The only surviving attacker of the Pakistani terror team which killed 166 people in Mumbai in a 60-hour televized city-wide rampage was sentenced to death in an Indian court today. 
As it happens I was thinking about this several days ago when Thomas posted his excellent piece on the attempted carbombing in New York, Resilience? He enjoins us:
The problem with all this is that the terrorists, whoever they turn out to be, have an overarching interest in provoking attention and creating fear. True, domestic terrorism constitutes a serious threat. No, not a strategic or existential one. So therefore a failed, amateurish plot should not be treated like a strategic threat. It should not get more attention than it deserves. If it does, the subtext will be clearly understood by extremists everywhere: America is frightened.
Not a few other very clever people have remarked similarly. Keep cool. Do not overreact. Keep a sense of perspective. I quite agree. As Thomas lays out elsewhere, see Cracks in the Jihad, Al Qaeda is remarkably self-alienating. Our over-reaction pumps air into their sinking life raft. Moreover, as also was observed in comments the trendline with these sorts of attacks is from ineptitude to even greater depth of ineptitude. The self-starting Jihadi tends to be a noob, it would seem. And yet with a sense of perspective we see that there are several trendlines which are less positive.
- First, for quite a few decades now (I would date the start of it to post-war urbanization, accelerated by television, and then again by the web) insurgents are increasingly detached from the population. In the country it’s hard to be anonymous. If you’re hiding in a farmer’s haybarn the farmer knows you’re there. In the city its easy.
- Second, the elements of attack are basically widely available. The Mumbai attackers had AK-74s and ammunition, energy bars, backpacks, and mobile phones–and the supply of the latter they could easily obtain from the bodies of their victims so really all that was required was a telephone number in order to tap into their command and control network.
- Third, if you take a few data points starting, say, almost forty years ago with the attack on Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics in 1972, the Siege of Mecca in 1979, the Colombian Palace of Justice Siege in 1985, the Budyennovsk raid in 1995, the Nord-Ost Seige in 2002, and Beslan Massacre in 2004, you see a gradual increase in the scale, brutality and sophistication of raids.
A few guys really committed guys with the level of infantry training you could get in a good reserve unit, equipped with stuff you can purchase from Tesco for a few hundred pounds, and weapons available to anyone with cash and criminal connections can cause a colossal amount of damage. Of course an interesting question is whether the two trend lines–self-start Jihadist ineptitude, increasing non-state death commando sophistication–are actually connected. Do they form part of a coherent strategy or are they independent phenomena? For that matter is the latter truly non-state? At any rate it seems to me that the question of resilience is highly germane. Let’s not ramp up fear without reason. But then again don’t fool yourself. Times Square is a point on a trend line. Mumbai is a point on a trend line. What’s next?
*Photo is from the Telegraph.
{ 19 comments… read them below or add one }
Dr. Betz, I think you make a mistake in treating terrorism as a single trend; the events you cite in your third point are separated by decades, but also by the fact that they are entirely different conflicts. It’s almost certainly the case that some terrorist groups learn from one another (witness the various discussions between FARC, PIRA and ETA), but I don’t think there has been a worldwide trend towards greater sophistication. My knowledge of pre-1945 terrorism is patchy, but there must have been sophisticated non-state attacks before then, and there have certainly been no shortage of unsophisticated attacks since.
@Tom
A trend (especially one relating to human behaviour) is not a set of inflexible rules – it is a pattern that emerges from the data set within a given period of time. This does not imply that all data should fit the pattern: a trend lies somewhere between a hypothesis and grey goo.
When studying human behaviour (or in this case Terrorist behaviour), it is almost inevitable that trends will emerge. Humans are competitive learning machines – seeking to perform better within a given environment (keeping up with the Joneses) by adapting that what had succeeded before in a manner that will create the impression of greater success.
