Yes, EU defence fans – some exciting news in the Guardian today, about a French suggestion that we co-ordinate nuclear submarine patrols, thereby cutting down the number of boats required. Apparently some in the RN aren’t keen. On the plus side, it would at least diminish the chances of them bumping into each other mid-Atlantic – but would it, they ask, actually save much money? I’m not much of a bean-counter, but I know just enough to suspect that such estimates are usually a tad on the low side.
And as a good European, I’m confident enough in my Britishness and ignorant enough in matters maritime to hope that there is scope for much greater collaboration between the states of Europe. I’d like a carrier group with British carriers and, say, Portuguese frigates – and I think there’s now sufficient confluence of European security identities and sufficient fiscal doom to make that happen. Doing so will undoubtedly have an impact on conceptions of sovereignty and identity, in the approved Jean Monnet fashion. C’est la vie, Kameraden. But I have to say, when it comes to continuous at sea deterrent capability, something in me still wants a bomb with a bloody great Union Flag on top of it.
{ 4 comments… read them below or add one }
Sure, if you have the choice, why not ? Of course you’ll prefer to keep your own nukes. But can you afford it? One of the reasons why the French – we – are making that kind of offers is precisely because we’re affraid to see you being constrained to give up the deterrence business – leaving us alone in Europe, in a politically uncomfortable position.
The question is whether the right people in the UK also think nukes are needed, whatever it might cost.
But don’t get me wrong: it’s not the first time we offer to share our nuclear deterrence, and it’s not as if each of our neighbours had been enthousiastic about it…
There are a couple of issues here.
More than the cost factor is the issue of control. However, theoretical and abstract it might be in the event of only 1 European SSBN who decides to launch missiles? While friction over sharing a CV might non have substantial operational repercussions in the event of the event one needed to launch a SLBM the lines of communication would have to be clear. Dual control in the past like nuclear US Pershings or Tomahawks in Germany has not been a question of equals, hence it was easy. Actual dual-control between Britain and France would be complex to say the least.
If Britain was willing to give up the continuous deterrent at sea posture with perhaps one French boat at sea and a British one at 24 hours notice to sail one might over this problem. But there would be no savings.
The fiscal saving would be small as the actual cost of maintaining a patrol (food, equipment, crew time etc..) is minimal if not peanuts in comparison to the infrastructure of maintaining a nuclear deterrent at sea. One joint nuclear base would save money in the long term, but because of the sovereignty aspect this is a non-starter.
Collaboration in the development of nuclear submarines and weapons is not a current option because of the divided nature of the British nuclear infrastructure. While the civilian programme is based on French technology the military programme is based on US know-how. The whole debate about the Trident replacement is in part about sovereignty and Britons place in the world, but just as much about whether Britain wants to maintain the industrial capacity to build nuclear submarines.
‘Savings’ with collaboration with the French would mean buying French technology and boats in the future. And French missiles. Two problems here. 1) if you are going to spend £20-30 billion on Trident replacement the money, or a sizable proportion of it needs to stay in the UK. While Trident III is inevitable going to be American the boats will be British. Maybe the French could be persuaded to by British ….. 2) French submarines are inferior.
From Fleet: We’re getting Trident. The training etc is going ahead, and the cost of not getting Trident is more than buying it… the US will not allow us to back out of that partnership without some severe penalties. Still, if the French/EU are happy to either pay the way for us to get out or even give up their deterrent and opt for collaboration with us, I’d go with this option. Afterall, the argument for our Nuclear Deterrent still largely rests on the French having it, therefore we need it too… It would reduce the RN budget considerably as regards an asset that we do not control; we pay the upkeep of a weapon system we cannot use to support current ops, but is purely the plaything of our Political lords and masters. While it is nice to have won the deterrence control from the RAF, it is a poisoned chalice for the Service where the expense and budget is concerned.
With the loss of our MR 2 nimrods, and MR 4 not coming operational for at least another 12-18 months, currently our overstretched and ageing T23 frigates are our only means of clearing the sea lanes into the Clyde of any prowling Russian submarines. These cuts to conventional forces directly threaten our Nuclear Deterrence anyway. I wonder what the situation is for the French?
And as for EU carrier groups etc, what about the counter piracy ops in the Gulf etc that we, the RN, have led EU Task Groups on?
Overall, in my opinion there would be no savings. In fact, due to the terms of the contract (and this is the Rumour Service equivalent speaking here from Fleet) it would be the reverse. Simply, this is not feasible. MF, you are more than correct when the savings on patrol would be minimal, just as not holding cocktail parties saves money…
AY: We’re getting Trident. The training etc is going ahead, and the cost of not getting Trident is more than buying.
Exactly the whole system is geared up for this. There is no short-medium term money to be saved by any other approach.
AY: While it is nice to have won the deterrence control from the RAF, it is a poisoned chalice for the Service where the expense and budget is concerned.
You are right, but there is another way of phrasing this. The RN is responsible for the nations strategic deterrent. But its a ‘strategic deterrent’ not a service capability. Hence it is a national asset and the Navy should not have to pay for it with its own operational resources.