Pat Porter, erstwhile of this parish, has a post over at his new digs on Hans Morgenthau and the Credibility Trap. Typically, he talks good sense:
Credibility is a dangerous and potentially misleading concept in foreign policy. It can be the logic behind escalation in a misconceived war, and it can be deployed as the last-stand argument against withdrawal. And it dubiously assumes, as in Afghanistan, that others judge our calibre and strength in general by our determination in one peripheral conflict.
To me, the problem is the peculiarly outdated and narrowly focused way in which credibility claims tend to be vouched which is usually in terms of the states ability and resolve to deter other potentially hostile states or leaders who fear retaliation for their actions because they value their lives and power. But this doesn’t apply in the same way with global insurgency which does not fear military retaliation so much and may indeed welcome it–because inevitably given their location ‘amongst the people’ it ends up acting as a recruiting tool for it, providing a constant and vivid reinforcement of the cause. What is lost is the sense of credibility as the quality of being able to work within the information environment in a way that influences the beliefs of others to one’s own advantage. To purposefully shape the beliefs and ideas of others, in other words. I tend to see the whole ‘War on Terror’ as very largely a contest of credibility–and ours unfortunately is draining away in the dust of Iraq and Afghanistan too. Pat’s reminded of Morgenthau; I’m reminded of Kipling who wrote of our previous Afghan adventure:
Let us admit it fairly, as a business people should
We have had no end of a lesson; it will do us no end of good.
I sure hope so. Yet, at the end of the day, I also reckon that the manner in which we depart is consequential. I think we should have our eyes on the exit and be moving in that direction with the most seemly haste possible but not faster than the preservation of honour and dignity would allow. In real terms, ballpark, two at most three years.
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Whereas, I’m reminded of Schelling:
The whole purpose of verbal or ritualistic commitments, of political and diplomatic commitments, or of efforts to attach honour and reputation to a commitment, is to make the commitment manifestly hard to get out of on short notice. Even the commitments not deliberately incurred, and the commitments that embarrass one in unforeseen circumstances, cannot be undone cheaply. The cost is the discrediting of other commitments that one would still like to be credited.’ – Arms and Influence
Separately – Patrick may have moved to quieter blogging waters to escape hoi polloi – but we’re not going to let that stop us debating him here… :)
I understand the instinctive appeal for a “decent interval,” but it seems to me that this is ultimately a misplaced sense of what a country’s honor and dignity are. There is no honor in sticking to a conflict where one has lost any hope of achieving strategic interests. Several works (by Eric Larson, by Peter Feaver and Christopher Gelpi) have shown how tolerance to casualties is largely dependent on whether people think that the stakes are worth it. Staying just for the sake of staying, while casualties keep mounting on all sides, would not just be wrong ethically: it would also be a major political liability, and make Afghanistan follow the lead of Vietnam, where “not being seen as losing” became the guiding principle of successive administrations in spite of numerous reports warning that there was no victory in sight.
‘There is no honor in sticking to a conflict where one has lost any hope of achieving strategic interests. ‘
I agree. What seems to me to be happening right now is a redefining of our strategic objectives into a form rather severely attenuated from those which we had at the beginning and therefore possibly manageable inside a couple of years. Miliband is making a speech tonight at MIT which is I expect going to lay out the UK’s exit strategy (in so many words). It’s not a new idea. Declare victory and go. Keep the cash and guns flowing and hope for the best.
For what it’s worth, I vote with Porter/Morgenthau. It’s worth noting that there are lots of credibilities at stake here, though. There is our ability to deter our enemies, of course. Then there is our ability to reassure our allies. But then there is also the armed forces’ credibility, both in presenting themselves to the general public (which is damaged by being seen to fight a ‘bad’ war) and in presenting themselves to other militaries (which is damaged by being seen to leave any war). Pride is a pretty central military value, and Basra hurt.
None of them good enough reasons either for going or staying, but all worthy of consideration nonetheless.
Good comments and observations.
Regarding “But then there is also the armed forces’ credibility. . .in presenting themselves to other militaries. . .”, all I can do from this side of the pond is assure that you guys carry a lot of heft in the credibility department, Basra notwithstanding. Without a doubt, some of the finest fighting men I have ever met were in service to Queen and Country.
So, I say it’s time to come on over to the “dark side” and become the 51st state. At least your warfighters will be kitted out and funded properly, for a change.
That is a lovely offer Gunrunner. Wouldn’t it make more sense though for you to come back into the fold? Come on it’s easy, just say: ‘I Gunrunner swear by Almighty God that, on becoming a British citizen, I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth the Second, Her Heirs and Successors according to law.’ I mean if you’re willing to pay for the British Army’s kit now you might as well. Wasn’t that what the whole Revolution was about in the first place? :)
I might give it serious thought, though we already have our own royals (Kennedy family).
Next week, in London for business and good times. :-)
great comments all, and nice that I can’t fully avoid the clamour!
btw there’s a general point lurking in the excellent post and comments that’s worth making more explicit: if we were to consider credibility seriously rather than just as a glib assumption, that could be an argument for accelerated withdrawal rather than prolonging the war effort. If credibility via one ‘small war’ was a powerful factor in international relations, (which I doubt), a country’s global reputation could be hurt if it were seen as a pitiful giant, steadily bleeding, over-extended and increasingly demoralised in an ill-judged war.
‘if we were to consider credibility seriously rather than just as a glib assumption…’
Yes, that’s what I mean. Except that it doesn’t lead me to argue for an accelerated withdrawal. Actually I suppose it depends much on the range we’re talking about. On the one hand you’ve got the ‘it’s a generational commitment’ camp while on the other hand you’ve got the ‘bug out now!’ camp. My position is walk, don’t run.
is the ‘generational commitment’ case still being made somewhere? my impression was that the debate was now about the optimum way/pace/conditions in which to draw down
Tom nails it. Credibility with whom? By doing what? And how would I measure that? Perception by others is important when it comes to strategy – but it’s only partly in our gift to shape.
only partly in our gift to shape…and dangerous to over-value or obsess about. less worry about it would have helped in a number of crises historically…