Relating to the Terrorist’s success criteria specifically: we see that the Terrorist does not seek to subvert or gain legitimacy within his target society, but to create a sense of terror (panic, if you like) within this society in order to communicate a set of values forcefully. However, terror and panic are transient psychological states. It is almost impossible to keep an entire target society suspended in such a state for a prolonged period of time. Therefore, the Terrorist seeking to execute the “more successful attack”, is guided and compelled by the need to create Terror in greater quantity and quality, resulting in the establishment of trends on the following indicators:
a) The Terrorist needs to create an event that will unfold over several hours – thus getting the media coverage, and holding the attention of the audience.
b) The event should occur at or around a recognisable landmark, or symbol – the more recognisable, the better the media coverage, as well as the larger audience affected.
c) The event should be of such that it causes a change in behaviour within the target community. The Terrorist needs to create a disproportionate and irrational association between the event and inanimate objects and innocent individuals within the target community – thereby prolonging the memory of Terror. He should attempt to get an old lady to fear her grocer, an architect to proclaim that skyscrapers are no longer viable, commuters to experience an inexplicable unease on the Metro.
d) The nature of the event should be of such that it’s ferocity and brutality can compete successfully with a host of modern-day distracters.
e) The Terrorist needs to be seen to be impervious to all the security measures that had been set in place to prevent him from committing his atrocity.
f) The Terrorist should attempt to establish a ‘brand’ and build on it – a modus operandi that is instantly recognisable by his target community.
g) If at all possible, the Terrorist needs to seek the establishment of ongoing dialogue within the target community regarding the event – the creation of a conspiracy theory is ideal. As are movies, video-games, factual TV programs, action figures, etc.
h) The Terrorist needs to extract a disproportionately violent response from the target community security forces – in such a way that the response always needs to be justified by the authorities. The ideal is for the target community to be horrified by the effects of the response.
Trends add value to an analysis to the extent that they allow us to predict the future regarding the data set. The more visible the trend, the more accurate the prediction. Naturally, the data will always contain outlier points – this is true of practically every data set under the sun. This could be caused by dirty data, noise, inability to express the data and a host of other data-related issues. As such, this particular data set is susceptible to a large number of such interferences (including the brace of recent amateurish efforts that the professionals will no doubt find very convenient – since it distorts the data, impacts predictions and introduces complacency) – so I do not think that we’d be able to draw a Bell-Curve – yet. But the trends are still there.
As far as tactics go, it is instructive to look at the Mumbai attacks, and the similar attacks in Kabul around the same time, as a case of the measure-counter-measure cycle. Most anti-terrorist/security measures in place around tourist hotels and the like, tend to concentrate on vehicle bombs. So, we have increased stand-off, no-go areas, Jersey barriers, etc. Just try and get a car near Glasgow Airport to see what I mean.
But we see a tactical response to these in Mumbai: leave the car at home and go in with ‘a complex attack’ (a mix of small arms and hand-held explosive devices). First to go are the in-house security guards and then the hotel is your oyster. Active shooter scenarios are the nightmare of law enforcement all over the world. Do a couple active-shooter attacks at the same time, you got real problems. Add to that attackers who don’t need an egress (except up the silver cord to the next life) and what might seem simple becomes devilishly difficult to respond to.
[Of course, there are other measures to defeat the counter-measures: at the Marriot Hotel in Islamabad, the security staff had installed a crash-proof gate at a reasonable distance away from the hotel, enough to mitigate against a bomb of a certain size. That's the measure. The counter-measure? Build a bigger a bomb, enough to defeat the stand-off distance.]
As to your last bracketed point this shows that depending on the weapon a considerable distance may be required:
http://www.nationalhomelandsecurityknowledgebase.com/Research/International_Articles/img/ATF.gif
Good food for thought and discussion with Thomas’ piece. I wll chime in with the (no doubt predictable to some who at least read my meager contributions) observation that while on the one hand we do need to keep a cool head when considering “terrorism” (used generically here) threats/acts and ideally preemptively rather than merely by reaction, we also need to avoid the ludicrous and dangerous place in which we find ourselves at least in some quarters (regrettably some highly placed at the policy level) in the US where the default position–even “officially” it seems–is to avoid at all costs any recognition of the experience-based probabilities or even actual evidence that suggests such actions may be related to islamic “extremism.”
This has now become, by virtue of the “perfect storm” of factors including an administration that is at best mis-guided in its foreign and defense policies, a fawning and complicit media, effective lobbying and propaganda by groups like CAIR that labels any such connections bigoted etc. All of these have combined to make it “unacceptable” to even comment on the reality of such things, much less draw reasonable inferences or or take other actions to prevent attacks or unravel networks and capture “terrorists” after they are attempted.
