needed are multibillion aircraft carriers, hundreds of Typhoons/F-35s and ballistic missile submarines. Astute SSN can deliver nuclear Tomahawks well enough. Gutting RAF and RN of the big ticket items will save the procurement budget for what is needed, fighting Taliban and Somali pirates. Argies are no threat, their military is rusted junk.
I have to strongly disagree with you. Land warfare is complex and politically extremely hard to justify and support. Given the current public support for the operation in Afghanistan (close to none, to say it brutally), you are not going to be able to start another operation anywhere any time soon. Simply because the press, the public and most of the population will immediately hate the government that starts such an operation.
Another land conflict like Afghanistan is not going to happen unless the UK is really, really pressed into it by evident and largely-understood reasons.
Besides, whatever politicians say won’t change the fact that the UK is an island. As such, it is surrounded by the sea. And a huge army on a island is arguably useless if there’s not a safe mean to move it to trouble-spots. Unless you are saying that we have to expect an invasion in Portsmouth or Dover any time soon. To move the army to trouble-spots you need an airlift capability that is not available and will never be available. Even the US, with hundreds of C17, C130 and C5 Galaxy have troubles sustaining the deployment of 30.000 soldiers. It takes months to move them to the area and support them with the vehicles needed and all the logistic.
Besides, you cannot expect every conflict to be fought against an enemy that can oppose you barely an handful of SA7 and Stinger portable SAM. Besides, you can’t always expect to have friedly bases where to land, close to the trouble-spot at hand.
At the end, you’ll have to move your troops with ships. As it happened for Iraq and even for Afghanistan, much as people forgets it so easily. Even now, with Camp Bastion, Kandhar and all the FOBs in place, the US still supplies most of the air support from the aircraft carriers at sea. Carriers that need to friendly base in the area, and that can go anywhere they are needed, at any time.
If you accept that most battles will happen in the Middle East, or anyway far away from the UK, you’ll need troops that are light and deployable. You’ll need a balanced mean of deploying them: Ships taken up from trade, the immensely useful Bay ships, Albion, Bulwark, Ocean and the two CVFs as needed. At the same time, you’ll need C17s and A400s, the only planes really capable to move vehicles to trouble-spots.
If you accept that you may not have a base in the area, you need the capability to break the door with a kick, and thus the Royal Marines and the capability to launch anphibious assaults. (vital, too, to be able to maintain the Falklands, that are potentially the source of many, many years of energetic independence if oil is found in great amounts). If you need to fight away from home, you need aircraft carriers to protect you, keep the sky clean, support you, and eventually carry you to the battlefield even.
And you need to be able to keep the sea secure.
90% of UK trade goes by sea, in and out. Further cuts to the navy would be SUICIDAL, if you consider this simple fact. The Senior service has been already battered more than enough, sincerely… and it has been a horrible way to sell the future of the nation cheaply. Britain always lived on the sea. Survived on the sea. And things have not changed. Perhaps, they have gotten worse. A couple of modern diesel-electric submarines, a COUPLE, could already be quite a nightmare for merchant shipping until they are found and sunk. Argentina has 3. Russia has 14 in the north fleet, plus several nuclear subs even more dangerous. Iran has got 3 Kilo subs too. And China has uncountable subs.
The RN has not enough ships to take on all her tasks and fight the Somali pirates. Cutting even more would totally chop the legs of the UK. Unless you have an idea to fight pirates by invading Somalia’s uncontrollable coastal region with air-moved divisions of the army. Personally, i don’t think it would work. And i think you’ll see how ridiculous that idea is, too.
The Royal Marines could do it, but there is not politic will to do it. Thus, it’s all about ships. Ships that travel the world and show to everyone that the UK still exists. Cut on them to have 150.000 soldiers. Then what? They would still be less than Poland’s army. And no one would see them most of the time.
No one would see the UK.
As to Trident, there’s a number of issues: developing a cruise missile with nuclear warheads risks to be very expensive. Cruise missiles have a range of 1800, perhaps up to 3000 kilometers if you can design such a missile. But that means you’ll need more submarines out on patrol, far nearer to the coast of a potential enemy, to be able to strike back.
You can’t design a nuclear Tomahawk, either: the US has been retired, and re-make it would pose a big problem. When you launch a Tomahawk, how can people know if it is nuclear or conventional? The risk is massive, and politically it cannot be accepted. The US themselves would probably put a veto on such a design option. You’ll need to start from white paper, with all the cost implied.
And you’ll need new logistic, new equipment, new training, new everything. And still you’d have to re-engineer the Astute subs, because you can’t just put a nuke on it.
Believe it or not, the cheapest and most viable successor to Trident D5 is Trident E6, if that’s going to be its true name as it seems. Because you already have the support infrastructure. You have the US to share the design workload and the price with.
It may be possible to make economy by stepping down from 16 to 4 Trident tubes on each sub. Smaller subs, less missiles, less warheads: economy, compliance with a commitment to less nukes in the world, and a secure, effective deterrent still in place.
A better balance, more acceptable in a world that may not be in the dark of the Cold War anymore, but that has far more nuclear-capable states than back then, and is, no matter what kind of fairy-tales they tell us, far more unsure than it was back then.
You need a stronger navy. Better strategic mobility. And an army more like the Royal Marines or the paratroopers: mobile, agile, and with a small logistic footprint so to be able to reach the spot, put a foot in the door to keep it open, and fight as reinforces arrive to help. No wonder that the 16th air assault and the RM Commandos are so often in Afghanistan, and are replaced regularly by light-divisions of the army that have similar characteristics. Sadly, this means cutting on the number of AS90 and Challengers. Most should be mothballed and well preserved for when the need for them will arise, by keeping a brigade active and engaged in training, so to keep expertise and methods alive for a “rapid” regeneration when it is needed.
That’s how the british empire worked for centuries. And hell, i think it worked so damn well back then. Now there’s no empire anymore, but the UK is still an island fighting wars far away from home, relying on sea trade, and surrounded by sea, now just like back then.
Interesting debate. However there seems to be one clear flaw with the ‘big navy, mobile army, keep Britain a global presence’ argument. Namely the utility of force issue, and the associated ‘tail’ of cumulatively quite expensive overseas commitments. It is the whole expeditionary scenario that has led to current UK military overstretch, since not one conflict that Britain has got involved in since 1996 has resolved itself in a sufficiently successful way to allow a full drawdown. Yes, there have been campaigns (Sierra Leone, Bosnia, and now possibly southern Iraq) which have been ‘relatively’ successful rather than complete quagmires demanding further reinforcements, but all continue to demand a presence, and nobody any longer seriously believes in the ‘light footprint, get in and get out quickly’ paradigm. The logical conclusion is that to continue down the path of expeditionary war requires either (a) a larger army AND a larger navy, which the UK itself can’t demographically or economically afford-people forget about the role of the Indian Army in the old empire days (b) a redivision of economic burden sharing, i.e. the UK military essentially becoming either the EU or America’s pet rottweiler, fed and supplied at their expense, which looks equally unlikely (c) recognition of the longer term unsustainability of such a course, and a fundamental rethinking of the UK’s role in the world.
There may be other options of course, but I’m struggling to see them. There is absolutely no realistic prospect of defence spending increasing as some rant about in the Tory press (to 4% of GDP for example), so we either continue with the fantasy of doing more with less, or we have a fundamental rethink. I don’t see any brave decisions being made by the Lib-Tory coalition we have now got, so unfortunately I predict more drift.
Your reasoning is good, indeed. But the need to stay in place after the fight ends is a demonstration of the failure of the international organizations like the UN, more than a failure of the UK. I actually believe the UK has gained considerable success in its interventions: the Sierra Leone campaign is something that the world admires.
But, indeed, the reasoning of “more boots on the ground” is, in itself, correct. Much as it is correct that the UK can’t afford it.
I know many do not not share this vision of mine, but i actually wish, for a future as close as possible, a sort of federal europe on the model of the US, in fact, were an as unitary as possible voice speaks loud for every member state, and were as many aspects as possible of the defence are collaboratively developed.
I firmly believe that, since everyone in Europe is happy to say “we’re under the French and British nuclear umbrella”, every nation state of Europe should contribute some money for the nuclear deterrent, for example. Same goes for the always vital aircraft carriers groups: the only real carriers in europe are the Charles de Gaulle and (hopefully) the CVFs, and i think it would be fair for Europe to contribute some money for them as well, since undoubtedly these ships will be considered “valuable parts of the European naval groups”.
If they want them, they should contribute some, i think.
And in future, nuclear subs, aircraft carriers, main battle tanks and the most expensive hardware should be commonly developed and funded.
In the immediate, anyway, i’m the first recognizing that it won’t happen. At this point, though, i would still bet my money on the navy, not on the army. Because i see far less willingness in joining other land operations, and i see plenty of use for the navy, in peacetime, and in a whole range of future challenges: protection of trade, of fishery, of the Falklands and the oil that will come from there, protection of the ships that carry gas, oil and goods in Britain, world-visibility, and the future struggle for the Arctic area and its resources, unless we are going to stay idle as US, Canada and Russia brawl for the bigger shares. Europe (and Uk in particular given its position) should definitely be ready to safeguard its security and interest in that area.
If not for the oil and resources that we believe are down there, for the strategic importance of the area and for the WATER. If we accept that water will become a vital resource in a matter of years, even the ice itself will be invaluable, since it is the largest reserve of water that exists.
Besides, building ships will have an effect on the economy, too. It will give work to lots of people, keep the shipbuilding industry alive, generate taxes money, and will supply work to lots of companies across the country: a ship needs paint, steel, cables, computers, furniture, tv, kitchens and lots of stuff. It seems ridiculous to list it out, but this is all stuff that needs to be produced and bought. Thus, it is money for lots of people in so many different fields.
And again, i see that an island needs a strong navy. The UK has been left with a pitifully small and battered navy, despite its ship working hard all around the world. Japan, richer and with more population but far less active outside of its backyard, has 50 escort ships and planning new DDH that are, in truth, carriers the size of Invincible, pretty much.
Everyone sees the need for ships. Japan, Korea, India, China, the US themselves, Russia, Italy and France (even if France had to make its own cuts, admittedly) and many others. Are they all stupid, or we are missing something ourself, by cutting, cutting, cutting, always on the navy…?
It is interesting to see how quickly we must echo debates within Whitehall- with arguments starting in strategic parameters and ending up in practical terms becoming inter-service debates (although given what those who have worked in the MoD suggest anecdotally, here at least the debates remain civil… and with rather less Machiavellian politics).
I’m not suggesting that there is any intent in this rather that a decreased sized pot of money naturally leads to changing priorities and that in-turn leads to inter-service jostling. I for one have no issue with such things and can pick sides as fast as anyone (he says, happily waving his white ensign), but wonder if trying to please all three services is going to be financially viable in the near and medium term future. If not- then if there is going to be a real deep strategic review of how our armed forces are to operate in opening decades of the 21st century, should we perhaps start with looking at how the MoD itself is organised?
I too see benefit in a more Federal future, though I would not want to be limited to Europe: I think there is much scope for collaboration with Canada, Australia, perhaps other nations as well.
I am most pleased by what I head about the Type-26 project, in this regard.
I think we should aim to do, and can succeed in doing, better than the US model.
In particular, their military procurement is an absolute train-wreck, and has been for over a decade.
As a consumer of defence (all government) I value competition as a tool to get me value for money, and it seems to me that the US model suffers from monopolys in the government side of the defence-industrial relationship. Hence I value the UK, France, Spain, et. al. all comming up with their own specifications as to what should be built.
However, we also need “economies of scale” in build, and to avoid the design expense of re-inventing the wheel. (Both initial cost, and cost of designing upgrades.)
Perhaps the compromise possition is: “only go with a new design, if we can convince at least one other (large) country to also buy it”?
Indeed, it is very promising that the Type 26 project is being pursued with collaboration with Australia and New Zealand. I was very pleased to hear so, and it makes me hope in a future when, once again, Commonwealth navies will field the same classes of ships.
Also because, the more ships you build, the more their cost goes down.
I regret the past failures of the Horizon project, and the withdrawal of France from the Eurofighter. Much as the Typhoon is maligned as a relic of Cold War, it is actually something we should be proud and grateful for. Not only is is a fantastic fighter, not only does it support 40.000 jobs in the Uk, but is is a SUCCESS on the market.
Saudi Arabia bought 72, and soon will spend 4 billions on weapons for them, again in the UK. They also may soon order 24 more planes, which would be awesome.
Oman is in talks to buy 24.
India may buy up to 126.
Even Japan is evaluating it, and sell Typhoons to Japan would be an historic success for Europe in a country that always buys american.
Austria bought 15.
Switzerland probably will buy it too.
Greece, Denmark, Romania, all valued it or expressed interest and may one day become markets.
Typhoon is the most successful fighter of recent generation on the market.
I really think that press, and people in general, should better reason before attacking wildly the defence industry, that with 300.000 workers and all the money it generates is the only true successful industry Uk still possesses, apart from Rolls Royce.
