Comments on: Strategy Beyond Afghanistan http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2010/01/strategy-beyond-afghanistan/ Wed, 08 Sep 2010 17:16:42 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.0.1 By: Pericles http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2010/01/strategy-beyond-afghanistan/comment-page-1/#comment-4285 Pericles Tue, 02 Feb 2010 12:12:17 +0000 http://kingsofwar.org.uk/?p=3234#comment-4285 What Steve said. I think the perception of OeN that navies give 'power' in the abstract only if they also assume a Mahanite form is completely undermined by the subsequent admissions that (a) such navies have limited utility in many real world scenarios (b) that 'power' is apparently distinct from the fact that you 'don’t even have to be able to use them, though it helps!!' The idea that only the possession of aircraft carriers will sustain and secure Britain's role as a 'great power' is a perfect example of a completely circular and nonsensical strategic argument, since 'power' here is being presented as some abstract thing divorced from what the core interests of the state actually are. Again, it defies common sense and belief that the RN has to be prepared to participate in a big naval war in Asia in the next fifty years-war may come in that part of the world, but Britain isn't going to be a regional 'great power' in that scenario. And even if Britain chose to engage, the despatch of two aircraft carriers with associated support arms ain't going to tip the local balance of power. The RN in a real warfighting context there would in practice be only just big enough to be a catastrophic liability. Fascinating also in OeN's worldview is the associated notion that power projection from sea deep inland will be as unproblematic and attainable in future as it has been against, erm, the Taliban. In short-the types of scenarios justifying expanding expenditure on a Mahanite-style fleet are unrealistic and, even if they were realistic, it is highly unlikely to be a scenario that Britain can (a) afford or (b) enthusiastically commit to. The RN today needs a much more concrete purpose in order to shape a far more rational procurement policy. Urgently. What Steve said. I think the perception of OeN that navies give ‘power’ in the abstract only if they also assume a Mahanite form is completely undermined by the subsequent admissions that (a) such navies have limited utility in many real world scenarios (b) that ‘power’ is apparently distinct from the fact that you ‘don’t even have to be able to use them, though it helps!!’
The idea that only the possession of aircraft carriers will sustain and secure Britain’s role as a ‘great power’ is a perfect example of a completely circular and nonsensical strategic argument, since ‘power’ here is being presented as some abstract thing divorced from what the core interests of the state actually are. Again, it defies common sense and belief that the RN has to be prepared to participate in a big naval war in Asia in the next fifty years-war may come in that part of the world, but Britain isn’t going to be a regional ‘great power’ in that scenario. And even if Britain chose to engage, the despatch of two aircraft carriers with associated support arms ain’t going to tip the local balance of power. The RN in a real warfighting context there would in practice be only just big enough to be a catastrophic liability. Fascinating also in OeN’s worldview is the associated notion that power projection from sea deep inland will be as unproblematic and attainable in future as it has been against, erm, the Taliban. In short-the types of scenarios justifying expanding expenditure on a Mahanite-style fleet are unrealistic and, even if they were realistic, it is highly unlikely to be a scenario that Britain can (a) afford or (b) enthusiastically commit to. The RN today needs a much more concrete purpose in order to shape a far more rational procurement policy. Urgently.

]]> By: Steve http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2010/01/strategy-beyond-afghanistan/comment-page-1/#comment-4277 Steve Mon, 01 Feb 2010 20:46:47 +0000 http://kingsofwar.org.uk/?p=3234#comment-4277 OeN - I don't buy it. Justifications as abstract as this are the RN's entire problem. You fail to define 'power' in the differing senses that any of your 10 named countries might see it, and provide no evidence beyond the theoretical of how a navy contributes to it. You misunderstand 'commercial interests' in the UK and throw terms such as 'global trading systems' around with little thought as to what they actually might mean or consist of. Further you dismiss actual utility (for example - counter piracy) as 'neither here nor there' in one paragraph but later (Straits of Malacca or Afghanistan aircraft) cite such actual utility as being important. There is also a reason that Mahanian-style definitions of navies as 'power-political' tools are missing. And that's because a. it's not 1660 any more and b. it's a very expensive way to lead yourself into gross and unnecessary international tensions. OeN – I don’t buy it. Justifications as abstract as this are the RN’s entire problem.
You fail to define ‘power’ in the differing senses that any of your 10 named countries might see it, and provide no evidence beyond the theoretical of how a navy contributes to it.
You misunderstand ‘commercial interests’ in the UK and throw terms such as ‘global trading systems’ around with little thought as to what they actually might mean or consist of.
Further you dismiss actual utility (for example – counter piracy) as ‘neither here nor there’ in one paragraph but later (Straits of Malacca or Afghanistan aircraft) cite such actual utility as being important.
There is also a reason that Mahanian-style definitions of navies as ‘power-political’ tools are missing. And that’s because a. it’s not 1660 any more and b. it’s a very expensive way to lead yourself into gross and unnecessary international tensions.

