Here’s Mark Urban (for overseas readers, one of our finest war reporters)
There are simply too many people mouthing off about Afghanistan who have never been there and have no intention of seeing what the conflict actually looks like on the ground.
Ouch.
Of course, there are plenty of people in Afghanistan who don’t have a clue about what’s going on either, just ask Major General Flynn. But the idea that you have to experience war first hand in order to properly understand it is a commonplace observation, particularly fallacious when it elides personal exposure to danger with an astute understanding of strategy. Clausewitz fell for it too, writing that ‘in the art of war experience counts more than any amount of abstract truths’.
Any amount? And what sort of experience? This can’t be right, otherwise every veteran would be a veritable Napoleon.
John Keegan, longtime instructor at Sandhurst opens his marvelous book The Face of Battle with a confession:
I have never been in a battle, and I grow increasingly convinced that I have very little idea of what a battle can be like.
Another follows immediately:
I [...] have generally avoided making a close tactical analysis of battle, entailing as it would my passing judgment on the behaviour of men under circumstances I have not had to meet, and have concentrated the weight of my teaching on such subjects as strategic theory, [and] national defence policy.
Very sensible, I’d say – and to the point. Tactics isn’t strategy, and the view from a compound in Helmand River Valley is tactical.
Have I been to Afghanistan? No. Am I going? I certainly hope so. Seeing the conflict in the flesh rather than on screen will doubtless add something to my understanding, but would a few weeks in the thick of it give me the answers that research cannot? I’d say not.
Of course, to do that research, I rely in part on the likes of Urban, delivering reliable, informed reporting. For which reason, I am both grateful and full of admiration for war reporters. But their bravery doesn’t disqualify me from having an informed opinion.
What’s your take?
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Generally I agree. One thing which direct experience does add to strategic studies is a better understanding of the means, given the role that moral factors play in determining those means.
On Urban’s wider point about the number of malinformed Afghan experts, he is undoubtedly correct, although hopefully one aspect of a long war is that even malinformed pundits have time to educate themselves.
A rather close-to-the-bone satire on Afghanistan punditry: http://easterncampaign.wordpress.com/2009/12/16/29-tips-for-bad-writing-on-afghanistan/
Ken, you’ve probably got a pretty good idea of where I stand on this sort of thing. Urban’s got a good point, but I have to agree with you. No single set of experiences or learning can claim authority over another, while a variety of each lends maturity to whichever forms of knowledge we choose to profess.
I think it also depends in what one means by “combat experience” and for what purpose it is being relied upon later. I believe it is borne out by experience and reflected in literature (academic and otherwise) that a rifleman has a starkly different view of the “war” in which he has fought from that of a 4* general who commanded all forces in that war. Obviously subsequent study and experience can further expand and shape the actual combat experience but in terms of the combat itself the former is likely to be a very tightly focused perspective that in all likelihood will not afford much strategic or geopolitical insights except perhaps metaphorically. The latter will obviously have more of the “grand” strategy. There are myriad permutations on this reality. Even at the lower end of the chain of command, a rifleman will have a wholly different perspective than a logistics clerk in an air-conditioned warehouse in a rear area. None of this is new.
As for experience of others who are not in the military such as those from media, NGOs, think tanks, universities etc., the extent and “value” of such experience also much depends on the particular context in terms of both the “in country” experience and the purposes for which that experience is drawn upon later. Another important set of variables includes the “background” of the person (social, educational, political, occupational etc.) and the “world view” thereafter, the point being that 2 people can experience very similar things in combat and come away with far different perspectives and feelings about it. As a consequence I think only gross generalizations are possible about such things (e.g., “better understanding of the means, given the role that moral factors play in determining those means” as tomwein 1 puts it) and as John Keegan’s situation demonstrates, combat experience is not a universal litmus test for expertise in military matters or themes.
Carl von C. surely does not mean that simple experience of war turns you into Napoleon. He meant IMHO that formulas like “you need an advantage of x percent in number of infantry to win battles of type x” are meaningless unless passed through the sieve of real command experience and a knowledge of military history. Also, he was writing about what it took to be a good officer rather than a good analyst
He was writing about the relationship between theory and practice; and that between historicism and generalisation. Oh, and that between mechanical and organic conceptions of strategy.
Good officers, he would argue, had jolly well better be good analysts – that’s inherent in the genius of command: analyzing and distilling from complexity and uncertainty.
one thing are the analytical skills you need to be an officer; connected/related but not the same are the skills required to be what we would now call analyst/expert or whatever
One can be either too close or too far from reality. Commentators appear to trade off either, pledging on the one hand that they’ve been somewhere and therefore have a superior view, or, on the other, that people who’ve been are too partial. As usual, the middle point is probably the safest.
