As many of you will know the UK MoD is at work now on the preparation of a Green Paper leading up to a full (and overdue) defence review next year. We have been discussing many of the key issues in British strategy here on this blog for two years already. I think it speaks well of the informed and thoughtful KOW readership that the MoD Strategy Unit is now reaching out to this little corner of the defence blogosphere to engage with us on such matters. Below I am posting a note from Vincent Devine, who heads the Strategy Unit, which is intended to kick off a debate here on these pages on issues of mutual concern. I am personally chuffed that we have been asked. More importantly, I welcome the spirit of openness to debate and alternative views which the gesture represents. Across the pond they have been better at this, see The Army Needs Your Help, for instance, and I think they have realized better policy and strategy in the doing. I could quote a bunch of clichés here about ‘sunlight being the best detergent’, or ‘a problem shared is a problem halved’ but, really, it’s self-evident isn’t it? Here in the UK we’ve ground to make up and not a lot of time and resource to waste and so I find this development highly encouraging.
Before I yield the ‘floor’ (as it were) to the Strategy Unit I’d like to affirm that neither I, let alone KOW corporately, are endorsing any of the views which the Strategy Unit may present; indeed, that would defeat the point of the exercise. Reader, be as critical as you like in the comments. I only wish to remind you of the simple founding rules of this blog:
1. Be sensible.
2. Be polite.
Ideally, what we say here will also be constructive. Need I point out that, ultimately, we all have the same aim—the betterment of UK defence and security?
From here down it’s Vincent Devine talking:
I’m grateful to David Betz for letting the UK Ministry of Defence Strategy Unit engage with Kings of War to gather views about the future of the UK’s defence policy.
The Strategy Unit, which I lead, is a small team of military officers, MoD and FCO officials and international exchange officers. We are pulling together the new Defence Green Paper, which will set out some of the key defence issues before a full defence review next year. As we prepare the Green Paper we want to take advantage of the very active academic and think-tank debate on defence issues, and ideally provoke some of this discussion ourselves. We running a series of traditional, real-world seminars and meetings with experts. Via Kings of War we also want to plug into the informed and interested defence blogosphere, hoping to reach a wider and (possibly) fresher audience.
This is, as far as I know, the first time the Ministry of Defence has done this, and it is something of an experiment. Depending on your reactions, we plan to post on several occasions between now and the end of the year. We’d like each time to pose one of the defence policy questions we’re considering, and ask for your views. We won’t plan to respond to each comment as it comes in (though we might chip in if any particularly live discussion kicks off), but will offer a set of reactions and impressions to wrap up the exchanges after about a week. And we want to be able to share with you some of our emerging thinking.
We hope the process will mirror the overall Green Paper approach: it’s about identifying the key questions, rather than trying to answer them now; it firmly places our defence policy within our wider international and security policy; and it’s based on the assumption that we may need to make some tough choices. If you want more background about the Green Paper process, you can find the Defence Secretary’s Parliamentary statement here , and of course some of you may have heard his speech at King’s on this last week.
We have agreed with David some ground rules for our participation in KoW, intended to help keep the debate lively. We are contributing as the MoD Strategy Unit, rather than trying to speak for the Ministry as a whole – we therefore won’t need to have all our contributions chiselled in stone before we submit them. Neither the Strategy Unit nor KoW make any commitment to agree with or support the views of the other – which indeed would undermine the whole point. We (genuinely) want to encourage people to say what they think – the most useful comments will be those which are informed, grounded and focused.
Finally, I’d like to suggest an open question to start the discussion: as we look at setting our future defence policy, what are the greatest problems we need to tackle and – equally important – what are the greatest advantages we can exploit?
There’s been a lot of good writing on this recently, including of course from David himself and Anthony Cormack, and from Theo Farrell, Malcolm Chalmers, Paul Cornish, Andrew Dorman, Hew Strachan and others. They’ve looked both at tactical/operational issues and at the overall strategic picture. Some see the glass half-full, some half-empty. Some focus on the need for success in current operations, others on the state of the whole defence machine. They identify a very broad range of issues: which of these are causes rather than symptoms, and which show grounds for optimism, which pessimism?
I look forward to seeing what you have to say.
Vincent Devine
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Beyond the Afghan war, we have forgottent he principles of post 9-11 tactics to center and target foreign cells from other countries who participate in electronic and real time jihad. The socio-economic impact of terrorism of 9-11 greatly affected Us interests and its western alliles of NATO and ISAF. The recognizable goals of todays intelligence is to identify those theats as they occur, identify leadership, find the cell name, size capcity, and its mission. Thus, by electronic means we have also started electronic filesharing on some of these groups of foreign combattants in many nations and countries. As we slowly unravel the cells, we are finding that these bad actors are continually pushing for weapons proliferation of any kind to continue their organized agendas of jihad globally to enforce raddical Islam, sharia law, etc. Some means of cooperation by news agencies & military forces have aligned with a few educated and dedicate civilians who wish to participate in debunking these criminal organizations. Price Floyd Asst Dir of the DoD will speak in two weeks to identify OPSEC and how this may kill or grow this progeram of cooperation between free nations. I have worked 5 years with various military, civilian, scientists, informants, public, and have found that cooperation can in fact swat these global cells as they attempt to create acts of subversion, sabatoge, dissuasuion, FOIA attemts at our intelligence, attacks on computers, etc. The ongoing threat to our nation here US stateside is just as important as the mission in the UK and elsewhere of our allied nations. We have commited more troops and monpower than in the Vietnam war. Thus, with this knowledge we will be able to continuate a mutual level of trust ion oyur mission to erradicate and stop terrorists plots and disrupt, dissuade, or deter their actions.
Any comments back may be received at @max1mos111 at Twitter
Godspeed!
The UK (and the West at large) has consistently failed to identify the strategic doctrine and ideology if Islamist networks and insurgencies. These foundational definitions and discussions matter and they haven’t materialized.
Strategic communication remains under-resourced and poorly understood throughout the defence establishment.
These are both problems that UK has the capacity to solve, but it might involve making people feel uncomfortable – something the UK has not shown much willingness to do.
The UK and her allies lack a convincing and effective strategic narrative – this one is a bit stickier.
“Finally, I’d like to suggest an open question to start the discussion: as we look at setting our future defence policy, what are the greatest problems we need to tackle and – equally important – what are the greatest advantages we can exploit?”
The greatest problem “we” need to tackle is also our greatest advantage in my opinion: Immense amount of soft power and civil resources lie untapped, with what seems like a communication-gap between civilians and uniforms hindering its implementation. The failure to effectively start meaningful pop-centric goodwill building off the bat back in 2002 seems to illustrate this disconnect between reality and politics, as does the lack of seriousness in building the Karzai-state framework.. So, what is most urgently needed in my opinion is a rapid new structure for making our technological superiority benefit the citizens of Afghanistan. The problem is that it may be too late. The hope lies in that it may not be too late.
P.S: Another question is to what extent CT work should be performed by military forces from the west. Where is the funding of a pan-islamic anti-terror force, with Pakistanis, Indonesians and other islamic soldiers fighting the killers of innocents? The interaction with the umma has been horrific.
Wow, what a challenge and opportunity! I’m sure that my few comments will have a minimum effect upon the debate but could not resist the opening presented by the forum.
Given the apparent priorities of the various UK governments to internal social programs, it appears that they want be a worldwide power, but don’t want to pay for it. Therefore, it appears that all facets of the government (including the Foreign Office and Treasury), not just Defence, needs to be deeply involved in the formulation of this White Paper. I would even be so bold as to suggest that the Parliamentary Defence Committees should be involved. Granted, it makes it much more difficult to come to a consensus agreement with more players and most likely there will increased leaks to the press concerning some particular aspects under discussion. However, once that agreement is actually attained, then everybody has a reason to support the White Paper, as opposed to sitting on the sidelines sniping at whatever government is in power at the moment.
At least in government service (although not in academia) plagiarism is regarded as the most sincere form of flattery. Therefore, reading and extracting what is good from Australia’s recent White Paper (Available at http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/) and France’s White Paper of 2008 (Available at http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/France_English2008.pdf) might be in order and better suited for the United Kingdom rather than say the forthcoming Quadrennial Defense Review from the United States.
I wouldn’t presume to teach somebody in the Strategy Unit the fundamental questions to ask. Those questions at the grand strategic level really don’t vary much country to country, although the answers vary quite a bit. However, due to my statement above about the various governments not wanting to pay for defence, I would include one small question: What can we afford? It will take a bit more thinking to discuss the biggest problems and advantages for the future.
