Here they come. You must have read about it already. Didn’t anyone tell them surprise was a key Principle of War?
Is that sensible? The man from the WSJ, among the many hacks briefed ahead of time, had doubts:
By surrendering the element of surprise, the coalition has given its enemy time to dig entrenched fighting positions and tunnel networks. Perhaps worse for the attacking infantrymen, the insurgents have had time to booby-trap buildings and bury bombs along paths, roads and irrigated fields. Such hidden devices inflict the majority of U.S. and allied casualties.
Two very sound reasons for the lack of operational secrecy suggest themselves. First, I’d back the insurgents to know something was coming, even without a subscription to the Journal.
Second, more importantly, avoiding a big fight is the name of the game for the coalition. Preserving your force and securing the people are key objectives if you’re going to do population-focused counterinsurgency. Ideally you want to take control of the populous areas with minimal fighting, and you want the insurgent out in the sticks, where he can be hunted down more readily than among the population, and where there’s less chance of large-scale civilian casualties.
The insurgent, meanwhile, must fight among the people, not just for safety, but to retain his relevance. Announcing that you’re coming gives him a tough choice.
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Not to mention that the Journal has managed to delude itself into thinking in terms of entrenchments and military casualties. Those will be important for the tactics that the soldiers use, but of far less importance strategically. Either the WSJ has forgotten that this is a counterinsurgency (despite the fact that everyone and their dog, cat, and goldfish has heard the word by now) or they’re deliberately writing this piece to attack the strategy, and indirectly Obama. Anyone want to take their pick on which?
And yes, insurgents seem to have good intelligence on these things. At Fallujah I understand the insurgents knew the time of the operation down to the hour.
Grant,
If you read the full article, rather than the lone excerpt on this blog post, it is clear that the author is not doing anything of the sort. The article starts out discussing the risks of announcing the movements (largely to dispense of them later), then discusses how this is a break from past practice, and then discusses why it may be successful.
I don’t see how this article can be seen as anything other than a balanced analysis, especially in light of its striking similarity with the three points made by Mr. Payne.
1. Mr. Payne writes…
The article quotes a coalition spokesman…
2. Mr. Payne writes…
The article quotes a coalition spokesman…
3. Mr. Payne writes…
The article quotes a coalition spokesman…
Now that I think about, has anyone ever seen Mr. Payne and a coalition spokesman in the same location?
The WSJ’s editorial staff is partisan. The rest of the journalists are pretty mainstream. The op-ed pages are an entirely different animal than the rest of the paper. The article is mostly supportive, particularly the second paragraph from O’Hanlon and the last five paragraphs of the article.
Schmedlap, you’ve blown my cover! :)
Formerly Grant: Considering the placeline is “Kandahar”, meaning the person writing a NEWS (not an opinion) piece is at least in the province of Kandahar, methinks the reporter/embed doesn’t realize the Taliban & other bad guys tend to get beaten badly in stand-up-face-to-face fights with ISAF (hence all the booby traps/IEDs). In spite of big talk from (alleged) Taliban commanders on the ground:
http://is.gd/7Qpj6
if ISAF doesn’t have enough troops to hold all the ground they take, all the insurgents have to do is melt away into the people, not shoot back, and continue to intimidate the population if/when the ISAF troops leave. Why dig and (likely) loose when you can hide your weapons and wait a bit?
I’ll take the “forgotten that this is a counterinsurgency” option, please.
It’s of no surprise to me that operational surprise has been ceded in order to build public support. The two things that are key for a democracy to win a COIN operation are prising the local population away from the insurgent whilst also maintaining support at home. The coalition’s Centre of Gravity for this operation is public support which is most effectively grown in the petri dish of the media. Hopefully a strategic commander has worked through the campaign calculus and has judged that the ‘lifes and limbs’ of those fighting the COIN are worth the strategic support this tactic will secure!
“The two things that are key for a democracy to win a COIN operation are prising the local population away from the insurgent whilst also maintaining support at home. ”
Picking the right war in the first place is just as important. I recommend David Edelstein’s article on this, ‘Occupational Hazards’, published a few years ago in International Security, particularly its conclusion:
Occupation success, then, is largely influenced by structural factors that occupying powers cannot easily manipulate. To the extent they can, great powers must therefore carefully choose places to occupy where the threat environment is conducive to occupation success. It is not merely coincidence that occupations have most often failed on the periphery of the international system where geostrategic importance is questionable, great powers are likely to be impatient, and nationalism is often in its emergent stages. This is not to suggest that the policy choices that occupying powers make are irrelevant. Occupying powers can increase
their chances of success both by pursuing a wartime strategy that creates an environment welcoming to occupation and by employing strategies, such as contingent withdrawal, that make their pledges to create an independent, indigenous government more credible.
Good stuff, PP. Still, given that the choice of where to occupy has already been taken, let’s hope work implementing his last sentence goes to plan….
Interesting thoughts on identity in your post at the magisterial Offshore Balancer, btw. If multiple identities are available, and if culture is somehow dynamic and non-deterministic in the manner you suggest – why isn’t that a cause for optimism? Or at least a cause for shrewd calculation about to leverage different identities?
good question.
two reasons:
1) fluidity is not the same thing as control-ability. This fluid culture is still hard to control/reprogramme. If anything, the fact that the fixed primordial ‘tribe’ or ethnic/parochial community doesn’t really exist in straightforward ways suggests that there isn’t a single ‘essence’ or ‘cultural personality’ that we can predict, model and manipulate. that’s one point of the document I cited.
2) although people such as the Pashtuns have multiple identities and loyalties, that in itself does not predispose them to accept population-centric nationbuilding. most military occupations by foreigners still historically breed resistance and resentment except for atypical cases with certain conditions (again, Edelstein is the man on this). in fact, as I argued in that little book, insurgents wield traditions and rules and identities flexibly in order to win.
Yes, but most identities, historically, have shifted to incorporate ideas about statehood and nation, in addition to whatever other societal structures are in play.
Insurgents, I agree, ought to have a good handle on traditions, rules and identities – but we needn’t suppose that other indigenous groups have similar knowledge and influence. After all, insurgents don’t always win.
“most identities, historically, have shifted to incorporate ideas about statehood and nation, in addition to whatever other societal structures are in play.”
sure, but mostly not at our convenience or timetable. Ten years in, how’s our project to encourage Afghan loyalty to Kabul going?
“insurgents don’t always win.”
I agree, but they usually lose when they are a despised ethnic minority lacking external support, whom the host population hates more than the occupier! Otherwise, insurgents have a better shot at posing as the true patriots defending local interests than occupiers do. This gives them the edge in the contest for cultural legitimacy.
It’s early days – ask Chou Enlai. How’s it going? Not bad, I’d say, all things considered. Where’s your sense of optimism? :)
the future’s so bright, I’m wearing shades
Just read the Telegraph article. Maj Ed Hill was a student on MA War in the Modern World here at KCL. Very clever and inspiring guy. Take care, Ed.