While the final version of the Capstone Concept was published a couple of weeks ago, the US Army TRADOC (Training & Doctrine Command) public affairs team are publicizing it this week, perhaps so it did not get lost over the holiday period (or because the public affairs team was enjoying the holidays, but I am willing to give them the benefit of the doubt).
As readers will recall, there was a concerted effort from the UK MoD for input to the forthcoming Green Paper here on KOW, as well as a response to the initial feedback. As noted at the time, this was occurring in parallel across the pond on the Small Wars Journal for the Capstone Concept, which is noted in the TRADOC press release and suggests there will be future opportunities to provide input:
The Capstone Concept was the first Army document to be crowd-sourced while in draft form. In September, the document was posted to the Small Wars Journal’s discussion board and participants were welcome to read, comment and contribute to the draft before it was submitted for final approval.
It is worth noting that the star-power behind this doctrine is none other than the nearly-Colonel-(Retired)-rather-than-Brigadier-General HR McMaster, about whom I previously blogged (and much has been written elsewhere). As I suggested on Twitter, this piece of doctrine gives some indication of the US Army’s current thinking on future conflicts. I would argue, however, that one of the more radical statements in the doctrine comes in the first paragraph of the TRADOC Commanding General’s foreward:
Ideas matter. Emerging from specific human, historical, and technological contexts, ideas affect understanding and influence behavior. Ideas can serve as the driving force behind significant institutional change. Because the need for change will always be with us, the exchange of ideas and conceptual development must be among our top priorities. [Emphasis added.]
Despite protestations to the contrary from the editor of Joint Forces Quarterly (second half of the linked post), I would agree with the assertion that the US military – or at least the Army, with which I am most familiar – is institutionally anti-intellectual, so being told that “ideas matter” is a rather unorthodox, bordering on heretical, thing to say. Even more to the point, the implication is that the US Army needs to change.
So often, the Army’s emphasis is on action over reflection, understandable for an organization that gets things done, but with a dangerous corollary. As a personal example, during my cadet years, I was encouraged to idolize Douglas MacArthur’s exhortation that “there is no substitute for victory,” without being taught the context in which he said it (i.e. it was in the letter he wrote to Representative Joseph W. Martin, Jr., which was read aloud on the House floor 5 April 1951, and was the final act of insubordination that led to Truman relieving him of command when he was arguing to expand the Korean War into China and escalate with nuclear weapons). “There is no substitute for victory” is an idea that matters – for its attempted subversion of civilian control of the military, not for the reasons usually given about commitment to the mission, etc. But taking time to understand ideas and their origins requires too much effort and gets in the way of killing people and blowing *&^% up…
On a bureaucratic and process note, I do wonder how long it will be before someone starts comparing the widely circulated draft with the published version to see what did and did not make the final cut (Disclaimer: I have started to do so, but only in regard to the changes I personally proposed to the writing team. So far, my suggestions have had a mixed reception…).
Edits and revisions might suggest something about the relative strength of different “tribes” in the Army and about whose ideas are dominant. What you think war will look like in the future has serious implications for which kit you will need and for which parts of the military should grow (or shrink). Thus, predictions might support or undermine a given branch’s pet projects and seeing who “won” and “lost” in the editing process would be useful indicators. How much does the document support increased funding for rotary aviation, for example? Does the predicted range of conflicts justify a greater emphasis on indirect fires? There are numerous ways to examine the issue, with implications for every specialty in the service.
General Dempsey is right. Ideas do matter. The bigger question is whether those with the power to implement institutional change agree with him – and with Brigadier General McMaster’s ideas.
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Very interesting. Regarding your observation that “Even more to the point, the implication is that the US Army needs to change.” I wonder if this is so surprising. Perhaps you mean it in the specific context of the Capstone publication, but surely when one reviews the myriad pronouncements, initiatives, publications, manuals etc. etc. of the military overall, do these not all suggest a climate of “change?” I liken it to the kaizen/TGM movement of continuous improvement whereby the institution and its constituent parts are (or should be) constantly self-examining, adjusting, experimenting etc.
Perhaps the significance of this in the context of your post is not so much whether the (US) military either generally or within its constituent parts is an institution of “change” but rather is more qualitative in terms of what “kind” of change and by whom is it urged?
With respect (hearfelt), at least to me as an academic dilettante of sorts, I perceive an apparent bias of some posters on KoW (and on other blogs of similar interest) in favor of more academically-sourced or influenced recommendations for “change” than those emanating from within the military institutions from “mere” practitioners of the military art (e.g., those without advanced degrees or perhaps more to the point, even those with such degrees but only from military “schools” rather than “sufficiently reputable” civilian institutions).