]]> By: One-eyed navalist http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2010/01/strategy-beyond-afghanistan/comment-page-1/#comment-4267 One-eyed navalist Mon, 01 Feb 2010 16:49:20 +0000 http://kingsofwar.org.uk/?p=3234#comment-4267 I'm afraid I found the comments on this article rather missed the point of what the author was trying to say. I'd like to try engage with those comments and add some of my own views, broadly put. UK national interests rarely reside in rescuing or intervening in failed states as the Afghan conflict should consistently remind us (our national interests there are only really served by playing a role in the NATO alliance IF that is indeed in our national interest, but let's take that as given). Our national interests lie in being powerful and playing at the top table as this allows us to protect our geo-strategic possessions/commercial interests etc. This will not be achieved by denuding all other defence capabilites for the sake of a COIN-focussed army capable, or rather incapable, or winning unrewarding conflicts in failed states. It is only by playing a role as a nation state, powerful and able to play in the big league, that our armed forces serve any purpose. We won't achieve that by downsizing the Navy - the maritime field is the one where the UK can add real value by itself or as an alliance partner. We might think instead about denuding (if we need to denude anything) the Army - all those soldiers are very pricey, as are their pensions. Kit is cheap by comparison, and is much more valuable in terms of great power relationships, which is where the true issues of 'defence' really lie (the term is misleading - we don't defend, we project power, but who's got a Ministry of Power Projection?). Why not reduce the size of the Army and RAF and commit to a maritime strategy where the Army finally admits its role as an oversized Marine corps? That'd save some cash - the Army has as bigger budget after all and isn't it that which is unaffordable? Failure or inability to stop piracy is neither here nor there - policemen don't stop all crime yet we have them. But more importantly, this activity is an ancillary, not a core role. Navies have always spent more of their time NOT being used than being used, and much of their use is not concerned with other navies at all. That doesn't mean they serve no function! The RN was virtually unused between 1815 and 1914 in the sense of engaging other navies but it served a vital purpose in furthering Britain's interests. While we live in a different world, some of the circumstances still apply. The Navy didn't stop piracy in the c19, but it helped create the systemic stability which eventually reduced it and brought the benefits of globalised trade. I'm afraid you and others have become too focussed on the events and activity and apparent contemporary format of warfighting, terrorism and so on and forget that defence is concerned more broadly with power and that much of the focus of defence is not upon fighting wars at all. I always point out the instructive example of nuclear weapons - we don't use them but yet we maintain them. And putting them at sea is the cheapest and most effective way of doing so. The criticism of the RN for trying to justify its ambitions in somewhat spurious terms are perhaps fair, but that reflects the contemporary 'discourse' in which armed forces have to appear to have 'utility' and engage with the apparent issues of the day. This fails to observe a wider, subtler sphere of foreign policy concerned with power. I'm not sure the RN is able to ennunciate its real rationale in sufficiently explicit terms for the commentors - but I don't think that's necessarily a fault of its own. And talking of maps, why is Afghanistan any more significant to us than the Straits of Malacca on your terms? All have a certain strategic importance and in rational terms, we're actually more likely to want to ensure that part of the world is stable than Afghanistan is. I for one am not terribly worried about terrorism, especially if a major threat to the security of the world's trading system were to emerge. That really would worry me!! Even if such a threat doesn't emerge, however, it doesn't negate the need for a powerful navy, because a powerful navy means a powerful UK. It is precisely the LACK of a sufficiently Mahan-style definition of navies as a power-political tool which is missing. Why do China, Russia, France, India, Italy, the USA, South Korea, Brazil - even Thailand! - aspire to a powerful navy based around aircraft carriers? To advance and protect their national interests, power and prestige. You don't even have to be able to use them, though it helps!! On a practical level, we're not preparing for Midway or Trafalgar - CVF is designed for power projection not engaging other ships - get some basic concepts right please. Where does much US airpower in Afghan come from? Aircraft carriers in the Gulf, and Afghan is a pretty unusual case in global terms (most population is near the sea, and anything that really matters as well!). You also seem to overlook the maritime contribution to recent conflicts but that's standard form. I'm not sure we should tie ourselves too closely to things like a codified, fomulated 'national strategy' and so on. They limit flexibility and assume knowledge and tend to channel thinking in predictable and unhelpful directions. Better to follow the old British 'school' of pragmatism and traditionalism in foreign and defence policy - avoid too many fixed prognostications and assumptions about what the future might hold. I’m afraid I found the comments on this article rather missed the point of what the author was trying to say. I’d like to try engage with those comments and add some of my own views, broadly put.
