Dr Liam Fox has according to his civil servants mastered his brief as Defence Secretary with great competence in a matter of days, and yet after so much time on his hands during his years in opposition he fails palpably to understand the nature of the global movement which threatens the UK and the central position it has on the plans for our immediate security.
Prior to leaving for Kabul with William Hague and Andrew Mitchell , he made some bafflingly contradictory remarks to the Times. According to a 22 May report Afghanistan remains top priority, it must not become a failed state – a base to launch terror campaigns anywhere in the world. However in the same interview Dr Fox is reported as saying that UK must distinguish between its military objectives in Afghanistan and long-term development plans for Afghanistan’s future social needs. UK forces are not there to export democracy, or to act as global policemen, or to foster social development projects in a broken down thirteenth century state. After all Afghanistan is no different from dozens of other similarly undeveloped states.
The surprise of these remarks is that they convey a disquieting failure to understand the nature of insurgency and counter insurgency. Although politicians and their statement managers don’t like to use the words, insurgency and counter insurgency have been the only show in town for NATO’s leading armed forces since 9/11.
The problem for Dr Fox is that changing course in Afghanistan calls into question the whole edifice of UK’s security thinking, and as the potential helmsman for this spectacular change of course, he needs to have a much better understanding of insurgency and counter insurgency in the 21st century than his predecessors. He does not have the luxury of separating UK’s military objectives from the larger development programme – they are both part of the same campaign. He must either continue to deploy a complete and effective military presence or change UK’s role and position in the coalition. There is no halfway option whose primary objective would be to satisfy the pressures of the Treasury.
Afghanistan is an unpopular war, it really makes no sense as a strategic policy, it is costly in life and treasure; Dr Fox would be right to go for a change of course. However as part of a cabinet that is in the steely grip of some very 20th century security advisors, does Dr Fox understand that changing course in Afghanistan is a strategy decision which must be underwritten first of all by a successful domestic security campaign? In his Times interview he did not say how the presence or absence of the British military contingent in Afghanistan is related to the security of the populations in UK, or whether he is planning in future to discuss these issues with much greater asperity with the Home Office, whose domestic campaign, the “CONTEST STRATEGY” would take political primacy over his operations in Afghanistan. And furthermore that after being severely mauled by a March 2010 Parliamentary Commission the Home Office’s Preventing Violent Extremism programme which is central to the “CONTEST STRATEGY” may be discontinued by the new government.
These are interesting times. It is right that we should now scrutinize our lack of strategy in Afghanistan and concentrate more purposefully on protecting the populations in UK. However to carry his ministry and the UK Armed Forces and the electorate with him, Dr Fox needs to show us, pretty convincingly, that he gets it.
{ 9 comments… read them below or add one }
From what I’ve seen Fox’s problem is that he’s a little too focussed on the high tech ‘exciting’ end of the military spectrum and isnt as interested in COIN. Hopefully as he grows in experience in the new role that’ll change, but I imagine there’ll also be a movement within his department to keep the status quo in place.
‘He does not have the luxury of separating UK’s military objectives from the larger development programme – they are both part of the same campaign’
Agreed, but I read his comments as managing expectations – there is a large difference between the sort of development required in Afghanistan to deny ‘a safe haven to terrorists’ and the past rhetoric from some sources which has created visions of a modern pluralist liberal democracy.
‘UK forces are not there to export democracy, or to act as global policemen, or to foster social development projects in a broken down thirteenth century state.’
All true and none of it incompatible with the desire to foster political, security and modest economic development required to stabilise the state.
The author mentions the potential for change in the ‘Prevent’ strategy and listening to Baroness Pauline Neville-Jones, the new Minister of State for Security (OSCT), within the Home Office may yield clues.
Her latest and first media interview was on the Islam Channel: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ztRmieuj7kw . Alongside is a shorter clip from a pre-government speech in Israel, in February 2010: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C3-GWVm05d0&feature=related
The choice of the Islam Channel was interesting given the criticism from the Quilliam Foundation recently, which suggests a distancing from their viewpoint.
There are some signs from within government that “All is well” and little will change – now the Tories have been briefed on the realities of the CT situation.
We shall see.
I expect ‘Prevent’ will be changed, partly as the Minister indicated in the interview. Plus if OSCT’s budget is cut, with the “soft end” the community programmes etc losing cash, rather than the profusion of civil servants and “extremism entrepreneurs”.
