2010 will be the year of Iran. The country has a nascent revolt and a nascent nuclear program. Aharon Ze’evi-Farkash, formerly the head of Israel’s Military Intelligence, compared the two issues to two trucks. “Both of them moved up a gear in the past six months, but it is unclear which will reach its destination first.” Last week The New York Times ran an op-ed on the second issue, the Iranian bomb.
Alan Kuperman wrote that “the United States faces a stark choice: military air strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities or acquiescence to Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons.” He then opted for the first. Some reactions to his article were notably mainly for their venom (“silly,” “appalling,” “tendentious,” “mad.”) But the problem is serious, and deserves serious consideration.
The following deliberation rests on two assumptions, that Iran wants a nuclear bomb and that non-military means to stop Iran have failed and will continue to fail. Both assumptions can be questioned, but both are realistic. If these assumptions are set, the only water-proof way to counter the argument for military strikes is to make the point that, yes, we can live with an Iranian bomb. Everybody who categorically argues against the military option implicitly says, Yes, we can.
Then seven questions have to be confronted, in an honest, sober, calm, and nuanced way. They are all counterfactual, but that is the nature of the beast. When considering these questions, pessimistic assumptions are preferable to overly optimistic ones (after all, excessive optimism was tried unsuccessfully in Afghanistan and Iraq already.)
(1) Can Iran be deterred? — Perhaps, yes. The regime is not irrational, of course. But no responsible leader could answer affirmatively and with certainty. Because deterring Iran is much more difficult than deterring the Soviet Union (and even during the Cold War the world, too often, came dangerously close to nuclear armageddon): Iran is politically instable internally; it is in an instable neighborhood; it does not even recognize its most hated enemy, Israel; the regime has a religiously fundamentalist dimension, making it less predictable; deterrence will not be bipolar, making communication and credibility — the cornerstones of deterrence — much more difficult.
(2) Will an atomic bomb up Iran’s support and aggressive use of militant groups? — Likely, yes. If the optimists are right, and Iran would only want the bomb to have “great power” status, not to actually use it, then the country is likely to behave more as such — which means it is more likely to use its terrorists proxies, Hamas and Hezbollah and potentially others, below the nuclear threshold.
(3) Will Iran give the bomb to terrorists? — Probably not. It would be folly in light of the consequences. But then it also cannot be excluded with certainty; after all Iran is already shipping weapons to Islamic terrorist groups abroad.
(4) Will other states want the weapon, too? — Very likely. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and smaller states in the region will predictably find it very hard to stomach that two Islamic countries should be nuclear great powers, Pakistan and Iran, but no Arab country. It might be hard to avoid an Arab bomb, maybe more than one.
(5) Will the risk of use grow? — Again, yes, the more countries have the weapon, the higher the likelihood that it will actually be used some time. And error, temper, misunderstanding, and miscalculation are no strangers to the Middle East. But if a nuclear bomb would be used once, even accidentally, it would not stop there. Retaliation, precisely in the name of deterrence, would be an immediate imperative and near-certain consequence. That raises a hairy question.
(6) What would such punishment imply? — Nuclear retaliation, in the name of deterrence and credibility, would very likely mean dropping at least one nuclear weapon on a target that would cause the necessary level of pain. (This language is nasty, but that’s what deterrence is about, consult Thomas Schelling). This means a city. If optimistic assumptions are wrong, therefore, nuclear retaliation against a major Iranian city might become necessary. This could mean hundreds of thousands of civilian fatalities. A very irritating consequence to consider. Which brings us to the moral dimension.
(7) Is an Iranian bomb morally acceptable? — Perhaps this is the most vexing question. The world has seen worse 65 years ago: not hundreds of thousands dead, but many millions of innocent civilians. I’m referring to the Holocaust. And the Iranian regime, not just the president, repeatedly denied the Shoah. Ahmadinejad even explicitly stated this goal and affirmed his wish to wipe Israel off the map. I’m writing this as a German in Jerusalem: it would be face-losing moral bankruptcy to reward a Holocaust-denying regime that brutally suppresses its own people with a nuclear weapons capability.
Ultimately it is a call of judgment. An Iranian bomb is, for the reasons above, “not acceptable,” as German Chancellor Merkel said in Washington last month.