I seem to recall Liam Fox – I think it was he – saying that strategic defence policy could not be established until we had decided on our foreign policy priorities. Given that it is now generally accepted that we can no longer afford an autonomous defence capability, and that all future operations are likely to be conducted within the context of alliances – and our own capabilities will have to be decided in terms of what be can best bring to an alliance – the key foreign policy issue is to decide on the alliances within which framework we will be operating.
Herein lies the unresolved problem. There are those two competing matrices, the US-led coalition, and the Euro-centric coalition (ERRF etc). In doctrinal and objective terms, far from being compatible, these are effectively mutually exclusive – and we cannot afford to take an active part in both. Thus, we are going to have to make a choice … which is not possible in the context of our membership of the EU, when we have treaty obligations, while at the same time we are committed to supporting the US-led effort in Afghanistan. One or the other must go.
One can see, however, the new administration – as did the current one – refusing to make a choice, and even refusing to accept that we have to make a choice, thus continuing the fudge which has dogged current defence planning. The defence problem is insoluble until or unless we make the choice and since we have no intention of making that choice, the problem is insoluble.
One danger of basing strategy on a survey of threats is that you end up with a very broad but unfocused list – much like the current UK National Security Strategy. That list will be predictable: terrorism, proliferation, and then out to more nebulous ‘threats’ like climate change. It’s very hard to develop structures and capabilities to address the uncertainty and risk associated with these threats in a meaningful way without attaching some probabilities and consequences to them – and the margin of error in doing so is huge.
As a hedge against that uncertainty, I’d like to see the Green Paper address the appropriate balance between quantity and quality. In many areas we need more – people and platforms – and we can sacrifice some quality to achieve it.
Looking forward to a good debate.
The original questions were: what are the greatest problems we need to tackle and – equally important – what are the greatest advantages we can exploit?
I shall try to respond to the first only now.
Retention of public support is vital and yes the public do get bored (Ulster), bewidlered (Bosnia), many think Iraq was based on lies and Afghanistan is wrong. Maybe the UK public trusted HMG during the ‘Cold War’ and in a few other examples, but that is now history.
Defence does not stand alone or in a “silo”. Foriegn policy too is no longer, if it ever was, just a matter for Whitehall-Westminster to decide. The pressure for considering climate change did start within, it came from outside and became a political issue – especially with the young.
Explain to the public and interested elites why the ‘special relationship’ with the USA is necessary today, not in the often cited examples of the Falklands War or the ‘Cold War’. Let alone tomorrow and into the future. Nor do we want to become known as the “America’s Ghurkha”. Incidentally Western Europe needs the alliance too, in NATO; out of area expeditions in Afghanistan notably I suspect lack public support.
Treat our armed services better and I have sympathy with the criticism that the civilian staff can be better treated. Why was the MoD Main Building renovated before service accomodation?
That’ll do.
What are the greatest problems we need to tackle and – equally important – what are the greatest advantages we can exploit?
The greatest problems we need to tackle are the ones that fly under our radar, lie outside the box, blind-side us… They are, almost by definition, our blind spots, the things that our cultural assumptions program us to ignore.
Steve Coll was quite explicit about one such blind spot the other day. He said about bin Laden — but his comment extends to jihadists in general:
Quote: “there is this interaction of millenarian, apocalyptic thinking on the one hand — which justifies all violence — and this sort of terrestrial political critique on the other. And what happens when you read his statements in the west is that, well, everyone can understand the political critique, so that gets all the attention — and people’s eyes glaze over at the rest because it’s a little bit hard to digest. But when you read it in full it’s a very, very important aspect of why he’s doing what he’s doing and who he thinks he is.”
Compare this, from Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, *The Age of Sacred Terror*:
Quote: “So much of what was heard from al-Qaeda after the attacks sounded to Americans like gibberish that many chords of the apocalypse were missed.”
We seem to have an almost pathological inability to listen to the religious and specifically apocalyptic content of jihadist sentiment and of the environment in which it thrives. And if our analysts do listen and take note, they may still not feel the power of millenarian ideas that stir deep currents in those who feel them and create strong bonds between those who share them.
Clausewitz observed (and the current draft of the American Army Capstone Project quotes him on this exact point):
Quote: “In war everything is uncertain and variable, intertwined with psychological forces and effects, and the product of a continuous interaction of opposites.”
Those “psychological forces” are our blind spot. We find it enormously difficult to take religious motivations seriously, let alone “end of the world” ideas — which we can always conveniently brush off as no more than and a cartoon figure holding a banner proclaiming “The End is Nigh”.
Specifically, we should take note of Islamic apocalyptic, both Shi’ite and Sunni. As Tim Furnish notes in *Holiest Wars: Islamic Mahdis, their Jihads, and Osama bin Laden*:
Quote: “Muslim messianic movements are to fundamentalist uprisings what nuclear weapons are to conventional ones: triggered by the same detonating agents, but far more powerful in scope and effect.”
We need a sustained dialog between intelligence analysts and those scholars of religion who understand the power of apocalyptic thinking as a force-multiplier — in regard to AQ, but also (and differently) Iran, and even Iraq.
It is precisely because this strand is so easily missed or dismissed that we need to pay such close attention to it.
I am a little offended by Charles Cameron’s view, but…I think I’ll explain my own personal view. Ignore it if you want.
“What are the greatest problems we need to tackle and – equally important – what are the greatest advantages we can exploit?”
The greatest problem that needs to be tackled is the inability to treat our enemies as legit combatants, to be hated, to be feared, to be killed even, but…also to talk to and deal with.
We have a feeling of right and wrong, good and evil. Just talking and dealing with “the enemy” is seen as a betrayal, seen as leading to problems. The end result is that nations expend lots of resources battling against “the enemy”, when another, more effective solution could be found.
Islamists use legitimate grievances in order to promote their beliefs. They make the argument of war so as to resolve these legitimate grievances. It is impossible to resolve all of these legitimate grievances, and giving in too much may encourage future security problems. But that does not mean that it is okay to engage in needless alienation.
Of course, talking to all enemies would not be productive. For example, talking with Al-Qaeda is a foolhardy proposal. But the UK should explore discussing with the “moderate” Taliban, and trying to find common ground with less radical Islamists, Islamists that do not like the UK at all, but are willing to talk regardless and come to an agreement.
After all, at the end of the day, it is not the ‘silent majority’ that threatens UK Security. It’s the violent minority who has guns.
Altough, I realize that while I have opinions, I’m not exactly good or knowledgeable on military defense, so ignore my opinion.
I do think that the UK shouldn’t engage in needless alienation is because it can then be added onto the list of grievances, and thus could boost the popularity of violence as a solution to solve these grievances. If the UK wants to really stop violence, it should try to resolve these grievances entirely, but this will only worsen UK’s security, as it basically rewards violence.
An addition: Sun Tzu said that the best commander is not one who wins battles, but one who doesn’t have to fight them in the first place. Think about that.
just one idea amongst many:
Britain will be better served if it tries for a more modest, beneficial bilateral relationship with America. Instead of endlessly pursuing a fictitious ‘special’ influence.
Alternatively, if it desires to exert global influence via America, fighting expeditionary wars in wildly unfavourable circumstances will not secure this outcome. If anything, it strains and erodes relations rather than strengthening them.
That, and an abandonment of messianic liberalism untempered by any sense of the limits of power. but that’s for another argument.
Assuming the trends in UK defence policy with regards to spending, deployment rates, equipment deterioration, and so forth continue along the current trajectory for the next 3-5 years, it might be extremely worthwhile to contact your opposite numbers in Holland, Italy and other mid-ranking European military powers to get an idea of where they see the future direction of their armed forces development. No point in reinventing the wheel, though it will necessitate discarding with certain cultural biases in the UK outlook on these matters.
@ Jeff – but we’re not a middle ranking European power. We’re a top ranking European power, and a second tier world one, both economically and in terms of hard power. Isn’t France the better comparison?
@ Patrick – isn’t this is one problem of the MoD designing strategy? Suppose you were interested in getting out of the ‘messianic liberalism’ game (supposing again that we’re in one). Seems to me that that is for the really grand fromages to decide, not the MoD. Absent that decision, you’re going to get more of the same – UK as a force for good, promotion of democracy where possible, dependable ally of the US. And that means expeditionary forces, sustainable for the long term and geared to low-intensity and nation-building tasks.
@ Vincent – do you or the Strategy Unit intend to engage with the readers comments here, or are you in listening mode?