Because seriously. Not much of the rest is left alive. And if the navy is further mashed up, the little shipbuilding left in Britain will die.
Sad and incredible end for the nation that up to the 1900 leaded the innovation and building of ships at global level. Everyone had its ships built and engineered in the Uk. Now, UK takes its merchant ships from South Korea: and no one ever points it out, but the enterprise of killing the british shipbuilding has been one of the most impressive politic disasters of human history, if you think about it.
And well, i hope so. Europe may one day become a federation working better than the US, and that would make of Europe, once more, a central stage of global relevance. The only way to stay important as China and India grow and Russia gets back powerful, richness, and military power as well.
From a purely financial perspective how much can the UK afford now and for the near to mid future? How much cash can be brought to bear on this problem? Im guessing that no matter how the argument goes something will have to be cut. Can those more in the know expand a bit on this?
From a purely financial perspective, the UK could make an effort and complete all its major projects for defence. More than money, what lacks is political will to do it.
Because the need to cut the deficit exists, and to cut it the politicians undoubtedly will look at the armed forces and tear off the shiny ribbons from the uniforms, to say it with an ironic image. This because no one is politically ready to say “from almost 30 years the budget for defence has been decreasing (when it has not been simply robbed) while NHS has been growing of 34% in ten years, education budget grew 40% and so along. Why can’t we look into NHS and education, make sure that money is ACTUALLY WELL USED and rise the defence budget to 3 or 4% of GDP for a couple of years in the meanwhile? Not forever, just long enough to ensure we can conclude the important programs we have started, reform the acquisition project at the MOD, cut on “useless” wastes of various sort and then implement a more careful policy on defence.
This won’t be done. Look at the press: perhaps at times someone wonders for what all that money is used in schools and hospitals, but it is rare. What is constantly said is that “mod wastes money”.
Actually, the mod has been doing, in proportion, immensely better than NHS and Education both.
Uk has been fighting wars constantly, all around the world, from Sierra Leone to Bosnia to Afghanistan, not just on peacetime budget, but on a shrinking peace-time budget that’s now lover than France’s one.
Welfare gets 34% of GDP for its budget. Defence the 2.2%, down from a peacetime budget that once was nearly 3% and then 2.5% for some time.
I’m not a defender of the Mod. I’m the first thinking that changes are needed. But i also have to point out that the “wastes in management” are largely caused by the absurd politics of delaying, delaying, delaying. Last example, the CVF, delayed of two years to save 400 millions in 2010 and 2011, only to have 600 to pay later on. With more to spend to keep Illustrious and Ark Royal going until the Queen and the Prince are ready to go.
Same goes for the “shameful” Type 45, that’s actually an awesome ship, plagued by an absurd policy, that wasn’t satiated with delays, but had to cancel the second batch of ships. Which obviously saved little, because the price of the first 6 ships grew exponentially.
Same goes with Astute. One was to be ordered every 12 months, then every 22. They are ordered… when? When politicians can’t delay it anymore. Which meant, ultimately, just before the elections, with the “go” for Astute 5 and some long-lead orders of equipment for building the 6th.
Again, 8 Astutes were needed, and the RN cried for 8. But the plan is already down to 7, and most likely 6 will be built, at over a billion apiece, when building all 8 would have given the RN a credible force, would have kept Barrow working, and would have meant lower unit-cost. And with less inactivity between Astute-build and Vanguard replacement-build, the cost of the second would have been lower too.
The record, though, is about FRES. The greatest shame EVER. A program that lost its identity years ago and that arguably does not exist anymore. Piranha V was selected as utility vehicle, then the agreement was erased, and there was the shift to the Recon vehicle. That probably will not come. And surely not in 2015, because General Dynamics, with a lower cost bid, won… But, unfortunately, General Dynamics DOES NOT HAVE a prototype yet. It used an ASCOD baseline vehicle in the tests (aka: a bad-looking, less-effective but younger twin of the Warrior, built in Spain and Austria…) against the CV90-based Scout vehicle of BAe, that was mostly complete and ready to be built.
General Dynamics won because the treasury picked up their paper-tiger, not built and not tested, over the CV90 that the army favoured. And there’s no way they are going to move from paper to production within the expected 2015 date.
So we have a spanish IFV with a German-made turret (the Rheinmetal “Lance”) still to assemble, test and eventually produce as scout vehicle.
I don’t say so because i like BAe, you know. But i invite you all to compare the data on the internet (and the awesome video of the CV90) with the nothing offered by GD. And think about it.
Anyway, back to the main question, it is, again, hard to tell. 2011 budget for defence won’t rise, but won’t decrease either. So, its effective power depends from inflaction alone. After that? Who knows. It all depends on how much the politicians will want to tear off the uniforms of our heroes in order to keep feeding the money-hungry top brass of NHS and education.
NHS probably won’t get better at all. Same for education. But they’d get votes, someone would get money, and all would be happy.
Until something nasty happens, and the boy-scout reduced armed forces grumble: “we told you so.”
1939. 1982. 1999. 2001. 2003. Next…?
Gabriele – Would you be refering to the awesome Type 45 that is currently at sea without its primary system – PAAMS? The system that suffered further setbacks in December 2009 which lead the MOD to expect delays on its in-service date to run to years, not months. The Type 45 that currently goes to sea with little more than a 4.5″ gun? The Type-45 is an example of trying to do too much with one ship. If it represents something, it represents a trade-off of spending money now to retain capability for later.
As for the Eurofighter Typhoons that we’ve sold to Saudi Arabi, would those be the Tranche 2 versions that maintain more capacity that our in-service Tranche 1 versions? Regardless of the number that the Saudis have commited to buy, BAE hasn’t actually signed a contract with the Indians, nor the Japanese, and if you expect the Greek government to pay for the 60 that they agreed on buying back in 1999, it may be quite some time before their finances are in any order to acquire them.
Our ‘big-ticket’ military purchases have not delivered value for money when considered as warfighting assets. Why a Type 45 when you could license and build two or three Arleigh Burke class destroyers? Why the Eurofighter when you could buy a number of Rafales, or F22 Raptors?
These projects and purchases, in my opinion, can only be considered as value for money if they’re looked at as exchanges of capital for capability.
That’s actually not true. The fault of the lack of armament on the Type 45 is not caused by the Type 45. The ship itself could easily take 8 Harpoon, 2xTriple Stingray torpedo tubes and a 155 mm naval gun tomorrow in the morning if there was the will and the money for fitting them on the hull.
Same, it could be fitted with 16 more missile cells, armed with Tomahawk missiles, as it has been designed for.
This has not been made because no one has given the go ahead, and the navy has no money for it. As an admiral said, probably Jonathan Band, the Type 45 have been built this way because they were desperately needed to replace the Type 42, but they couldn’t be bought “complete” with all arms. The rest of the weaponry will (hopefully) come later on, like Phalanx CIWSs removed from old Type 42 and such.
But that’s no a fault of the Type 45 project.
And as to the Typhoon, no, there’s no contracts in place for the moment. But there are talks at least. And it is more than most of the industry has. Or you really think there’s a long queue of customers out of british industries? If you believe there are, i’d like to know what they want to buy.
And the Arleight Burke are expensive ships. 2/3 is a ridiculous number, to start with, and 6 is the very least needed to make license-build a viable option in first place. But the Arleigh are also horribly expensive to run, and pretty bigger than even the Type 45. They have no british technology nor british equipment on board, so they would have needed a fairly big amount of changes.
No british armament either.
And they aren’t Anti-Air vessels. The PAAMS suffered a setback in the last two fire tests because of faults in a batch of production missiles, but the sustem itself is the best air-defence system in the world, and even the US recognized it.
The Type 45 performed more than excellently on sea trials. It sports the Sampson, recognized as the best radar in the world. And the missile system itself failed two launches after perhaps 20 test fire for Aster 15 and 15 tests for Aster 30, considering the trials made by french and italian navies too.
2 test failures aren’t much. And aren’t a scandal for a whole new missile system. Actually, only 2 faults on so many tests are quite a promising result.
How many times did the Aegis system miss its targets in the years?
Don’t we attack always and without restraints the products of british engineering, always suggesting to “buy foreign stuff.”
Buy foreign stuff and produce nothing at home is what destroyed western economy. And UK’s economy in particular.
Buying foreign isn’t a solution. Especially not for military stuff.
I remind you that when Britain still produced, the world actually bought. How many Alvis armored vehicles went all around the world? How many british ships were bought all around the world? How many planes?
You can’t stop producing stuff and dream a strong economy, you know.
And not a strong army, navy or air force, either. Especially if one day they cease to sell you stuff.
Want to end up like Iran with its F14 Tomcat grounded by lack of spare parts?
Firstly, cost:
According to: “CRS Report for Congress, Navy DDG-1000 and DDG-51 Destroyer Programs: Background, Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress. Updated November 14, 2008″, the cost of America re-starting DDG-51 production, (annual procurement rate starting in FY2010,) at a rate of one per year is 2.2 billion $ in 2010, rising to 2.4 billion $ in 2013. So that is about twice the procurement cost of the Type-45, leading to a “fleet” of 3 ships.
The Type-45 is also significantly cheaper to operate & maintain. (Crew, fuel, growth margin.) Sorry, I don’t have figures for this.
Secondly, capability:
The DDG-51 has, as far as I can tell, 3 missile directors, and the AEGIS/Standard system requires guidance whilst the missile is maneouvering (they fly in a straight line without guidance). So that is terminal guidance on 3 targets.
Sampson/ASTER has active terminal guidance, and can interleave guidance for 12 missiles into the main radar.
So at a bare minimum, it can handle 4 times as many inbounds as a DDG-51.
Being high up, it has superior range vs. sea skimmers.
The ASTER missile itself is much more agile than the Standard.
Correct.
Americans are trying to develop the Standard 6, that will include the radar seeker of the AMRAAM, to try and make the Aegis missiles autonomous at least in the final engagement run.
Differently from ESSM, Sea Sparrow, SM2 etc that all need the guidance of the radar of the ship for all the time.
The Type 45 can map up to 1000 targets, follow 500, and control 16 missiles in the air at once, firing salvos of up to 8 missiles in 10 seconds.
The Aster missile as vectored “pif-paf” thrust and its own radar seeker, so the missile can follow autonomously its target. So, i’d take a Type 45 over even a Ticonderoga cruiser all the time, for air defence.
Off course, the Ticos has a massive load of weapons of all sorts… But as i said, the Type 45 could easily be fitted with Harpoon, Stingray and Tomahwk itself, and still move to the 155 mm naval gun, so it is not so disadvantaged.
Besides, there’s a voice that once CAMM is ready, the Type 45 will disembark the ASTER15 and load the 16 cells usually occupied by the ASTER 15 with quad-packed CAMM, reducing even the gap in missile numbers.
The ASTER 15 is equal to the ASTER30, it only uses a smaller booster for short range, thus it is said to be possible to convert the 15 to 30 by changing the booster.
As to the F22, for what i know, the line of production is actually about to close, after just 183 planes built.
And the export version actually does not exist, because export of the F22 has been vetoed by Congress as “sensible technology”.
And its cost, anyway, is absolutely tremendous, far too high to be justified, and certainly too high to be affordable for the UK.
There wasn’t a real alternative to the Typhoon. France itself was a partner of Typhoon when the program started, but as with the Horizon ships, France wanted to lead, wanted the SNECMA engines now on the Rafale to push the Typhoon and so along… So, it quit.
With the result that the Typhoon is a better fighter, even if so far it lacks an AESA radar.
Rafale, on the other hand, has a less powerful engine, less speed and less power.
The only true regret is that, with France in the program, we would have definitely had a “Sea Typhoon” for the aircraft carriers.
Re: “Why the Eurofighter when you could buy a number of Rafales, or F22 Raptors?”
I don’t understand this possition.
At the time the Typhoon project was started, the Rafale didn’t exist. After the project split, the one with the larger production run should be the best value for money. The fact that it keeps winning contests, and the Rafale keeps loosing, indicates to me that people with access to the performance figures regard it as better value for money.
(The Rafale’s much smaller radar aperture seems particularly significant to me.)
I comprehend the F-22 comparision even less.
The only version of the F-22 cleared for export – the F-22 International – is a mock-up made of cardboard. Sure, this F-22I’s cardboard-composite design has a very low RCS, but it payload is infinitely less than the Typhoon, and… (I’ll let you write the rest of that gag yourself.)
More seriously, the F-22 costs about 250% of the Typhoon, (intriguing as submarines seem to cost about 250% of a comparable frigate,) and is NOT as high as 250% as good at intercepting enemy aircraft, before that aircraft gets to your tanker/runway/carrier, after which the issue is moot. (At least, not according to RAND.)
(I really wish I had the means to do a full-blown thesis on that roles stealth is, and is not, a force multiplier for…)
To focus on the main point of the thread:
“But i also have to point out that the “wastes in management” are largely caused by the absurd politics of delaying, delaying, delaying. Last example, the CVF, delayed of two years to save 400 millions in 2010 and 2011, only to have 600 to pay later on.”
