Col Gian Gentile‘s piece on ‘The Death of the Armour Corps‘ for the Small Wars Journal has reignited the discussion of how the US military’s focus on counterinsurgency is crowding out its traditional priorities and capabilities. At this point in the debate, most people recognise the need to strike some sort of balance, which is a common platform of sorts even if it does not get us very far (for where is the balance to be struck?). Still, it is an important discussion – and readers may be interested in the informed exchanges over at Small Wars Journal, or the reactions to Gian Gentile’s piece over at Wings over Iraq and The Best Defence.
In general, however, this is a topic prone to certain analytical and methodological pitfalls. More specifically, it is very difficult to say with any confidence whether or not the US military, or any military for that matter, is sufficiently, overly, or inadequately geared toward counterinsurgency. Why?
1) What is counterinsurgency? Because the concept can be understood in so many ways, even training that is ostensibly for counterinsurgency can be entirely unrelated to its stated aim, something alluded to in a previous post.
2) How is one to measure extant counterinsurgency capabilities? In the amount of hours devoted to counterinsurgency in specific curricula, or in the conduct of effective counterinsurgency operations in theatre? Is a military only good at counterinsurgency once it succeeds in counterinsurgency operations? Given the difficulty of such operations, this represents a potentially open-ended commitment to train for and study counterinsurgency.
And if the conduct of operations is the chosen metric, how does one separate the tactical or operational performance of various units from the broader political context in which such operations take place, and which in many cases determine their level of success, however defined? Put differently, is failure in a counterinsurgency campaign due to a lack of relevant training and education, or due to factors very much beyond the control of military academies and training centres?
3) The size of the US military in particular means that evidence both for and against a greater emphasis on COIN can readily be found. Anecdotal evidence is particularly convenient in this regard, and in my own research, I have been struck by how attempts to reconcile such ‘evidence’ can lead to very contradictory, almost schizophrenic, findings. One person will cite almost constant attention to stability operations in training and education; another will complain that the focus was on Fulda Gap-type manoeuvres, with little emphasis on the ‘human terrain’ or other ‘non-military’ aspects of ongoing campaigns. The sample space is just too big.*
4) Muddying the waters further, the discussion has become farcically polarised, undermining attempts to arrive at a common perception of current capabilities and capability gaps. Pride, parochial interests and previous positions have often turned the discussion into one of proving your camp right.
5) If we can’t figure out where the balance between disparate priorities currently resides due to the issues noted above, what are the chances of determining whether that balance should move slightly to the right or left? Without some consensus on the former, discussions of the latter are impossible (cart before the horse, etc).
Does this mean that the conversation should not be had. Absolutely not, but it requires greater specificity, a little less subjectivity and far more consensus as to where our priorities currently are, and where they should rightly be. More easily said than done. Still, maybe the next QDR, right…?
Another way forward is to think less of ‘counterinsurgency’ and ‘conventional combat’ as diametrically opposed concepts. Too often, categories such as these are trotted out as if they have a rarefied equivalent out there in the real world. A better form of analysis may be to ask:
- what are the features of the contemporary operating environment;
- what are the skill-sets and capabilities required to meet the challenges presented by this environment; and
- which of these skill-sets and capabilities should reside within the armed forces?
The approach is not particularly new: a similar tack was taken in the US Army’s recent Capstone Concept Paper, and to good effect. For me, this type of analysis suggests the enduring relevance of many of the capabilities and skill-sets learned as part of the recent reorientation toward counterinsurgency – particularly for future operations conducted in towns and cities, against non-state armed groups, among civilian populations, or to build host-nation capability. Still, borrowing again from the Capstone Concept, perhaps another area that requires special emphasis is adaptability: if the danger is not being prepared, or preparing for the wrong contingency, adaptability will be key to mitigating these shortcomings as they emerge.
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* That is not to say that anecdotal evidence is not useful or important. To the contrary – and there is a lot of shared experiences in the comments section to Tom Ricks’ recent blog post on this matter that deserves close reading. The point is that anecdotal evidence, on aggregate, is often contradictory and unless analysed carefully, a dangerous foundation from which to draw conclusions.
{ 3 comments… read them below or add one }
Something that seems to get lost in the discussion about counterinsurgency/COIN etc is the fact that a military may not even be the best actor to do it.
Most theaters for COIN contain destroyed or damaged infrastructure, shattered or fractured populations and unstable political systems/situations (not counting the often rough terrain and landscape). Rebuilding or repairing in such conditions would be difficult enough without armed groups contesting the terrain.
A modern state, such as the UK, in the wake of a major disaster in which the above effects were to come into play would find that rebuilding and repair difficult enough but imagine if armed forces were added to the mix in a struggle for power. It is not hard to imagine the additional ‘friction’ causing increased complexity and difficulty in solving the problem if not actually creating more problems and enhancing others.
The point being that the discussion for or against COIN still is rooted in military terms in almost every case (often in US terms only) weather its for or against or arguing for some degree of change or reformat.
Arguably there is a need for gaining stability in counterinsurgency (or whatever it is deemed) but the need to balance that out with other factors and the heavy reality that a contentious and combative population armed and willing to fight on their own territory against outsiders is going to be tough to beat or even to change their minds has to be factored in and regardless of the ‘political will’ of the outsiders to continue the fight the mere presence may be enough to keep things agitated.
Something else that gets lost in the discussion is how COIN and such activities are seen and perceived as just another form of colonialism. An occupying force, military or otherwise is going to have be perceived as a colonial occupier no matter what as they are simply not part of the local populace no matter how many schools or clinics they setup. This is a common and repeated theme in all the histories of insurgency, in groups and out groups.