Any military strike on Iran’s nuclear installations comes with its own costs, risks, and uncertainties, as Patrick Porter pointed out. But there is no option without costs and risks. Therefore the unpleasant yet necessary question is not if, but when, how, and with whom, to act militarily. Easy, we know, it is not. Neither morally, politically, nor militarily. At some point, no more easy choices might be left. (Even if Iran goes nuclear, a new military deterrent posture becomes necessary.)
But let’s end the year on an optimistic note and question the second assumption above; perhaps diplomacy and sanctions can work and Barack Obama might still be able to vindicate his Nobel Peace Prize.
{ 18 comments… read them below or add one }
fine post.
On point 7 about moral acceptability: is it unacceptable for offensive regimes that oppress their own people to obtain nuclear weapons? If so, does that we are morally bound to use force to prevent it?
I hope not. On that basis, we would have launched preventive wars, or at least bombed, Mao’s China, Pakistan, the Soviet Union, and even the apartheid regime of South Africa. Your moral imperative would lead to endless counter-proliferation wars. Is that really a lesser evil?
In this case, there is an added moral problem. Bombing Iran would be a political gift to the regime. By strengthening it with a national emergency, tyranny and the brutal suppression you speak of would be prolonged.
If we attacked Iran, other states looking on would make one, simple calculation: America and its allies don’t attack those who already have the bomb, or who just might have it. Consider the different fate of, say, Saddam Hussein and Kim Jong Il. It would be the most powerful argument yet for going nuclear.
I agree in part but there are several areas that I have to argue against.
On number:
1. This ignores that in China we had a leader who would be considered ‘unstable’ governed by a doctrine that at the time was held in as much loathing at the time as conservative Islamic cleric dominated states are now. In China you had an irrational system that led to the deaths of at least 30 million. I note there was never a war there. Also when you argue that ‘deterrence will not be bipolar’ I have no idea what that even means. If you mean that the rival nation will not have nuclear deterrence we already know that this is not so.
2. On this I agree, at least somewhat. I imagine that events at the national level in those countries will either allow Iran more ability to support them or less, but I find it likely that both Israel and Iran will focus on the use of proxy groups.
3. I’ll agree that Iran would not be likely to give any nuclear weapons to a terrorist group, but I personally see it as so unlikely that it is only worth a basic plan to decide what to do if it does happen.
4. Again I agree in part, but given the high costs and technical difficulties of doing so I can’t see any of the smaller Arab states doing so.
5. No disagreements there.
6. Here I must note that this does not factor in geography. It is much easier for the U.S or Iran to throw nuclear weapons at each other (ignoring what might happen if models are correct) than it is for Iran or Israel to launch attacks. Their close proximity means that radiation and dust knocked up would likely take a huge toll on every nation in the region, Iran and Israel included.
7. Lastly, the argument that Iran would use them on Israel out of ideology. Despite right-wing rhetoric I think it safe to say that Ahmadinejad (and more importantly Khamenei) are more rational than we think. Further, the West did not take meaningful steps to stop Pakistan or Israel from acquiring the weapons. The moral argument only applies if you feel a need to protect Israel.
To sum I hope that Iran will decide to limit itself to nuclear energy and not weapons though that is growing more dim. However, I simply cannot convince myself that air strikes would provide the results that we want.
Even if the answers to all those questions suggested we ought to intervene militarily – and with the exception of point 7, I find them broadly convincing – you do not pay sufficient attention to the pragmatic questions. I don’t have sufficient operational knowledge to judge for myself, but I have certainly read much about the fearsome difficulties faced in knocking out or even seriously impeding the Iranian nuclear program. I’m not inclined towards symbolic but useless gestures; you can have all the “should” in the world, but without the “can” it doesn’t mean much.
I think Tom raises perhaps the real operative point that may make much of the rest of the discussion, as we are wont to say in the law, interesting but moot, m’Lord.
While I am also not in the loop in terms of current relevant intelligence, from the open source information, I think it reasonable to conclude that Iran has taken maximum advantage of the time afforded it during the various iterations of “negotiations” with the “West” to distribute and harden the critical nodes of its C2 in general and its nuclear program in particular. To analogize this situation to that of the Israeli air strike on the Iraqi Tammuz 1/Osirak reactor, is apt only to the extent a nuclear facility of Muslim nation was involved.