Kenneth,
This is why I prefaced my statement by noting if the current trends continue. And indeed I want to be absolutely clear that I mean a ‘middle ranking European military power’ and not a ‘top ranking European one’. I specifically highlight the word ‘military’ since this is not a discussion about ‘economic’ power. Please note I am being somewhat more generous than Admiral Band since I did not refer to the Belgians, precisely because I think both the Dutch or Italians provide better examples. However, the main takeaway here is that whereas we used to view the UK and France as the top-tier European military powers, at least from a power projection perspective, if current trends continue the UK will fall into a lower tier.
@ Jeff
Which trends though? We outspend the Italians 5:2. Our defence budget has been edging (very slowly) upwards through the decade, theirs has been declining. The Dutch budget’s been going up too, but we still spend more than 5 times as much. As a share of GDP we’re a full point above either. As for what we do with that money, we can demonstrably deploy and sustain (with some operational strain) c. 10k ground troops. We’ve been doing that for more than half a decade. I think we’re in a different league to them, and I don’t see the trend that you do.
But there’s a point here about the relationship between economic constraints and threats. How much money are we prepared to put into the insurance kitty against future contingencies, especially when some are quite nebulous? To what extent will this review, like many previous ones be driven by economics? Should the review be focused more on capabilities than threats?
1. Firstly, I hugely welcome this very innovative step forward by the strategy unit. My experience is MoD is often fearful of innovation and I am really pleased that KOW is being used in this manner.
2. If there was an issue on which I would like to see proper MoD focus it is Strategic Communication and informational effect. The MoD currently plays, in my view, well meaning ‘lip service’ to the issue. TIO, DMC et al are staffed by well meaning intelligent and dedicated Officers – but they are all amateurs in this most important environment. We send out officers as SO1 Influence, SO1 Strat Comm etc. who have no real understanding of the power of informational effect and how to harness it to positive advantage. It takes them 3 months of their 6 month tour to understand the issues and build confidence and competence. The significance and acceptance of informational effect varies from Commander to Commander. We are shortly to issue JDP3-40 which contains a small chapter on Influence and misses the big picture stuff – because it is written by well meaning but ultimately inexperienced people in this important arena. So, where does this relate to strategy?
3. Future strategy must be to place informational effect at the centre of command and for two very good reasons. 1. It directly impacts on operational, tactical and strategic levels … immediately. (See Nik Gowing’s ‘Skyful of lies and Black Swans’ for a thoughtful discussion). 2. Waging ‘information war’ (imperfect I know) is cheaper than bombs, a whole lot more paletable, reduces collateral damage and I believe it can be a whole lot more successful. So, our strategy must be to recognise the issue first and foremost – it cannot continue to exist on the periphery and be personality dependent.
4. Next we must consider how to deal with it and use it to advantage. We must professionalise information across the 3 services. MEdia Ops, IO, PsyOps et al are too important to be the preserve of amateurs.
5. We need to centralise in MOD an organisation that looks after ‘Strategic Communication of which current DMC and TIO are part. It cannot be driven by the day’s cuts or single service PR in the manner DMC are now and it cannot be under-resourced and theatre focussed like TIO are now. It must embrace these of course but rise above them and it must reach across government and it must have a seat on RICU.
6. MoD strategy should be to recognise that Strat Comm can be applied not just in the engage phase but in the prevent and in the recovery phase. Far better to prevent than engage. Far better to properly recover than to have to return to the field of battle. And here lies the argument for MoD to be moving away from a Defence mindset and into a security mindset.
7. The MoD will, I am sure, come to this realisation – because in essence it is a ‘no brainer’ – at some point in the future. But we cant afford to wait – to manage complex future instability the speed of adaption and innovation must increase dramatically and with it a proper research base. Strat Comm works.
8. There are numerous papers out on this issue which I would commend to the Strategy Unit.
Quote, ‘The most useful comments will be those which are informed, grounded and focused. Finally, I’d like to suggest an open question to start the discussion: as we look at setting our future defence policy, what are the greatest problems we need to tackle and – equally important – what are the greatest advantages we can exploit?’
I’m trying to be constructive here. If you pose an informed, grounded and focused question or series of questions, rather than than asking an anonymous crowd to fill in the first two boxes of a cod-analytical SWOT process, then perhaps you’ll get the style of answer you quite rightly deem would be most useful, i.e. an informed, grounded and focused one.
Economics will definitely be driving a good part of this, though there is a bit more to it than that. The point I was trying to make about Holland and Italy is not about defence spending. What I am referring to is defence outputs rather than inputs (even though outputs depend on inputs but let’s leave that to one side for the moment). In other words, what kind of conflicts will the UK be able to engage in based on its capabilities (which in part does relate back to expenditure but not always). On your point about UK defence spending, I would suspect that there will be quite a few cuts on the horizon, but even in terms of relative spending, the French now outpace the UK. You are quite correct that compared to Italy or Holland, the UK still spends far more, and it may be some time before the UK sinks to Italy’s level. I doubt very much it will get anywhere near as low as Holland’s (though I am talking about current levels of capability in both of those cases). However, the measure of military power is not simply a matter of expenditure. For instance, it would seem as though from a planning perspective, the UK can forget about fighting ‘division-level’ wars. This in itself requires a massive sea-change in thinking about the utility of UK armed forces in conventional warfare, and hence warfare more generally. As such, the ‘brigade-plus’ operation will be the limit of UK military power, which means less clout, prestige, and so forth. I highlight here the British Army’s relative capability, since the naval (perhaps some of the naval historians in the dept. would care to comment on this) and air dimensions have fallen to such a degree that I think that case is made already, whereas the Army which is the strongest of Britain’s 3 services is where this argument will be made or broken. Now, assuming we are talking about the brigade-level as the maximum for the British Army’s power projection capability in conventional wars, the question can then be raised about the relative utility of this capability compared to countries such as Italy or Holland. In the conventional case, this defence review may find that the utility is so minimal (and here I would compare it to what it was in March 2003 for instance) that it is not worth the time or effort to maintain it in the event of a future contingency, which is somewhat similar to the Italy or Dutch cases, but not necessarily the French one. One would also suspect that the COIN/LIC advocates within the British Army will be pleased to hear this as deployable brigades will only be useful for the ‘aftermath’ of conventional war-fighting. Again, the 2003 Iraq case study should be explored further in this context, particularly the political implications vis-a-vis the US.
At this point I will go out on a limb to address your final question about capabilities versus threats. To put it bluntly, the capabilities determine the threats. Some obvious clarification is in order. The first point to make is that if military forces are too weak to deal with a threat, then governments will use some other method to deal with them (diplomacy, economics, covert action, working within a coalition/alliance, etc.). Or they may attempt to marginalize the threat in terms of their threat discourse. One only has to think of the many global crises at the moment in which UK military forces could be employed but aren’t because the forces aren’t available. The Congo crisis last year is a good example of this phenomenon and also warrants further study with regards to British decision-making and the considerations of use/non-use of military force. I’m not sure what you are considering ‘threats’ apart from terrorism (based upon reading some of your previous posts), but this is something that should be at the basis of defence thinking. In other words, if the UK does not have the capability to counter a certain threat, then perhaps it makes more sense simply to pass the buck, as countries such as Italy or Holland might. The nature of threat of course also depends upon one’s worldview (compare the threat assessments of the UK government versus Poland, Sweden, or Portugal). In this sense, ‘threat’ is also defined by one’s own identity. One could go on, but hopefully you see where I’m going with this.
This is an enormous field and desirable military numbers and assets must surely wait until we have chewed over immediate problems. The most remarkable phenomenon of the current conflict is the suicide bomber – the Kamikaze and Assassins are not really parallels. It could be a weak point.
The security services should work hard to produce, as nearly as possible, the numbers, ages and gender of all the the bombers since the phenomenon began. These should be published, together with the ages of the low-level commanders who send the bombers out, where that is known. A debate among Moslem scholars should then be contrived to establish whether failed bombers (such as the doctor who died of burns in Glasgow without killing anybody) have so displeased Allah that they were unworthy of success. Equally, some religious tenet that those who recruit and arm the bombers have a religious duty to follow suit could be found. This would discourage many.
Finally, media stories of bombers spending their last hours with prostitutes might cause doubts.
Ken:
“Suppose you were interested in getting out of the ‘messianic liberalism’ game (supposing again that we’re in one).”
We invaded Iraq and Afghanistan with the formal goals of creating liberal democracies, liberating folk and eliminating terrorism. Now we are trying to erdicate narcotics in the poorest nation on earth while committing force to promote ‘good governance’ and free elections.
So if there’s a way that this isn’t messianic liberalism, I’m all ears.