UK national interests rarely reside in rescuing or intervening in failed states as the Afghan conflict should consistently remind us (our national interests there are only really served by playing a role in the NATO alliance IF that is indeed in our national interest, but let’s take that as given). Our national interests lie in being powerful and playing at the top table as this allows us to protect our geo-strategic possessions/commercial interests etc. This will not be achieved by denuding all other defence capabilites for the sake of a COIN-focussed army capable, or rather incapable, or winning unrewarding conflicts in failed states. It is only by playing a role as a nation state, powerful and able to play in the big league, that our armed forces serve any purpose. We won’t achieve that by downsizing the Navy – the maritime field is the one where the UK can add real value by itself or as an alliance partner.
We might think instead about denuding (if we need to denude anything) the Army – all those soldiers are very pricey, as are their pensions. Kit is cheap by comparison, and is much more valuable in terms of great power relationships, which is where the true issues of ‘defence’ really lie (the term is misleading – we don’t defend, we project power, but who’s got a Ministry of Power Projection?). Why not reduce the size of the Army and RAF and commit to a maritime strategy where the Army finally admits its role as an oversized Marine corps? That’d save some cash – the Army has as bigger budget after all and isn’t it that which is unaffordable?
Failure or inability to stop piracy is neither here nor there – policemen don’t stop all crime yet we have them. But more importantly, this activity is an ancillary, not a core role. Navies have always spent more of their time NOT being used than being used, and much of their use is not concerned with other navies at all. That doesn’t mean they serve no function! The RN was virtually unused between 1815 and 1914 in the sense of engaging other navies but it served a vital purpose in furthering Britain’s interests. While we live in a different world, some of the circumstances still apply. The Navy didn’t stop piracy in the c19, but it helped create the systemic stability which eventually reduced it and brought the benefits of globalised trade.
I’m afraid you and others have become too focussed on the events and activity and apparent contemporary format of warfighting, terrorism and so on and forget that defence is concerned more broadly with power and that much of the focus of defence is not upon fighting wars at all. I always point out the instructive example of nuclear weapons – we don’t use them but yet we maintain them. And putting them at sea is the cheapest and most effective way of doing so.
The criticism of the RN for trying to justify its ambitions in somewhat spurious terms are perhaps fair, but that reflects the contemporary ‘discourse’ in which armed forces have to appear to have ‘utility’ and engage with the apparent issues of the day. This fails to observe a wider, subtler sphere of foreign policy concerned with power. I’m not sure the RN is able to ennunciate its real rationale in sufficiently explicit terms for the commentors – but I don’t think that’s necessarily a fault of its own. And talking of maps, why is Afghanistan any more significant to us than the Straits of Malacca on your terms? All have a certain strategic importance and in rational terms, we’re actually more likely to want to ensure that part of the world is stable than Afghanistan is. I for one am not terribly worried about terrorism, especially if a major threat to the security of the world’s trading system were to emerge. That really would worry me!! Even if such a threat doesn’t emerge, however, it doesn’t negate the need for a powerful navy, because a powerful navy means a powerful UK.
It is precisely the LACK of a sufficiently Mahan-style definition of navies as a power-political tool which is missing.
Why do China, Russia, France, India, Italy, the USA, South Korea, Brazil – even Thailand! – aspire to a powerful navy based around aircraft carriers? To advance and protect their national interests, power and prestige. You don’t even have to be able to use them, though it helps!! On a practical level, we’re not preparing for Midway or Trafalgar – CVF is designed for power projection not engaging other ships – get some basic concepts right please. Where does much US airpower in Afghan come from? Aircraft carriers in the Gulf, and Afghan is a pretty unusual case in global terms (most population is near the sea, and anything that really matters as well!). You also seem to overlook the maritime contribution to recent conflicts but that’s standard form.
I’m not sure we should tie ourselves too closely to things like a codified, fomulated ‘national strategy’ and so on. They limit flexibility and assume knowledge and tend to channel thinking in predictable and unhelpful directions. Better to follow the old British ‘school’ of pragmatism and traditionalism in foreign and defence policy – avoid too many fixed prognostications and assumptions about what the future might hold.

