Alex Strick van Linschoten has some highly interesting thoughts on John Nagl’s recent lecture here at King’s (I wish I could have been there). Alex Strick’s closing paragraph:
Finally, the most worrying of all was his suggestion that, for the future, maybe “the military needs to become more like the State Department, and the State Department need to become more like the military.” One of the biggest problems — in my analysis — that we suffer from in southern Afghanistan is western political establishments’ almost complete reliance on the military to form policy in the absence of their own more creative and useful alternatives. We see this with the United States in particular, but also in the United Kingdom. What we most certainly don’t need, is a further creep of political power into the hands of the military who, we must remember, only come with a limited toolbox and set of resources to respond to different kinds of problems.
But read the entire thing. (credits to Leah Farrall)
{ 8 comments… read them below or add one }
Good post. The theme throughout, it occurs to me, is US pragmatism versus broader idealism. Alex Strick van Linschoten wants a longer, more informed, more modest, less expedient approach to operations in Afghanistan, the US knows it is on borrowed time and is looking for a way to justify its eventual withdrawal; Strick van Linschoten looks at human security issues relating to Afghan friends and acquaintances, US COIN now concerns itself with ‘sufficient’ security, which can denote some sort of progress; Strick van Linschoten wants a proper delineation of responsibilities and authorities between State and DoD, Nagl and others with day-to-day familiarity with these institutions seek to fill capability gaps as best they can until appropriators actually start funding a civilian capacity to go out to and operate in the field, and so on.
None of that delegitimises the post, which is important and in my view largely correct, but the two sides may be talking past each other. One reason for that may be John’s confident and slightly jocular style of delivery which I imagine can irk those who see things differently (then again I wasn’t there).
Does anyone know if the talk was recorded?
Thanks.
I was thinking about the convergence of the military and State Dept a while back. I think Dr. Nagl might be a bit too late–the military is already acting like the State Dept, and State is already acting a lot like the military–just look at the most recent designs of US embassies. You hae the fortress-like embassy in Baghdad, the new US embassy outside London (apparently moved from its prime location in Grovsenor Square to the other side of the Thames), and the US embassy in Germany (decried as a “lump”).
He may have meant that the military should have an understanding closer to a civilian on some matters and that the State Dept. should take over some of the roles that the military is currently in. However, I still have no idea what civilians can really do in a counterinsurgency. If you tell them to go into the field and help plan construction projects they might retort (justifiably) that they’ll get kidnapped or shot if they don’t have soldiers with them. It’s an area that doesn’t seem to get much attention from academia and news reporting.
With respect to Mr. Nagl and others who share his view, I think the notion of blurring even further the lines of expertise and responsibility between DoD and DoS is, while perhaps “logical” at some superficial level in terms of our current fascination with COIN, is fraught with danger in several key ways and at several levels. While I adhere to the Clausewitzian view of matters of state being on a continuum that extends from the “diplomatic” to the martial, it should not follow that because in some types of conflict the gradations between the “clearly” (in the sense of predominance more than discrete and concrete) political/diplomatic and the “clearly” military are such that they require even more ambiguity (and often confusion) between the departments in “conflict management.”
From a US perspective at least, Nagl’s suggestion poses Constitutional problems in that the respective roles of the tripartite federal government are difficult enough to keep in equilibrium (intentionally so due to the prescience of our founders) without further exacerbation of the kind that would follow if things were to go as Nagl suggests. There are also significant systemic and practical difficulties in terms of the respective capabilities (structural, experiential and as to education, training and perhaps most important “disposition”–there are reasons such as personality, “world view” etc.–why some people gravitate toward diplomacy and others to the military) of DoD and DoS and the people involved in each department.
Having been involved in one way or another in “national security” matters as an operator and academic for over 40 years, I have seen such suggestions (and even popular “movements” as these things are wont to become as various inspirational observers such as Nagl, Krulak (Sr. and Jr.), Bill Lind, Bing West, Smedley Butler, Bruce Hoffman, Bruce Gudmundsson et al.) come and go in the field. I think we need to be careful given this dynamic not to become overly focused or fascinated by a particular view at the expense of other considerations such as the history of US use of military force that demonstrates the need for flexibility and capability all along the conflict spectrum (for example, Gulf War I was not something that many of our great thinkers in the 1980s predicted).
I admit a personal bias from my still vivid memory of the Beirut Marine barracks bombing where the “mission” was dictated largely by the DoS as on of “presence.”
@ David Ucko – It seemed as if Nagl was looking at both the short and long term – which would make his suggestion slightly more worrying. He noted that all major actors in the debate over State Dept enlargement agree that growth is necessary. But he placed stress on the need for DoS to build greater ‘deployment’ capacity – something which seemed to go beyond filling a short-term capability gap – though he did not elabourate on the posture (militarised or otherwise) that this deployment might assume.
One of his statements did appear much more focused on ‘sufficient’ security and the short-term perspective. Whilst running through the list of ‘essential services’ provided by effective counter-insurgents – he emphasised the importance of building roads. This seems to be conventional COIN wisdom – though I question the long-term ramifications. Finishing the ring road was probably a net good without being overly intrusive to local populations. The long-term utility of connecting major population centres with local villages – and expanding so on – appears much more contestable.
More roads may be useful for Af govt or NATO-ISAF access – it may give rural populations a chance to more easily bring their goods to market – but how do Afghans feel? What to they think about standing by and permitting greater access to a govt largely viewed as corrupt?
This speaks to a much larger issue of the centralisation of power in Af – another idea that seems to become conventional wisdom. Western institutions are most comfortable replicating structures they are familiar with – such as themselves. They are less willing to consider perspectives other than ‘centralisation first’. The US has thrown itself behind centralisation – and has vested a great deal of time and political capital building and supporting the institutions currently in situ. They have to make the best of a bad situation largely of their own creation – not least the recent elections. They are indeed on borrowed time.
Hi Camino,
Yes the talk was recorded. It was a typical tour de force by Nagl. He managed to answer 17 questions in 48 minutes. I think that must be a new world record!
Theo
@Cincinnatus Jr:
Would DoD taking on some civilian tasks really pose a constitutional challenge? Code of Federal Regulations prescribes a role for the departments of Army and Navy in ‘military government’ until such tasks can be transferred to local or civilian bodies. So it seems to me that this is a historically consistent challenge. But my research into the US constitution is minimal: could I ask, what’s the incompatibility, exactly?
@Dave Clemente: it seems inevitable to me that State would need to become more operational and deployable (but particularly so AID) for DoD to act less like State/AID in theatre. I don’t see how you could have one with the other.
On the roads thing, I take it you’ve read the section of ‘The Accidental Guerrilla’ dealing with the road project in Kunar province. I find the argument quite compelling, though I take your point about state-rural tensions being brought into focus through closer contact.