Messianic liberalism? I thought we were stealing oil and gas and waging war on Islam. And trying to establish a permanent military presence in Central Asia in the name of American imperialism. Now I’m confused.
From all at the Strategy Unit a big “Thank you” for a great array of opening comments. We won’t answer all of them (and some others in the Strategy Unit are itching to chip in as well on certain points) but a recurring theme has been asking what the first principles might be for a defence review. Much hinges on the question of, “what are the UK’s aims and ambitions?”
Not surprisingly, few are willing to really commit to paper on what is a very subjective theme. The National Security Strategy sets out the Government’s position. But in our discussions with a very wide array of people on this subject outside of Whitehall, the view is split. About half think that UK should now recognise it is a small nation with declining relative influence, with limited global interests and should play its part on the global stage primarily as part of Europe. The other half stress that the UK is a member of the P5 and G8 and a significant player in Europe, NATO and the EU. We also have the second or third largest Defence Budget in cash terms in the world. So we should not underestimate the UKs role and influence.
What do you think? Are you ‘Little Britains’ or ‘Great Britains’?
More importantly perhaps, is there a middle ground, and if so, how do you express it?
Patrick – it’s the messianic bit that tickled me. I don’t think that in either case the UK got involved in creating democracies in Iraq and Afghanistan for their own sake, but because there was a perceived strategic interest involved too – staying onside with America, or tackling Islamists.
The only purely liberal British intervention of the last decade was SL. For Afg and Iraq, I’m reminded of Blair’s speech in Chicago a decade ago: when deciding of whether to intervene as a good liberal: ‘in the end values and interests merge’ he said. Well, only sometimes. But he added a crucial qualifier before intervention should happen: ‘do we have national interests involved?’ Presumably he meant interests other than promoting our values – i.e. the only sort of interests that seem to count for old-school realists.
That’s why we got here. The question then is whether democratic state-building is the way home.
None of which helps Vincent overmuch.
As you hint to Alex, these are not mutually exclusive. It is possible to act as a part of Europe and yet still be an influential world power. The surest way to lost that influence is to stop acting like a world power with significant global interests. Respect is only given to those who demand it.
(Speaking as an American, it might help if the British establishment didn’t freak out every time Obama doesn’t return a phone call from the PM.)
Two considerations from the current operations 1) for the foreseeable future Britain will not become involved in another openended large scale operation 2) Britain will not be operating unilaterally in any medium or large scale operation (perhaps a peace keeping operation somewhere) but rather through one of the numerous multi lateral organisations NATO, EU, UN etc… Britain’s aims and ambitions can remain global, but not necessarily to the extent of becoming involved in a conflict that requires heavy formations in the desert.
The difference between ‘Little Britain’s’ and ‘Great Britain’s’ is that the latter has the ability to project some form of military force globally to implement whatever strategic agenda and take a lead role in alliance based operations. Rather than trying to achieve operational independence the aim should be to be a lead nation within an alliance framework. This does not mean Britain needs to posses all the military capabilities, it means Britain must have core assets and capabilities. These will have a disproporionate effect during times of crisis or operations and ultimately provide a greater degree of political leverage. The aim should be to able to lead an operation without US support.
Further there is no need to duplicate capabilities that are not crucial components to medium scale multilateral undertakings. We do not for example require air assets for a strategic air campaign or heavy ground forces because these are not needed within this strategic paradigm. That is not to say that Challenger tanks or Tornados are completely useless, but they are not as useful as other assets. Such assets are components of large scale unlimited war and these roles can be taken on by others. There are enough better American or German tanks to go around.
What this in practice means is a shift towards a far more expeditionary military structure. Within future budgetary constraints the future focus should be on core command infrastructures, flexibile and mobile forces. Light air and sea mobile land forces backed by tactical air support and air transport. The logistical chain and heavy follow up forces can be provided by others. As the political direction is towards multilateral action more serious consideration to closer integration with partner nations should be developed. In all fairness this is already happening, but should be pushed more.
Maintaining the fig-leaf of operational independence is doomed to failure at some stage most likely sooner rather than later. As equipment becomes more expensive pooling resources becomes an imperative. NATO maintains its E-3 fleet, why not pooled surveillance aircraft or drones. Beyond Predator/Reaper Britain has no real drone programme in development at a time when such new technology might be able to provide solutions to some of the existing procurement problems. It is no secret that Britain will not be able to afford an airgroup for the carriers, let alone two, so why not make cross decking of foreign resources a permanent fixture? This would allow Britain to remain a lead nation by providing the core asset (carrier deck) while at the same time providing flexibility and interoperability.
The key to such collaboration is not to view it as surrendering capabilities to a multinational setup up, but again by taking the lead Britain can influence the course of developments and by providing a framework into which junior alliance partners can adopt a ‘plug and play’ approach Britain can maintain itself as a leading player.
Strategy Unit,
Original cited by Vincent: ‘The Strategy Unit, which I lead, is a small team of military officers, MoD and FCO officials and international exchange officers’.
Why are international exchange officers involved in such a UK national policy process? I would suspect that they are from the ‘Old Commenwealth’ and the USA.
Puzzled.
‘What are the greatest advantages we can exploit?’
Oddly enough not our military, although I do not disregard them and many envy their professionalism.
The English language enhanced by the BBC World Service, BBC News and TV programmes – the later often make suprising friends in obscure places. Culture and sport – notably cricket and football.
Technological capability – look how many UK citizens work abroad in developing and failing states. Our current economy may weaken this.
Democracy and Freedom. Whilst domestic confidence in UK politicians is weak and currently weaker still I suspect this is not shared abroad. A UK mission to Pakistan found knowledge of how our courts worked impressed even the hostile questioners – at the time of the Manchester CT arrests too.
Multicultural Britain – which continues to attract a variety of admirers and those who want to settle here. For example Somalis from across the EU. The presence of non-white faces on parades, newsreel etc makes this point.
We need to retain and develop public understanding, if not support abroad.
great post MF
I’m wary of getting involved in this debate, because we’ve all been around the same general sets of goalposts more than a few times in the past. But the points others have made about the interlinking of foreign policy, defence policy, and economic strength and interests really are critical. Britain right now has a window of opportunity in which it can make still choices; that window is shrinking rapidly like the trash compactor in Star Wars. This choice is not a false dichotomy between being a EU good egg or a Washington best buddy, but between still being an autonomous state and not being one ( I mean this absolutely seriously, not in a Guardian-reader ‘Bush’s poodle’ kind of way). Essentially, if British foreign policy remains committed to Blairite liberal internationalism, ‘armed statebuilding’ in essence, the logical implication remains endless interventionary expeditionary warfare, on the twin assumptions that defeating the enemy ‘over there’ also prevents the problem ‘coming here’, whilst simultaneously also being the ‘moral’ thing to do. Nothing David Miliband has ever said has convinced me that the current government will change that tune. It’s also been a convenient tune up until now, because it plays into the Atlanticist agenda (no difference between New Labour and Tories on this-see short piece in latest London Review of Books on this), where Europe is ‘useless’, but Britain is ‘indispensable’. There is only one problem with this tune-pursuing it much further will render Britain no longer an autonomous state in the international system, the country can no longer afford it, and public support for it is haemmoraghing daily. Better ‘strat comms’ are not going to solve this problem. Britain can either continue trying to meet the liberal interventionist agenda, with all the associated, increasingly unsustainable cost and procurement implications (if manpower ‘surges’ become the answer in every stabilisation scenario for example, then clearly our capacity is limited; equipment procurement becomes purely of the ‘plug in and play’ type outlined above, creating inbuilt dependency on one major partner), or it can adopt a more modest, coldly ‘realist’ set of foreign policy assumptions. There are plenty of other countries out there which remain liberal democracies (Sweden, Norway, Finland) but take very different approaches over how to participate within the international system than the UK currently does. Making a strategic choice is the only longer term real answer to all the second and third order questions about procurement, force structure, posture etc. Existing strengths and weaknesses are well known about. My own gut instinct is that the existing status quo cannot stand, and change should be made before strategic failure becomes too obvious. But we should also not pretend that this debate can be decided by short-term financial horsetrading between government departments and services-only wider choices in terms of political philosophy and strategic realignment, EITHER more realist OR more internationalist (with the accompanying inevitable increasing subordination due to the sheer costs involved), will address the real dilemmas.
Can I just make a pitch for decent medical/psych support. For Troops, Families and Communities. Before and after. I accept we need to get the wounded in every sense back in the fight. Lets give it some thought ,reasearch and cash.