One doesn’t have to travel somewhere to understand it but one should recognise and caveat personal biases before commenting one way or the other on an issue. This was the point Urban was probably trying to make. He’s right – faddism rules the day.
I find a lot of the debate on recent wars ridiculous, particularly facile arguments about cultural ignorance among the military. Do we really think everyone could speak German in the early part of the 20th century. People have a stunning propensity to hoover up crap from the media without even bothering trying to find things out for themselves.
True.
Sometimes people can’t see the woods for the trees.
Distance can give a wider perspective. Being in the thick of it can give you a very real, locally accurate view of things, but then you don’t get the whole picture. Ethnological research has always suffered from this.
And people sometimes underestimate the capacity of human imagination and intellect. We don’t always need the experience to understand the experience. Otherise Mark Urban may as well tell us to stop mouthing off about anything that happened before our lifetime. Forget about understanding history.
Even in the field, our information is often secondary and our experiences fleeting. No doubt Mark didn’t fire any weapons, experience a lifetime as a local farmer, or shoot anyone.
But, given the choice between a Kenneth Payne who had never been to Afghanistan, and a Kenneth Payne who had, I would choose the latter over the former for the most accurate analysis of events there. Both Kenneths qualify for having an informed opinion, but one has a significant advantage. Experience undeniably improves understanding, even if inexperience doesn’t disqualify it.
Perhaps the only reliable way to know if Mark Urban is right or wrong, is to go to Afghanistan and see if experience there is vital to mouthing off correctly. But that only goes to make his point, the sly urban fox.
Elides… I learnt a word.
I think this piece is spot on (to use the language of our British allies).
If one is to have an informed opinion, then this suggests that the basis of one’s opinion should be a reasonable understanding of relevant information. The boots-on-the-ground perspective is not particularly relevant to an informed opinion of the strategic issues. Familiarity with the strategic issues is not particularly relevant to the boots-on-the-ground implementation.
An anecdote that (I hope) gives a good example…
In a recent course that I took, we got onto a tangent of some fairly big picture issues regarding Iraq. I was the only person in the class who had a somewhat rosy view of those particular issues. One of my peers, fed up with my position let forth with claims that I perhaps needed to go to Iraq and get a dose of reality. Well, that settled that… almost. As it turns out, I was the only person in the building (let alone the class) who had been to Iraq – and not just once, but thrice. And I was there as an Infantry Officer. And contrary to claims that “officers don’t get their hands dirty” or “never see any action” I got a very close view of the situation, warts and all. Upon sharing this information, I then had to ask, “so how does my boots-on-the-ground perspective help to clarify anything? You said I need to go there. Well I have. Three times. Does this mean now I’m suddenly correct, even though I was apparently wrong 10 seconds ago and my argument is unchanged?”
Obviously, injecting the facts of my deployments did nothing to impact the merit of my argument. It also had absolutely nothing to do with my views on the issues discussed. What I found odd was that my peer could have made a stronger argument by asserting, “maybe you need to spend a little more time on the Joint Staff and you’d have a different view of these big picture issues.” But he didn’t. Instead, he opted for the old, “you haven’t been there.” It is not an argument born of reason. It is a tactic to attack the other person, put them on the defensive, and divert the discussion away from the issue at hand.
“You haven’t been there” is the ultimate lazy retort. What it really means is, “I’m too uninformed to refute your argument” or “I’m too lazy to formulate a rebuttal.” In smaller, less formal discussions, I’ve found that the best response to “you’d have a different view if you’d been there” is to simply reply, “maybe you’re right.” And then let the person eventually discover – perhaps weeks later – that you have been there. It’s also less awkward if you’re not trying to be confrontational. Patience is a virtue. Laziness should be punished.
The logical extension of Urban’s position, while understandable, is a refutation of the scientific process. If he had said “there are too many uninformed people mouthing off about Afghanistan” then I would agree with him completely. I too hope to go to Afghanistan at some point this year, but for me its an opportunity to collect data, test hypotheses and add a specific layer of knowledge that I could not acquire sitting in London. But if I hadn’t already spent a couple of years reading and researching about my subject, that information would be meaningless as its relatively specific.
To return to my first sentence, Urban’s argument is akin to telling a physicist that if they haven’t used the console of a particle accelerator first hand, they have no right to use the data or comment on high energy physics. The other fallacy of such arguments is that we’d need to throw out almost every history book ever written because they didn’t “experience” their subjects.
schmedlap,
well said! of course, your interlocutor might take a different line. ‘Well, the fact that you’ve been there means you’ve ‘gone native’ and have lost objectivity/impartiality.’
once it begins, there is no end to the hollow ‘identity politics’ argument. I am suspicious of folks who do use it, one way or the other, because it is usually the sign that their reasoning is poor, they are running out of good arguments, and have to go ad hominem.