I agree that this occurs, and is a major cause of cost increases. Perhaps we would benefit from rule, that the government may not delay a project “to save money” unless they can show that it will not cause a net rise the the project’s cost?
Or at least, that an independent body should be set up, to report to parliment, whenever they predict that a “cost saving” delay will in fact cause a project cost increase. (In the hope that this will be enough of an embarassment, as to stop it being done.)
Actually, i think that the effects of the policy of delay has been reported in parliament almost every time it was implemented.
Create yet another commission inside the MOD is thus another waste of money: it is enough to actually listen to industry itself and to the already-present officers and program-managers, who know well this kind of problem.
Of course, if their warnings are always ignored like Labour did, it brings to nothing.
And it should also be accepted that the first money-saving measure is to have a clear agreement and plan with the industry, and actually follow its schedule.
Of course, some delay most likely will come up still, when a technical issue comes up and needs to be solved, but if we can avoid constantly delaying stuff and erasing orders, putting industry in difficulty and uncertainty on even base-facts as the workforce needed, it is already a massive improvement.
Re-use of technology is also a good measure if the work is done the right way. For example, the new CAMM missile that will replace Rapier and Sea Wolf, is (so far, and i hope also in the future) a wonderful example of a job well done. Using as much as possible of the proven Asraam, as much as possible of the Aster radar seeker, and a new “cold-launch” technique that allows the launch canister to be fitted anywhere since there’s no rocket-flame and exhausts to manage.
CAMM promises to be an excellent system, and so far it is on schedule and progressing well.
Idem for Fire Shadow, too.
The Type 26 is a crucial program and potentially a very successful one, provided that:
A) The delay-and-uncertainty style is avoided
B) The ship is EFFECTIVELY designed re-suing what of good we have: so far it has been said that, basically, the Type 26 will inherit CAMM, Artisan radar, Sonar, Stingray launchers and probably even Harpoon missiles.
The hull should be derived as much as possible from the Type 45′s one, since expertise on it is still alive and it performed excellently at sea.
Of course, silent-running measures for submarine-hunt will have to be inherited from the Type 23, arguably the best sub-hunter in the world.
Thus, the new systems of the Type 26 should be:
16 MK41 cells and the Tomahawk missiles for them, since this appears to be a requirement, also because SSN are always less and are a rather costy way to deliver fire support.
The 155 mm Naval Gun made by Bae.
The 30 mm guns and the machine-guns will be, again, inherited from the Type 23.
In theory, thus, the cost of the Type 26 should be actually pretty low.
The CAMM missiles use no proprietary radar for their cueing, and thanks to the cold-launch their canisters could literally be bolted to the deck without problems, so it shouldn’t be complex to have them on board.
Australia and New Zealand would probably build their own Type 26 if the cost stays low. However, they will mount US weapons for compatibility with what they already have. This, though, shouldn’t be a problem for a modular ship.
Again, the program must be firmly managed, and the plan followed, though. It will be interesting to see what happens.
Rocks – Orbit – Drop – Drive home for dinner.
David
Whilst I would accept some of your criticisms, what everyone ignores when talking about procurement from UK sources is that it is highly politicised. There is no doubt that we could procure US or French kit but which politician would be happy to sacrifice UK jobs to do it.
In 1995 Malcom Rifkind overrode the then Chief of Defence Procurement to split the Support Helicopter order so that AWHL would have a UK customer for the Mk3 Merlin. Notably the ‘off-the-shelf’ purchase of the value for money CH47 was the very one that left 8 in hangars at Boscombe Down for the last 10 years.
My PhD research into the political economy of defence has shown that time after time political factors override the military requirement and cost issues. Bernard Gray also said so (albeit obtusely) in his report whihc is why he though acquisition should be outsourced. I’m not a betting man but I would lay odds on the fact that the current coalition wouldn’t dare go abroad for capability.
From the military perspective they have always wished for more off the shelf proven kit, cheaper but Yeovil jobs are more important than Philadelphia ones especially when the Chief Secretary is the MP for Yeovil!!!
Actually, the Merlin chopper is the best medium-lift helicopter in the world, and even US wanted it for their presidential chopper. Even Japan bought it, and we know that they buy always american, normally.
The Ch47 is too different and too bigger to be compared to the AW101 merlin. It is unfair to directly compare two choppers that are more different than similar.
But, anyway, even if it was a political decision… british jobs should be more important than foreign ones indeed. I can’t understand why the hell it is so scandalous to think in a british-first way.
It took a 12 Merlin order from India to safeguard the jobs at Yeovil recently, and we should be happy they came in time.
Just as i hope most of the planned CH47 will be built in Yeovil on license, too.
I’d actually be well happy to see as many british jobs saved as possible, and i’d be happy to see industry going on, not dying.
When it is possible to save british jobs, this should ALWAYS be a priority, actually.
This not to say that Chinooks aren’t needed. They are certainly extremely useful (more Merlin would come handy to replace Sea Kings and Pumas, though). But if they can be license-built, better yet.
And if you suggest Blackhawk against Merlin instead, i say: read the specs. Merlin beats it largely.
This continues to be a fascinating discussion. But the arguments are varied. We have arguments that we need to raise military spending as part of GDP to 4% of GDP as a temporary phenomenon, but there’s not much in the way of credible threat right now to swing that argument. There’s also an argument that we need five subs now to be ready to maintain an effective deterrant in forty years time, but not much clarity as to why the UK ‘needs’ this level of deterrant. In short, the technocractic arguments are, as usual, dazzlingly well formed, the political-strategic ones less so. Health spending needs to increase for example, because the UK is predominantly an ageing population. Education spending needs to increase because, for better or worse, we’ve already committed ourselves to a knowledge economy rather than industrial mass manufacturing. But military spending? I go back to the point that we (the UK specifically) are not about to fight a nuclear land war in SE Asia, not just now, but ever.
What programs do you think are so strategically wrong to be erased without consequences, then?
Aircraft Carriers: then you can as well scrap the navy and the army. Because not the navy, not the army, are going to go anywhere without protection of fighter planes above.
As the generals said in 1982: “Without air cover, we can’t go to the Falklands”.
And we saw what happens when planes attack a fleet at sea that has no Early-Warning radar planes and a credible escort of jet fighters.
Air Tankers: without them, by now, you can make no serious aerial campaign.
AWACS and Sentinel planes and recon drones: even in Afghanistan, they are needed more and more, not less and less.
Transport choppers: we have heard so much about the need for them already.
New protected vehicles for the army: i think we don’t need to say a thing about this.
Nuclear deterrence: you make a point. We are not going to fight nuclear wars. But that’s because we could retaliate in tone to an attack. The Mutually Assured Destruction concept prevented the Cold War from becoming hot, and ensured 60 years of “peace”, with only minor conflicts coming up. If you want things to stay this way, or everyone drops nukes at once, or you need to keep your own to oppose to the enemy ones. Because the use of the nukes is ensuring that NO ONE uses nukes. Much as people forgets it.
You’d trust a single person with a gun in a room of disarmed men?
I wouldn’t. Lust for power is a bad thing.
Submarines: the SSN are the most powerful weapon of the navy. Most minor navies won’t challenge the Royal Navy just because they fear the SSN that may lurke nearby in the deep.
With Tomahawk and their unrivaled stealthness, the SSN are ultimate weapons we’ll always need.
Also because China, India and Russia (and tomorrow perhaps Brazil too) are building new ones or anyway fielding more and more as time goes by. You really want, once more, to have nothing to oppose?
You suggest living on a prayer. Like Chamberlaine in 1938 and its “Never Again War” gentlemen agreement with Germany. A sad, sad joke.
Frigates: with 90% of trade going by sea, pirates attacking more and more ships every years, with drug traffic growing larger and larger, you suggest cutting even more on the workhorses of the navy?
Then why India, China, Russia, Korea, Japan, Brazil etc all seek new ships? Are they all stupid?
Typhoon: the Tranche 3b is most likely dead anyway, so it is a cut already implemented. Saving for the budget, loss for the economy and jobs lost. We’ll see if it is true glory to just cut. But we can hope on new export orders for it, at least.
Transport planes: well, i think they are needed dearly. The 7th C17 is much needed help for the airbridge to Afghanistan, and with the 22 C13K going to retire in 2012, the A400 is URGENTLY neeeded.
FRES: as a program, it is a total disgrace. To erase immediately. But the need for new vehicles for the army is there and needs to be addressed. You don’t have a car as old as the Scimitar scout vehicle of the army, believe me. And your car is not shot upon either, so you’ll probably accept that something newer would be nice for the soldiers that risk their lives.
F35: well, i explained why planes on carries are needed, right?
Fire Shadow: it is a battle-winning capability in both Afghanistan-like operations and all-out warfare. A win-win program.
Etc. I won’t list all projects, but the major ones are here. And i don’t see how they could be cut without potentially disastrous consequences. That’s why i suggested the dream of a temporary increase to the long-robbed defence budget. Just to complete the programs at hand and overcome the shameful debts of the MOD. This, obviously, while reforming the MOD to lower its costs and erase wastes. But cut, cut, cut is going to damage the soldiers, the country, the industry and thus the economy at once.
Gabriele – My interpretation of your post is that you are describing a situation where the tail wags the dog. Any military project, procurement, or deployment comes into existence because of a political decision behind it.
These projects are the result of a political desire to maintain the status quo without looking forward to ask the question: Can the status quo be maintained? As you note, Brazil, India, Russia and China are all fast-growing economies with similarly growing political aspirations. Matched against this reality we need to be realistic: can we afford the escalation in the price of maintaining the status quo?
As a side-note, my earlier comment about the Arleigh Burke was meant as a suggestion of licensing the design and building it in the UK – the comparative cost would give us two Arleigh Burkes for the cost of one Type 45 if the South Korean KDX-III example is any indicator of price.
It wouldn’t be so cheaply, because british manpower is far more expensive that Korean manpower. And probably mostly anything, from steel to electric wires, has a much higher price in the western world than in the eastern.
As to maintaining the status quo, well, again, it is a matter of politican will. And people’s will.
People now dream about Uk isolating itself from the world, becoming a new switzerland or a norwey, or whatever, and they think that losing the place at the high floors of internation politics is not big deal. Well, it is a very wrong assumption i fear. And when they realize it, the risk is that it will be too late.
Arguably, again, i could say you that the money for the military could be found without cutting major programs if politicians were ready to make the cuts that, we all know, will never come: first of all, cuts to the horrible cost of politicy itself, and of politicians themselves. I suspect that, overall, the government costs actually far more than Defence does.
And i think that it is truly not value for money either. But this, i know, is sci-fi, since we can’t expect politicians to cut their own gaining, right?
But NHS and International Aid are ring-fenced. Why?
Personally, in times of recognized economical crisis, i’d cut the international aid to 0,0 pounds. First solve your own problems, then help others. Much as many will immediately point the finger at me and say that i’m a racist bastard or something.
And NHS. Oh, i know. People want money to go to the NHS. The fact that years of increase in the budget have generated mostly greater and greater waste of money is never pointed out.
So, you are telling me that the budget of 2.2% of GDP of defence is inaffordable, while a 34% budget on Welfare and a NHS budget which grew 34% in the last ten years without generating an equal rise in capability is affordable?
Why NHS fails and is given more money, no matter what, and the Defence no? Because people can’t care less of defence, until the press says them that our boys die because they don’t have enough kit.
And at that point the unthinkable happens and you see people say “cut on defence” and “buy better and more kit” at the same time.
Priorities are just totally wrong. From years. It truly won’t be a tragedy to cut slightly on NHS for a few years and keep the defence budget alive.
It is not that UK can’t afford it. It can’t be afforded if there’s no will to take care of it.
But beware, you all. Without changes to the welfare, NHS and Education policy, you won’t save the government budget.
It is not the 2% of Defence that bring you down. It is the ever rising cost of everything else.
You can cut the Defence budget to 0 if you really want. But a few years in the future, you’ll be in the nasty situation where Welfare alone takes 60% of GDP. If Defence is not affordable, the nation is not affordable either.
If our military is going to be decreased even more, the last great industry of the UK will be lost too.
300.000 jobs, plus the many men dropped out of the 3 services. The work of soldier is a work. A soldier kicked out is an unemployed.
Welfare will take care of them all? Or what?
Everything has consequences, men.
You are going to cut to come out of recession. But what if the cuts only create more jobless people that weight even more on the economy?
The destroyed Germany of the 1930 did not cut on defence to fight the economic crisis. It started building tanks.
Now, i’m not saying we can do the same… But perhaps, we should think a little more about what money generates what, and for once take every factor in consideration.
This said, i know cuts will come on defence, much as my heart aches at the thought.
I only say that we’re gonna regret it one day. It all depends on just HOW MUCH we will regret that.