And during.
As regards some of the points related to Strategic Communication, notably by Maelstrom, my personal view is that Michael Yon’s most recent piece is very important:
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/bullshit-bob.htm
I can’t speak for the nuts and bolts of the termination of Yon’s embed. I certainly would not say that the narrative that has been presented by the MoD is necessarily inaccurate. But it is telling in itself that, were Yon to be correct as to the reasons underpinning the end of his embed, I would not be surprised and nor would a lot of other people I know and work with.
More importantly, the piece illustrates a number of absolutely central points regarding the openness of the American system relative to our own in terms of seeing openness and debate as net positives rather than threats. The recognition of the need to sustain public support has, in too many cases, degenerated into a frantic and sometimes unseemly series of attempts to stamp down on anything that could cause “embarassment”. This will not work in the long run. I recognise that this initiative by the Strategy Unit (thanks, gents – seriously) is a move in a contrary direction to Yon’s critique, obviously, but I do believe that the broader point stands.
I’m aware that this issue is not a first order one as far as SDR and the Green Paper are concerned and that there in many ways the conversation that is taking place needs to encompass a far higher level of analysis. However, I do think that the Yon piece repays close reading as an illustration of a number of the institutional and attidudinal problems we have in this country – problems which, incidentally, are not Afghan/COIN context specific as far as I’m concerned.
Kenny,
messianic does not mean ‘purely altruistic’ or ‘not related to interest’. It means the belief that Britain has a world mission as pivotal power, global hub, force for good, or whatever other vague slogan is used, to spread its values and offering the oppressed peoples of critical regions a political deliverance. It also tends towards the vision of the conflict as a global crusade in rather absolute and stark terms. indeed, the very notion that one’s interests = the universalisation of one’s values is in itself a messianic position, seeking to transform the world rather than compromise and manage its imperfections.
Here’s Tony Blair after 9/11:
‘This mass terrorism is the new evil in our world today…we, the democracies of this world, are going to have to come together to fight it together and eradicate this evil completely.’
hence messianic. not so much a strategy as a theology.
Patty -
Of course it’s about the balance between pragmatism and idealism. A messianic policy would be one excessively marked by idealism. So that’s a judgment call – and since you use the term pejoratively, your judgment is clear. And I agree, Blair in high rhetorical mood certainly smacked of the messiah.
But in amongst all the theology he knew one big thing – stay close to the Americans. That’s pragmatism of a sort, if misguided, and explains 2003 as much as his idealism. Post-Blair, things have become sill more pragmatic: we left Basra for starters, even before things there improved. So I don’t see too much moral crusading or appetite for muscular liberalism. Just a sobering debate about the best way to pick up the pieces in Afghanistan.
But without opening a stale, Kennan-esque can of worms about the role of moralism in foreign policy, I think it’s fair to say that advocacy of one’s (liberal) values is an inseparable part of the national interest.
Michael Yon needs to get over himself. Seriously.
not much moral crusading? we are still trying to turn Afghanistan into a democracy, end the drug trade there and our defence discourse still speaks of ‘ungoverned spaces’ that our army must be prepared to re-order in future expeditionary missions. we may have abandoned Blair’s messianic rhetoric, but the vision lives on. and we are still trying to recover from where it has led us (see your video above).
moralism in foreign policy? sometimes, possibly. but personally, I don’t want to boycott trade with repressive regimes (Saudi Arabia, China) in order to be true to our liberal values. Liberalism is not ultimately compatible with sustainable foreign policy. we have to shake hands with and accommodate all sorts of vile actors in the world in order to pursue our national interests. it was only with the help of highly illiberal forces indeed that we smashed AQ in Iraq, or scattered the Taliban in Afghanistan. Even when we oppose our reactionary enemies, we must hire other reactionaries. I’m happy to acknowledge this and devise policies accordingly. but lets be honest about it.rather than preaching liberalism abroad but consistently practise realpolitik. embrace the anarchy!
Lets not be afraid to use our civilians. Remember Emma Sky talking about how UK Commanders considered her a tree-hugging hippy. We have a wide range of citizens operating worldwide, often in failing/hollowed and developing states. These are our new Political Officers. Similarly the multi-ethnic British population means a wide reservoir of talent, both linguisticly and also in terms of experience. We need to be tapping into the communities and using their knowledge. The FCO, the DFID and the MOD all need to spend more time together and to unify their efforts.
The UK also needs to decide. Is it a junior partner with the US (as the US becomes less and less Anglo-Saxon I think this possibility recedes) or a pre-eminent partner in the EU? The European connection definitely requires another look (not least because politically within the EU, the UK is often at a loss). Again the EU is full of great civilian ‘mentors’. We need to be using that. Lets not be afraid to be international in our recruitment.
Lets consider the problems of the future too. We need to be sending ‘mentors’ to teach and learn with as many countries as possible. We need to be expanding awareness of British culture, opportunities and capabilities. We need to start thinking about the allies and friends of the future, not just the present.
Finally lets consider that these advantages, in action, require us to increase global communication. That must range from holding open days at British Embassies (to everyone, not just politicians and businessmen) to building railways in Afghanistan.
Firstly, hats off to the MoD Strategy Unit for embraching this blog, which is the best defence blog anywhere. Some thoughts:-
MoD and wider Whitehall needs to create a dedicated unit to engage academia more effectively. While engagement with academia does occur (and isn’t openly advertised) there needs to be a culture shift, both within government and academia. Practical steps need to be taken to facilitate this, particularly when it comes to security clearances. Again the Yanks are way ahead of the Brits here (eg. RAND has cleared folk). Some academic disciplines (eg. anthropology) that could significantly and positively help defence are unfortunately paralysed by ethical issues. These people individually want to help but the weight of their professional bodies prevents them from doing so. These bodies need to get over it and need to be convinced through trust building.
Funding relevant academic institutions could also be improved which would provide that much needed expertise in the right areas for the long term. Much of the academic work that’s funded at the present is, frankly, bollocks. Places like SOAS are fabulous but most of their graduates end up sitting in expensive chairs in the Amnesty office. We need a national academy of sciences like the Russians have, whereby military officers and civil servants can acquire expertise in foreign cultures, including obscure languages and relevant analytical skills. MoD and the Foreign Office need the political officers of the colonial era. Also, academia is terrible at providing actual analytical skills that are relevant to the real world – this needs sorted pronto.
Knowledge should be embraced. External expertise is useful but MoD also needs to use its own experts and promote civilian specialists to relevant strategy units; the military move on from their posts relatively quickly and in this day and age we need continuity of expertise for success. (See the wonderful Orbis article by David Betz on this point). The Brits have some of the best analysts anywhere – use them. Another issue is that policymakers are often uninterested in the requisite detail needed to address complex emergencies in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. Yes its difficult but there are people in govt who understand these places.
Machinery of government, particularly cross Whitehall working, needs to be improved. This often works well in theatre but is piss poor at the Whitehall end. Again see the Betz article for the importance of this for success in COIN.
STRATCOMMS – critical to success but don’t be overburdened by it. Too much time appears to be spent by senior military folk rebutting wild claims made in the media. This doesn’t win over public opinion. More effort should go into schools, teaching kids about far flung areas of the world where a British military presence is required for the well being of world security.
Strategic defence programmes are a waste of money and inter-service rivalries pathetic and represent a bygone generation of military officers. Forget tomorrow’s war. Fight today’s.
COINTASTIC, I fully agree with most of your points (the stratcomms one aside), and welcome this dialogue as the first small step along that path.
I hate to venture into bureaucratic politics, because it always frustrates me how much time civil servants spend discussing membership of various committees, rather than the issue at hand. I am, however, worried that the Strategy Unit and this strategy review are owned by the MoD. It seems to me a telling sign that the various arms of Government still arent working together. That leads me to the first of my key recommendations for British strategy, which is that something must be done to get the FCO properly and enthusiastically on board. They have to be made to understand that embassies are not politically important in the internet age, and are principally used for the issuing of passports to drunken Brits on holiday. Instead, they have got to start providing the local (especially linguistic and anthropological) expertise; it is not reasonable to expect the military to do everything. (On a related point, the military has to get better at refusing tasks – see earlier post on the dangers of ‘Cracking on’).
Second, we need to concentrate on Stratcomms.
It is possible to sketch a very rough history of British power in the 1950s of always trying to just hold on to our influence with ever less spending. In the 1950s, conscription went. Over the next half-century, the Navy was steadily hollowed out. Now we are left with the army as the lead arm, manpower being a cheaper option than the big, expensive equipment required for the Navy and RAF. Now, it seems, we have decided that our expeditionary army is also too expensive, and we are seeking to hold onto our power by some other, even cheaper, means. Stratcomms seems to offer that.
