James Bosbonitis, a new PhD student in the War Studies department at King’s submits the following for KOW readers to mull over. I am very much a land-oriented sort of guy. I can get seasick in a canoe if the lake is too choppy; in fact I get a little woozyjust looking at the sea for too long. But I am inclined to agree with James. Surely a reasoned discussion of national security strategy should start with a look at a map which shows one incontrovertible truth about our island: it’s an island. We’re an import/export nation. Most of what we eat comes from somewhere else; much of what we produce is consumed somewhere else. We can afford to get quite a bit else wrong provided that we have a strong navy. With a good pair of suspenders you can perhaps ease off a notch or two on the belt. Personally, I suspect that First Sea Lord Adm. Stanhope and CGS Gen. Richards see things more eye to eye than the press reports suggest. I eagerly await something from the RAF on how vital is its contribution to the nation’s security. After all, which service is providing air defence for the London Olympics? I’m just sayin’…
Anyway, here’s James:
With a general election due in the UK within the next six months and a Strategic Defence Review to follow in the subsequent new Parliament, it is apposite to start thinking about British military strategy in the medium term. It also means thinking beyond Afghanistan and a narrow focus on counter-insurgency. Despite the current malaise gripping the international economy, the development of a globalising economic and multi-polar strategic international system continues; the state remains its principal actor and maritime trade the backbone of the global economy. What does this mean for the UK? As a significant member of the international community with global interests and dependent on international trade, the UK has arguably two fundamental interests; a stable international system and unhindered international maritime trade.
The current campaign in Afghanistan and its goal to prevent that country becoming again a safe-haven for jihadists reflects Britain’s interest in a stable international system. However, the campaign (and operations in Iraq) also holds important lessons for British military strategists. First, an expeditionary and interventionist approach to operations is appropriate so to contain and deal with threats at source, but enduring ‘state-building’ commitments are expensive, narrowly-focused and divert from Britain’s necessarily global outlook (and not too mention unpopular with the electorate). Secondly and appropriate to discussions of ‘exit strategies’ from Afghanistan, an unsuccessful operation (if only by perception) will undermine British (and more broadly Western) credibility and deterrence of potential adversaries thus undermining strategic stability. In determining British strategy post-Afghanistan and cognisant of Britain’s compromised economic position, what options are open to the UK?
The aforementioned importance of strategic stability and international maritime trade suggests a potential strategy emphasising the prevention of conflict. A paper recently released under the auspices of the Royal Navy’s Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff entitled ‘The Maritime Contribution to Defence and Security: Today and Tomorrow’ [[i]] suggests:
A policy advocating conflict prevention which utilises all levers of national power [added emphasis], recognising the role played by conventional military capabilities, should therefore be central to our national efforts to defend the international system and the UK’s place within it.
That is, an approach which links British military strategy with a wider common national strategic objective; this is important as it can tie together the efforts of the MoD, FCO and other government departments. The prevention of conflict could be defined as the basis for a British grand strategy. In military terms, a conflict prevention strategy would be based upon the dissuasion, deterrence and coercion of potential adversaries whilst reassuring and supporting allies. This would require forces that were capable, credible and able to respond to a range of contingencies, i.e. the attributes possessed by, for example, maritime forces (see ‘How Navies Prevent Conflict’). Maritime forces can provide a significant contribution to a preventive strategy due to their mobility, flexibility and versatility inherent to being sea-based; access, basing and over-flight arrangements are not a constraint on maritime forces. Further, sea-basing has a substantially smaller political footprint than a land-based presence on foreign soil. Ships can be forward deployed in a region of interest to provide reassurance to allies, deter potential adversaries and be capable of covering a range of activities from counter-piracy/terrorism through to high-end operations or supporting humanitarian activities; they are multi-role platforms. The centre piece of the future Royal Navy (see Future Maritime Operational Concept’; a task group based around the forthcoming Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers with embarked F-35s and helicopters (and potentially unmanned aircraft), type 45 destroyers and littoral manoeuvre forces, will provide a credible and capable force able to provide a range of responses to a variety of threats. Such a force should deter an adversary, however, if required, it could provide the initial response to a crisis erupting ahead of other air and ground forces deploying. This is the central point; a capable, forward deployed maritime force can help prevent conflict by deterring adversaries with a robust, versatile, adaptable and flexible force package. It is not to argue that one Service can provide a panacea to Britain’s defence requirements. In the upcoming defence review, the individual strengths and weaknesses of each Service need to be considered, and British strategy in the mid-to-long term based on what the three services can collectively contribute to the defence of British interests.
[i] Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (2009), ‘The Maritime Contribution to Defence and Security: Today and Tomorrow’.
{ 10 comments… read them below or add one }
Two quick ones:
(a) ‘Conflict prevention’ in failed states is not really within the power of a conventional navy; what would the presence of a naval task force add to the situation in Somalia for example, outside of combating piracy? Conflict prevention relies upon functioning opposing states that can function effectively enough as coherently centralized entities to be constrained (as was the situation, ironically, with Iraq pre-2003).