The Times Square incident is instructive and troubling if you review the responses of at least the political stratum of the federal government (bolstered by other similarly situated politicos like the NY mayor) as the incident progressed. Indeed, the good mayor was even suggesting as late as a day before the putative bomber was caught that the incident was in effect the work of some “home grown” individual or group that was angry over the health care fiasco. The obvious subtitle of such an assertion–as demonstrated by the media’s subsequent characterizations of this line of “reasoning”–that it was the work of “right wing” bigots who either were part of or were encouraged by the Tea Party movement or other “Tim McVeigh wannabes.”
As I am one that is not shy to share an opinion. . .here goes. . .
“If it does, the subtext will be clearly understood by extremists everywhere: America is frightened.”
Not frightened. . . .angry. Big difference.
Most points have already been discussed, but the points seem to be contradictory; on the one hand saying not to ascribe too much to terror attacks, but on the other hand, the “scale, brutality and sophistication of raids [terrorist]” is increasing. Final note, just because the method of attack or tool used may be “unsophisticated,” by no means diminishes the threat. It is the act that counts.
“Of course an interesting question is whether the two trend lines–self-start Jihadist ineptitude, increasing non-state death commando sophistication–are actually connected.”
Perhaps this means the “smart” ones are being killed off?
“Perhaps this means the “smart” ones are being killed off?” We can but hope but as the saying goes “it only takes one…”
Indeed. . . .
…the points seem to be contradictory; on the one hand saying not to ascribe too much to terror attacks, but on the other hand, the “scale, brutality and sophistication of raids [terrorist]” is increasing… is exactly the dilemma that the analyst is facing: the data is anomalous, with two discrete contradictory trends presenting at the same time. On the one hand, we have the “Keystone Cops” – bungling idiots that cannot organise the proverbial in a brewery… and on the other, an ever more sophisticated series of professional Kamikaze attacks, evident of careful planning and executed with dedicated precision by well-organised attackers. This raises a number of questions:
a) Which one is the real trend? Or do both exist in their own right? Either way, how can we use these trends to predict what will happen next?
b) Are these trends related? If so, how? Since the “professionals” benefit from existence of the “amateur” trend, is it perhaps something they deliberately seek to further? Or perhaps something they’ve been working hard to establish in the first instance? Are we witnessing a rare (if not the only) example of a terrorist strategy?
c) How do we respond? Should the same response be applied to instances of both? Do we run the risk of either attaching too much credibility to the amateurs, or being complacent regarding the professionals?
>>Are we witnessing a rare (if not the only) example of a terrorist strategy?
Hi Quintin, insofar as they are capable of strategy – yes, I think so. Abu Mus’ab al Suri outlined this sort of approach, using groups and individuals of different capabilities. Perhaps we can see his voluminous work as more of a doctrine than a strategy – effective at the operational rather than the strategic level. Dima Adamsky captures the idea well in his recent Studies in Conflict article:
http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a918405711~db=all~jumptype=rss
Thank you for the link, Kenneth.
Of all the data, the possibility of “Terror Central” – being the emergence of a cohesive General Staff structure, capable of formulating Strategy at all levels – is perhaps the strongest indication of increasing sophistication.
On the point that terrorism is not an existential threat, that is true but that doesn’t occur to the average citizen. For them, it’s the fact that at any moment some figure could come out and blow them up that matters. It isn’t at all likely, but that’s not what they care about.
As for the shooter theory, there was actually a debate about those tactics over at the Al-sahwa blog. Additionally, a police chief I know of worked out how easy it would be for terrorists in his state to destroy the entire command network (normally I assume terrorists already have this figured out, but in this case I’ll decline to give the specifics). However, I personally think cases like Mumbai are going to remain in the minority of attacks for one simple reason. The lack of a real exit strategy. When you do something like this, you are effectively committing yourself to keep shooting until you are dead. You can’t set up a bomb and walk away. You can’t hide among the populace. Yes, it is true that suicide bombers go in with the same fate, but for them the attack will be over in a moment. They don’t have to think of combat tactics or spend a great deal of time in the attack. When these types of attacks do happen they will capture the news for a month or so, but they will still remain in the minority.
I think there is a difference between “professional” terrorists and “enthusiastic amateurs”.
The times square bomber would fall into the later category and the Mumbai attackers into former.
The difference?
Training (real training not a crash course in a camp), organization, supply and logistics, planning and most obviously intelligence.