This has got to be carefully planned, with reams of local knowledge, and be WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT. Sorry to shout, but the academic world has been saying this for a while now. There are some fantastically valuable ideas in the comments above about leveraging our large immigrant communities in the UK and expatriate communities around the world. I’d add more effective use of the Commonwealth to that. Likewise, the EU, which is a pretty powerful brand in the third world.
Finally, as some others have already mentioned, this is a geopolitical debate of enormous importance, and the politicians *must* provide a more detailed breakdown of their assumptions and decisions if it is to be translated into useful strategy.
Sincerely,
Tom Wein
what are the greatest problems we need to tackle and – equally important – what are the greatest advantages we can exploit?
First, it is important to recognize that the greatest problems Britain faces are not ones which the military is well suited to counter. This is a remarkably peaceful era, and the threats to UK security are small. Environmental issues, energy security, poverty/inequality and consequent social dislocations, etc, pose more significant difficulties for the UK and have a much greater impact on the lives of British people than terrorism, WMD, piracy, instability, failed states, etc. Any strategic review must consider opportunity costs – whatever the value of money spent on defence, is this the best use of money, or could more good be done by spending it elsewhere??
As far as strategic advantages are concerned, the primary strategic advantage the West, including the UK, holds is the example of its economic and political success. This has the power to change others by making them want to adopt these models themselves. It was this, more than anything else, which led to the collapse of communism (the Soviets themselves realised that their model had failed, because they could see the difference). Activity which detracts from this, by for instance alienating others through military adventures, undermines what is our greatest resource.
Because of all this, I would identify as another significant problem our own overestimation of our ability to change others through the use of military power.
Paul
Thanks to the Strategy Unit for inviting comments. There are two possible themes to explore here as I see it, and they’re being skirted around in other comments:
1. What should the British armed forces look like?
2. What might the Defence Review itself look like? This is more of an issue of practical politics and finance
These two are rather inseparable but I’m going to divide them anyway.
To start with 2.
Jeff suggested that someone with a naval perspective would like to weigh in so I’ll take that invitation.
As I see it Jeff’s quite right to suggest that the Defence Review is largely concerned with finance. After all, the purse strings are now being drawn in and there are plenty of arguments flying about regarding scrapping this programme or other. This comes in two forms (i) in terms of the MoD’s relationship with the Treasury and other departments and (ii) in terms of internal relationships within the MoD – let’s call this interservice but remember that it can often be intraservice as well. There’s a strange tendency to talk about the ‘MoD’ or ‘defence policy’ or even ‘British policy’ as if it were formulated in some strange black box with no internal workings.
On (i) there has been some talk of having a security budget but that to me poses the difficult issue of where security ends – energy? Agriculture? Police? All these things can be seen in a security light if you wish. It also conflates the armed forces with ‘security’, something I find extremely problematical and a worldview I’d like to dispute (see below).
A bit of historical context is worth remembering. The ’98 SDR was, I would argue, very favourable to the RN over and above the other services. In many ways, the expeditionary strategy and jointness planks were written from out of the RN’s doctrinal papers and were very much in line with its stance. Thus the RN has the most to lose in terms of a shift away from an expeditionary strategy.
Jeff seemed to be suggesting that the RN had ceased to be a significant player either within the defence agenda or as a world navy. Perhaps that’s a misreading – but I’d strongly disagree. I’d put the RN as second in the world in terms of equipment and activity, despite its lowish personnel numbers. With CVF I think that would be indisputable – mercifully I don’t think any Conservative PM would dare cut a ship named after the reigning monarch. Whilst Jeff seems to be arguing that the Army is the critical component in deciding whether we have a viable overall defence posture I’d contend that it’s very much dependent upon a combination of all three services. He’s perhaps correct that the Army seems to have gained the casting vote, or maybe the upper hand, but I don’t think it’ll want to throw the baby out with the bathwater. Having read some of what the new CGS had to say it’s somewhat ambiguous:
“ If I am half right, those charged with the design and equipping of our armed forces need to do three things. Firstly to decide whether they believe conflicts with dissatisfied and violent non-state actors are here for the long term or are an historical aberration? Secondly do they believe that, despite globalisation and greater mutual inter-dependence, state on state warfare remains something for which they must prepare? And thirdly, but here I think is where some comfort can be drawn, if it is decided that our armed forces need to be capable of succeeding in both, would not the two types of conflict look surprisingly similar in practise, at least to those actually charged with conducting them at the tactical level? If they were, and I believe tendentiously that there is a good case for thinking they might be, it would make the issue of preparing our forces much easier to agree on.”
My personal view is that we’ll see little major substantive change in UK defence policy even given budget cuts and a defence review. Anything other than salami-slicing is going to be politically very difficult even if there appears to be much in the press about cutting big programmes (and some very irresponsible commentators – I won’t name names but I find Max Hastings particularly offensive on this score. Oops!) it’s more likely things will be trimmed, a bit like Trident’s replacement might be, even if that won’t save a penny in the long run. Maybe that’s too sanguine a view but if you look at what happened with Eurofighter then if even the most expensive, over-running and illogical programmes can’t be cut, then what can?
On a more serious note, we can cut this or that programme, but are the incoming government really likely to totally abandon the past decade of defence policy – aimed at expeditionary warfare – now that the UK armed forces are basically configured to and have invested heavily in doing so? Whether they ought to or not – I’d argue not – I don’t see that they really can, bearing in mind the dictum about politics being the art of the possible. Also we must remember that defence isn’t merely a question of strategy of course, because of the question of jobs, infrastructure and so on that support it. With defence exports offering valuable currency and being about the only part of UK industry performing moderately well, I don’t see any politically astute government threatening that.
That said, what there has been remarkably little comment here about the interservice relationship. I see it as dire. Dannatt and Band both missed out on CDS because of their outspoken stances – that’s why we seem to have kept Stirrup in that role much to the RAF’s delight, no doubt. There has been much blood on the carpet over the RAF’s failed bid to bring all of the UK’s fixed wing assets under its control (which irritated the RN which was celebrating 100 years of the FAA at the time – or 100 years of defending its air assets from the grasp of the RAF!). Similarly, you can’t have missed the efforts of certain members/ex-members of the army and their pet hacks to discredit anything which isn’t painted green. Personally I found the efforts of ex-Chiefs of Staff to get the money from Trident a particularly reprehensible spectacle (see also ‘Soldiers against the bomb?’ by Julian Lewis in RUSI Journal Feb 2009).
Clearly, the Army has won the public debate as it can now defend almost anything – particularly that most expensive aspect of its budget, its wage bill – by appeal to popular sentiment, although it looks unlikely to get FRES any time soon. It’s also a shame that the public don’t seem to realise that the other services exist and we should deplore the constant way in which members of other services are lazily referred to as ‘soldiers’ or ‘troops’! Sadly there is also a public assumption that anything that flies must also belong to the RAF. I quote here from the FT: ‘The army also fears the implications for its own long-term future. Britain will hold a strategic defence review after the next election, and its generals are adamant that land operations must not lose out to calls for stronger naval and air power. “The higher our profile going into the review,” one general said recently, “the harder it will be to ignore us.”’… which sums it all up rather nicely in my view. One can see countless examples of this sort of thinking – the Army seems to have failed to learn the lesson that if the services criticise each other they’ll all lose out in the end. If you don’t believe me, review the CVF/F-111 programmes of the ‘60s. It would be better if the armed forces didn’t engage in these type of rivalries because it tends to mean a smaller slice of the pie for defence as a whole rather than a victory for a particular services (which generally isn’t in the interest of the country). Apologies if this is put in rather too strong terms for what is wanted here, but we ought to be clear about what bureaucratic, and particularly service politics are about.
PS I agree with Ryan’s major point. On his other comment – the reason everyone ‘freaked out’ is because it’s a great way to score political points if it looks like Pres Obama isn’t giving you enough attention. General election’s coming up you know!
Going back to the first question I raised, ‘What should British defence policy look like?’. The reason I made this point second not first is because we can’t develop strategy in a political and budgetary vacuum. However, looking at British policy from a perspective of what it ‘should’ be I agree with Colin Gray (RUSI Journal Dec 2008) that ‘A defence review worthy of the name must avoid providing answers only to present day questions, but must aim to minimise regrets for a moving tomorrow about which we are massively ignorant. Domestic terrorism is not of itself capable of wreaking serious damage upon British society. Rather, Britain’s overall military strategy must be dominated by maritime considerations, and the national security policy that the strategy serves has to remain within reach of, though not always in lock-step with, that of the United States.’