(b) Assuming that failed states will not meet this overarching strategic purpose (and notice that we’re reverse-engineering here, trying to find a core strategic goal in order to justify maintaining a capability), the only place where ‘conflict prevention’ by constraining effectively functioning states looks potentially relevant is the Far East-it is by contrast simply neither relevant nor essential in European waters. The U.K. Navy have been using the Malacca straits and other maritime choke points as a strategic rationale for their global footprint for decades-this is scarcely new thinking. However there is a broader problem that it is increasingly less credible that the U.K. will bring much to the party in this part of the world, not unless we want to repeat the Russian experience at Tsushima and go down gloriously to a watery grave fighting over Taiwan-scarcely a core UK strategic interest.
Taking these two points together, one comes to the conclusion that what we have here is a shrinking capacity searching desperately for a viable mission. This is not a formula for good strategy.
‘Taking these two points together, one comes to the conclusion that what we have here is a shrinking capacity searching desperately for a viable mission. This is not a formula for good strategy.’
Well, yeah, I think I might agree with that. But I’d put it differently. Besides a map another basic thing you need when you consider a national strategy is an idea of what sort of country that you are or want to be. We don’t have that. I think that is the overriding reason why the defence green paper, such as we know of it, is so intentionally self-limiting.
Put another way (stream of consciousness continuing here)-the UK navy is still trapped by a Mahanite/Corbett model. It is however a dead parrot as far as the U.K. is concerned, due to the growing and in the long-term unsustainable gap between doctrine and capability, even supposing a coalition context which would in most scenarios then scarcely reflect the UK’s own core natural interests. That parrot is deceased. It has suffered a demise. It is no more. He has bought it, etc…
‘That parrot is deceased. It has suffered a demise. It is no more. He has bought it, etc…’
No no he’s not dead, he’s, he’s restin’! Remarkable bird, the Norwegian Blue, idn’it, ay? Beautiful plumage!
We could go on. But it would help too to have an understanding of our own core natural interests which of course would follow on from knowing what sort of country we wanted to be which we don’t because the people (i.e., our government, and it must be said, the blokes who wish to be the government next) who might engage the country in such a discussion don’t wish to have it for one reason or another. Alas, alack, whatever.
I couldn’t agree more. My issue is not that the UK doesn’t need a navy (it does of course), but that it may, at this particular moment in history, be chaining itself to the wrong maritime tradition. With growing budget constraints, the Royal Navy might actually (gasp) learn something from studying the tradition of other navies than Anglo-Saxon ones. By contrast it’s the desire to constantly sit at the top table and prepare for the next Trafalgar/Battle of the Midway that risks crippling it as a usable arm.
To return to the Parrot metaphor a minute: He’s resting…
That just might be it. At the moment, ot all Services are pulling equally on the oars of the ship of state. But aside from interservice rivalry and a Mercatilist approach to budgeting does this necessarilyhave to be a bad thing? Priorities should change, and therefore, within limits, should focus and investment. As Pericles rightly points out: horses for courses, not courses for horses.
A map is a poor place to start a strategic security estimate. This is the conceptual mistake the RN always makes as it churns out its various fluff pieces. Geographical distance or disposition does not equate to strategy.
A definition of adversaries, a term used, but not expanded here, is a reasonable place to begin.
The author also overstates entirely the capability of naval platforms both from a technical and from a legal/political point of view. The manifest failure to counter piracy off the HOA is but one example, impotence in the Persian Gulf another. You won’t read about that in the FMOC – in fact there is often very little evidence of capability provided at all.
I’m afraid I found the comments on this article rather missed the point of what the author was trying to say. I’d like to try engage with those comments and add some of my own views, broadly put.
UK national interests rarely reside in rescuing or intervening in failed states as the Afghan conflict should consistently remind us (our national interests there are only really served by playing a role in the NATO alliance IF that is indeed in our national interest, but let’s take that as given). Our national interests lie in being powerful and playing at the top table as this allows us to protect our geo-strategic possessions/commercial interests etc. This will not be achieved by denuding all other defence capabilites for the sake of a COIN-focussed army capable, or rather incapable, or winning unrewarding conflicts in failed states. It is only by playing a role as a nation state, powerful and able to play in the big league, that our armed forces serve any purpose. We won’t achieve that by downsizing the Navy – the maritime field is the one where the UK can add real value by itself or as an alliance partner.
We might think instead about denuding (if we need to denude anything) the Army – all those soldiers are very pricey, as are their pensions. Kit is cheap by comparison, and is much more valuable in terms of great power relationships, which is where the true issues of ‘defence’ really lie (the term is misleading – we don’t defend, we project power, but who’s got a Ministry of Power Projection?). Why not reduce the size of the Army and RAF and commit to a maritime strategy where the Army finally admits its role as an oversized Marine corps? That’d save some cash – the Army has as bigger budget after all and isn’t it that which is unaffordable?