Undoubtedly direct experience can be a great raw material…if it is well analysed. But its probably a better guide to tactical and specific, lower-level questions than grand ones. Do I really have to go to Iran to argue that its overall a bad idea to bomb the country? Would a few fleeting, subjective, random conversations with various locals actually strengthen my ability to grasp the issues? Why do people with experience of Iran themselves disagree about the issues? Christopher Hitchens went to Iran recently and thinks pretty much that a quick regime change war is in order. Does that mean I’m wrong and he’s right?
btw jack, your final point is particularly good. Mark Urban himself has written history books. By his own argument, they lack value and he shouldn’t have bothered.
btw jack, your final point is particularly good. Mark Urban himself has written history books. By his own argument, they lack value and he shouldn’t have bothered.
All this being said (mostly eloquently and with insight), I go back to my point that “experience” is very fact and circumstance specific as to its relative usefulness in informing one’s later perspectives and points of view. Indeed, it can even be quite misleading.
For instance, assuming there is some point or position that is objectively “true” about a particular conflict (I am assuming this solely for my point since it never really exists in the real world–all “truth” beyond the physical (Newton’s laws and the like in terms of predicting the terminal blast effect of a Hellfire missile for example) being ultimately subjective–such as PP’s repeated mantra of the wrongness of “bombing Iran”), one’s experience (actual or perceived) can cause you to take a contrary view in spite of the objective evidence to the contrary. If your experience was in microcosm “different” from the “truth” it is quite possible you will draw the “wrong” conclusion about the larger issue.
Perhaps the take-away point is that “experience” can be useful and helpful in these matters but it is not the sine qua non for validating one’s views. Similarly, those without such experience should not lose sight of the importance of experience (positively or negatively) that sometimes happens as a function of the occasional arrogance of academe (again I use the term broadly) that I have discussed in another thread.
hey jj,
agreed. but on this point:
“…such as PP’s repeated mantra of the wrongness of “bombing Iran”..”
repeated mantra? you are technically right. I have argued that bombing Iran would be a bad move, and have said so twice on this blog, in the three years I posted/commented here.
not sure why you would put bombing Iran in shudder quotes. are you implying that an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities does not count as bombing Iran? Iranians may quibble.
Again we see the inherent (or at least for my feeble attempts at communicating my thoughts-such as they are-accurately). I meant no criticism by my reference but was only alluding to your consistent position vis a vis attacking Iran. As I have indicated on the relevant thread, I agree with this conclusion for possibly different reasons (mine is a mainly pragmatic concern). My quotes merely were to refer to the larger discussion we had on the other thread.
ah, understood. just out of interest, what is the pragmatic concern? because I agree, there are serious practical problems to do with the whole question.
JJH+PP
Are there any good reasons for not attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities that *aren’t* pragmatic? Ones like: Israel doesn’t have enough resources to do enough damage on its own (unless it were to use its own nuclear weapons, gulp), the US wants to avoid complicating matters in the region even more than they already are, an attack now would stabilize a shaky regime, the possibility that an attack on Iran’s facilities might lead to general war in the region etc.
If none of these conditions prevailed what would there be not to like about using force to prevent the current regime in Iran from getting its hands on nuclear weapons?
With regard to the more general debate: I wonder what value (to an analyst/pundit) personal experience in Afghanistan is has if you don’t speak Dari or Pashto.
hey Eamon,
good point – by ‘pragmatic’ I just meant ‘technical’ (misleadingly, I realise) ie. the possibility of even knowing where the facilities are, the inability to shut down the programme, etc. you are absolutely right about the many dangers you identify.
I wouldn’t like the current regime to get them, and though its clearly better for liberal and moderate regimes to have them, any further nuclear proliferation is not likeable. But we have to distinguish what is desirable from what is essential, I suspect.
As I have previously said I have grave doubts as to how effective non-nuclear air strikes would be in stopping the Iranian nuclear weapon program–even assuming the US would have the will to try it. The Iranians have had a decade to distribute and harden the key nodes of the program such that air strikes only, even with the vaunted “bunker busting” technology (of which the Iranians have also been aware for years), will IMHO have limited effect. I believe if the goal is to effectively take the Iranians back to “square one” on its program, a significant operation will be required involving air and ground forces.
Given what I perceive as a lack of domestic and international political will among our current civilian masters, such an extensive operation isa unlikely absent some incredibly stupid move by the Iranians (detonating a nuke in Israel), I just am not sanguine the US will ever do what it will really take. At most, and this is my greater fear since half measures will only exacerbate things in my view, the US might undertake support of Israel in limited air strikes (Israel does not have the kind of capabilities, short of nuclear, that are needed for anything decisive) that will disrupt for a time Iran’s program.