“But taking time to understand ideas and their origins requires too much effort and gets in the way of killing people and blowing *&^% up…”
I don’t know which unit(s) the author served in, but I am sorry he was subjected to such attitudes. Luckily, I don’t think most of us were subjected to similar nonsense in any units that we served in. An unintelligent commander or staff officer, or two, in a unit? Sure. An institution of anti-intellectualism? Sounds like he was dealt a bad hand and it scarred him.
What you said.
Ibid.
Cincy Jr., what YOU said.
“Perhaps the significance of this in the context of your post is not so much whether the (US) military either generally or within its constituent parts is an institution of “change” but rather is more qualitative in terms of what “kind” of change and by whom is it urged? ”
Having lived through the Army changing everything from its structure to its doctrine to its training methods, the idea that it is an institution incapable of changing is ludicrous to me. I think the complaints come from people who are not happy with what has changed or how long it took to do it.
I had to smile at your post. In my day (too long ago) in the Marines we had a saying to typify the ever-changing “word”—”Brown [or green depending on the time of year] side out” that was an allusion to the reversible camouflage cloth covers for our steel pot helmets. In fairness to the other posters who raise the issue of “change” in the military, however, I realize they are referring to something a bit more substantial and and broader scope than which color camouflage to wear on a given day.
Cincy, my day was then, too, April and October 1, change the uniforms. I was not going to metion something as prosaic as that. But I watched doctrine change every decade–I was an LT when the 1976 version of FM 100-5 (as it was called then) changed our basic doctrine, and saw it change again in the 80s, the 90s and the 00s. Our divisions have gone from ROAD to DIV86 to AOE (with light and motorized divisions thrown in for good measure) to essentially none. And I have to wonder how many of the complainers are even aware of those gut-wrenching, institution changing evolutions the Army went through in just my career.
As an LT I spent too many evenings walking through the barracks with a locked and loaded 45 looking for drug deals, and checking every bathroom stall twice a night looking for ODs. I think too many people have forgotten–or never learned–what the Army was and how much it has changed itself.
I hear you. Same for the USMC. When I visit a base today and see the apparent quality of the Marines compared to the post Vietnam doldrums of the early 1970s I have to pinch myself to remember it is the same service. On a less “prosaic” level, just a quick scan of all the different school houses, think tanks etc. resident at our major training and doctrine base at Quantico VA screams of change.
Thanks to all four of you, Cincinattus Jr., Schmedlap, SNLII, and libertariansolider, for your thoughts on the post. I’ll respond to a few of your points:
Cincinattus, Jr.: I’m still mulling over your idea about a ‘climate of change’, and I’m pretty cynical. The change-climate is the often parodied idea that we only get new acronyms because someone needs a bullet on an evaluation. Everyone seems to come in convinced that their predecessor was not nearly as good as they are, so we go about reinventing the wheel from the top down.
On your point about a subtle snobbery against ideas coming from within the military vice from those in academia, I would like to think that I don’t care who comes up with a great idea, so long as it’s a great idea. Straddling the proverbial divide between the two, as I currently am, I *do* want to push the military to continue to seek out every possible source of great ideas, because we should not hubristically assume that we are the only ones who should be, ought to be, and are thinking about the problems we face.
Schmedlap: I was going for a bit of hyperbole in my ‘killing people and blowing *&^% up’ remark. At the same time, I have still heard from multiple sources that two years of grad school and three years teaching is a ‘waste of time’ for an officer. What the military rewards is telling about what it values. In comparative terms, am I pleased about the military’s (esp. the US Army’s and USMC’s) willingness to reflect on how badly things were going in Iraq earlier when held up against our British peers? Absolutely. Do I think we could do better? Yes.
libertariansoldier: I am not saying we are incapable of change as an institution, but we are not an institution that inherently embraces efforts to do things better. It is usually more along the lines of being compelled, either by someone at the top with a great idea and the power to make it happen or from the outside by our civilian masters. Lots of things *have* changed, and mostly for the better, but it’s not an easy process.
Keep keeping me honest and forcing me to think through what I’m saying. Thanks.
Just to clarify what I may have not said clearly:
You said:
“I would like to think that I don’t care who comes up with a great idea, so long as it’s a great idea. Straddling the proverbial divide between the two, as I currently am, I *do* want to push the military to continue to seek out every possible source of great ideas, because we should not hubristically assume that we are the only ones who should be, ought to be, and are thinking about the problems we face.”
My point was more that some in academia (I use this broadly to include the various civilian “think tanks” and the like) IMHO tend on occasion to discount (and in some cases denigrate) the uniformed services’ efforts to change (hopefully for the better). This phenomenon is not unique to the military as I also see the same thing in our business and law faculties when they consider their “real world” counterparts’ efforts at managing their own affairs and “changing” as they go.
My other observation is that much depends on what one considers a “great idea” and what criteria are used in such a determination. While it is in rare cases true that some ideas are so “great” that they almost immediately receive wide acceptance whereas most others are “great” to some and something less to others.