Good questions and good points as always. Point one: cuts are going to happen. Everywhere, across near-enough all government departments. As the FT reports today, we are looking at cuts of £37 bn a year by 2013-14, and in practice, with locked in running costs (overseas aid, income tax cuts, a jobs package) cuts of £57bn a year by 2013-14 (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5f577db0-5dff-11df-8153-00144feab49a.html). This isn’t a Robert Gates-US style process of still spending big on defence whilst talking about waste and inefficiencies and cutting down on paperclips that the UK MOD faces. Nationally, we face an austerity package similar to Ireland, Greece or Spain. So spending of defence as a percentage of GDP is not going to go up. It’s just not. Remember, only the NHS is ring-fenced, and Trident already soaks up a significant chunk of MoD budget in these circumstances, cost-effectiveness arguments etc. aside.
Second: you asked what programs are ‘strategically so wrong to be erased without consequences.’ My point from the very beginning is that, if one assumes that our current strategic posture is correct, then, of course, none of them. It just happens to be a fact that we also can’t afford it. So we can try to go for greater burden-sharing, which will take years to set up and has a mixed history in terms of effectiveness anyway, or we can begin looking at how other small countries (many of them without a nuclear deterrant or particularly significant global expeditionary capabilities) manage to somehow survive and prosper (Finland, Sweden, Norway). And of course there’s risk involved with that, but it’s a level of risk closely related to political decisions that are ours to make. Invoking Neville Chamberlain by the way is bringing us close to the equivalent of Godwin’s Law when it comes to procurement debates.
I wasn’t invoking Chamberlain against your points, believe me. But i invoked it because lately i’ve heard and read a lot about “we’ll never be at war anymore”, “state on state war is something that will never again happen”…
All stuff that has nothing new.
The Great War was meant to be the last one.
Later, it was about sacrificing the czech to have never-ending peace and friendship.
Months later we had the Second World War. It had to be the last one.
We had the Cold War.
Korea.
Vietnam.
Falklands.
Iraq.
Bosnia
Sierra Leone
Afghanistan
Iraq
Lebanon
And i’m most likely missing some. Not in all of these the Uk fought, but in most. They all were meant to be the last. They all were never foreseen. They all were thought impossible, never-happening events.
They all happened.
Yet, people still says irrealistic things to this day, with even more belief than back then. Man truly never, never learn.
“Si vis pacem, para bellum” : if you want peace, prepare for war.
3000 years old a saying. I still believe in it.
Again, small countries. Like Georgia. US-Allied, about to join NATO. Invaded by Russia. Left alone.
Just like Czech in 1938.
Poland itself has been menaced by Russia recently, with the Iskander missiles relocated in Kaliningrad, near the border.
France now even wants to sell Mistral assault ships to Russia, much as the Baltic nations cry in fear and ask us, their allies, to never do such a thing.
There are small nations that have small armies, yeah. But if something bad happens, can they really expect to be helped?
Czech weren’t.
No one helped Uk in the falklands either, past some intelligence help and some support that, valuable as it was, wasn’t a “we come and help you”.
It would have been enough for the US to send some ships south. Argies would have retreated.
Did they do? No.
Think if actual fighting was needed!
Georgia wasn’t rescued either.
And it wasn’t because war is costy, dirty and bloody. And no one wanted to get dirty for Georgia’s sake.
What tells you it would be any different for another nation?
You really think US will go to war if China invades Taiwan tomorrow? Answer: no. Maybe Bush would have. Its own people would have depicted him as a true devil, though.
Obama would probably just protest. Or perhaps just shut up.
As to my point about why we should reconsider cutting on defence despite the budget crisis, i invite you to look to my other post above, so i won’t repeat myself.
I’m glad that some good discussion can take place in here, at least… without people cheerfully shouting zero-thought horrors as “let’s just spend it all on schools and hospitals!”
A good set of points. However war is a continuation of politics. Georgia would not have been thrashed by Russia if they hadn’t first tried to level Tskhinvali to the ground and ethnically cleanse the South Ossetians from the face of the Earth. I don’t say this to make a cheap debating point, but to reiterate that the wars you get into are a result of conscious policy choices shaped by one’s national identity, strategic posture, and your diplomatic approach within your own immediate neighbourhood. I mentioned Finland deliberately as an example-Finland got stomped by the USSR in 1944 but, via effective diplomacy, avoided Soviet absorption, and went on to develop an effective working relationship, balanced between East and West, that they then successfully maintained for the rest of the Cold War as a non-aligned state. They had (and have) a good army, but their national security was at the end of the day secured by the very careful policy choices that they made, affected by their neighbourhood. Czechoslovakia was less lucky against Hitler because Chamberlain thought it unthinkable to politically engage the USSR as a strategic counterweight, both Chamberlain and Daladier didn’t see the merit of going to war over the Czechs, and, within the Czechs’ own neighbourhood, Hungary and Poland then also joined the Nazis in the territorial carve-up. The policies of all sides in inter-war Eastern Europe go a long way to explaining that outcome, it wasn’t simply that Hitler had this massive arms build up (which, by the way, was actually bankrupting the country, and is now seen as a major explanation for his increasingly desperate aggressiveness) and rolled over everybody. ‘Building up today to insure against tomorrow’ is only a coherent premise if one has a clear policy position about what type and what scale of conflict one is prepared to become involved in, and a clear perspective on one’s own ‘neighbourhood’. Britain is not about to be invaded by China, or (I submit) by Russia. It needs to decide what it’s ‘neighbourhood’ is, and I mentioned the Scandinavian states again because they certainly provide ONE example of how states shape themselves within our immediate neighbourhood. It doesn’t HAVE to be the model we follow, but the comparison does point to some of the disproportions in our current overstretch. Nobody is talking about abolishing the armed forces altogether. But invoking the (dubious) virtues of ‘military Keynesianism’ is not a substitute for a lack of coherent strategic policy either. The question of defence comes back to issues of policy-for what? And against what? What’s the neighbourhood and where do the threats come from within that neighbourhood?
@Pericles
You are sensible regarding the determination of neighbourhood. And I submit that Finland had it easy to determine their neighbourhood – a rough neighbourhood, I admit… after all, it wouldn’t require a keen eyesight to spot the two major military dictatorships so close (or on) your borders. But this is the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. And I guess the clue is in the name.
For instance, the UK is a permanent member of the UN Security Council. This role carries a lot of international responsibility. As does the UK’s role as a senior NATO partner. And the role of founding member of the Commonwealth. And then there are our 14 overseas territories. And the allies outside of multi-lateral agreements. That’s a big neighbourhood.
You are hopefully equally correct regarding your assertion that we’re not likely to be invaded by the PRC or Russia. Invaded? No! But I can think of several conflict scenarios with any of them. Admittedly, no imminent threat – but focussing on the PRC as an example, consider the following:
a) The Korean Peninsula brews up – and the PRC assists North Korea (as it had in the past).
b) PRC invades Taiwan.
c) PRC intervenes in Afghanistan.
Regarding Russia, the threats to our friends and allies are probably even more real.
None of these scenarios involve a direct threat to UK soil. But we are not only concerning ourselves with attacks on our soil here. Of course, we expect our friends and allies to remain sensible on the international stage. But sometimes, that is just not enough.
So maybe we should walk away from all of it now. Put our hands up and say “sorry, you’re on your own”. Would the rest of the world understand? After all, if we cannot do it, then we cannot do it. Simple as that. But I’ve got a feeling that we’ll soon run into trouble, both internally and abroad.
Let’s look abroad first: The world is not exactly governed by sane and rational people everywhere and at all times, as Chamberlain had learnt the hard way. Will these leaders understand and curb their response? Or will our retreat act as a signal to them to advance? I’m betting on the latter.
And now internally: As Jamie Oliver found out with his School Dinner programme – there is a massive distinction between that what people say they want, and that what they do want. While Jamie forced carrots down the pupils’ throats, mummies were handing them burgers through the school yard fence. We all believe in that what is good for us. We know what we have to do – but we just cannot always get ourselves to do it.
Historically, stepping back too much, and too quickly, has never built any good.
WWII would have been avoided if the patience of France and UK had finished in 1936 or 1937 or even early 1938, when Germany was still building up its forces and could have been “easily” beaten, as the nazi generals themselves said after the war.
Uk already tried many times to retreat from its responsibilities. The East of Suez policy. The 1982 disarmament with the plans of selling out all the aircraft carriers, the retreat of Endurance from the south Atlantic… all signals that your potential enemy does not miss, and that make him say “look. We are close. Just another push, and we are done with them.”
I look at the world, and i don’t see a safe world, simply put.
What if SOuth Korea proves that the North sunk that patrol ship?
What will Iran do tomorrow?
What about Taiwan?
What about Pakistan and India, always at cold war between themselves?
What about a strengthening, growing-nationalist Russia?
What about Middle East in general, full of problems as it is?
What about Falklands?
What China will do next? What after Nepal, Taiwan?
What about the economic crisis, with the internal disorders in Greece, tomorrow in Spain?
What about Thailand and its politic instability, most likely caused and cherished by China that can thus take control of the backstage of the nation, as it took control of Myanmar, pretty much…
What about terrorist?
What about cyber warfare?
And what about the unexpected, that’s the worst of all?
And what about…?
Far too many questions to hope that nothing bad will happen soon or later.
Arguably, the world rarely has been, in the past, so dangerous as it is right now.
Regarding your list of questions, you’ve missed that paragon of political stability that is Africa. How can you miss an entire continent? (Hehehe)
Actually, i could say you that Georgia has been invaded because Russia did not want it to join NATO, and because across Georgia passes a vital oil pipeline that reaches Turkey and bring gas and oil to Europe without crossing russian land.
The scope of the pipeline is to avoid Russia rising the prices freely every winter, or worse leave Europe dry of gas. (which already happened more than once)
Now Russia’s military stands right near the pipeline, and its security in case of crisis is thus none.
I could also point out that Russia had been “exercising” its troops at the borders with Georgia for a good two months well before Georgia started its own ops. And it is said that Russian troops were trying exactly the moves they later made in the war.
I could arguably point out that they were going to attack in any case, and that Georgia only stupidly provided a casus belli for the russians to start the assault with a political excuse.
But even accepting all your points. What we’ll need help, what will be the excuse, or the political reasons, or whatever that will prevent the help from coming?
Why no one moved to help us in 1982? Because politically they did not want to go in such a brawl over Argentina. Trying to reason like an american, a french, or whatever, i see their point.
But it does not change the fact we were alone. And we would most likely be next time, too.
As to the fact that Britain won’t be invaded, i can agree.
As to the neightbours… well, Russia shouldn’t be trusted that much, anyway. They don’t need to invade UK to cause havoc: it would be enough to sink merchant ships, damage the platforms in the North Sea, use cyber attacks or hit UK’s interests abroad.
Another neightbour you can’t trust is Argentina. And it IS near, much as it can’t be seen from Dover.
With the oil recently found, and the reported possibility of 90 years of energetic independence in terms of oil that are believed to be down there, you can’t assume that Argentina won’t try again.
And this time, it seems to have support from other oil-hungry regional powers like Brazil. And while diplomacy can and should be used, the oil and the island are UK’s, and any agreement would have to reflect that. If not for economic interests, for the respect of the Falklands people and of the soldiers who fought and died down there.
“Just give those rocks to Argies”. When i read this kind of things on the internet, my blood ices over.
Other probable enemies in the short/medium term include undoubtedly Iran. Let’s face it, it is a serious risk.
And with 40% of global shipping moving through Hormuz, Iran could cause an economic chaos that we can’t even imagine.
It already once, in the 70′, started sinking tankers. What if it happens again? With the added nuissance of their ballistic missiles, of a massive army constantly growing and of, tomorrow, the capability to throw nukes around or worse, supply them to terrorist cells?
I think we can still see strategic reasons to not give away our armed forces.
And, call me a navy-fanatic, but i still believe that we need the navy to stay at least as numerically consistent as planned: 2 CVF, 6 Type 45, 7 Astutes, etc.
Also because, in ten years, it already lost far too much power and consistency.
An island giving away its navy is a ridiculous paradox.
Especially when confronted by: pirates, a possible Iranian blockade in Hormuz, a possible if not invasion but blockade around the Falklands by Argies and maybe some friends of them, etc.
If we accept that there’s no great land war nor invasion ahead us in the immediate future, if really the great battle between tanks are gone, then the cuts should go on the Heavy Tank regiments and on the AS90 Heavy Artillery. I don’t say it willingly, but it is true.
You should mothball them, preserve them, and keep only a brigade active to keep training and expertise alive. Move the rest to more needed, more mobile medium vehicles and infantry roles. No increase in personell numbers, but more boots on the ground available at the same time. And cuts made for many millions.
In place of the AS90, the Archer self-propelled artillery makes more sense, both in COIN and medium-scale ops.
The mothballed vehicles could be surged back if needed.
Another cut we could reasonably afford is put Rapier out of service. It is by now obsolescent anyway, and had we a serious need for air defence, it wouldn’t make much.
The Rapier regiments should re-role to much needed light infantry, and there would still be a saving by not having a missile system to run.
In 2018, the far more effective and less expensive to run CAMM will come in service, and the training and activity will resume on it.