This is the folly I think of having delayed the years the West has in fruitless “negotiations” and sanctions where the Iranians have played the West, as we say in the southern US, “like a fiddle.” They have traded time for talk that has given them the time to prepare for military efforts to stop them.
so we’re stuck with deterrence, Israeli deterrence to be precise
…and US deterrence, over the horizon.
I will not hold my breath however and will ruefully await the likely “train wreck” that looms over that horizon. Regrettably, our post WWII UN system has especially in the last 25 years or so proven largely ineffective at dealing with obstreperous regimes that were willing to call the “world’s” bluff. At least the Israelis have a sufficient obvious threat that causes them to maintain a more realistic world view at least in terms of the grim truth that some enemies will only respond to threatened or real force. Other “Western” states with more abstract threats kid themselves into thinking the human race has somehow generally progressed beyond such things as avarice, greed, sectarian fervor, nationalism and other natural traits that when multiplied into a nation (or sub-national group like AQ) such that the will and capability to use military force is no longer a priority, believing instead that negotiation will always work.
To return to the OP, if I may, I think we are being slightly unfair on Mr. Urban. First, though his point was badly phrased, I think he is more immediately criticizing those who have not studied their material, rather than those who have not been to the country.
And second, there is a lack of original data coming from Afghanistan (see the Flynn article, for example). Traveling to the country does not in itself bring this, but it is tricky to amass such data *without* going there. It is probably a problem inherent in humanities, that it is original analysis, rather than original collection, which is really rewarded.
Well Tom, perhaps. But he said what he said.
Journalists, of course, are not necessarily the best analysers of masses of data – their view is as prone to heuristics and bias as the rest of us, and they operate against fierce time constraints. Today a story on Afghanistan, tomorrow one on Haiti.
Is it tricky to amass data without going there? Sure, if you plan on amassing it yourself. Otherwise, that’s where judgment comes in, and using the large amounts of data that have already been amassed to inform decision-making.
Great post and a tough question. I don’t think there is any universal rule to help one figure out the legitimacy of pundits other than one’s own judgement. I had written on this topic a while ago (sorry for the plug of my own blog, but it seems relevant and too lengthy to take up space on yours….):
http://tachesdhuile.blogspot.com/2009/07/service-does-not-expert-make.html
Plug away – Ink Spots is worth the plug :)
“I am both grateful and full of admiration for war reporters.”
I tend to take a different take on those blow-dried-tele-promoter-reading-Pulitzer-seeking-look-at-me reporters that can’t get the most basic facts correct, from the the hardware they observe to the branch of service they are assigned to.
Moreover, I have no loyalty for those that would sacrifice soldiers lives in pursuit of a story: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HGg_dpGhlf0
(Disturbing).
Yeah, well reporters, like soldiers – and academics too – come in all shapes and sizes.
Meanwhile, for a view from the front with much to recommend it, how about my new fave read, Free Range International: http://freerangeinternational.com/blog/
Of course, everyone is different, but please know that the reporters in the video were the heavy-hitters of the mainstream media and represented the best of their profession. . .and they failed. So, yes, people are different but these journalists were supposed to be the best.
Reporters/journalists can be useful in the deception game, however, and I’m not talking about lying to the media, but letting them draw their own conclusions.
During Gulf War I, the Marines rehearsed amphibious beach assaults and the media dutifully reported on these exercises (“On 1 February, Newsweek magazine carried a feature article on the planned amphibious invasion,” http://www.iwar.org.uk/iwar/resources/iw-course/IW120%20Reading.doc).
Because of their own limited observation capabilities, Saddam took note of the media reports and constructed elaborate beach defenses and prepared to repel an amphibious assault that never was going to happen. This tied down numerous Iraqi divisions.
I have read that some media were angry over being “used” in such a way, and while I understand their frustration, I think the soldiers right to life exceeds the media’s perceived need to know. Now, if the media were more like Ernie Pyle of WWII fame, then I would think differently.
Nice link, by the way, bookmarked.
No television reporter is one of the “best of his profession,” if his profession is war correspondence. You are more than right to be skeptical of their type, but they do not represent the best military reporting by any stretch of the imagination.
C.J. Chivers, for example, does not deserve the very harsh words you used above. He’s a former Marine rifle platoon commander who fought in Desert Storm, and who fairly often writes front-page embedded stories for the NYT as well as very thoughtful posts for the NYT’s “At War” blog about firearms, helmets, etc. And there are others like him — but you will not find them in front of a video camera, for the most part.