David, thank you for U tubes, very interesting. After reading Parliamentary Commission report on Prevent it is hard to believe that it will not be modified and how this is done will tell us about the influences within the new cabinet. In previous experience, Northern Ireland for example, a complicated domestic campaign takes ages to acquire a comprehensible “personality” and achieve a measurable effect. The chattering class pressures us to have unrealistic expectations and the chances are Prevent or something like it will still be going long after I am dead ! JM
John,
One agreement:
‘UK forces are not there to export democracy, or to act as global policemen, or to foster social development projects in a broken down thirteenth century state. After all Afghanistan is no different from dozens of other similarly undeveloped states.’
Amen to that.
But:
‘insurgency and counter insurgency have been the only show in town for NATO’s leading armed forces since 9/11.’
That’s not really true, is it? US-led coalitions fought against state regimes and their forces in 2001 and 2003. They are also involved in anti-piracy, deterrence and, for a time, policing no-fly zones.
“However as part of a cabinet that is in the steely grip of some very 20th century security advisors…”
Do you believe that the 20th century has nothing to offer us intellectually or theoretically? This would be an odd and extreme position to take, given that Al Qaeda incorporates many 20th century thinkers/movements into its own strategic thought, from Mao to Che to the black panthers, and much American theory on insurgency into the bargain. I commend the forthcoming work of Ken Payne on this. Maoist insurgency still exists in altered form – shadow governments and counterstates are still part of the Taliban’s uprising, even if we have a greater domestic dimension to insurgency than in the past. You dismiss history a little blithely.
Pat, “… counter insurgency is the only show in town” , it really is the only show in town. Talk to the coal face, visit the training schools, attend the officer study days, ask the wives, look at the medals they wear if you ever get to see them in that particular uniform. At the opening phase of Iraq there were a few weeks of conventional warfare, this does not rescue your proposition from the years of countering insurgency that followed.
20th century experience is a stepping off point for understanding where we are now. The problem with some of our very influential advisors is that they haven’t managed to step off yet. JM
David:
I am certain that something will shift in PREVENT, I am just not sure anyone knows what it will be. As long as we continue to be safe from attack, it is likely that we will see things scaled down across the board. Hopefully this will not displace the entire program, as some worthy work is being done.
First though, I imagine there is likely to be some sort of cold-eyed accounting of everything that is being funded under the tag of PREVENT.
With regards the article above: Foxy has always seemed very doctrinaire in his outlook, something which was always going to hit some problems when he suddenly had to face the multifaceted responsibilities that come with power. Lets hope he can figure out his path sooner rather than later…
“Talk to the coal face, visit the training schools, attend the officer study days, ask the wives, look at the medals they wear if you ever get to see them in that particular uniform.”
Well thanks for the tip. I actually have worked with and near the military for four years now, and I can assure you that they talk about other things too, like Britain’s ability to deter, to coerce, to fight a conventional war, to police waters and protect sealanes, to conduct cyber-defence against other states, etc.
“At the opening phase of Iraq there were a few weeks of conventional warfare, this does not rescue your proposition from the years of countering insurgency that followed.”
Yes it does, actually. A defeat or stalemate or withdrawal in those first few weeks would have prevented the years of coin that followed. We are fighting insurgencies in large part because we overthrew foreign regimes and occupied the countries.
In addition, there was also a protracted period when the RAF patrolled no-fly zones over northern Iraq. There was an invasion and overthrow of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in the autumn of 2001. There is an ongoing confrontation with the state of Iran over its nuclear weapons. Britain has participated with the US in moving warships and aircraft into the Gulf to pressure Tehran, for better or worse. Russian bombers have on many occasions in the past few years penetrated British airspace, leading to the RAF being ‘scrambled’ to repel them. It is an incontestable fact that insurgency/COIN is not the only game in town, no matter how anyone subjectively feels about it. So we might have to agree to disagree.
Hi John,
>>Afghanistan is an unpopular war, it really makes no sense as a strategic policy
Unless, perhaps, you factor in the reputational costs of withdrawing before our main ally wants us to for the second time in quick succession.
On your point about better protecting the home front, one of the more positive developments in the last few weeks has, for me, been the noises from the new government about re-appraising the balance between security measures and civil liberties – thinking more explicitly about crime than CT perhaps – but the two are related. If one’s security is, in some measure, perceptual, then reassuring people rather than scaring the pants off them might be a good idea. Cheap too, in these straightened times.
Welcome to blogging, incidentally.