After all, we don’t have a need for Rapier currently. And we could lease a more effective battery of missiles from one of our allies if we really needed those.
But in “peacetime” (we are not really at peace, much as people says we are) and war alike, i think UK’ll still need ships.
In peacetime to protect trade, show the flag, represent the Uk, deter, etc. In war time, to take care of all the tasks that arise. Eventually, to deploy the Royal Marines to Somalia if the pirate problem gets so bad that it becomes necessary to invade the coastal area of the “nation” and clean it up.
Somalia itself may ask for it one day, since it has no control anymore on the area.
And it would be nice if, for once, was Europe to answer, and not the US. It would be a very strong political signal.
A list of threats is never a good starting point. It implies we need to do everything and be everwhere. How does ratcheting up naval construction combat cyberwarfare? What is the UK interest in Myanmar? Why do we (ie posters here) appear to be arguing on one level that the foreign aid budget can be cut to zero, but on the other that we need to be ready to fight in lockstep with the South Koreans? After fifty years of heavy military subsidies, can they really not do that by themselves? The idea of China today backing N. Korea in such a scenario is also, pardon me, complete fantasy, their only interest in N.Korea right now is raping it of minerals. Regarding Quentin’s point about ‘our’ (global it seems) neighbourhood-if that really is our neighbourhood, then it’s way too big. It’s not to say we don’t have red lines which we must always defend and not let others cross. But taking that prospectus of our strategic ‘neighbourhood’, we’d have to go back to national conscription to stand even the remotest chance of having any national capability to offset multiple threats in that neighbourhood. There also seems to be a real reluctance here to grasp the financial detail that I laid out on 13th May from the FT. People here are talking about our strategic responsibilities as though we were still a nineteenth century great power. Our actual financial status, meanwhile, is closer to Greece’s, we just happen to be slightly better leveraged at present (ie longer lifespan on repaying debt), and even that could change. So my advice: stop thinking ‘Commonwealth! Falklands! Bash the North Koreans!’ Start thinking: Greece. Cruel but true.
The list of what could go wrong in the next years must be the starting point of a process of strategy planning. On what are you going to plan otherwise? Merely on money? Then, don’t talk about strategy at all and call the defence review with the name that unfortunately should have: “how much money can we rob from defence and politically go away with it”.
I’m not saying that the UK has to directly intervene in all the troublespots i’ve listed, but we must consider that they exists. And that the consequences of a crisis may go beyond anything we can foresee at the moment. We may be forced to move, politically in the first place, and military eventually.
And accept that without a credible military, we don’t have a credible foreign policy because our voice isn’t backed up by the “big stick” that Roosevelt talked of already so many years ago.
Myanmar is a strategic area of the Indian Ocean, and an ex-british colony. As such, it should interests the Uk more than it already does, but i’ve not said we must intervene.
But we can’t look away and say “it’s all fine, really”, either.
Nor can we keep it up giving oversea aid while our economy is in crisis, and especially we can’t give billions to India and China because people there dies starving: that’s the responsibility of their government, that instead builds weapons, heavy industry and space program. Different priorities than ours.
And again, why they see the need for so much weapons, then? Does China fear to be invaded by Vietnam? Does it fear the revenge of invaded nepal people?
And stop thinking about Falklands??? You can’t be serious. What next? Stop thinking about Dover? Then London, perhaps, and Liverpool just after.
Yeah. Stop caring about british people, british land and british oil (and thus economy, because oil IS economy) and rise oversea aid to 1%, then spend the defence budget on it too. We are not a power anymore, right?
It is absurd. In a global world, you can’t hope to hide in your corner and survive just because you don’t bother others, just because you hope they’ll be nice and generous.
It simply does not work.
UK does not have to protect an empire anymore, but it can’t just drop its role and hide.
And the fear for the deficit is, i think, excessive. While the deficit is a very serious problem, now it is being used as a weapon of terror. Italy lives from pretty much always on a public debt that’s horrible compared to Uk’s one.
Why can’t Uk survive a few years of debt and there’s still terror-run for cutting everywhere.
Cutting too much and unwisely will damage the economy and the nation, not help it going out of the recession.
The economic crisis, want it or no, was the proof that you can’t make money with money, with banks and financial services alone. You need manufacture. Because what you build is there and is solid. Financial operations can burn millions of pounds in a second.
You can’t further destroy manufacture to keep alive the financial system that failed so miserably.
It is ritual suicide, samurai-style.
The voice of reason. And there is no denying it – it is a pickle.
But as my previous posts in this thread regarding Nuclear Deterrence – I am of the opinion that your points are also moot… for as long as the UK is a democracy, no government would be able to implement your advice, because no government would survive the required implementation period.
As voters, we’ve recently had an opportunity to influence policy – now we need to make those policies work. As with every organisation on this planet, no matter who or what or the line of business – we face a discrepancy regarding our objectives (policies) and the resources available to pursue those objectives to a degree of success. This is a global constant, always have been and always will be. Yet we’ve always managed to cope in the past and have done so with distinction – even in times far more pressing than now.
And so the time has arrived where we need to throw that double six again. Not for national pride, or some purile contest with the French, (we do not have the money for that), but because we have real responsibilities – global responsibilities, ones that we’re serious about.
I’m afraid that I cannot see any real alternatives other than the continuation of the acceptance of the burden represented by those responsibilities, (a good thing that I’m not in charge then), but remain open to suggestions.
‘So my advice: stop thinking ‘Commonwealth! Falklands! Bash the North Koreans!’ Start thinking: Greece. Cruel but true.’
Thoughtful as ever, Pericles. However, in my view, mostly wrong. I like your point about understanding one’s ‘neighbourhood’. It seems to me that the UK’s ‘neighbourhood’ is:
a) watery;
b) locally militarily benign; and yet,
c) irremediably global.
There’s not much to argue over a and b, I think, and the logical conclusions one might draw from them about prioritization of capabilities are if not completely self-evident pretty straightforward. A is fact and B, well, if the Russians rediscovered a capability and desire for belligerency there would still be a lot of territory and a gigantic moat in between them and us.
But the last is a bone on which we might gnaw for a while. My point of view: our global orientation is a product of our economy which still more than any other in the world is based upon import and export; our history which means that there are significant populations scattered across the globe with whom we share much cultural and emotional affinity, political and legal systems, and language, amongst other things (so, yes, think Commonwealth–really, why not?); and, our national psyche which is what it is (thank God, or whoever) despite the insistent urgings of substantial parts of the political and social elite over five decades for Britain to embrace mediocrity.
It’s the last which makes me bridle at your ‘Think Greece’ injunction. It’s not that I disagree with the point about money. I am the epitome of the fiscal conservative myself. And I’m appalled by the management of the Ministry of Defence which appears to have created an armed forces that is simultaneously bloated and too lean which does create rather a dilemma: increase spending to alleviate the problem in the lean areas and it gets gobbled up by the fat ones; decrease spending to reduce the bloat and you starve the parts that are running hot already.
No, the problem is that there’s 2,500 years between your namesake Pericles and modern Greece. They’ve had a lot of time to habituate un-greatness. Whereas we hid what remained of ours under a bushel within my own lifetime. Of course that is emotional but surely the first question to ask when considering our strategy is what kind of country do we want to be. I don’t know about you but my answer is most decidedly not Greece. By all means let’s be realistic about means but if the starting point of the discussion is the premise ‘you’re a dwarf put some dwarf clothes on’ then I’m not up for it. Back to the drawing board. Save the Kobayashi Maru!
I will just add another couple of things: Greece spends big, historically, on defence. In proportion, more than the UK, considering the global relevance of the two nations. This because Greece and Turkey have their own “cold war” going on from years.
Now, the crisis will freeze Greece’s spending some. But i’m willing to bet that defence spending won’t go that down, despite all.
Much as the 60 Typhoons they wanted won’t be bought for some time (one day undoubtedly they will, as soon as it’ll be possible, and i’m willing to bet a lot of money on it). So, even thinking like Greece does not mean going away from the support to the armed forces.
Same goes for Spain, that has been spending big in the latest years to improve its military: new frigates, 60 Tomahawk missiles, Centauro wheeled tanks, Pizarro IFVs, Typhoon, A400, the Juan Carlos STOVL carrier/landing ship, and lots of other stuff.
I don’t expect them to step back on much of the programs. Probably from none of those.
And this leads me to my last consideration: probably they have smashed against the truth, ulike UK people.
Defence is not unaffordable, at 2.2% of GDP.
Welfare at 34% and rising, NHS and Education at over 40% and rising, International Aid (an absurd 0.7% and growing that is FAR too much, especially if the Uk is so willing to reduce its global relevance) and other sectors of government spending ARE inaffordable. Especially, their continuous double-digit growth IS INAFFORDABLE while economy shrinks or grows of 0.something or 1%-something if luck looks Uk’s way.
They want to ring-fence them from cuts. Well, it is not going to work.
Ring-fence the lion share of the expenses and cut on the ridiculous amounts will cause only more damage than help.
Because it will damage a 300.000 jobs, 35Bn a year-industry.
Damage the political revelance and security of the nation.
And generate ridiculous savings (if some at all) in exchange.
It is like a family who has a 500.000 pounds debt but a house still full of LCD-television, MP3, expensive car and such deciding that spending on a security door is “inaffordable”.
Result: the saving does not reduce the debt.
And if bad luck hits, his house gets robbed too.
If not now, tomorrow it will be impossible to aid that the continuous growth of welfare can’t be sustained. And it will have to be cut even harder as an answer.
Unless you know how to make GDP grow of 50% each year to sustain the growth of expense on Education, Hospitals, Aid and such.
Let’s not kid ourselves, men. Defence spending has been decreasing from the 1980, sharply. Even if there are wastes on defence management, it is not defence expenses that caused the crisis.
It is a financial and welfare system that can’t work anymore, because they eat each other in a circle.
And now that i think of it anyway… What’s the gigantic moat that would protect UK from a newly-aggressive Russia? Norwey and its few, old F16 fighters? Because the russian bombers that have resumed their cruises towards the UK airspace come from there.
Same goes for their fleet, that is far less “obsolescent” and “dead” than people likes to say. (New SSBN, a new SSN, a new SSK that is starting to supplement and one day replace the Kilo subs, another Kirov super-cruises to be refitted for service within the 2011, the new frigates and the always good Sovremenny destroyers… and so along) What serious obstacle stands between them and the North Sea, apart from the long travel around Scandinavia?
Norwey and Sweden’s navies? Not really.
In the Cold War the UK was considered the bulwark around which the defence of Northern Europe would revolve. And that’s because UK had to stop the russian navy from going south from the North Sea. The famous GIUK gap: Greenland, Iceland, UK.
Actually, the UK is the first serious bulwark. And the moat in front of it, at least in terms of sea and air warfare, is actually very thin.
This for love of truth, because i’m not willing to believe a war with Russia is imminent, obviously. But since it can’t be defined impossible either, it is better to think twice on the situation before culling in false certainties.
Uk has lots of interests in the North Sea, that could be hit in Day 1. And the RAF would be pretty much alove over the North Sea and the whole East Coast.
When still the US won’t be there to help either, because it would take time for them to arrive.
Another problem of relaying too much on others. What if they come late? Or don’t come at all?
I love these fantasy wars 8-)
It is fantasy to a point. Everything can be listed under “fantasy” until something truly happens.
Again, i’m not saying it is going to happen tomorrow. But IF is going to happen, the truth is that the only true moat around the UK is the sea, as it as always been in history.
But without a navy on it, the sea won’t be of much help. And much as the resources in the North Sea have been growing thin lately, the oil and gas platforms, the fish itself, the trade routes and everything in the North Sea are vital interest for the Uk.
And an easy enough target for terrorism, and certainly for a nation as military powerful as Russia.
You want realism? Ok, that is a fair expectation. Here, let me try to accommodate:
I would like to propose a new agenda for the Review
1) Afghanistan
a) What are we going to do? (Not the current strategy… the Soviets tried most of that as well)
b) How long will it take? (We’ve been there for a decade – and we are at square one. Long term plans do not work)
c) How much will it cost? (The real cost… not amortised over 20 years, or some fancy Anderson Consulting adjustment)
d) What will we get for our effort? (Not the old Blairite rhetoric… it is past its sell-by-date)
2) Any other business.
I would like to point out that “any other business” is actually a lot of stuff. Unless we reason like we are in a videogame, were we know that the mission going on is one and only one and nothing else will happen in the meanwhile, until we are done with the task at end.
But your point 1 is obviously the starting point of the review, and thus i’ll try to give my own answers to it.
a) In the short term, troops are going to hold the ground and keep patroling and trying to tie with the population. Very soon, another operation like Mosharak will start, this time targeted on the area of Kandahar. Use of helicopters will increase.
This is nothing particularly new. But it is not like there are alternatives. It is easy and good to say “let’s quit”, but the truth is that it is not possible.
Even if there will be a lot of political efforts to scale down the numbers of soldiers committed, from the next year already if that’s at all possible.