But the situation as it is with anti terror measures is not one of complacence, even if a nation built its anti terror measures to the degree of a fortress state (ignoring for the moment the hellish outcomes of creating such a state) those “professionals” seeking to penetrate its defenses and terrorize its population would most likely still find a way while the “amateurs” would not.
In strategic terms any defense is able to be penetrated if enough effort is put in, be it through sheer force or by going around the defenses. In such a situation the defender would and will always be playing catch up.
A response to terrorism that is purely defensive will always fail. In such situations the (as I think the US Football metaphor sums things up) “best defensive is a good offensive”. But this does’nt always mean killing the terrorists, it can also mean engaging with them as dealing with the cause of a particular issue can be just as effective.
The problem being in this day and age is the incredible ubiquity of weapons and cheap technology which can multiply the potential of such weapons and those that use them.
This creates situations where those who feel cut out of a particular political dialog (often one of the drivers of terrorism when its not state sponsored) are much more able to resort to covert means of violence rather than just stewing silently. The anonymity of the internet has lead to a similar situation where Trolling and the BTards of Anonymous are very much art forms in themselves of expressions of those who are unable to participate in the greater dialog.
Most of these people will never become “professional” terrorists and at best will act as isolated individuals or in small isolated groups because there is often not the greater cause to create the situations for coherent terrorist/insurgent organizations (ie specific groups or populations cut off from the political discourse).
The real problem begins when you get populations with a reason to resort to such means, or state sponsored terrorism. In the case of state sponsored terrorism there is the potential now for states to fight wars in the shadows, using deniability to strike their enemies by covertly supporting groups which are not directly affiliated with them (US support for the Mujahideen in Afghanistan or the Chinese and Russian use of hacker groups to strike at their enemies).
This is not limited to the more obvious things such as Iranian backed Hezbolla but also includes western efforts against the Soviets in Afghanistan, the School of the Americas training programs and even more basic military exercises and exchanges that take place between nations (One overseas exercise that I went one included a course through an urban range complete with a class on how to defend a house by using booby traps and obstacles).
The point of this being is that its impossible to stop all attacks (less so when the attackers are trained and determined) and that there is a need to deal with the cause of the problem much more than a passive defense but in a world in which people are able to get easy access to weapons and enabling technology the weight of the problem has swung from the old style state repression of such factors (dissent etc) which drive terrorism and a need to be more proactive towards the driving causes of it.
Mumbai and 911 might be infrequent attacks but they are driven more by such factors than the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan and elsewhere and you only need to get one successful attack to do great damage.
The appearance of amateurs in all this reflect that some members of the general populace have now begun to actively sympathize with the “other side” and in doing so reflect that all important shift on the hinge which both terrorism and insurgency swing: the opinion of the general populace, the hearts and minds.
Its the creation of “terror” and the need to gain publicity, to be seen as in active opposition to a regime or government which is an essential need in such conflicts. Continued US efforts (in both the media and Govt) to hype the terror threat and keep their populations on edge prevents the building up of resistance to such attacks (as populations on both sides of WWII became inured to the bombing campaigns which were rained down on mostly civilian populations) and works in the attackers favor giving them the “air” the need breath as they swim among the populace.
Jihad Janes, shoe and underwear bombers, SUVs crashing into airport terminals or parked in times square, Military personnel running amok with weapons and such behaviors are more akin to things such as road rage and the now somewhat familiar US situation of “going postal” than any form of Terrorism and Insurgency. Such people usually do not have manifestos, organizations or goals beyond expressions of rage and fury and as such dont have terror or political change as their goal and in fact have no real goal at all.
Terrorist organizations and insurgents do have long term goals, manifestos and do not wish to simply unleash their rage on society at large. The fact that some use people as suicide bombers does not negate this point as they are simply tapping into such pools of inarticulate rage for their own means and harnessing such individuals for their own ends.
The Times Square bomber might have been one of these, given some basic training and sent back into the fray, alone and with minimal (if any) support. At best he was used for an end, at worst he was simply driven to a point where he felt he could not participate in the greater discussion and given that in most states support for military operations overseas is now less than the dissent against its worth noting the mood of the populace.
