As this debate has evolved, the title is somewhat a misnomer. It’s not about who should decide whether to go to war. Both Professors state their agreement on that. It sounds like Prof Bogdanor is debating the internal policy discussion and debate within the government and how public that should be. While it’s nice to think that the debate could be public without negative ramifications, I tend to agree with Prof. Bogdanor in that being anointed as “professionals” military advice is somehow more “objective” and less “political” (political here being a pejorative for short-sighted and self-serving). However, I don’t think Prof Strachan is necessarily debating that point. He’s making the point, well in line with Clausewitz (no surprise there) is that there really is no such thing as purely military advice at this level.

The way I see it, both the military leaders and the civilian leaders need to understand both the military and political aspects of the issue. By dint of their background, professions and roles, obviously the military will likely be on surer footing with military aspects while the civilians with the political aspects. But they need one another in a free debate and discussion. While that decision could be public, that will change the tenor of the debate, and have implications for future such decision-making processes—probably to the negative in my opinion.

Inevitably politicians contemplating discretionary military engagements tend to be risk adverse. This is due to domestic politics and the structural norms of the present international political system rather than any analysis of the utility of force or human rights or proportionality, all of which can be impacted on to some degree by the military through better doctrine and training and more manpower and equipment. This may not be enough though. Even overwhelming military means and great operational success can lead to uncertain political ends at home and internationally. That equals political and policy failure, regardless of how good the military advice was along the way.

Ultimately, the political gain/loss has to be assessed by the politicians with the means versus ends balance in mind and they alone take on the responsibility for the decision to use military forces.

Even Clausewitz, at times in his writing, acknowledged the potential need to fight for policy aims in the face of potential military failure. It is not inconceivable that politicians will determine it prudent for policy reasons to engage forces in a military venture, even when advised that because of a lack of means the military risk operational failure or a damaged reputation. Participation in an alliance/coalition venture may be considered necessary or prudent to maintain or gain strategic influence. Operational success, whilst highly desirable, may never trump the policy aim when applying these criteria.

Perhaps this discussion needs to put the emphasis back on the criteria used by the decision makers in making the policy cost/gain decisions for military engagement, rather than on the significance of the military advisor in the policy discussion.

There are a few ways to interpret the problem. One is to stick to principle and enter into a slightly tautological mantra of ‘civilians must lead because the Liberal model of civil-military relations puts civilians in leadership roles’.

Another is to ask why that is in the first place. Obviously, competence is one aspect of any model of civil-military relations. But so, too, are the concepts of authority and accountability. Indeed, these three concepts form the real crux of the matter, in my opinion.

If politicians are to be held accountable (and they are, albeit to an imperfect degree, in a regime of responsible government) then they must have the final say. Of course, they can seek advice from whomever they choose. If they receive that advice from their cat or their dead mother (bonus points for identifying to which late head of government I am referring) then they should be held accountable for that. If they choose to take the advice from brilliant civil servants or daring generals…well then they, too, must be ready to account for that. The buck must stop with them.

And why? Because they have the authority to spend the people’s money, vested in them as the people’s representatives. They alone have the authority to compel citizens to fight and die. In this way, the military is set in the same position as the police, scientists, academics, civil servants, and doctors. Doctors have the competence to do brain transplants, but it is the politicians who have the authority to order them to do so (by establishing laws, guidelines, and budgets–think stem cell research, for example), and the accountability to ‘pay the consequences’ with the electorate if the idea turns out badly.

Now, one could create an alternate regime, whereby the authority and the accountability for military action rested with the military, with whom the competence also rests. Here, taken to absurd extremes, the experts would somehow control their own turf, with politicians somehow facilitating ‘what is best’ on their behalf. In such a system, would the generals also be accountable if a war or a particular policy were a failure? It could be designed to be that way, sure. Who would adjudicate between the experts? Perhaps some ‘supremo expert’? More realistically, the experts would remain aloof from control, perhaps like in Turkey or Iran.

Another alternative would be to require all citizens, or at least those who sought political office, to have been soldiers. The novel Starship Troopers spells such a regime out in some detail.

I suppose the main point I would make is that to change the role of the military would change the nature of the political regime under which we all live. Each choice has implications, some of which would be profound.

Finally, the current model may work well, just not with the particular personalities now in place. As the old Latin saw has it: ab abusu ad usum non valet consequentia.