Unfortunately, lots of people is quitting in the next months, already, and the forces in the southern region of Afghanistan will be overstretched once more. And no one of the other allies is willing to send more. US officers and Obama himself will greatly press the UK to stay to fill the gaps, and will most likely actually try to obtain new Uk soldiers for the frontline.
To this question, it would be nice to answer simply “no. We are quitting, just like you let us down on the Falklands to back the argies lately.”
Politically, though, this is not really feasible. There will not be troop increases, but the numbers will not decrease either, i fear.
b) How long it takes. For the Uk, likely 5 more years before a complete (or nearly complete, some liasoning team will likely stay far longer) withdrawal happens.
The US troops will likely stay in with big numbers for longer time.
c) How much will it cost. Hard question. 5 billions, though, are reserved for UOR and afghan commitments for the new year, apparently.
d) What UK gets.
A weak but friendly Afghanistan government, ruling on a territory that will never be fully cleaned up by rebel groups, but that should be possible to overall control without ISAF help.
Hopefully, a massive reduction in the production of drugs.
The removal of a serious danger (the taliban organization) that:
1) trains Al-quaeda
2) menaces the Nuclear facilities in Northern Pakistan
And last, Europe as a whole gets the chance to complete the Nabucco oil pipeline that will grant the supply of oil and gas from the east standing at a reasonable distance from Russia’a greedy hands and control.
Realistically, a complete success is not feasible: terrorists and taliban themselves have been capable to survive in the northern Pakistan, where ISAF does not reach them and where the Pakistani army has been having nuts with them.
Lately, US and UK special forces and Reaper drones have been working hard in that area, but we know it is not enough.
It will be a partial success. But this was reasonably known from the very start. Sad as it is to think so.
If someone ever thought to go there and magically solve all troubles, well… It’s a dreamer.
Gabriele,
I would like to point out that “any other business” is actually a lot of stuff. I know… but until we’ve dealt with the elephant in the room, everything else will be subject to change. So why bother at all?
a) In the short term, troops are going to hold the ground and keep patroling and trying to tie with the population. Very soon, another operation like Mosharak will start, this time targeted on the area of Kandahar. Use of helicopters will increase. Did you know…
i) The Soviets also tried surging. They had more than double the number of troops that we currently have combined. They had more troops, more helicopters (800, to be exact).
ii) They also equipped and trained the DRA Army in an “Afghanize” programme. The Mujahideen found the 1,500 to 2,000 deserters a month to be a welcome addition to their ranks.
iii) They also “swept” areas (Pandshir was swept no less than 9 times in what appeared to be a transformation into an institutionalised annual event) – at times with up to 4 divisions per sweep.
iv) They also conducted combined operations with the Afghanistani Army. They trained and equipped, over and over again. Yet they found the DRA Army all but useless in actual operations – and it was in fact so infiltrated by the Mujahideen that they could not trust their Afghanistani “allies” enough to include them in mission planning, or to share critical intelligence with.
v) They built roads, schools, hospitals, dams – more than we have, and in less time too.
vi) They also supported an unpopular government in Kabul (President Karmal), who also tied the combat troops down to the protection of infrastructure and also tried to reconcile with the insurgents.
But it is not like there are alternatives. It is easy and good to say “let’s quit”, but the truth is that it is not possible. I agree with the second part, not the first. This is our (the UK’s) fourth shot at the title in Afghanistan. We have to do better than simply: “keep letting him hit you in the head – you’re hurting his hand”.
b) How long it takes. For the Uk, likely 5 more years before a complete (or nearly complete, some liasoning team will likely stay far longer) withdrawal happens. Too long… need new plan. We’re trying to bore the enemy into submission. We need to do better.
A weak but friendly Afghanistan government, ruling on a territory that will never be fully cleaned up by rebel groups, but that should be possible to overall control without ISAF help. I submit that we’ll get nothing on the current strategy – except a rapid exit that will hopefully not be as costly and bloody as the retreats from our previous three campaigns in Afghanistan – and exactly for the reasons you mentioned in your closing. What will Afghanistan look like after we’ve left? And a year later? How about two?
You know, this is not the kind of things that the soldiers in Afghanistan like to hear.
Basically, you deem them inexorably to death or failure anyway. While there is some sense in what you say, i think that, luckily, it is unfair to sustain that the lads in Helmand are doing so badly.
Anyway, again, it is easy to say that we need to do better. We all agree to that.
What’s hard to come up with is HOW you do better. That’s the kind of suggestion that would be useful.
Or at least, suggestions on just how to find a way to come out with inacceptable political consequences and without having to come back again the day after we go out.
What will Afghanistan look like when the ops end?
Like Iraq. Surely not better, luckily a bit worse.
But not a complete failure as you seem to think, either.
You are right… nobody likes to hear this type of thing – and it is even worse if there is a thread of truth in it.
I know our boys are holding their own. I also know from Afghanistani history that this is not always an indication of things to come. The bottom line is that the Pashtun’s national sport is to humiliate successive “greatest military machine the world has ever seen”, from Alexander the Great, to the present day (with the exception of Napoleon and “He who must not be named”). And they are really good at it. On our previous three exits from this hell hole, our boys also fought with raw courage and determination – down to the last man on one occasion.
The Pashtun (Uzbeks, Turkmen and Tadjiks) do not want to be governed. Not by foreigners, not even by themselves. The political history of Afghanistan shows that an accepted (or normal) means of assigning values authoritatively, is by civil war. This is a constant.
And you’re right regarding the HOW as well. However, I can hardly profess to match up to the collective intellectual might of the members of the Review on my own, but I would like to suggest the following as a point of departure. The definition of Strategy that I like best (though it has it’s limitations), is:
the method of applying means of coercion to create an untenable situation for your opponent
Somebody, please tell me – what would an untenable situation for our enemy look like? Do we know? If we do, what is it? If we don’t, how can we figure it out? Because the application of means of coercion without that knowledge, will achieve nothing. And it looks as if this has been the problem all along.
Regarding the future? That was exactly what the Soviets were hoping for – not a complete failure. Sadly, they also did not grasp the constant of above. Maybe, 10 years after our exit, the Chinese will try and sort that mess out. I wonder what their lot will be?
An untenable situation for the taliban is either complete destruction, or the physical incapability to fight.
Both seems unfortunately impossible to achieve completely. The second, thought, could be almost reached by more activelly cutting the taliban supply of weapons.
This, though, means taking on a serious, hard stance against China and Iran, the most important and well-known weapon suppliers to the talibans.
This also needs a great effort of intelligence to find and take the funds in the banks of the world that are used to buy those weapons.
But still, this will require also a raw, tough “attrition” process with new, rapid attacks, possibly launched in the most complete surprise achievable, by means of helicopter-insertion. Go in, clean a small area by killing as many rebels as possible, seizing as much weaponry and explosive as possible, and move out to attack another location later on.
This is evidently opposite to the long-term target of holding the ground against the talibans. But it is the best way to cut down their number: Moshtarak was announced weeks ahead of its part. Good to save civilians, but the rebels merely moved out of the area for the most part, and now there’s more land “under control” but more soldiers blocked in FOBs to defend it against rebels that have moved just outside the area and come back daily to cause havoc.
This is a war in the first place. And i still think that killing the most talibans possible is the only way to seriously be able to hold the ground.
Politically inacceptable as it may sound.
So the problem is solved then? (hehehe)
As for holding ground, a key principle of this war (and almost every other instance of COIN), is that it is not positional warfare, but manoeuvre warfare. Ask the Soviets… it took them 9 sweeps of the Pandshir Valley to learn that lesson.
And with that – exit stage left.
Umm…Nabucco has next to nothing to do with Afghanistan. Like, zero. Quite literally. Nada. Zilch. Sorry. It’s main points of supply are Turkmenistan and Iran, (both lovely regimes in and of themselves), and it would need access to Iranian gas to be remotely commercially viable-an uncomfortable fact for its sponsors. But it has absolutely nothing to do with Afghanistan, as a glance at a map would tell you…
Correct, i’m wrong. It is not the Nabucco. Nabucco is the other one pipeline with the stretch crossing Georgia. That same Georgia that would have had to be defended far more actively.
But back to the point, Nabucco is not its name, but there’s a planned pipeline that has to cross Afghanistan… Actually, more than one, since there’s also a planned gas-pipeline that will go towards Asia from the Turkmenistan.
This, perhaps, interests the Uk far less, but we don’t have a vision of the economic interests under all these plans, and so i won’t bet.
I think there are two distinct time-frames that need to be considered:
(1) The next 5 years, until the stakes in the banks can be sold off. This means cuts now, to protect the economy, to allow more growth later.
(2) Since the end of the Cold War, a lot of nations have stopped being so dumb with their own economics, so their per-capita GDP sould be assumed to rise to match ours. Given that their population is more than us, and their habitable land a lot more than us, this puts us on a one-way trip to much reduced significance.
…
For point (1):
- The argument “no cuts for defence because it has already been cut, and we are at war” should be seriously considered. It may be over-ruled, but it must at least be seriously considered.
- There is no point in making cuts now, if the cost to make up for the cuts, is more than gets saved by reducing the nations interest payments.
- The only thing I can see that is cuttable, is ordering Rafales rather than F-35s. The cost hike on the F-35 makes this unavoidable. The timing means that only off-the-shelf alternatives are safe enough. It would still be “good enough”. (A competition between the Rafale & F/A-18E/F would be prudent, and liable to keep the costs down.)
- Everything else (Trident replacement, Type-26, vehicles, helicopters,) is either far too early in development to have anything worth cutting, or is required in current war.
- Queen Elizabeth has been mostly paid for, Prince of Wales – well, the track record says we can’t delay that and save any money.
…
For point (2):
- We need to be bigger, which is only going to happen if we change ourselves – change what constitutes “us”.
- I can’t actually see the “give up” option being possible for the Britich public to convert to.
- The Eurostate concept, in which we would be patriotic towards France, Germany, Greece, etc. and them towards us, seems even less possible.
- I am surprised how much Australians still care about us. They do have a track record of being willing to die for us, in large numbers. Getting ourselves to feel the same about them seems vaguely possible. Seeing our foreign policy & defence decided by our MPs, sitting in Canberra? I can just about imagine it… and can’t really see any (long term) alternative.
This is of course, an utterly preposterous notion – I’ll be suggesting a Liberal-Conservative coallition government next! (Wait, what?)
I guess my point is, you need to do ~something~ to get the numbers to add up, and the alternative of a Euro “progressive alliance” coallition is ludicrously harder, at least in my humble opinion.
…that was a bit too long. Appologies…
I agree, overall. The defence budget shouldn’t be cut, because it has been from the late 70′, and now it has reached a point were further cuts risk to cause a damage that can’t be later fixed, not even if the needs arise.
What you don’t have when a conflict starts, you don’t have for months, years, or don’t have at all. Not everything can be “surged up” in case of need.
Think you can build, put at sea, arm and crew an aircraft carrier if we need it? It would take years. And in the meanwhile… there would be nothing to do. Nothing to do at all.
We must accept it, there’s plenty of possible scenarios that couldn’t be solved lacking the correct kit.
I hear that Argentina has rusty armed forces. But it is close to the Falklands and has thousands of men that would happily fight for the islands since there’s oil and since they have been grown to consider them as their own property.
They don’t need a great navy to cause the UK nuts if the Royal Navy is left without carriers: once they land a few thousand soldiers on the islands, with merchant ships for what matters (it’s not like the Uk has serious defenses down there past the 4 Typhoon fighters, and who knows what kind of stock of weaponry is available for them), if the RN has no aircraft carriers, no one will take the risk to go down there again. Not the navy, not the army.
Because as Rommel himself said, fight modern wars without cover from the sky is like interpretating african tribes with spears against the european colonialist armies in 1800. The result is the same.
Same goes for trouble in the Hormouz strait with Iran. No air cover, no intervention at all. And it is valid for any other possible scenario of war.
As to the F35, i think the number of those will be savagely cut. We all know it. But i think there’s a better alternative to Rafale: the F35C. It is less costy, because it does not have the added complexity of the vertical take off gear. Lower unit cost, but especially a mainteinance cost in the years far lower, for the same reason.
It also has far better performances in terms of range and weaponry-load.
The US navy plans to buy many F35C, more than the F35B bought by US marines, so switching to the C variant would allow the UK to buy a plane which benefits of numbers for a reduction in unit cost.
And this would mean not wasting the billions already spent on the F35, that include all the design efforts made on the CVFs carriers to make them optimally-prepared for the F35. Change to Rafale does not seem to offer real savings: Rolls Royce would be damaged. Billions of pounds would have been officially wasted to obtain nothing. And the military would have less capable kit than planned, once more in recent history.
Of course. The F35C require the determination to spend part of the money saved with the lower unit-cost onto fitting the carriers with the catapults and arresting gear.
Disadvantage: 500 millions of expense.
Advantage: full compatibility with US and France naval aviation. Capability to take on board US and France planes.
Plus the possibility of leasing a tiny number of Hawkeye embarked AWACS plane from the US at a low cost to finally address the need for embarked early warning sensors.