In the world there will always be professional terrorists and the most successful ways of dealing with them is not escalation of the conflict, the same applies to insurgencies. The best examples of this would be how The Red Army Faction in West Germany was dealt with and the British efforts in Malaya. Neither were clean and neat and there were losses of life but both effectively dealt with the underlying issues much more than simple kinetic responses.
The worst examples of such conflicts (Rhodesia, Northern Ireland, Afghanistan (Russian and US cases) and Iraq, Vietnam, ETA and many others) are sadly the majority of cases as the underlying issues are still unresolved and that the resisting parties have not been able to create enough effect to bring the other side to the point of negotiation on the issue as well as an unwillingness by the Govt/regime to correct the greater problems and so they go on.
In such cases unless the situation can be resolved as in Sri Lanka by isolating and destroying the opposing force (and there is no real indication that its really resolved but suppressed for the short and mind term) then the conflict will go on.
Strategically, terrorism and insurgency operate in ways that appear to be incoherent to conventional militaries but the doctrine is well known. Mao’s Peoples War and Guevara’s Guerrilla Warfare being only two of the more well known examples in the west but the difference between “amateurs” and “professionals” is distinct here.
Incoherent and isolated acts of rage may be exploited as part of a larger plan but in most cases are just random. A concerted, successful and effective attack by insurgents or terrorists is part of a larger strategic plan weather it appears so or not. Dealing with the bigger picture will never be perfect and failures will occur.
Times Square was not a failure or complacency, even if the bomb had detonated and people killed as its simply not possible to lock down all potential avenues of attack (this ignores the more obvious mistakes by both the suspect and the authorities (sloppy security issues on both sides)) as casualties occur in warfare and mistakes are made no matter how solid the defense.
Daniel D: much grist for the KOW mill. As I am restrained by one thumbed use of my I-phone during my dog walk, I will offer but two brief o servations for now. First, the pro/am dichotomy is of course more complex (even setting aside the issue of criteria to differentiate one from the other) in that one often uses the other operationally–such as the use of women, children and even the disabled to deliver otherwise sophisticated weapons in very “professionally” planned and executed attacks and conversely “amateurs” may hire “pros” ala” the Seven Samurai to assist them in variuos ways. Second, while it may have been true in times past that the US and some of it’s alliies used “scare” tactics for various purposes in characterizing various threats, generally or in specific siuations, IMHO the US, UK and others have now swung dangerously in the opposite direction–going through incredible machinations that defy reality and probability to avoid even using certain words such as (ssssshhh) terrorist, radical, Islamist and the like. While it may be ( and we can but fervently hope it is so) that such denial is for public consumption such that the real story in our security services is not so corrupted, my own experience, bolstered by the occasional lifting of the veil to show how we are actually approaching these very real threats is not encouraging. If nothing else , the public deniAls (even to the point attacks are attributed to the LEAST probable motives and perpetrators especially when it furthers the crass domestic political agendas of the current ruling elite) send very conflicting signAls to those actually trying to protect us.
You are of course right about my “professional” and “amateur” classifications. I was merely trying to show that the Times square bomber was not likely to be operating in the same capacity as those at Mumbai or elsewhere. Bumbling would not do the whole times square thing justice, the fact that he was caught on a plane (after supposedly being on a watch list) just adds to the overall shambles of the operation.
On the second point I do think the tone has been reduced over time but the meme has enter the popular consciousness, the word terrorist or the conception of who and what terrorists (in the general public’s mind) are is not as coherent as it is often thought. I think over time it will readjust as the authorities tone things down but the issue still comes across in very black and white terms in the MSM.
Its very impressive that you can walk the dog and send a post with one thumb on an I-Phone, bravo sir.
Daniel D: Thanks for the dexterity kudos–still at it though now taking my elderly mother to her Mothers Day dinner, but I wanted to mention the report I heard in the car that the Times Square suspect has been confirmed to be affiliated with the Taliban. I think you may be giving Americans more credit than we deserve if you believe there is a widespread common belief or perspective about the sources, means, methods or other meaningful attributes of terror threats unless such threats also happen to be contestants on Dancing with the Stars or Biggest Loser.
“unless such threats also happen to be contestants on Dancing with the Stars or Biggest Loser.”
Does that happen much? It would certainly be a new take on the subject.
Well I suppose those involved in such tripe are terrorists in their own way assaulting the limits of good taste and taking our “culture” to new lows of inanity.
Great blog. Can I know what theme did you employ?