A long time ago (in blog-time), I posted some thoughts about the shifting norm of international assassination. What surprises me, thinking about recent events in Dubai, is not so much that states assassinate their enemies, but that they still do so rarely – even now, when those enemies are often non-state actors, the killing of whom essentially necessitates assassination (if you define that as being the targeted killing of named individuals).
Of course, the US has been racking up the tally in Waziristan over the last year or so, and there are occasional killings attributed to the Israelis – but denied by them – that of the thoroughly nasty Imad Mugniyah, for example. It’s not a good time to be an Iranian nuclear scientist either, I suspect.
The unveiling of the Dubai plotters shows one potential downside of this tactic – reputational. It’s one thing to cultivate a reputation as no-nonsense men of action with long memories and large cojones, but another to be pinged as unscrupulous identity thieves, and brazen flouters of international niceties. Ambiguity, or outright denial and misdirection are perhaps better outcomes after assassination attempts. While its not as embarrassing as the fallout from their attempt on Khaled Mishal, Israel, I’m sure, could do without the heat and the stigma. What was it Hedley Bull said about the soft sanctions of opprobrium in an international society of states?
To be avoided in dark alleys
{ 3 comments… read them below or add one }
I can think of a few reasons for why there should be so few assassinations. The first is that it isn’t always so easy to actually find the target. This might be a time of information, but with the glut of data we have it can actually be even more difficult to make sure where someone is. The second is the dangers of it. I may have mentioned that non-explosive assassins must get close to their target and risk capture and/or death. Most conventional assassins would not like to risk it, especially as many are focused on the continuation of their career. Lastly there is the matter of standards and retaliation. I seem to recall reading somewhere that in Afghanistan during the 80s the CIA deliberately held back from targeting KGB officers out of this fear, which would be rather sensible.
On this assassination, we still can’t say for sure it was Israel. This wouldn’t be the first time that Israel has inexpertly handled such a mission, but it would be rather strange of them to use the identities of other Israelis as well as the question of the rather flimsy disguises.
Lastly, if you are referring to Massoud Ali Mohammadi I remain heavily unconvinced that either the U.S or Israel was involved in the matter. To start if I recall he focused on quantum theory, admittedly this doesn’t bar him from working on nuclear reactors but I would assume there would be better candidates. Second is that he was listed in several places as being on the side of the reformists. Of course this doesn’t necessarily mean that he wouldn’t have been killed anyway, if either nation were actually killing scientists I can’t see them hesitating over political loyalty, but it does suggest other culprits and he was hardly a ‘supporter of the revolution’ as was claimed. Finally, this assumes that somehow, at a point when security in Tehran was at its height in a nation where the U.S and Israel have difficulty moving already, either nation could somehow insert a team of assassins and extract them. My other points simply state that I am skeptical, but the last one to my mind beggars belief.
Well said. I puzzled my own reaction when I read of a drone strike in Africa (Somalia, was it?). It seemed rather unsporting, as compared to a Special Ops team dropping in by HALO and taking the bad guy out in a hail of gunfire. Why is that?
Think of the grief we would have been spared if a team of British assassins had murdered Adolf Hitler in 1938. Blue skies! — Dan Ford
That actually might have been the worst thing to do. By that point Germany was more than militaristic enough to fight anyway (plus an assassination would be causus belli), and there wouldn’t have been a questionable leader in power to give the Allies their victories in Eastern Europe and Normandy. Of course it might have been enough to stop the Holocaust, but I wouldn’t bet on it.