Varyag
Why build an aircraft carrier? John Arquilla thinks they’re military dodos, vulnerable to networked enemies. I’m no maritime guru, but I can see that swarming and autonomy will present quite a challenge for a system (the carrier group) that concentrates its assets so heavily in one big, slow moving platform. Patrick Porter, on the other hand, disagrees. The Chinese are pressing on with the Varyag, the Indians are buying, and the Russians are again interested in carriers. Even we’re building two (for now). All this interest in carriers suggests that the fashionistas of future war have got it wrong. Why invest so much in an obsolete technology? Surely these huge financial commitments indicate that the carrier will remain the most formidable expression of mobile power for a good while yet?
Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko have a great paper in the current edition of International Security that points to the answer. They apply Henri Tajfel and John Turner’s social identity theory to Chinese foreign policy behaviour after the Cold War. The reasons states behave the way they do are not ‘rational’, at least in the theoretical sense of rationality, beloved of 20th century social science. In particular, Tajfel and co argued, the social groups we form will go a long way to shaping our behaviours and attitudes. We conform to the norms of our group, often unconsciously. And we have a lot vested in our group – notably our sense of self-esteem. The groups themselves are not static – we have multiple identities, engaged at different times and in differing circumstances. They are, as Tajfel wrote, in a constant flux, of coming and going. Also from the social psychologists comes the idea that groups are defined not only by their own norms, but also in contrast to those of other groups. States, like other social groups, can differ from each other in more profound ways than size or economic capacity, while still retaining their inherent state-ness.
How does that fit with China and the Varyag? Well, suppose you’re in the inferior group as judged by a commonly accepted yardstick. You’ve got some options: suck it up, at cost to self-esteem; compete with the big boys; or reimagine the ways in which you are a state, and in so doing change the rules of the game. You can’t physically change the rather large group that is ‘China’ – because it’s got a pretty strong hold on the imagination of all concerned. But you can shape what it means to be China. You don’t have to play by the existing rules that suit the hegemonic, or dominant group. And indeed there’s both scope and merit in defining yourself differently from others – especially if one conceives of prestige and self-esteem, not power and security, as the overarching rationale for behaviour.
The Varyag was China’s attempt to play by the big boys rules. It’s a status symbol that says, ‘we’ve arrived’. Or that was the aim. In fact, that won’t cut it, because whichever way you squint at it, it’s still a reverse engineered Soviet hand-me-down. Or an upgraded Macao casino. Regardless of its capabilities, proper respect will have to wait till China has designed and built one themselves from the keel up (and that’s from a native of a country currently hard at work on a French designed carrier).
From this perspective, the Varyag reconstruction is not wholly the result of a rational assessment of maritime technology and trends, and it won’t do much to boost China’s material power capabilities (their efforts in developing effective anti-carrier weaponry will probably do much more to upset the balance of power in the Far East than shifting the ratio of carriers from 11-0 to 11-1). Actually, it’s the equivalent of those huge Middle East arms deals for advanced fighter aircraft: flashy, but a bit flaky. It’s the same too as the inter-war Irish army who, in Theo Farrell’s great illustration, structured itself in conventional fashion, with armoured formations, but hardly any armour. Group status and self-esteem are driving military structures in these examples – not power and the need for security. So, is the Varyag a convincing demonstration that carriers remain viable? Hardly – it’s a new investment banker’s first Porsche: a bit tacky and not quite the Aston Martin he’s secretly craving.
There are alternatives to coming second best and feeling constantly chippy about it. One such, as the EU states have demonstrated, is to reinvent the rules – redefining security in a more expansive way and seeking, as Robert Cooper has persuasively described, to extend the bounds of your conception, by converting the barbarians at the gates into model Europeans. Say what you will about the realism of that project, or its reliance on American extended-deterrence – but you cannot doubt that the Europeans, at least European elites, are sincere and have constructed a normatively distinct conception of sovereignty and power. This is a construct that affords self-esteem, and indeed, some measure of respect elsewhere. I’m not alone in worrying that it underestimates the potential for trouble on the European block, but my point is not that it’s the best conception of how to imagine oneself: just that it’s the sincere conception of the governments of the EU. Has China done that, or is it still sucking it up, at the cost of impaired self esteem? Larson and Shevchenko can see the origins of something uniquely Chinese in its foreign policy of responsibility:
China has increasingly taken on a more activist, constructive world role that includes increased support for multilateralism, a policy that has reassured other states, enhanced China’s global role, and increased its relative status.
Maybe – but I still see a traditional conception of prestige as driving China, embodied in its derivative carrier.