However, we were asked for some ‘fresh’ thinking, so here’s mine:
One persistent aspect of the discussion here, and in general, is the focus upon threats. My response to that is that it’s pretty meaningless – we face few threats to speak of apart from some vaguely defined systemic threats and long-range possibilities. We can certainly use this level of uncertainty of future ‘threats’ to develop a defence policy but it’s not a particularly helpful basis for determining what our armed forces might look like. Geoff Till, amongst others, has argued that navies in particular are in the business of upholding and maintaining the world political and economic system from various state and non-state threats and we can draw up some reasonable prospects of what they might look like. On the other hand, it’s quite possible to argue that these are so remote, disparate and unlikely to be responsive to military force that this is not a sufficient basis for a defence policy to be based. Moreover, it ignores the whole basis for the reason we discuss threats – and my belief is because ‘threat’ is the best way of selling defence to a public who are unlikely to shell out their hard-earned taxes on defence otherwise (and would rather waste it on diversity officers and so forth). For instance, it’s very easy to sell a Navy if someone’s likely to sink your trade and cut off your food supplies, or sell an air force if it looks like the French, sorry, Germans might bomb your cities. But how does one ‘sell’ this spending in the absence of threat? Terrorism has proven a useful medium to some extent – look how the security services have benefitted – but I for one agree with Gray that it cannot do any serious damage to the UK and is becoming increasingly less viable as a means of getting budget share. As an argument for having such large forces in Afghanistan and trying to nation-build there counter-terrorism is very dubious, although not as an argument for having a rather smaller force there as Rory Stewart has done.
Instead, we need to ‘zero base’ our armed forces and ask what they really exist for. This can, in my view, be divided into three areas:
i) Actual or probable conflict scenarios.
Naturally, this is the area which gets the most attention and thought directed at it. Clearly at the moment we’ve had endless discussion of the best means to fight counter-insurgencies and less recently, how to conduct humanitarian operations. The debate seems to revolve over whether we should equip our armed forces largely for COIN/LICS or whatever you care to call it or for more high-intensity ops. This is what Gen Richards – I presume – was trying to resolve. It might be something of a false dichotomy as armed forces have tended to do both things at the same time anyway – look at most of the Cold War. I would also argue that success in COIN tends to be much more contingent upon circumstances than most writers allow for anyway. Nonetheless, if we must choose, I would argue that going too far down the COIN or the nation-building route poses considerable risk. We’ve been involved in a regional war every ten years or so, of mixed emphasis (Falklands, Gulf, Iraq – plus the air ops over Kosovo, Afghanistan) so it’s not safe to assume we don’t need to do that again. Interestingly, the major stability ops have sometimes followed the ‘violent theatre entry’ actions so it’s futile to prepare for one without the other. Moving away from high intensity combat systems will also destroy the defence industry which builds them and reduce the chances of getting them back again – although defence should not be seen as a source of employment. Despite all the pressing reasons for being involved in them, these are invariably wars of choice, so we can elect to stay out or leave without any substantive damage being done.
Unfortunately, as likely or probable conflict scenarios are the only ones most people can see as necessary for armed forces (indeed, most armed forces themselves think in this way) it makes it very hard to argue other than preparing for the conflicts we’re likely to face. However, I would argue that these are actually the lowest priority as they tend to contribute least to our national interest and often mitigate against the other, more important, aspects of our defence policy except where they are important for alliance-building (which is the reason why we’re so committed in Afghanistan, surely).
ii) Deterrence
Deterrence is often cited as a cornerstone of much of our defence policy. It’s a big part of the SDR New Chapter, it’s usually held up as the reason for having a ‘nuclear deterrent’ and so forth. Exactly who the RAF deters I’m unsure, but certainly our naval forces have a powerful, credible case for being viewed as a deterrent force. Lawrence Freedman has recently discussed the concept, arguing that deterrence is moving towards a concept of upholding global norms and behaviour. This seems a coherent argument, like Till’s, for having a large and credible conventional and nuclear capability. Under the ‘umbrella’ provided by sea-borne domination, protection and control of the world’s shipping and trade-lanes, the ‘Western Alliance’ can freely get involved in or distance itself from conflicts as it chooses and uphold its norms as it goes. We can also make a case for the coercive potential of highly capable and deployable armed forces (and by deployable we mean expeditionary, and by expeditionary we mean ‘maritime’ – not solely naval – by definition). The argument being that ‘rouge’ states and so on are less likely to misbehave if we can threaten them. However, I’m not fully convinced by the arguments for deterrence, nuclear or conventional. Of course, if we strip back our deterrence forces, nuclear and conventional we may find the old adage about ‘si vis pacem, para bellum’ comes true. Nevertheless there aren’t that many countries out there to be deterred or coerced, and the limitations on our doing so are very great. Again, to deter you must have a credible threat, and we don’t have a genuine threat to deter.
iii) To uphold and represent the UK’s position as a player in global power politics – in other words, to gain a seat at the table
No doubt all the IR theorists amongst you will immediately categorise me as an abhorrent and out-dated Realist, but it is my firm belief that the most important reason for the existence of the UK armed forces has nothing to do with fighting or deterring conflict whatsoever. What seems entirely self-evident to me is rarely grasped by most people who write about defence, let alone most members of the ‘public’. To my mind this is, in the absence of any serious existential or major internal or external threat, the reason why all states who seek to develop their armed forces have them. Similarly, why does the EU want armed forces? It certainly won’t use them, I hope!
This position is rarely stated for a number of reasons. Firstly, governments in a democracy would never use it as a means to justify the possession of armed forces. They fall back constantly on the threat, potential threat or deterrence argument because they feel the public probably won’t buy (or rather, pay for) it. This is because the wider public do not think of the world like a statesman/woman has to – in general they see a public service as something that must fulfil a service. For the majority, to pay taxes for something that will never be used is a difficult concept, thus deterrents are never the easiest things to justify. However, to pay for something so abstracted as a mechanism to enhance their country’s standing in the world – something most of them are entirely unconcerned with – is never going to work. So, we need a threat and we find ourselves in a rather contorted position to search for that threat viz. the USN trying to make the PLAN look like a potent force or Eurofighters ‘intercepting’ crusty old Russian bombers.
We can see the mechanism behind posture most clearly from Britain’s nuclear deterrent, after all, nuclear weapons are the most abstracted from traditional notions of strategy. Britain, it is evident from reading the historical record, did not acquire nuclear weapons because we faced a nuclear threat from the Soviets – or even a particularly potent conventional threat. We acquired them largely because we wanted to play in the great power game with the USSR and the USA. The Soviet threat merely provided a convenient pretext. The nuclear deterrent, built as it is on a combination of ‘independence’ and a mutually supportive relationship with the US (they want us to buy Trident missiles as it helps them sell the programme to their govt) is a nice example of how items of British defence policy are increasingly headed. Thus the absence of a threatening USSR makes little real difference to whether we continue to possess nuclear weapons. That other countries such as India wish to obtain them is a good indication that there is significant utility in doing so in the absence of any great existential threat.
Another way of putting this is in contrary to Rupert Smith’s arguments about the ‘utility of force’. His view that we’ve seen an end of industrial war and now all war is ‘amongst the people’ is all very well (actually it’s extremely problematical because the two have always co-existed, but never mind!). However, its narrow (army/COIN)-mindedness is evident from its focus upon conflict as the only role of armed forces. Any glance at history tells us that armed forces spend a good deal, if not most, of their time not fighting – especially navies. They have a separate purpose which is often both a combination of deterrent and power-political instrument. The nineteenth century is the foremost analogy of this – a constant series of ‘small wars’, counter-piracy and prevention of human trafficking where the RN was involved but its main role was in the deterrent and power-political position of the battlefleet. As we’ve less to deter, the power-political role comes to the fore. Smith’s view, and it seems to have become, in one form or another, Army thinking and much of the current of academic/quasi-academic and journalistic writing, thinks about the armed forces as a component of ‘security’ when I would argue that they are as much, if not more, a component of our foreign policy/power political position. Richards’ comments are fixated upon conflict, but that is only to see one side of the coin (ha ha). So, instead of ‘utility of force’ we need also examine the ‘utility of forces’ which is rather less obvious but rather more important.
