Comments on: Review: The Insurgent Archipelago

By: General Mattis’s Martial Mix-Tape | Kings of War

General Mattis’s Martial Mix-Tape | Kings of War — Thu, 29 Jul 2010 22:59:59 +0000

[...] reasons stated on KOW earlier, John Mackinlay’s The Insurgent [...]

By: Il mondo secondo il Pentagono « Defenders of freedom's Blog

Il mondo secondo il Pentagono « Defenders of freedom's Blog — Tue, 16 Feb 2010 15:17:39 +0000

[...] un’interessante recensione ad un promettente libro “The Insurgent Archipelago” dell’inglese Johm Mackinley; l’autore [...]

By: ArmitageShanks

ArmitageShanks — Tue, 16 Feb 2010 13:27:40 +0000

I am very glad I saw this review. I did as you instructed initially and bought it.. It’s filled a few important gaps in my knowledge, and rather gratifyingly, has confirmed some conclusions that I’d come to myself.

I wonder if Mackinlay is in contact with David Kilcullen? When he analogised some aspects of the global insurgency as being something like a virus at one point, it reminded me of Kilcullen’s description of al-Qa’ida’s strategy. Either way, I think The Insurgent Archipelago and The Accidental Guerrilla support one another quite well.

By: omar

omar — Sat, 13 Feb 2010 04:30:12 +0000

I was not trying to pass judgment on WHY trends are what they are. Its “turtles all the way”…every turtle is standing on some other turtle. My point was that its still possible to see that some things are more in line with broader historical trends and some are sharply contrary to them. Taking advantage of a rising trend is an easier job, going against the spirit of the age makes an already difficult job almost impossible….
On a smaller time scale, contingency and chance and the best laid plans of mice and men can mean the difference between victory and defeat…But it sometimes seems to me that even then, the really ironic thing is that if anti-colonialism is the flavor of the age, then the victorious colonist may end up finishing the colonial operation off anyway (didnt victorious Maoists become the most capitalist capitalists on the planet??)

By: Formerly Grant

Formerly Grant — Fri, 12 Feb 2010 06:21:44 +0000

If I understand the thrust of this article correctly, it means that even as the United States military is switching the immediate focus from conventional wars to counterinsurgencies we are still fighting the last war instead of the current one. How delightful.
I’m starting to think the only incentive I have to remain here is that I’m not good at other languages.

By: Formerly Grant

Formerly Grant — Fri, 12 Feb 2010 06:18:57 +0000

On anti-colonialism, don’t forget that it took place under very specific circumstances.
The majority of the empires had at least some basis in liberal democracies which meant that from the start they had a potentially fatal flaw.
Many of the insurgents served in the First and/or Second World Wars where they learned something of that imperial nation’s tactics.
In Asia the Japanese victories proved to the host populations that the Western nations could be defeated, and the American victory over Japan didn’t really change that.
In fighting the World Wars the imperial nations spent a huge amount of resources and then had to fund a continuous war in another part of the world. Admittedly I imagine a large percentage of the imperial populations supported this at first (even the Communists, look at France), but as time went on they started to question it.
Lastly, many of these nationalist insurgencies started within years of one another, giving each one more viability than they would have normally had.
To summarize, I agree that the Western nations were fighting a losing battle, but thinking it was inevitable is a mistake. Nationalism is no more inevitable than the idea that history inexorably leads to Communism, it is a matter of chance and circumstance.

By: David Betz

David Betz — Thu, 11 Feb 2010 11:27:35 +0000

That makes lots of sense, Omar. It’s a good argument which I have heard before in various places. For instance I like the way that Douglas Porch says it in his chapter on French Imperial Warfare in Carter Malkasian and Daniel Marston’s edited book Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare:

‘The French Army proved to be fairly innovative on an operational and tactical level in its Asian and North African theatres of conflict. But this virtue could save it in neither Indochina nor Algeria because the political objective was compromised. There was no way to engage a population with a message of colonialism–with its subtext of defeat, racial and economic domination, and humiliation–at a time of growing anti-imperialism in the early Cold War years.’

By: Ben

Ben — Thu, 11 Feb 2010 10:11:26 +0000

As Ryan says: great book and great review.

I sympathise with David’s point about propaganda of the deed to some extent. That said, as I see it, the problem with counter-insurgents trying to exploit propaganda of the deed is that COIN practitioners are usually governments / states, or offshoots thereof. While there is no theoretical impediment to them harnessing the power of deeds, govts / states tend to lack creativity and agility, and are often out of touch with the target population.

Omar: your argument reminds me of something Stefan Aust said about the Red Army Faktion (or Baader Meinhof Gang):

“But every kind of terrorism is always embedded in a larger conflict. Only out of such a conflict does terrorism draw its power and win support for its murderous clandestine groups. So when we look at the history of the RAF, it relates to German history—both before and after World War II. The RAF is like an auxiliary craft floating along in the stream of time, a gunboat, if you will. This does not diminish the responsibility of those involved, but explains it, perhaps.”

By: Links of the Day « OnParkStreet

Links of the Day « OnParkStreet — Thu, 11 Feb 2010 02:27:31 +0000

[...] 2. Review: The Insurgent Archipelago [...]

By: omar

omar — Wed, 10 Feb 2010 18:26:23 +0000

I have a semi-digested theory that all of this is crucial to the insurgent and counter-insurgent, but to a distant observer it can seem that the most crucial element is “historical necessity”. There are broader trends in human history that play out THROUGH insurgency and counter-insurgency. Tactical successes and failure may determine how a particular group does (whether insurgent group X or counter-insurgent army Y “succeed”) in the immediate term, but neither can buck the broader historical trend for too long. IF the counter-insurgent army has adopted overall aims that are contrary to the “zeitgeist”, then the best tactics will only go so far (and the same for the insurgents). For example, I think the current pakistani taliban insurgency (in itself…there may be an element of being used by superior intelligences in some of their actions and that is a different story) is led by young cadres of “true jihadis”, whose vision of the world is out of touch with the broader trends in modern human society. Knowing this, I suspect they will fail even though the army arrayed against them is not the most competent, etc. etc. On the other hand, anti-colonialism (the notion that every society should be ruled by its own people) is a modern trend that is very well established and IF the Afghan taliban have that as their aim, they get a huge boost, even if their tactics and day to day decisions are not the best. In turn, that means that it is very important for ISAF to be NOT an occupying force, even if that means sacrificing some efficiencies. And so on…
Or, to a different example, I would suggest that in terms of planning and intelligent analysis of tactics and counter-tactics, the Israeli “counter-insurgent” effort is likely much more sophisticated and capable than the “insurgent” effort of the Palestinians, but its the Israelis who are trying to buck the historical trend (in this case, the trend that “civilized” modern countries do not like to see themselves as oppressors of alien nationalities and other civilized people dont like to see them doing that) and while they can delay the inevitable, they will have to concede to the “insurgents” at some point.
Does that make any kind of sense?