Two cracking books got me thinking this week. The first, Peter Paret’s brilliant biography of Clausewitz, touches on many themes in the great man’s work – but of particular interest to me was his take on Clausewitz’s psychological understanding of war. In Clausewitz’s conception, war is fundamentally a human institution – occurring between and within different societies, and shaped by the attitudes and attributes of the individuals who people them.
Nowhere is this approach more evident than in Clausewitz’s treatment of the psychology of leadership. Here’s an example of his thinking, from an early paper ostensibly about Gustavus Adolphus, but self-evidently more ambitious than that:
Human intelligence is liable to self-deception and error, and never more so than in the press of events. At such times, character must serve to steady conviction, and a new impression must not triumph over the completed through process for the simple reason that events seem more vivid in reality than in recollection, and because at the moment of action it is often impossible to run through once more the whole sequence of ideas that had led to the original conviction.
Whatever you think about the wisdom of relying on prior beliefs and attitudes rather than responding to incoming information, it should be clear from that passage how much weight Clausewitz placed on agency in warfare, and, moreover, on the psychology of decision makers. As it happens, there’s abundant evidence that people really do interpret events according to pre-existing beliefs, rather than on their rational, objective merits, especially in stressful, ambiguous circumstances. Clausewitz was describing what commonly happens. But when it comes to those earlier beliefs, Clausewitz may have been in error to place great weight on their utility – such beliefs are themselves shaped by earlier emotional events in our lives – just because they’re pre-existing is no great guarantee of profundity. Emotion and memory interact in ways that profoundly shape our outlook and our decision making.
That Clausewitz was unable to develop his understanding of human behaviour further than he did is a product of the state of human sciences in his times. Paret describes his psychological writing as ‘the weakest part’ of On War. Clausewitz might have agreed – bemoaning ‘our slight scientific knowledge’ of what he called ‘this obscure field’. As Paret notes, Clausewitz took refuge in ‘genius’ – a broad and ill-defined category into which could be bundled all those traits desirable in effective leaders. Even so, he made some telling and enduring observations (you can read more about them in a forthcoming book…).
Stephen Rosen is luckier, and uses his advantage to good effect in his absorbing book, War and Human Nature. Consider that question raised by the young Clausewitz – should decisions be made in accord with pre-existing beliefs, or in response to vivid new information? What does experience count for? Rosen grounds much of his book in biological and cognitive psychology – especially focusing on the role of emotion in shaping war. In one chapter, he takes aim at the rationalist model of decision-making. It’s not just that there’s incomplete information, or an overabundance of noise, with the attendant need to apply simplifying cognitive heuristics – what really makes a difference to decision-making, he argues, is emotion, particularly emotional memories:
A new situation, when encountered, will be seen as conforming to one of many patterns stored in the long-term memory of the decision maker. Those remembered patterns were formed at a time of emotional arousal through which the deicision maker lived. In short, decisions are affected by emotion-based pattern recognition, a process of which the decision maker may or may not be consciously aware. Reason and conscious cognition will also be in operation and can reverse or modify the emotion based decision if time permits and compelling data is available. On the other hand, reason and conscious cognition can play a secondary role after a basic course of action has been highlighted by the emotion-based pattern recognition.
There’s a lot of science, and a lot of nuance, behind that short passage. Buy the book if that sample piques your curiosity – it’s an excellent read, and a good rejoiner to the many theorists of international relations who build towering theoretical castles on the sand of under-specified and untested assumptions about human nature.
Clausewitz and Rosen also have fascinating views on the psychology of combatants, both as individuals and groups – particularly on what makes for defeated forces. More on that some other time, perhaps.
It's been emotional
{ 4 comments… read them below or add one }
Of course that isn’t exactly a great thing. Policy makers brought up thinking of Munich would be less able to handle the less ambitious desires of Soviet and American leaders. In a more modern example, leaders raised to think of two major powers that could easily go to war at any given time might be less able to see a world where nations appear to be constantly competing and making alliances without seriously considering escalation to war.
Thanks – this is an interesting source I may not have discovered without your review. As someone working with veterans, adjusting to life, post combat (and also as a Dramatherapist/ EMDR Practitioner) I am interested in what is said about emotional memory in Rosen’s text.
While not exactly on topic, what struck me in reading Paret’s book (and I only read it recently), is how Clausewitz’s search for answers in the conduct of war in time of great social and apparent military upheaval–then his actions and advocacy of change–all parallels the current efforts of many mid-grade officers in service today.
“Actor” is the right word – Rosen is paralleling Stanislavski’s idea that an actor should identify the emotions of his or her character with their own memories, as human emotions are universal. Need to portray despair or lust? You’ve felt them; dig into your past.