Social psychology has much to offer constructivist approaches to IR – it lends scientific rigour to the often interesting but speculative contentions of those who see meaning and identity as key factors in accounting for state behaviour. And constructivism, in turn, has much to offer realists – power is an elusive concept, and until the next big maritime battles, we can’t be absolutely sure about the utility of carriers. Given the inherent uncertainty involved, perception is an inescapable part of how we deploy our resources for future defence – perception of the threat, and also perception of ourselves. Don’t get me wrong – carriers continue to have military value in a variety of scenarios, and at some level you can construct as many conceptions of yourself as a good-egg, few of which will avail you when the wolves call at the door. But in the end, the activity dockside at Dalian says as much about what it means to be Chinese today as about what it will take to prevail in the naval clashes of the future.
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“Status” in the international arena has always prompted irrationality in terms of weaponry and is IMHO was a key factor in the bankruptcy of the USSR and continues today with the nuclear weapons programs of Iran and North Korea.
I don’t think there’s sufficient evidence that aircraft carriers are obsolete yet. If you want to have real sovereignty you need to be able to hold territory, on land or at sea. True, in theory you could make a network of smaller ships capable of both holding an area and attacking a ship, but that won’t be much use on its own in a conventional war against a fleet. You could easily argue that the U-boats in both World Wars were an early application of asymmetric war and networking, they still couldn’t effectively starve the U.K or dominate the seas.
Additionally, I’m not convinced that network theory is really a RMA as much as a new type of strategy to add on.
An interesting post, but I would add that maritime power, due to its unique ability to be something focused outside of territorial waters, tends to lend itself to images of self-identity much easier than say, an army (which by default only really trigger such sentiments during times of overt conflict). It is clear that China is undergoing an ongoing series of internal debates about how they see themselves and their role in the world, and like all growing mercantile nations, maritime power is quickly becoming the focus of such debates (it’s worth noting that to a lesser extent India is undergoing the same process for exactly the same reasons).
The problem with China is that they traditionally do not enter co-operative maritime alliances with other powers (at least until now with operations around the Horn of Africa). Hence the reason they are somewhat self-contained in terms of their own future plans. The idea of working in co-operation with others armed forces like in Europe is alien to the PRC.
That maritime power becomes closely linked with the idea of national status should not always be seen in context of the largest of ships (in this case aircraft carriers). India’s clear pride in their plans to create their own SSBN’s show that it can be found in other ships. But at least in terms dialogue with the public, aircraft carriers allow simplification and powerful symbolism. The irrationality of national status and its excesses can be potentially seen in non-military projects as well however, just as much.
I think there are a few other issues to contend with in regards to China’s sudden increase in expanding the scale of the People’s Liberation Army (Navy) that are far more rooted in pragmatic realities then self-identity. The most crucial of course, is trade. China needs to protect it’s ‘merchant fleets’ – and for once such an antique term actually does have legitimate use. Anyone who has seen the convoys of Chinese goods ships sailing in close formation with PLA(N) escorts around the waters near Somalia knows that the term is dryly accurate.
In fact the deployment of anti-piracy task groups in and around the Gulf of Aden represents arguably the first time China has deployed maritime forces outside its regional waters, and denotes not so much a shift in global world view on behalf of the Chinese but rather pragmatic necessity forcing strategic changes.
The development of a Chinese air craft carrier must be seen in conjunction with the rest of the surface fleet- with much more emphasis being placed upon the development of the Jiangkai II class frigates and Luyang II destroyers (equivalent to the US AEGIS) and submarine innovation (with wholesale replacement with more modern crafts).
Potentially, far more significant in terms of real power is China’s new Dong Feng Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile system- the idea of anti-ship missiles flying in one direction and then changing course mid flight suggests they could be very effective weapon indeed (certainly its causing raised eyebrows in the US navy).
If China’s stated aims for the PLA(N) operations are for ‘military operations other than war’, the building of any kind aircraft carrier must be seen within this context . I tend to side with Porter in this, that “there’s much much more to warfare than latching on to upcoming gadgets and innovative doctrines, and getting ‘ahead of the curve.’” Overall China seems to be balancing several objectives at once- planning on being able to give America a bloody nose in the increasingly unlikely event of the two nations ever bothering to go to war while being flexible enough to provide protection for trade, humanitarian relief and even ‘peace keeping’ (whatever that means these days). Still, they are likely to be playing catch up for the next 15 years or so.
In my opinion, China doesn’t have much reason at this point in time to work closely with Europe outside of the Horn of Africa. Its interests appear to be focused largely in the South China Sea*, Indian Ocean, and the near Pacific, so as things are it makes sense to focus on its own region.
*Call it what you will.
