Over at CCW, the Strachan/Bogdanor debate is developing nicely. The motion, remember, is this:
Military experts, not political amateurs, should decide whether we go to war.
In his second salvo, Professor Strachan, proposing the motion, develops his argument – suggesting that the real point of contention here is the degree to which means shape ends.
I am arguing that the means can condition the choice of ends to such an extent that they become part of the decision itself. If war is used to fulfil the purposes of policy (at least in an ideal version of what should happen), it is not in practice sufficient simply to decide on war to achieve that objective. The state needs to possess the military capability likely to deliver those ends. If democracy is indeed government by amateurs, the need for professional advice to be integrated in its decisions becomes even more pressing.
If you have a hammer, your problems look like nails – as the old chestnut goes. And, moreover, you’d be better off asking a carpenter not just how to use the hammer, but what to use it for.
My view is that means themselves are a reflection of how societies conceive of military force. Sure, long lead times mean that kit and (to a lesser extent) doctrine may lag behind faster moving societal conceptions of the strategic landscape. But in essence, societies shape warfare – where they don’t, you’ve got problems.
Thus, for example, is British strategy affected by societal proclivities on human rights (including of its own soldiers), proportionality and discrimination. If society wants to fight that way, fine. It will need to understand the limitations that such approaches place on appropriate ends. And there, Professor Strachan is surely right – the military ought to advise on those limitations. Unfortunately, its historical record in that respect is, well, mixed.
But how should it advise? Behind cabinet doors, or as a participant in the rough and tumble of public debate? In his reply, Vernon Bogdanor is drawn by Strachan’s thoughts on what might fairly be described as the overt politicisation of the officer corps. Bogdanor thinks this is wrong.
The principle of ministerial responsibility locates political power with ministers and provides a mechanism through which they can be accountable to Parliament, and, through Parliament, to the people. It sustains a structure within which ministers are served by experts who are required to serve governments of any political colour and who must, therefore, be debarred from any open political affiliation. The principle of ministerial responsibility requires, therefore, a politically neutral civil service and a politically neutral army.
That’s the model – and it has served the UK well. The problem comes when the model is held against the Clausewitzean trinity – people, army, government – in its current guise. What happens as the use of force becomes increasingly distanced from public understanding and engagement? What happens if the political leadership of the day also has limited understanding of military power? Is there a risk that military force becomes disconnected from its societal moorings, and if so, shouldn’t the military be able to better articulate a case for their role, and limitations? The public needs to know what the army thinks – especially if they are struggling to enlighten the politicians.
I’m not sure. I think senior military officers already do a good job of letting the public understand their (conflicting) views about the utility of force. And again, the merits of politicizing the military might depend on your view of their record in understanding contemporary conflict. The motion, remember, posits an ‘expert military’. Still, were senior officers to become overtly politically engaged, the pressure would most definitely be on – as political actors, the public mood that the military has been badly served by perfidious politicians would be placed under close scrutiny.
I have Professor Bogdanor ahead on points. You?
{ 4 comments… read them below or add one }
An interesting bout with some good hits on both sides.
There are a few ways to interpret the problem. One is to stick to principle and enter into a slightly tautological mantra of ‘civilians must lead because the Liberal model of civil-military relations puts civilians in leadership roles’.
Another is to ask why that is in the first place. Obviously, competence is one aspect of any model of civil-military relations. But so, too, are the concepts of authority and accountability. Indeed, these three concepts form the real crux of the matter, in my opinion.
If politicians are to be held accountable (and they are, albeit to an imperfect degree, in a regime of responsible government) then they must have the final say. Of course, they can seek advice from whomever they choose. If they receive that advice from their cat or their dead mother (bonus points for identifying to which late head of government I am referring) then they should be held accountable for that. If they choose to take the advice from brilliant civil servants or daring generals…well then they, too, must be ready to account for that. The buck must stop with them.
And why? Because they have the authority to spend the people’s money, vested in them as the people’s representatives. They alone have the authority to compel citizens to fight and die. In this way, the military is set in the same position as the police, scientists, academics, civil servants, and doctors. Doctors have the competence to do brain transplants, but it is the politicians who have the authority to order them to do so (by establishing laws, guidelines, and budgets–think stem cell research, for example), and the accountability to ‘pay the consequences’ with the electorate if the idea turns out badly.