Training of pilots could be done in collaborations with France or better with US naval pilots, keeping the costs down. In extreme, the pilots could be sent training directly in already-existing facilities in the USA, paying a sum that will undoubtedly be inferior to what would be paid to start a training program in the Uk.
I feel the need to clarify a little.
- The choice of plane for the JSF is complex, detailed, and certain to have all manner of devils living in its details. As such, it is for the guys and gals at DSTL to work out, and for us taxpayers to pay them to worry about for us.
- I accept that the JSF is what we want, that the F-35B was the best value for money “long term”, and shall leave it to DSTL to keep the B / C / Sea Typhoon choice under review.
- However, short term, it seems to me that the JSF is the only program with any financially significant difference between what we want, (and need long term,) and what we need right now. What we need right now, is something that can opperate from the CVFs – with no room for development delays.
- The recent 90% (?) price hike in the F-35 (all variants) doesn’t help, either.
- Hence:
off-the-shelf = Rafale or SuperHornet.
Terms = lease, buy and re-sell later, or a purchase choice that is a good replacement (in whole or part) for Tornado and/or Harrier.
(- E.g. lease Rafales; or buy EA-18Gs, so that we will then need fewers F-35s; or – well, this is where we get DSTL in again.)
(Just for clarity: my personal preference is: (1) that’s what I pay DSTL to determine, or if I must choose: (2) F-35Bs, followed very closely by (3) a mix of F-35Cs & Navy Typhoons. But this thread is asking “where could a cut be made?”)
There’s a problem in your reasoning. If you really think that the F35B is what is needed, then it makes no sense to suggest buying F18 or Rafale, because both planes, just like the F35C, would require removing the sky-jump and fit on the carriers EMALS catapults and arresting gear.
At this point, the best choice would be switching to the F35C, since it is new, arguably it is the best aircraft in its role, because when it is not deployed on carriers it would be loved by the RAF too that has been dreaming for a long-range, stealth plane for deep penetration from years (FOAS requirement, the various studies that followed, etc…) and because it is going to be bought in numbers by the US Navy, and the more you build, the less they cost.
US marines are going to buy 350 F35, it seems. Probably all B. 20 more or so are gonna go to Italy. And then, eventually, to the UK.
The US Navy plans 600 F35C. Buy more F35C would further lower their price, a benefit for the Uk and for the US navy too. And this would sweeten a bit the fact that in exchange the F35B cost would inexorably rise.
And who argues that Rolls Royce would be damaged forgets that the UK could simply buy the F136 engine for its F35C and save Rolls Royce workforce all the same.
Developing a naval Typhoon is never gonna happen, much as it would have been fascinating. Unfortunately, when France stepped out of the Eurofighter program, the Seaborne requirement went lost and there’s no way the Uk is gonna start, alone, the extensive and expensive re-engineering work.
This said, unfortunately it is well known that the F35 fleet will be cut.
But this only means that it makes more sense to buy 75/80 F35C than an equal (or lower, since the unit cost is higher) number of F35B.
F35C has to offer:
-Slightly lower unit cost (so it has been said, at least, and it makes sense because it lacks the VTOL expensive and complex gear)
-lower through-life cost (No VTOL gear to maintain, which will be costly and mainteinance-hungry)
-Longer range (the F35C has the greatest unrefueled range of all three the versions, F35B the shortest)
-Full size weapon bays capable of 2000 lb bombs (F35B is limited to 1000 lb because the bays had to be reduced to fit in the VTOL lift gear)
Disadvantages: it requires catapults and arresting gear. Arguably, though, on the long term this may be an advantage because the CVFs would then be fully interoperable with US and French carriers.
And it would be possible to lease a few Hawkeye AWACS to take over Early Warning role. (MASC requirement)
It has been reported by the press that the MOD was asking for this switch to happen. Labour seemed determined to stick to the F35B despite this request of both RN and RAF (typical…). The hope is that the new government will consider the switch of plane in the Review.
As to numbers, it has been long known by now that 150 or even 138 are, unfortunately, a fantasy. This is one of the only SECURE cuts. So, nothing really new there. The target will be between 70 and 80, likely. Less risks to be truly insufficient.
Thanks for taking the time to reply to me.
The F-35C has the same 90%+ cost overrun as the rest, and is the last one on the schedule due to be ready. No purchase-price cost saving there. (Especially not when adding the cost of extending the life of the existing aircraft.)
There are only 2 planes in production now that could be used instead. (Rafale & SuperHornet.)
Having done so, you are then stuck with a CTOL carrier, so then have to go for a F-35C in the future.
So perhaps you go for 50 F-18F-but-wired-for-G (as Australia has) for the first order; then, when the money is there, buy 90 F-35Cs, and covert the F18′s to G’s, towards the FOAS role?
The problem, is that the JSF does not exist to serve the carrier. It would be more precise to say that the carrier exists to project the JSF, but even more precise to say that both the carrier and the JSF exist to complment HM armed forces as a whole.
The USMC studies on close air support, following Vietnam, made it clear that the promptness is far more important than payload. Quickness (time) being a factor of both speed and distance, you need to base as close as possible. This drives VSTOL.
More recently, the harriers at Kandahar had their deployment extended by over a year (IIRC) because they had not been able to repair the runway enough to opperate anything else. The next closest runway being… Turkey somewhere?(!)
In practice, however, they are not used so much as VTOL, as E(xtremely)STOL.
So, in a year 2015 world, you have in-service Typhoons, and the Tornados, & Harriers needing replacement.
The F-35C can certainly replace the Tornado. But how to get the ESTOL deployment of many (low calibre) air-to-ground weapons?
The Typhoon has lots of hardpoints, and the ESTOL take-off, but not the ESTOL landing. To get the landing, you’d need a stronger arrestor hook, and a higher AoA comming in to land – which unfortunately blocks the pilot’s vision. There have been studies on a nose-wheel camera, or UCAV co-pilot for the landing. This pretty much gets you a STOBAR Typhoon – not by coincidence.
So, I’d compare the cost of F-35B’s; to a mix of F-35C’s + adding ESTOL to a tranche of Typhoons.
Conversely:
- VSTOL has a higher sorte generation rate than CATOBAR: at a range of 200-400 nm (typical for CV opperations) it is 50% higher. So that is 150% air-to-air payload, 150% external payload, or 75% internal payload / day, comparing F-35B to C.
- CATOBAR landing is much harder. This requires alot more training / practice, driving flying hours, driving fuel costs and maintenance costs. It also stresses the airframe more. (But that is why the airframe is strengthened.)
On the third hand:
- If your landing is being done by UCAV co-pilots (as mentioned above) then you don’t need all that pilot practice.
- There is a lot of work being done on UCAVs – all classified, so you and I have no way of properly analysing this. Does it provide the range that the F-35B lacks? Or is the first practical UCAV going to be better for the close-support role, using vast loiter times to get the required quickness of response?
Sheesh Mike – you’re making us look far too classy… :)
I have to say that we basically agree on a thing: carriers should be fitted as carriers, and thus have catapults and arresting gear. Because Rafale, Hornets and UCAVs are all going to need those, most likely.
But i have to say that, with the budget problems that burden the Mod, it is unrealistic to hope to be able to purchase F18 to convert in Growlers just a few years later, when the F35 becomes available. The UK government has defence as a too low priority to think of such a move, and face the nightmare of putting into service an interim class of aircrafts, face the costs of running them and build up a logistic, then convert them and buy yet another different plane. It is not going to happen, sadly. Much as the idea is appealing.
We must accept that what is bought, is what the Armed Forces get… And there won’t be anything new for them for many years after that. So, it makes no sense, despite the price hike, to let go of billions already spent into developing the F35 for buying a plane that, much as it is still effective, is a restyling of a pretty old design, that’s not going to be competitive for much longer and that is plagued by still unsolved stability problems with which the US Navy has had to struggle.
The money is little. And the purchase is one. No hopes to buy two things. At this point, going for the F35 is the only chance: it is new, and offers the performances and the operative life that’s needed for the RN.
Hopefully, one day, the UK will have its own UCAVs too. I’m thinking to Mantis and Taranis, obviously, both wonderful and potentially incredibly useful machines, especially the Mantis in the short term, which is far better than the famous Reaper, and could have lots of use both in COIN ops and in conventional warfare, and that could most likely operate from the carriers as well. But as to planes, we get only one.
Better to get the new and technologically leading one, so to be sure to have an edge for many years in the future.
Um, no, I wouldn’t have said we agreed on that.
I have no idea how I managed to come across to you as being in the definite CATOBAR camp.
If I were to choose just on the basis of carrier suitability – then I’d pinch myself, because single-service thinking is unacceptably inefficient.
- The only single plane that can replace both Harriers and Tornados, by providing both pen-strike and prompt air support, is the F-35B.
Furthermore:
- I don’t accept that the C will necessarily be cheaper to maintain than the B. It may be, but historically, catobar has had very high training costs.
- The +50% sorte generation rate of the B counters the higher internal payload of the C. (More, or less, depending on the scenario.)
- Since the whole purpose of a carrier is to move the plane’s starting point to be very close to the target, the greater range of the C is less significant.
- I don’t accept that we can only get one plane. If it were cheaper to get two, and get the desired effect, then (a) we should and (b) we could.
- The argument that “we have to have an F-35 to avoid wasting the investment” is a bit too close to the Gambler’s Fallacy for my liking. (Furthermore, it isn’t true anyway, since the initial investment is giving us a large % of production, of which we would only make up a small part anyway.)
Serious question:
How would you provide prompt close air support, after the harriers retire? (The F-35C can’t, because it’s not ESTOL.) (Saying “I wouldn’t” is a possible answer.)
You clearly really like the F-35C, so I am hoping you will be able to articulate what it is, that makes it so special to you, because I just don’t get it at the moment.
You have proposed F18 and Rafale and UCAVs. You realize, yes, that all these require catapults and arresting gear, and that currently the Invincible class and even the future CVFs as it stands are incapable to operate with planes that aren’t the Harriers of the US marines? If you suggest F18, you automatically suggest going CATOBAR. Same goes for Rafale.
And if you want to get the F35B instead, there’s no way you get FIRST the F18 and THEN the F35B. The MOD won’t have the money to do double purchase. We know it does not have enough even for a single one. And anyway, you can’t fit the carriers with catapults, then remove it all after 5 years and put a skyjump on it instead. It makes no sense. Especially since the MOD will never have 500 millions to spend on fitting catapults to the carriers as a short term measure. If it, for once, does a wise thing and fits them, giving the Uk a navy truly interoperable with French and US ones, it is for the 50 years of life of the carriers.
And i suggest F35C for several reasons:
-Lower mainteinance cost: there’s no way it can cost as much as the F35B. The VTOL gear is going to be inevitably costly to maintain.
-Longer range: this is actually very important a point. UAVs are so wanted on the front because of their endurance, so far longer than that of manned fighters. The F35C could stay on station for more time, supporting troops on the ground, and could fit far better in the role of deep strike in enemy territory, having the reach to do so.
Also because, Falklands teach, you don’t bring so happily your carriers close to the enemy. The farer you can stay from it and still attack, the better.
-Weapon load: while the expected higher sortie ratio of the F35B can mitigate the disadvantage (in theory), it does not change the fact that the F35B cannot carry internally 2000 lb bombs and similar ordnance. When you need it, you’re forced to carry it externally and ruin the stealthness. Not optimal a solution.
-Higher training cost is arguable: we could in fact just send our pilots to the US and have them trained in there. Alternatively, France would be available as well. And this is another advantage of interoperability.
The CVFs could also embark French and US navy planes when needed.
Close Air Support from VTOL planes has been greatly overestimated during the Cold War, but it never really happened.
While in Afghanistan the Harriers were indeed very active, it is also to note that most of the US air operations over the country (far more than those made by the Harriers) are made by F18 planes coming from carriers on station in the Oman Gulf.
And anyway, the Harriers needed a runway themselves: of course, it was short. But the image of Harriers taking off from everywhere is a myth, because the thrust of the engine for a take off on a not paved surface rises too much debris that risk damaging the plane. As such, take-off from un-paved runways is practically never done.
Arguably, the engineer corps could prepare a runway in very short time, and they would have, if instead of Harriers another plane was to be used.
While the VTOL is more fitted for this particular role, i think it is not as important a point as the others. And indeed, both RN and RAF have been reported to be very happy with a potential shift from B to C, but apparently the MOD so far opposed the move.
“the MOD doesnt have the money for a double purchase”
What?
Option A: 140 F-35Bs or C’s at the new price of $100m each, total $14b;
vs.
Option B: 50 F-18Es @ $50, followed by 90 F-35Cs @ $100, total $11.5b
The claim that “we can afford option A but not option B” makes no sense.
Operating a plane is not just the cost for purchasing it. It is mainteinance, logistic, spare parts, training and the land (and ship) structure that supports it.
The MOD already made clear that ultimately the target is to have just 2 class of planes in service: Typhoon and F35.