]]> By: Steve http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2010/01/strategy-beyond-afghanistan/comment-page-1/#comment-4235 Steve Sat, 30 Jan 2010 18:24:30 +0000 http://kingsofwar.org.uk/?p=3234#comment-4235 A map is a poor place to start a strategic security estimate. This is the conceptual mistake the RN always makes as it churns out its various fluff pieces. Geographical distance or disposition does not equate to strategy. A definition of adversaries, a term used, but not expanded here, is a reasonable place to begin. The author also overstates entirely the capability of naval platforms both from a technical and from a legal/political point of view. The manifest failure to counter piracy off the HOA is but one example, impotence in the Persian Gulf another. You won't read about that in the FMOC - in fact there is often very little evidence of capability provided at all. A map is a poor place to start a strategic security estimate. This is the conceptual mistake the RN always makes as it churns out its various fluff pieces. Geographical distance or disposition does not equate to strategy.

A definition of adversaries, a term used, but not expanded here, is a reasonable place to begin.

The author also overstates entirely the capability of naval platforms both from a technical and from a legal/political point of view. The manifest failure to counter piracy off the HOA is but one example, impotence in the Persian Gulf another. You won’t read about that in the FMOC – in fact there is often very little evidence of capability provided at all.

]]> By: The Faceless Bureaucrat http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2010/01/strategy-beyond-afghanistan/comment-page-1/#comment-4228 The Faceless Bureaucrat Fri, 29 Jan 2010 20:01:06 +0000 http://kingsofwar.org.uk/?p=3234#comment-4228 To return to the Parrot metaphor a minute: He's resting... That just might be it. At the moment, ot all Services are pulling equally on the oars of the ship of state. But aside from interservice rivalry and a Mercatilist approach to budgeting does this necessarilyhave to be a bad thing? Priorities should change, and therefore, within limits, should focus and investment. As Pericles rightly points out: horses for courses, not courses for horses. To return to the Parrot metaphor a minute: He’s resting…

That just might be it. At the moment, ot all Services are pulling equally on the oars of the ship of state. But aside from interservice rivalry and a Mercatilist approach to budgeting does this necessarilyhave to be a bad thing? Priorities should change, and therefore, within limits, should focus and investment. As Pericles rightly points out: horses for courses, not courses for horses.

]]> By: Pericles http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2010/01/strategy-beyond-afghanistan/comment-page-1/#comment-4227 Pericles Fri, 29 Jan 2010 19:37:32 +0000 http://kingsofwar.org.uk/?p=3234#comment-4227 I couldn't agree more. My issue is not that the UK doesn't need a navy (it does of course), but that it may, at this particular moment in history, be chaining itself to the wrong maritime tradition. With growing budget constraints, the Royal Navy might actually (gasp) learn something from studying the tradition of other navies than Anglo-Saxon ones. By contrast it's the desire to constantly sit at the top table and prepare for the next Trafalgar/Battle of the Midway that risks crippling it as a usable arm. I couldn’t agree more. My issue is not that the UK doesn’t need a navy (it does of course), but that it may, at this particular moment in history, be chaining itself to the wrong maritime tradition. With growing budget constraints, the Royal Navy might actually (gasp) learn something from studying the tradition of other navies than Anglo-Saxon ones. By contrast it’s the desire to constantly sit at the top table and prepare for the next Trafalgar/Battle of the Midway that risks crippling it as a usable arm.

]]> By: David Betz http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2010/01/strategy-beyond-afghanistan/comment-page-1/#comment-4226 David Betz Fri, 29 Jan 2010 17:48:22 +0000 http://kingsofwar.org.uk/?p=3234#comment-4226 'That parrot is deceased. It has suffered a demise. It is no more. He has bought it, etc…' No no he's not dead, he's, he's restin'! Remarkable bird, the Norwegian Blue, idn'it, ay? Beautiful plumage! We could go on. But it would help too to have an understanding of our own core natural interests which of course would follow on from knowing what sort of country we wanted to be which we don't because the people (i.e., our government, and it must be said, the blokes who wish to be the government next) who might engage the country in such a discussion don't wish to have it for one reason or another. Alas, alack, whatever. ‘That parrot is deceased. It has suffered a demise. It is no more. He has bought it, etc…’

No no he’s not dead, he’s, he’s restin’! Remarkable bird, the Norwegian Blue, idn’it, ay? Beautiful plumage!

We could go on. But it would help too to have an understanding of our own core natural interests which of course would follow on from knowing what sort of country we wanted to be which we don’t because the people (i.e., our government, and it must be said, the blokes who wish to be the government next) who might engage the country in such a discussion don’t wish to have it for one reason or another. Alas, alack, whatever.