Even with the vaunted military technology of the West in terms of “bunker busting bombs” and the like, and given the usual over-reliance on air power where political sensitivities are as acute as they are in the instant case, I am not at all sanguine in the prospects of an effective military action limited solely to air strikes (short of nuclear, which is unrealistic absent some incredibly stupid move by Iran such as actually using a nuclear weapon).
As a result, any military intervention with a reasonable likelihood of success (if those nations contemplating it are honest with themselves) is necessarily going to be a complex affair that is anything but “surgical” in the sense of very limited objectives attacked very quickly and decisively. Thus I wonder whether any “Western” state will have either the political will and the military capabilities needed.
While Israel may have the “will,” it does not have the breadth and depth of military capabilities that are needed and given the current US administration’s demonstrated inability to make such a decision, especially in such an intractable situation as this and its apparent coolness toward Israel, I do not see how the “West” can really do much in terms of military intervention. I fear that if military force is used, it will be indecisive (air strikes alone) such that our last best chance to stop Iran’s nuclear weapon ambitions will be lost.
I meant to add, I think this one of the finest, most intellectually rigorous and engaging blog posts I have read.
From the Iranian perspective, there are a number of errors and false assumptions in this post. The most glaring, of course, is the near ubiquitous false translation (in the West) of Ahmadinejad’s “wipe Israel off the face of the map” comment.
It’s interesting that even in Western academic circles, Iran’s advocacy for a one-state solution to the Palestinian issue, by means of a popular territorial referendum, is nearly always ignored. Moreover, the continuation of apartheid conditions for the territory is regarded as an accepted status quo, and any active resistance simply dismissed as “terrorist”. Why is that?
Iran’s current level of unrest can be equated to that which confronted the United States between the years 1965-72, during its anti-establishment “era”; encompassing the civil rights movement and the anti-war movement. Even the most recent level of street violence in Iran can be compared to that which took place in America’s metropolitan centers, containing largely African-Americans. By this criteria, was the United States politically unstable during this era? The answer, to some degree, can be applied in addressing Iran’s current situation.
Regarding the nuclear issue, the real question is not whether the West can live with an Iranian nuclear weapon. Rather, it is whether the West can live with a nuclear weapon capable Iran. The two conditions are different.
The fact that Iran is singled out where others, such as Brazil and a host of other nations, are not, is simply based on pro-Zionist objectives for the region. Even in this blog post, resistance groups to Zionist hegemony are singled out, in relation to Iran’s potential nuclear capacity, which is a sure sign of bias in addressing this situation.
Correctly identifying the situation in pro-Zionist terms, the real question is will the West continue to enable Zionist regional (nuclear) hegemony, at the expense of Iran’s legally entitled right to the nuclear fuel cycle (an important emerging industry), which brings with it nuclear-capable status.
And will the US and the West continue to try to destabilize Iran through support of separatist and subversive groups within Iran?
From an Iranian perspective, these are the relevant questions for its relationship with the West in 2010.
I note that you refer to it as ‘Zionist’ objectives and the like without exploring the history of the matter. In Iran I could just as easily call it a ‘Persian hegemony’ as the Baluchi, Kurds, and other groups do not have the same economic/political advantages of other parts of the nation. Also, generally if an NGO uses tactics such as bombing civilians they are described as terrorists. It wouldn’t matter if they were pro-democracy, nationalist, or religious, a terrorist is a terrorist.
I won’t lie, if I were a government official in any of these nations I’d be willing to work with any group if it could advance the goals of my nation and didn’t seem likely to spread regional chaos. However, I would be honest about what these people were.
The reason Iran sponsors a one-state solution is not out of sympathy for the Palestinian cause or some fuzzy vision of a harmonious levantine utopia with Jew and Arab living side by side. Rather a one-state solution automatically spells the end of Israel in its present form, i.e. a Jewish state.
BTW ‘Zionist’ is obvious code for ‘Jewish’ – I can’t believe you think you can get away with that kind of rubbish on an academic forum.