What role did aircraft carriers play in the responses to the Haitian and Pakistani earthquakes and the tsunami in Indonesia?
Navy is not intended and must not be intended for humanitarian proposses.
Either you are mockingly quoting a certain admiral (who said something very similar) or you are serious, I’m not quite sure. Regardless of which I have to disagree with the sentiment, some of the best PR for the navy (American at least) comes from arriving early on the scene in the Philippines a few years ago to help with relief efforts.
@ the first response…
Is that an indirect way of stating that aircraft carriers played no role?
The point of maritime power isn’t in having ONE carrier, but rather in having MANY carriers capable of continuous deployments abroad. If one wishes to project Sovereignty, having a single carrier doesn’t do much, because soon or later, you will run out of fuel, ammo, consumables, and you’ll have to leave, leaving your ground forces (if they are also deployed – via Amphibious Landing Ships – think HMS Ocean) vulnerable, for nothing says support to ground troops than having a variety of aircraft at their disposal. Actually, carriers are your strongest weapons in network-centric warfare, because they serve as the nerve centre from which you can protect, supply, and command a vast variety of ships. The US Carrier Vessel Battle Groups all do that, centred around a Carrier, one can place 2-3 Cruisers, 3-4 Frigates, a landing ship, resupply, and Submarines. Such a force has naval, air, and ground (Marine Expeditionary Units) forces at it’s disposal.
Current ground forces in Helmand and to some extent, Iraq, deployed via commercial airliners using nearby friendly terrority, or through establishing a frontier air base (Kandahar, Bagram), but such conveniences are not always going to be there.
The Chinese deployement into the Aden is one of necessity – it is a vital shipping route for them as it is for everyone else. As users of the Aden, they must also contribute if they wish to shape/influence policy regarding international piracy, which is an issue for them around the Phillipines and other South East Asian waters. I would suggest that the Chinese are not deploying to Aden for its ownsake as much as they are doing so to ‘buy’ a seat in discussing setting policies for enforcing Int’l Piracy. Plus, going back to the idea of its image, if the South Koreans are deploying their shiny, new KDX III Cruiser, King Sejong the Great (think a big, upgraded Burke or newer Ticonderoga), surely the Chinese must also deploy something that is equally as new and shiny.
I agree that the Varyag is as much a symbol of what it means to be ‘the Middle Kingdom’ and the vision of China its government has in terms of its role in the world. Submarines are great for actual operations, but by their clandestine nature cannot project power short of using force. Although Chinese submarines are not exactly on the quiet end of the spectrum.
Another issue is cost:
http://www.dailypress.com/news/dp-local_gates_0504may04,0,5026706.story
Ah, Schmedlap posed the very question I had!
Hospital ships and carriers and looking to be the “first in” at a humanitarian disaster as a part of a national strategy?
The Chinese touted their humanitarian efforts in Haiti quite a bit, no?
This article seems to miss one of the points of building a maritime doctrine; you can’t project a power you don’t have. Ask any US Naval Aviator with a smidgen of historical sense “What other US carriers were there before Langley?” The answer is “None.” The PRC is serious about projecting power not only within the China Sea, and to that end, there is still no better alternative for a nation with significant ocean territory than an aircraft carrier. It takes decades of experience in order to institutionalize a working naval aviation program, but everyone has to start somewhere. Let’s not let our cultural and political blinders prevent from seeing what this is – a natural step in the PRC’s evolution to a blue-water navy.
Carriers are nodes of the network. Other vesels are also vulnerable to the same weapons, maybe more vulnerable?
What the carriers will need are new weapons: lasers, rail guns, UAVS, autonomous subs, etc.
I don’t see how newer weapons would make much difference. A rail gun would have effectively the same problems as a chain gun, lasers haven’t been shown yet to be the best weapon possible (especially in water), and in any case these are aircraft carriers. The best weapon a carrier has is it’s planes. There might be something to say for drones, but a drone’s greatest strength at the moment appears to be the ability to keep them up for very long periods of time. I suspect certain types of helicopters are more effective at dealing with small sized aquatic enemies.
Edit.
I was referring to the comment directly above mine, it doesn’t appear to have been posted correctly.
To I Disagree and Formerly Grant: I think you both have valid points in that we need to always remember that the raison d’être of military and maritime forces is projection of (kinetic) force in the Clausewitzian sense. At the same time though it cannot be denied that certain capabilities of such forces to provide rapid and effective humanitarian aid has positive “or” potential. I fervently hope we in the US do not repeat the gross errors of the 1970s in allowing something like the “Vietnam Syndrome” dictate our foreign policy, force structure, training and just about every other aspect of our “national defense.”