]]> By: David Betz http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2010/01/strategy-beyond-afghanistan/comment-page-1/#comment-4225 David Betz Fri, 29 Jan 2010 17:39:37 +0000 http://kingsofwar.org.uk/?p=3234#comment-4225 'Taking these two points together, one comes to the conclusion that what we have here is a shrinking capacity searching desperately for a viable mission. This is not a formula for good strategy.' Well, yeah, I think I might agree with that. But I'd put it differently. Besides a map another basic thing you need when you consider a national strategy is an idea of what sort of country that you are or want to be. We don't have that. I think that is the overriding reason why the defence green paper, such as we know of it, is so intentionally self-limiting. ‘Taking these two points together, one comes to the conclusion that what we have here is a shrinking capacity searching desperately for a viable mission. This is not a formula for good strategy.’

Well, yeah, I think I might agree with that. But I’d put it differently. Besides a map another basic thing you need when you consider a national strategy is an idea of what sort of country that you are or want to be. We don’t have that. I think that is the overriding reason why the defence green paper, such as we know of it, is so intentionally self-limiting.

]]> By: Pericles http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2010/01/strategy-beyond-afghanistan/comment-page-1/#comment-4223 Pericles Fri, 29 Jan 2010 15:52:17 +0000 http://kingsofwar.org.uk/?p=3234#comment-4223 Put another way (stream of consciousness continuing here)-the UK navy is still trapped by a Mahanite/Corbett model. It is however a dead parrot as far as the U.K. is concerned, due to the growing and in the long-term unsustainable gap between doctrine and capability, even supposing a coalition context which would in most scenarios then scarcely reflect the UK's own core natural interests. That parrot is deceased. It has suffered a demise. It is no more. He has bought it, etc... Put another way (stream of consciousness continuing here)-the UK navy is still trapped by a Mahanite/Corbett model. It is however a dead parrot as far as the U.K. is concerned, due to the growing and in the long-term unsustainable gap between doctrine and capability, even supposing a coalition context which would in most scenarios then scarcely reflect the UK’s own core natural interests. That parrot is deceased. It has suffered a demise. It is no more. He has bought it, etc…

]]> By: Pericles http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2010/01/strategy-beyond-afghanistan/comment-page-1/#comment-4222 Pericles Fri, 29 Jan 2010 15:18:37 +0000 http://kingsofwar.org.uk/?p=3234#comment-4222 Two quick ones: (a) 'Conflict prevention' in failed states is not really within the power of a conventional navy; what would the presence of a naval task force add to the situation in Somalia for example, outside of combating piracy? Conflict prevention relies upon functioning opposing states that can function effectively enough as coherently centralized entities to be constrained (as was the situation, ironically, with Iraq pre-2003). (b) Assuming that failed states will not meet this overarching strategic purpose (and notice that we're reverse-engineering here, trying to find a core strategic goal in order to justify maintaining a capability), the only place where 'conflict prevention' by constraining effectively functioning states looks potentially relevant is the Far East-it is by contrast simply neither relevant nor essential in European waters. The U.K. Navy have been using the Malacca straits and other maritime choke points as a strategic rationale for their global footprint for decades-this is scarcely new thinking. However there is a broader problem that it is increasingly less credible that the U.K. will bring much to the party in this part of the world, not unless we want to repeat the Russian experience at Tsushima and go down gloriously to a watery grave fighting over Taiwan-scarcely a core UK strategic interest. Taking these two points together, one comes to the conclusion that what we have here is a shrinking capacity searching desperately for a viable mission. This is not a formula for good strategy. Two quick ones:
(a) ‘Conflict prevention’ in failed states is not really within the power of a conventional navy; what would the presence of a naval task force add to the situation in Somalia for example, outside of combating piracy? Conflict prevention relies upon functioning opposing states that can function effectively enough as coherently centralized entities to be constrained (as was the situation, ironically, with Iraq pre-2003).
(b) Assuming that failed states will not meet this overarching strategic purpose (and notice that we’re reverse-engineering here, trying to find a core strategic goal in order to justify maintaining a capability), the only place where ‘conflict prevention’ by constraining effectively functioning states looks potentially relevant is the Far East-it is by contrast simply neither relevant nor essential in European waters. The U.K. Navy have been using the Malacca straits and other maritime choke points as a strategic rationale for their global footprint for decades-this is scarcely new thinking. However there is a broader problem that it is increasingly less credible that the U.K. will bring much to the party in this part of the world, not unless we want to repeat the Russian experience at Tsushima and go down gloriously to a watery grave fighting over Taiwan-scarcely a core UK strategic interest.

Taking these two points together, one comes to the conclusion that what we have here is a shrinking capacity searching desperately for a viable mission. This is not a formula for good strategy.

]]>