Now, one could create an alternate regime, whereby the authority and the accountability for military action rested with the military, with whom the competence also rests. Here, taken to absurd extremes, the experts would somehow control their own turf, with politicians somehow facilitating ‘what is best’ on their behalf. In such a system, would the generals also be accountable if a war or a particular policy were a failure? It could be designed to be that way, sure. Who would adjudicate between the experts? Perhaps some ‘supremo expert’? More realistically, the experts would remain aloof from control, perhaps like in Turkey or Iran.
Another alternative would be to require all citizens, or at least those who sought political office, to have been soldiers. The novel Starship Troopers spells such a regime out in some detail.
I suppose the main point I would make is that to change the role of the military would change the nature of the political regime under which we all live. Each choice has implications, some of which would be profound.
Finally, the current model may work well, just not with the particular personalities now in place. As the old Latin saw has it: ab abusu ad usum non valet consequentia.
Personally, I feel a great deal of concern when soldiers involve themselves too deeply in politics. It is one thing to have a general testify before the legislature on how matters are going (though you should expect them to talk often and say little), it is another for a general to publicly begin speaking on whether or not certain nations are hostile, or how politically sensitive operations should be undertaken.
I’ll admit that one of the greatest ironies I note is that I want officers to be more politically oriented abroad, but to publicly have no politics at home.
The impact of military advice may be overstated in this discussion. If the purpose of the military advisor is to present political decision makers with an assessment of the potential military outcome of any military engagement, it follows that he can not simultaneously balance the venture against political gains/costs, either publicly or privately. Logically the military advisor advises what is potentially achievable militarily with what he has now or what can be put at his disposal in a reasonable time period and no more.
Inevitably politicians contemplating discretionary military engagements tend to be risk adverse. This is due to domestic politics and the structural norms of the present international political system rather than any analysis of the utility of force or human rights or proportionality, all of which can be impacted on to some degree by the military through better doctrine and training and more manpower and equipment. This may not be enough though. Even overwhelming military means and great operational success can lead to uncertain political ends at home and internationally. That equals political and policy failure, regardless of how good the military advice was along the way.
Ultimately, the political gain/loss has to be assessed by the politicians with the means versus ends balance in mind and they alone take on the responsibility for the decision to use military forces.
Even Clausewitz, at times in his writing, acknowledged the potential need to fight for policy aims in the face of potential military failure. It is not inconceivable that politicians will determine it prudent for policy reasons to engage forces in a military venture, even when advised that because of a lack of means the military risk operational failure or a damaged reputation. Participation in an alliance/coalition venture may be considered necessary or prudent to maintain or gain strategic influence. Operational success, whilst highly desirable, may never trump the policy aim when applying these criteria.
Perhaps this discussion needs to put the emphasis back on the criteria used by the decision makers in making the policy cost/gain decisions for military engagement, rather than on the significance of the military advisor in the policy discussion.
What struck me the most in the debate is how it reflects a British perspective on Samuel Huntington’s discussions in “The Soldier and the State.” One of Huntington’s points was that the division of powers of the US government in the US Constitution forces the military to be more political and less ”objective” because while the military is part of the Executive, it must provide candid, and public testimony directly to Congress. The position of Prof. Bogdanor that military leadership should not provide independent opinion and advice directly to Parliament is not even a possibility in the US system.
As this debate has evolved, the title is somewhat a misnomer. It’s not about who should decide whether to go to war. Both Professors state their agreement on that. It sounds like Prof Bogdanor is debating the internal policy discussion and debate within the government and how public that should be. While it’s nice to think that the debate could be public without negative ramifications, I tend to agree with Prof. Bogdanor in that being anointed as “professionals” military advice is somehow more “objective” and less “political” (political here being a pejorative for short-sighted and self-serving). However, I don’t think Prof Strachan is necessarily debating that point. He’s making the point, well in line with Clausewitz (no surprise there) is that there really is no such thing as purely military advice at this level.
The way I see it, both the military leaders and the civilian leaders need to understand both the military and political aspects of the issue. By dint of their background, professions and roles, obviously the military will likely be on surer footing with military aspects while the civilians with the political aspects. But they need one another in a free debate and discussion. While that decision could be public, that will change the tenor of the debate, and have implications for future such decision-making processes—probably to the negative in my opinion.