The impressively incompetent “underwear bomber” on Northwest Airlines Flight 253 and the impressively competent suicide attack on the CIA station in Khost province have reignited the debate on jihadism. So does an emboldened al-Qaeda have a new strategy? No. The jihad is cracking. The movement is in its worst shape since perhaps 9/11.
War, in Clausewitz’s eminent theory, was a clash of collective wills, “a continuation of politics by other means.” But jihad in the 21st century has radically changed its shape — so much that al-Qaeda no longer is a collective political actor with one “will.” Yet, as I argue in a new piece in The Wilson Quarterly, the jihad’s new weakness is also its new strength: because of its transformation, Islamist militancy is politically impaired yet fitter to survive its present crisis.
Some, apparently awestruck by the fanatics’ renewed sophistication, think that al-Qaeda “needs to be utterly destroyed.” Others think that providing better health services to Yemenis will cut it. But neither drones nor aid are the right answer, although both can be useful.
Both recent cases are illustrative: Abdulmutallab, the failed Nigerian suicide attacker, apparently was further radicalized in London and equipped in Yemen. Khalil Abu-Mulal al-Balawi, the successful Jordanian martyr — a doctor and online jihadi married to a Turkish journalist — was furious over the Gaza war, brought to Afghanistan by Jordanian and American intelligence services, where he was probably equipped by al-Qaeda operatives. So in one case there is no “Af-Pak” connection; in the other case that link, for all we know, was first created not by the jihadis, but by intelligence services.
Look to Europe to see one future of modern Islamic militancy: the jihadis in London and Paris have better health care than [most] many American citizens — and close to no support by any population, not even European Muslims. And the diaspora is just one of three niches for jihadism.
Even if all optimistic assumptions on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen would survive sustained contact with reality, we would still have to deal with various forms of local and global Islamic militancy, probably permanently.
Fundamental strategic notions and assumptions will have to be reconsidered. The great disappointment is that Washington has not begun this process with the arrival of Obama. And there is precious little coming from Europe so far.
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As usual, an interesting and thought provoking post. Until I can digest your article in the WQ, I will only ask a question in connection with this statement:
“The great disappointment is that Washington has not begun this process with the arrival of Obama.”
Assuming this disappointment is personal as well, what made you believe in the first place that He (or more importantly His handlers, advisors and minions) would really change the status quo ante? ;-)
Well, good point. I admit I, too, occasionally fall prey to reasonable optimism and some hope. I’m adjusting the blend with a grain of cynicism right now.
I know what you mean. Cheers.
Thomas – really great piece – congrats.
Al-Balawi was competent though, wasn’t he? What does that video tell us, if anything much, about the relationship between the global and the local jihad in that part of the world?
Thank you, Ken. Yes, the video. It’s anyone’s guess at this point. I think we just don’t know enough. Why not use him for revenge, if you’re Mehsud? Has Mehsud endorsed a global jihadi agenda by using Balawi and have him say “in the USA and outside it”? Why was no top-AQ leader sitting next to the Jordanian on the video? Academics, I like to believe, can and should have patience before coming up with answers (note to self …).
Quoting from your article in WQ – “In Afghanistan, coalition soldiers see the global-local split replicated as a fissure between what they call “big T” Taliban and “small t” Taliban. The “big T” ideologues fight for more global spiritual or political reasons; the “little t” opportunists fight for power, for money, or just to survive, to hedge their bets.”
I presume you are aware that this is extremely distorted use of the terms talib/taliban there.
Back in the 1980s you often had people fighting, say, in service of a khan who was just looking to protect his own land, just as this can be the case even nowadays, say, around poppy fields. The taliban, however, were the madrasa students who were anything but petty. It is from their ranks that the big T Taliban emerged eventually. So saying that small t taliban are the opportunists is really hijacking the meaning of the word to such a degree where it could become fundamental grievance itself, impeding the very global/local disaggregation that seems to the thing to aim for.
To reference the point above, here is a book that can offer insight for anyone interested: http://tiny.cc/QqPP2
Péter, you make a very good point, I think.
Thomas,
great piece indeed.