I respect the arguments of both sides in discussions such as this but given the dismal track record in COIN I think its well past due that the discussion be elevated to allow bringing in non military actors, not as adjuncts to military force (ala Human Terrain) but as full if not superior actors but also to place COIN in the same strategic paradigm as conventional military calculation: ie the need to make initial cost/benefit calculations before going to war.
Current conventional military action today is rare as the costs involved in such risky actions are well known and therefore have weight in the political calculations but COIN and interventions of such nature seem to be still based in a colonial mentality of “we have the superior technology etc so its only of matter of time that we will win after we go in…”
I respect the analysis and the hard work being done by people to understand it (I am one myself) but the limitations of the paradigm as a military one are now showing as many of the arguments turn of minute or opposites within a limited range rather than a larger (and more strategic approach) of the possibility of winning in the situation, a choice that can be made only before the act is begun as (to paraphrase Clausewitz) “once your in, things take on a life of their own and the clarity of the decision before is now lost”.
If the question in the title of this post is to be answered then I would answer by saying that within the military context all that can be learnt is learnt and known (as past examples show and the best authors show (Galula, the US Marines etc)) and that the issues that strike most painfully today are ones that come from the non military angles and as such argue against some forlorn hope in expanding military forces to cover them but instead point to greater strategic calculation before and during (ie considerations of if to attack at all, when to withdraw, fall back, even surrender).
The closest to a military analogy I can think of is that of the Generals in WWI who knew only to send men into fire, again and again in the Cult of the Offensive which has similar echoes today in the cult of winning in COIN with again generals and political leaders knowing nothing else but to send men into battle in the same old way time and time again, ignoring the obvious failures while searching for the holy grail in futile and self destructive acts.
In WWI the stalemate in the West was broken by the Allied development and use of the Tank and the German development of small arms tactics, both revolutionary in the face of military paradigm they were changing.
Today with COIN being much more of a war among the people than a straight military conflict we need to look for such game breaking options (if they exist) but not as military adjuncts or as parts of a military solution but as paradigm shifting developments which are in fact not designed to change the enemy but oursleves.
It may be a tough idea to swallow but modern militaries are ill suited for the nature of many of today’s conflicts, conventional force as we know it needs to shift to reflect the realities of the conflicts they fight but at a greater level there also needs to be a corresponding shift (a much harder one I suspect as militaries can and do change over time) in both the political and strategic realms.
The bloody stalemate on the Western front in WWI brought the french military to mutiny, drained the blood and treasure from all the combatants and shattered a generation despite the best efforts of the establishment through propaganda and omission to paint it differently. Algeria and Vietnam had similar effects in France and the US and while the strain of today’s conflicts are not as great as those before they exhibit all the characteristics in the circular nature of the discussion, the repetition of effort despite the outcome and the the refusal to fail in the face of obvious malfunction.
How much learning is enough? At times I dont think anything has been learnt.
Daniel D, thanks for your comment – food for thought. I need to think about it more, but for now I deduce three main points:
1) the military may not be the right instrument to conduct COIN;
2) COIN may not be the type of activity that we should be engaging in;
3) there is a need for a conceptual leap forward, may I say a ‘paradigm shift’?, in our understanding of how to operate in environments such as those encountered in Iraq, Afghanistan, etc.
If this is a fair summation, my response would be:
1) I agree, but it seems to me that there are no viable alternatives. If it is a stated objective to stabilise a certain area, a security force will be needed to maintain security. As to the role of non-military actors, typically – as I am sure you are aware – they have been too weak, too slow or too uninterested to make a significant difference, particularly where security is not guaranteed. On this point, may I refer to a previous KoW post: kingsofwar.org.uk/2010/02/militarising-foreign-policy/.
2) Well I would agree with this, but again it does of course come down to strategic objectives. If it is to stabilise a war-torn country, which I am not saying is always a wise or even possible end-state, some of the core principles and actions of COIN seem necessary. Now, as I have also said elsewhere, COIN, and the associated tasks, goes beyond just Iraq or Afghanistan: various global trends (urbanisation; our enduring superiority in conventional combat; the increased frequency of state-building) make operations conducted among the people and, often, with the objective of building governmental capacity quite likely. This of course gets us to:
3) Some paradigm shift in how to prosecute or approach these campaigns. Well I am open to suggestions… Part of the problem may be that we are not actually conducting COIN in Afghanistan, and nor are we likely to do so elsewhere, if we define COIN as something that requires time, investment and a clear political purpose. At this point, aren’t we really talking about damage-limitation and risk-management (for more on which, see Christopher Coker)?
@David
Your right about 1, thats how I see things. I do acknowledge the problem of using a tool thats not perfect for the job and doing the job with what you have but I think COIN stretches modern militaries flexibilities beyond what they are capable of (hence the need to change the military not the problem per se).
2, well I think it could/can be done but I think there needs to be more acknowledgment of the friction inducing variables at the higher levels (the lower levels know and deal with it well).
3. I would agree with you there again, I dont have any real answers but militaries evolve as much as societies do and that evolution may be required to succeed in this type of conflict. Risk management? definitely. Militaries are ideal institutions to think about risk (in a military format) but COIN seems to start after its begun, not in the planning and prep phase which is where most militaries start when a conflict looms (this may be more a reflection of the knee jerk reactions of political institutions than the militaries themselves).
I would also add that I do think COIN is winnable but the definition of ‘win’ needs to be changed.
I like your point about not doing COIN in Afghanistan, you hit the nail on the head there.