It makes no sense to think of a double purchase. It is simply not going to happen.
Besides, the latest (pessimistic) Pentagon review puts the F35 cost at 92.4 million dollars each.
“The Defense Department told lawmakers the F-35 fighter program could cost as much as $382.4 billion, with each Lightning II model coming with a $92.4 million price tag, according to DoD budget documents.” (from http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4652553&c=AME&s=LAN) and the price you set out for the F18 risks to be awfully optimistical. Besides, it is a design that the MOD does not wish to put in service, simply.
As to the selection of the kind of carrier is gonna be used, the “adaptable” design was ultimately chosen because it was recognized that, if not immediately, the catapults are going to be needed at some point, especially if you are going to keep cooperating with US navy and France as it has been suggested and if you want to put new UCAVs on the ships. Not the other way around, even if it would still work, obviously.
“If [CATOBAR is selected], it is for the 50 years of life of the carriers. ”
Not true.
The THALES design was selected over the BAe design specifically because it can easilly be converted from one mode to another.
The ship should last for 50 years, but the aircraft only last for 25, so they will be replaced. Since we don’t know what aircraft will be available in 25 years time, this “design-for-refit” mentality is very sensible.
Re: F-35B vs. F-35C opperating costs.
The lift fan is cold, and only used for a very small part of the aircraft’s flight time.
The F-35C is much harder to land. The pilots need many times more practice. All these extra practice take-offs and landings are expensive in their own right, and add wear-and-tear to the engine and landing gear. A CATOBAR fleet needs a larger % of its fleet assigned to training operations. (Bare in mind: most of their flying time will be in peace time, with sorte rates determined by training needs.)
So the “C” has one less part in it, but the whole aicraft is under a lot higher stress.
Good luck with the F35B transmission to the Lift Fan, the lift fan itself and all the system of doors that accompany it and its thrusters. Wasn’t it made by Rolls Royce, the only company with serious VTOL knowledge in the world, i wouldn’t give it a single penny.
The more complex the system, the more mainteinance it takes. I doubt the F35C will suffer that much: the fuselage is strenghtened and thought to survive a long life in the US navy.
With the RN more than likely to fly far less missions for plane during peacetime, the life of the planes will likely be far longer than the US navy counterparts, and mainteinance will be needed only after considerable time of normal operation.
re: longer ranges:
The endurance of the F-35C is still so much less than that of a UAV as makes no difference.
In the Falklands, the carriers were not opperated at the limit of the aircrafts range. Even with the option to operate at long range, US CATOBARS have chosen to opperate at about 300nm from their targets. Extreeme long range cripples your sorte generation.
Historically, this long-range aircraft strike has not happened much, and even less once Tomahawk became available to do it.
Conversely, short/medium ranged high-sorte opperations have kept on happening.
In the Falklands the aircraft carriers kept a position well far off east to the islands, and moved further away in some situations when Exocet were reported likely to come in the successive hours.
At the limit of the range you don’t go for safety reasons, you risk to lose the plane if it has not enough fuel to get back. But if you can stay away from the enemy, you sure do.
And the US carriers so far never really had to face an enemy armed with Exocet or worse: never had a Falklands style battle at sea, so they had no need to be as much cautious.
And to say that longer range and endurance is not important is denying the fact that the Harriers, the Tornado, and every other plane by now has a couple of auxiliary fuel tanks as standard fit for longer endurance. In other words, denying a truth.
VSTOL – you are correct to point out that the “V” isnt used in practice. Indeed, the F-35B can’t do vertical take-off with any payload. Furthermore, the plan is to use “rolling shipboard vertical landing”.
So the better term is ESTOL.
And ESTOL has been used constantly.
In Kandahar, there were Tornados ready to go out, and the MoD plan was to use them, being both quicker, higher payload, and significantly cheaper to opperate.
But despite their best efforts, the engineers had not been able to get the runway fixed.
And this sort of thing keeps happening. E.g. in the Falklands, the harriers got forward-deployed to refueling points on land, which was key to being able to provide air cover.
Well, we appear to have hit the limit of the “reply” function, which is the blogsphere’s way of telling us to move on.
Thank you for your time, I will certainly consider what you have said.
This is a fascinating debate, which I’ve been following closely.
My apologies for the naked self-promotion, but rather than reprising thoughts I’ve already written elsewhere, it seems simpler to provide you with the link to my own views on Britain’s future strategy:
http://www.infinityjournal.com/article/151/Articulating_a_British_foreign_policy_in_the_21st_Century
Quick version: Partnership with India and the US, based on a stripped down army which mostly does training of foreign militaries, lots of special forces and a reserve for defending the homeland. A navy with lots of small, agile ships for breadth of coverage and SLOC defence, and an RAF that mostly provides airlift capacity. Something there to piss off all three services. But do please take the time to read the whole article.
I like the idea of trying to secure greater collaboration with India. It promises to be a win-win situation, since both nations have potentially a lot to give to each other.
But i think we are running too much. I don’t agree on the fact that british armed forces are unable to focus on all sectors. This is like saying that the UK is entirely broken down, and sincerely, i don’t think so (thanks sky!). It is absurd to think to be able to tackle the economic crisis by destroying the armed forces. There’s no sense in such a move. Greece is broken, evidently more than the UK, far more. But no one has been saying that Greece army tomorrow will drop all its tanks and 80% of its infantry because “it can no longer afford it”. It does not exist. Such a move of UK would be a global first, and, i fear, something to bitterly regret afterwards.
If really the budget for defence must be robbed so largely, then reduce the armored force of the army. Mothball Challenger tanks and AS90 artillery. Drop out of service the Rapier and re-role these formations to much needed light infantry, while keeping an armored brigade active to keep alive the expertise and eventually re-form other units in case of need.
Already, such a move would be a first. A painfull one, a potentially dangerous one, and one that is not as needed as people likes to say. Because i keep warning you. It is not the 2% of GDP on defence that’s inaffordable. It is the 34% and rising on Welfare. The 40% on education and NHS (seriously, everyone. How much frigging money the NHS wastes? It keeps being reported that the MOD wastes money. But hell, other sectors waste tenfolds, let’s be clear on this)
A reduction in armored forces, with as many as possible of the men of the tanks re-roling to much needed infantry is what is more acceptable in the short term. Because tanks are sitting idle from when the bunch that operated in Iraq have returned home.
Cutting on infantry would be absurd, with the frequency with which the same units are forced to deploy in Afghanistan over and over again to be able to keep just 10.000 men active at the front.
Ok on increasing the activity of the Special Forces, but on a condition: political will to exploit them. Things like the political leash that stopped the SBS and Marines from stopping the kidnapping of the british couple taken by somali pirates make the special forces useless. Such an absurd leash ruined the reputation of Uk as a whole and damaged the mood of soldiers and population alike, and it was a tremendous shame.
Special Forces must be used without all this fear. Operation Barras in Sierra Leone being an example of what the UKSF are capable of. Uk already has the best special forces in the world, what often lacks is political readiness to accept the risk and move swiftly and resolutely.
A navy of small ships. 50-50, i’d say. I don’t really agree. India would really have the will and force to help the UK sorting out threats at sea? Hormuz strait closed? Falklands?
The first perhaps yes, since they need oil as Uk does, if not more. But the second? Indian forces going into South Atlantic? No. Hell no. They wouldn’t be able to do it, even wanting to.
And again, “an all small ships” navy is something unseen for a nation like Uk. I don’t think it can be accepted.
Of course, on the other hand, the famous C3 requirement for an ocean-going patrol ship capable to replace minesweepers, survey ships and such is important for such a vision of “small ships”. It must be gotten out right. I like the Venator concept a lot, speaking of which.
And you also have to consider that “small ships” are vulnerable: when the threat is a go-fast drug smuggler or a RPG-armed somali pirate, it can work… But you have to consider that by now pretty much everyone in the world has got anti-ship missiles very, very dangerous.
The simple existence of these would pretty much rule out the option of sending the “small ships” in most of the littoral areas of the world. And littoral to a point, because such missiles have a range of many, many miles.
Again, the small ship can’t be shorter than 90-110 meters to be truly ocean-capable and thus able to deploy as far as Somalian waters.
No carriers. Hell no. No way. It would be like forgetting all of a sudden the many lessons that were learned the hard way from 1918 onwards. It took as far as 1945 to understand that carriers, and not battleships, were the key.
In 1982 the concept had already been forgotten.
And now again we have to forget it…? How will the concept be re-learned, later? At what cost? How many boys will leave the skin away for re-learning the same lesson all over again?
With so much oil and 3000 britons living at fiftteen minutes of flight from always aggressive Argentina, with Iran, with all the possible threats, giving away the carriers…? No way.
The only concept that Labour had gotten right was that the carriers were to be the cornerstone of the defence strategy of the UK.
Sad would be to forget the lesson again.
RAF: less fighters, ok. Fine. More transports. Ok, needed for special forces (a true, small squadron of special-forces choppers and cargo planes on the US model would be very useful in many situations. It would have been back in 2000 in Sierra Leone too). More ISTAR assets: Mantis drones, AWACS, Sentinel and Rivet Joint. These must be all saved from cuts, because they are much needed, in COIN, in conventional warfare, in peacetime, always.
But especially, what is needed for real is a change of mind. Reason one moment on “hell, in ten years NHS budget rose 30%. Defence budget falls down continuously from the 1989 and is down to 2.2% of GDP from 3% in 2000. What’s unaffordable for real?”
Defence is not the right place to cut savagely. Even doing so, the savings would still be ridiculous, to start with, because the expense for defence is the lowest after the absurdly-high 0.7% for International Aid that makes happy only Bono Vox.
And it is simply too dangerous to cut so much.
Too much people happily talks about “scaling back Uk’s influence on the international stage”. Chance is, you won’t like what it’ll be like if it happens for real. Believe me, you won’t.
Gabriele, thanks for the reply.
I agree my strategy is a gamble. It basically trades actual (albeit limited) ability to enforce our will for emotional influence over someone who will hopefully do it for us.
I also fully agree that the NHS wastes plenty of money (although it seems doubtful that they are much more wasteful per pound than the MOD), and that there are fat budgets elsewhere. But there is no public will to maintain the defence budget. Sure, body armour stories are unpopular, but the public doesn’t really believe we’re going to deploy to the Falklands again (I’m not sure I do, either). As for other potential conflicts…I can’t think of any that the US wouldn’t do for us – Iran, North Korea. Plus, can you imagine trying to stir public support for war against Iran after the Iraq debacle? It’s not happening. So defence cuts are coming. We might as well get out ahead and think about what a stripped back armed forces would look like.
I want those carriers as well, but I don’t see it – at least £4bn for the boats, plus 140 JSFs at $90m each. And that’s without overruns and delays.
Well, sincerely, saying that the NHS does not wastes as much as MOD for pound is… shocking in itself. Because NHS gets WAY more pounds to waste.
This nation has got its priorities all wrong once more. It is true that history repeats itself, but hell… people truly never learns.
And well. Good optimism on the part of everyone, then! I actually see potentially lots of troubles coming in the future in the Falklands. The oil find has aroused Argentina’s interest once more to unsafe levels. And this time, the smell of oil has lured on Argentina’s side even Brazil and the others.
With 60 billions barrels potentially lying under the seabed, seriously… You can’t see a new deployment to the Falklands? Oh, hell, i see it. I see it, definitely. That would mean… 90 years of energetic indipendence for the UK at current rates of consume of oil.
At the same time, it is a bonanza of money for Argies, and a great temptation for a rising nation like Brazil.
If the RN get the carriers, they’ll probably just bitch and grumble about their bad luck. No carriers… 1982 all over again. With a difference: the Uk doesn’t even try to get the islands back. Lots of bitching at the UN, some sympathetic message from Us but no help at all… And if things go really, really, really well, the British Petroleum gets a small piece of the pie by finding an humiliating agreement with Argies.
Look, i’m italian. But i love the Uk. Completely. I consider it my second homeland. And i can’t see Uk people taking such an humiliation. I’m horrified of how happily people says to throw to hell centuries of history written with blood and glory for taking an humiliating back seat and hope that the rest of the world is kind enough not to stomp on Uk’s feet too much. I’m horrified of this, seriously.
These britons have nothing to do with the real britons, if you ask me.
And a war on Iran is unlikely in the short term, too, i’ll give you that. But beware: it may be impossible to stay out of it if troubles arise.
With 40% of global sea traffic passing from the Hormuz strait, and with so much of the world’s oil coming from there… if something bad happens, Uk won’t be able to stay back and watch.
Or better, it may try to do so. Let the US clean up the passage again. But what would be the political cost of it on the international stage? Look, even Europe would move, and fast, in that case.
It would be impossible to stay out.
And what else may happen tomorrow? We don’t know. That’s why there are armed forces to start with.
And despite my loathe of politicians, i’m struck with hoping that, for once, they have enough good sense and smartness to cut, but not too much.
It is an horrible feeling to have to rely on politicians… but since people seems to be blind and deaf, we’ve reached even that point.