Patrick
“Look to Europe to see one future of modern Islamic militancy: the jihadis in London and Paris have better health care than most American citizens”
Not to nitpick on a throw-away line in a blog post, but as an American physician – and as one who has worked with physicians that have practiced in multiple Western countries (UK-Australia-US seems to be a common axis, but Germany-US is not so uncommon) – I have to speak up. Most? I can accept some – that likely seems correct – but most? Beware the heated rhetoric of both right and left on US healthcare and the way it filters abroad. Both sides (and, as a conservative person who is somewhat active in politics, I shamefacedly admit I do this too) overstate the issues routinely.
Sorry for the OT, and to the main points of the post: very nice.
Point well taken. I realize how touchy the health care debate is — so “many” (the 35-and-something million uninsured U.S. citizens count as many, I think) should do the trick.
It’s just a more workmanlike approach, but I think that there might be some newfangled notions that emerge from the Case of the Diaper Bomb, beyond that he was an Arsenal fan (enough said).
In particular, in our effort to boggle ourselves senseless over the incompetence of Nigerian suicide bombers with PETN in their undies we might be missing the more salient danger suggested by Salafi groups previously fairly independent are talking to each other more and sharing operational aid.
Here’s something I posted elsewhere. It’s not particularly original, but rather sort of the consensus of a group of us — IDF and US and British officers, some ambassadors retired and at work, an Africanist or two and even a curiously competent expert I met the other day who studies, of all places, Yemen:
The type of device isn’t exactly new because a suspected al-Shabaab jahosh with the same sort of diaper bomb had been caught earlier. And the rectal bomb used to lightly scuff the mitts of Prince Muhammed in KSA was configured of PETN, too, only that time inserted, uhhhh, a bit north of the diaper.
The reaction is easy to understand because we know that AQAP will get more publicity even with a failed attack in the US (I’m calling it Propaganda without a Deed) than they would with a successful attack against a US target overseas, such as outside our embassy.
Some thoughts I’ve been considering:
1. What the failed attack might show is greater sharing of information, recruitment and weaponry than we previously saw between the various franchises. If it’s true what Yemen says, that Mutallab got the PETN in Lagos, not Yemen, then we’re probably looking at AQIM or a splinter from Boko Haram or a sleeper cell in Nigeria, which isn’t exactly a country or culture conducive to that sort of suicide bombing. Did AQ in NW Pakistan greenlight the operation? As you know, formal and far-enemy AQ has long cultural and familial ties to Yemen, so their links to AQAP are expected. But AQIM?
2. It seems obvious now that Yemen is right and that Mutallab was radicalized while in Togo but recruited in London by agents of AQAP, following an interest he expressed online. This shows far greater reach in the UK than everyone previously assumed.
3. We need to learn more about how Mutallab might resonate within the disaffected populations of Northern Nigeria. Will he be a hero? Or did his suicide bombing violate social norms that disgust the normally tolerant Sunnis? He likely will get out in about 20 years, too, making him young enough to still matter there. How will they receive him?
4. How much did Mutallab’s mother, the second wife of a polygamous father, play in his decision to go to Yemen to learn Arabic? SHe’s of Yemeni descent.
5. Far-enemy AQ in Pakistan long has been pretty racist. Did obtaining the Nigerian change their views of sub-Saharan Africa? Does this suggest something about the ongoing dance they’re doing with al-Shabaab?
6. It’s the unsexy stuff of bureaucracies, but if AQIM is tied to this, are we doing enough to aid the 10 allied nations in OEF-TQ? We give them about $80 million or so annually, and that goes a long way in N Africa, but should we not start looking harder about how we can do more to understand the nature of the threats and better reconcile ourselves to the vast lands of Islam — military aid when necessary, but also a need to better understand these many different complex cultures, empathetically listen to what they’re telling us, and seek to address the causative forces that create the rage in the first place.
Just my two rials.
SNLII
‘the jihadis in London and Paris have better health care than most American citizens’
I hope your knowledge of jihad exceeds your knowledge of health care deliveery. Blue skies! — Dan Ford