Failure or inability to stop piracy is neither here nor there – policemen don’t stop all crime yet we have them. But more importantly, this activity is an ancillary, not a core role. Navies have always spent more of their time NOT being used than being used, and much of their use is not concerned with other navies at all. That doesn’t mean they serve no function! The RN was virtually unused between 1815 and 1914 in the sense of engaging other navies but it served a vital purpose in furthering Britain’s interests. While we live in a different world, some of the circumstances still apply. The Navy didn’t stop piracy in the c19, but it helped create the systemic stability which eventually reduced it and brought the benefits of globalised trade.
I’m afraid you and others have become too focussed on the events and activity and apparent contemporary format of warfighting, terrorism and so on and forget that defence is concerned more broadly with power and that much of the focus of defence is not upon fighting wars at all. I always point out the instructive example of nuclear weapons – we don’t use them but yet we maintain them. And putting them at sea is the cheapest and most effective way of doing so.
The criticism of the RN for trying to justify its ambitions in somewhat spurious terms are perhaps fair, but that reflects the contemporary ‘discourse’ in which armed forces have to appear to have ‘utility’ and engage with the apparent issues of the day. This fails to observe a wider, subtler sphere of foreign policy concerned with power. I’m not sure the RN is able to ennunciate its real rationale in sufficiently explicit terms for the commentors – but I don’t think that’s necessarily a fault of its own. And talking of maps, why is Afghanistan any more significant to us than the Straits of Malacca on your terms? All have a certain strategic importance and in rational terms, we’re actually more likely to want to ensure that part of the world is stable than Afghanistan is. I for one am not terribly worried about terrorism, especially if a major threat to the security of the world’s trading system were to emerge. That really would worry me!! Even if such a threat doesn’t emerge, however, it doesn’t negate the need for a powerful navy, because a powerful navy means a powerful UK.
It is precisely the LACK of a sufficiently Mahan-style definition of navies as a power-political tool which is missing.
Why do China, Russia, France, India, Italy, the USA, South Korea, Brazil – even Thailand! – aspire to a powerful navy based around aircraft carriers? To advance and protect their national interests, power and prestige. You don’t even have to be able to use them, though it helps!! On a practical level, we’re not preparing for Midway or Trafalgar – CVF is designed for power projection not engaging other ships – get some basic concepts right please. Where does much US airpower in Afghan come from? Aircraft carriers in the Gulf, and Afghan is a pretty unusual case in global terms (most population is near the sea, and anything that really matters as well!). You also seem to overlook the maritime contribution to recent conflicts but that’s standard form.
I’m not sure we should tie ourselves too closely to things like a codified, fomulated ‘national strategy’ and so on. They limit flexibility and assume knowledge and tend to channel thinking in predictable and unhelpful directions. Better to follow the old British ‘school’ of pragmatism and traditionalism in foreign and defence policy – avoid too many fixed prognostications and assumptions about what the future might hold.
OeN – I don’t buy it. Justifications as abstract as this are the RN’s entire problem.
You fail to define ‘power’ in the differing senses that any of your 10 named countries might see it, and provide no evidence beyond the theoretical of how a navy contributes to it.
You misunderstand ‘commercial interests’ in the UK and throw terms such as ‘global trading systems’ around with little thought as to what they actually might mean or consist of.
Further you dismiss actual utility (for example – counter piracy) as ‘neither here nor there’ in one paragraph but later (Straits of Malacca or Afghanistan aircraft) cite such actual utility as being important.
There is also a reason that Mahanian-style definitions of navies as ‘power-political’ tools are missing. And that’s because a. it’s not 1660 any more and b. it’s a very expensive way to lead yourself into gross and unnecessary international tensions.
What Steve said. I think the perception of OeN that navies give ‘power’ in the abstract only if they also assume a Mahanite form is completely undermined by the subsequent admissions that (a) such navies have limited utility in many real world scenarios (b) that ‘power’ is apparently distinct from the fact that you ‘don’t even have to be able to use them, though it helps!!’
The idea that only the possession of aircraft carriers will sustain and secure Britain’s role as a ‘great power’ is a perfect example of a completely circular and nonsensical strategic argument, since ‘power’ here is being presented as some abstract thing divorced from what the core interests of the state actually are. Again, it defies common sense and belief that the RN has to be prepared to participate in a big naval war in Asia in the next fifty years-war may come in that part of the world, but Britain isn’t going to be a regional ‘great power’ in that scenario. And even if Britain chose to engage, the despatch of two aircraft carriers with associated support arms ain’t going to tip the local balance of power. The RN in a real warfighting context there would in practice be only just big enough to be a catastrophic liability. Fascinating also in OeN’s worldview is the associated notion that power projection from sea deep inland will be as unproblematic and attainable in future as it has been against, erm, the Taliban. In short-the types of scenarios justifying expanding expenditure on a Mahanite-style fleet are unrealistic and, even if they were realistic, it is highly unlikely to be a scenario that Britain can (a) afford or (b) enthusiastically commit to. The RN today needs a much more concrete purpose in order to shape a far more rational procurement policy. Urgently.