“The fact that Iran is singled out where others, such as Brazil and a host of other nations, are not, is simply based on pro-Zionist objectives for the region.”
Pirouz, as it happens I oppose military action against Iran and think that Israel should roll back Zionist expansionism in the West Bank.
But seriously, Brazil is not officially sponsoring Holocaust denial conferences. It is not supporting a paramilitary movement that chants ‘death to Israel’ and makes television dramas based upon the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. The Anti-semitism of the regime is vile and it is real. This is why we are more concerned with the clerics in Tehran than with Lula.
IMHO, the use of “zionist” (pro or con varieties) in the context of Pirouz’s post, and the likely inadvertent and unintended repetition in your rejoinder, carries with it the implicit anti-Semitism intended by those who use the term as code for their true prejudice.
Hey Cincinattus,
You are right that the word can be used as a shady innuendo, but it can also be used quite precisely to identify a political ideology that is closely linked to settlement expansion in Palestinian territories. Indeed, Zionism has played a leading role in these landgrabs. At any rate, that’s what I was driving at.
I assumed so–I just find it so disingenuous when political leaders, professors, pundits and others speak of the issues in the “greater middle east” and use the term in contexts that make it rather clear that they are not using it with the same precision as you. Happy New Year.
I am a little late to this discussion but I still have a couple of thoughts to add to the excellent points already made by others.
According to a Stratfor report today known whistleblower Phillip Giraldi has stated in interviews that the Iranian nuclear programs progress has been exaggerated. That the Iranians are no were near as far along as reported and that the intelligence regarding their progress has been linked to a government who would benefit from the most from the US taking military action;Israel.
A nuclear Iran has the potential to start an arms race in the Gulf. As the Sunni nations will look to have their own bomb as a counter balance to the Persians. With Saudi petro dollars I believe they could easily hire the best minds to build it for them. Or at least out of work Russians.
Another effect of a Persian bomb is driving these same countries into the arms of the west, mainly the US. Who would most likely pressure them not to develop their own nuclear weapons. Instead offering deterrence treaties under its protective umbrella. A situation that would benefit both sides, protection for them and oil/funding for the US.
The West would be greatly hurt by a perceived prejudice against Muslims by our lack of action against N Korea vs. our direct action against Iran. NK is in a key geographic part of the world, is at a xenophobic, isolated, a paranoid unstable country. Ruled by a small man with a messianic complex. Sound familiar? Yet, the West has not bombed him further into the Stone Age. The genie is out of the bottle. More needs to be done to pressure countries not to follow this path and more needs to done to develop counter measures to mitigate long to medium range missiles. The less effective the weapon the less reason ones has to spend the enormous sums of money needed to develop and deploy them.
As to Iran passing on weapons to proxy groups, Iran must know that posession of and use by their proxies will lead to their cities flat, radioactive and thier people dead. No talks just their immeadiate destruction.
To Mr. Pirouz, you describe Israel as a Zionist and hegemonic power. I believe you should reconsider your use of the second word.While leaving the other to the mouth breathing, knuckle dragging blogs.
As to the first word;Israel has been thought to be in procession of nuclear weapons for decades yet she has never threatened to use them on any other country. She has signed peace treaties with any neighbor who will acknowledge her right to exist. She has only gone to war after suffering attacks by groups or countries that kidnap and/or attack her population first. She has offered to recognize Hamas and its authority over the Palestinian territories if they will recognize her right to exist which they declined to do. So please sir refrain from such statements otherwise you marginalize your comments by showing your prejudices.
Best Regards gentlemen.
Be careful not to chafe your skin with all the hand wringing.
The anonymous insult is so manly – don’t you find?
Yes, as well as the implicit idea that instead of wringing our hands over a difficult question like Iran, we should just get to ACTION
I just saw this a little late…
Excellent post and productive discussion (marred by Pirouz) in the comments. I think we can all agree that the question “To attack or not to attack(Iran)?” posits options that seem to both be undesirable, yes? Thomas’ post thoughtfully addresses the risk of attacking Iran, just as Pat thoughtfully addressed the risks of attacking a couple days before.
Great work from KoW
sorry, re-reading this now. Thomas’ post addresses the risk of NOT attacking Iran