That’s pretty much the US position – or else why would they possess armed forces which are so much larger than anyone else in so many different areas? Unlike us, the US (and others) has not proved quite so wary about playing a power-political game and giving voice to a view of upholding the ‘national interest’. This is a position British statesmen are loathe to do explicitly, but they do tacitly even if no-one seems to observe it. The difficulty with this as a theoretical view is that it appears to present carte blanche to possess any particular item of equipment or size of forces we so desire on an arbitrary basis. As we have a finite budget we must assign priorities. Here’s where MF’s comments are very insightful as he makes a case for having certain capabilities over others. Deployability is essential and credibility is even more so as forces cannot function in a deterrent or warfighting role if they are neither of these.
There is, in fact, an inter-linking of all these three reasons for having armed forces. Take the Eurofighter (again) – as a piece of kit in the power-politics game it looks pretty great. However, in the credibility, utility and deterrent stakes it’s rather less so. Unlike maritime forces, it lacks the deployability to get to any likely conflict zones quickly – as pretty much all conflicts since 1945 have shown – Korea, Gulf ’91, Falklands – and all the other advantages of poise and flexibility etc that are inherent to maritime forces (read the doctrine if you want a blow-by-blow account). Fortunately, our enemies are a long way from Lincolnshire so short-legged interceptors aren’t going to help us much. Carriers, even if someone else’s planes are flying off them, have far more utility, global reach and alliance value (especially if someone else’s planes are flying off them). Similarly, warships can be picking up drugs smugglers in the Caribbean before quickly redeploying into a local deterrent force, hurricane assistance etc. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/8277483.stm Likewise, there’s much to be said for having lots of lovely MBTs but unlike Germany, say, they don’t play much in the credibility stakes if you can’t ship them anywhere and deploy them. Also, as our allies are likely to have them, not being so maritime-minded as us, we can use theirs in the grand old British tradition of having someone else (usually Germans actually) as cannon fodder. Whilst there are always costs involved in relying on alliances, and if you can afford it they are best avoided, we manifestly can’t and so we’re better holding onto those areas where we have a comparative advantage. Being historically, geographically, economically and culturally a maritime nation, it’s here where our main comparative advantage lies. If it’s a question of specialisation by division of labour, it’s clear that it’s Britain who should aim to specialise in maritime forces at the expense, if need be, or land and land-based air forces which we might have to rely on someone else for. If we can no longer afford to be a generalist, let’s be a maritime specialist, seeing as we have to possess maritime forces whatever. Whilst we’re unlikely to be the second biggest army or second biggest air force in the world, ceteris paribus we’ve got a pretty good shot at being the second biggest navy going.
This brings us back to the question of cost – COIN, and especially this type of nation-building campaign, is extremely costly, long-lasting and yields a marginal strategic benefit. To sacrifice 40 years of utility of our aircraft carriers, loss of shipbuilding industry, lack of surface warships or submarines (not to even mention the nuclear deterrent) for an unrewarding and expensive commitment to a country where success is unlikely and not really worth the effort is simply madness. I’m sure it’s not intended, but here the generals really are putting the interests of their service ahead of the national interest. We’ll be out of there in between 2 and 5 years – or we ought to be – and not that likely to commit to anything similar if we can avoid it. Although there is a strategic logic to the campaign based upon serving as an ally to the US and NATO (and therefore a gain to the national interest), we shouldn’t place that before the area where our national interests can best be served i.e. in the maritime domain.
However, the need for Britain’s armed forces to enhance our power-political weight should be at their forefront, NOT the desire to perform well in COIN or in humanitarian interventions, excepting where they add to our power-political position. That these campaigns can do so to a limited degree is manifest, but it shouldn’t be at the expense of a wider consideration of what our national interest is and will continue to be 10 or even 50 years hence – as a destruction of Britain’s maritime capability would take such a long period to recover from.
So, I don’t think that this tells us exactly the components of a defence review – we should keep this programme over that one etc. Expediency will dominate any review far more than strategy, even if we get the term in the title, I rather cynically believe. Because of the on-going operations in Afghanistan, it’s actually a very poor time to be holding a review as they will doubtless skew their direction of thinking towards a land-based/COIN campaign over a higher-intensity expeditionary and maritime force. Moreover, the cost-cutting which will inevitably occur will mean the sacrifice of some easy targets like warships which are big and costly capital programmes, over alternatives like pay freezes or reduction in the size of the army which clearly won’t wash in the current environment. One hope I have is that the outcry over Afghanistan will save the defence budget as a whole, but that might be too hopeful. The best we can hope for is that a sound case can be made behind closed doors and the new government can be prevailed upon to see sense.
While I agree with many of the sentiments express by the One-eyed Navalist I would phrase it slightly differently. Although I firmly behind maintaining a strong naval capability it is clear a balance must be struck. The calibre of Edward Grey’s ubiquitous projectile needs to to be of sufficient calibre to have an impact both militarily and politically. In uncertain times you cannot go wrong with a maritime based strategy whereas some of the alternative proposed do have inherent risks of becoming to focused on one role. Note a maritime orientated outlook does not mean a purely naval one, strong army and air-force components are part of its composition. The key is mobility and flexibility. Whatever security threats or campaigns Britain might become involved in over the coming decades we can be certain of some continuities.
1) Britain is a maritime nation and we are dependent on maritime commerce. While this is the standard navalist argument and somewhat of an ‘old hat’ difficult to convey it is fullness to a population removed from the sea it nonetheless remains true. While piracy is a very localized phenomena and hardly likely in the Channel (although unruly French or Spanish fishermen are) maritime commerce depends on stability.
2) It is in Britain’s economic and political interest to take a lead in the policing and governance of the maritime commons. This is a real and most cost effective contribution Britain can make to ensuring global order. Maritime assets are part, if not one of the most important parts, of Britain’s strategic communications toolboxes. The work the US and other European nations are doing in the field of maritime diplomacy is a good example of this.
3) Whatever military campaigns Britain is going to become involved in they are going to be outside of Europe and expeditionary in their nature. As such the ability to project power beyond Europe depends on maritime assets. If British expeditionary forces cannot supply or sustain themselves autonomously their political stock is far less. This requires more than a Ro-Ro transport.
While none of these core national missions require five carrier battle-groups and fifty nuclear submarines, they do require more than a few frigates. I somewhat disagree with the positive assessment by the OEN. The RN is at a tipping point in terms of capabilities. The carriers are prestige objects, but also very real tools. Striping out all the other assets to make them work is not a solution. Either you have naval forces or you don’t. A given 1), 2) and 3) doing without them is not an option.
Maritime operations have direct impact: lets use the counter-narcotics mission. We know that although Britain is nominally the lead nation on counter-narcotics in Afghanistan the efficacy of the mission has often been questioned and hard data is quite hard to come by. Contrast this with the proven track record of RN/USN/USCG/DEA operations in the Caribbean. Although I don’t have the figures, if they even exist, I have a hunch which counter-narcotics operation is the more successful of the two.
The references to the jointness and expeditionary nature of BR1806 are interesting and worth exploring a little more. Compared to the other services the RN was late in publishing its doctrine in the 1990s, but it is a very useful piece of writing to base future decisions on strategy on. BR1806 was heavily influence by the great(est) British strategist Julian Corbett. His collection of Greenwich staff college lectures published as, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, go beyond naval strategy and are well worth consulting when formulating strategic orientation and defense policy.
So many posts, but here is my humble contribution:
1) The UK is challenged by the perennial issue of being a small country, a medium sized power, with full spectrum ambitions. The East of Suez dilemma / problem is still with us, just in different forms. If we take the most eye-catching of our challenges, it is that faced by the multi-levelled and multi-sited issue of ‘Islamist terrorism’. The problems of acting outside the UK, but feeling some of the effects inside the UK will be well known to the MoD and its partner organisations. But ‘jointery’ in as full a sense as one might imagine needs to be cracked between the armed forces, the police, social services, local government, intelligence agencies etc etc. Holistic solutions, barriers dragged down – imagine a bureaucratic landscape that looks like an open plan office…
2) Think beyond the narrow defence industrial strategy, and the interests that run with it: use the EDA to carve up Europe into centres of defence manufacturing excellence. Less duplication, more focus and efficiency. We cannot afford to hold on to the replication.
3) Be Atlanticist, but be a friendly and critical junior partner, not a peer. We just aren’t a peer, in this realm, nor the intelligence realm.
4) COINTASTIC is correct in much of what he or she says. Instituting a dedicated institute has many problems – but these are not for this forum. And keep engaging, it’s good for us and it’s good for you. But be prepared to put in the time to explain to us how we can be useful to you – in some cases an unwillingness to engage is deliberate, and political, but often it’s not possessing the toolbox of skills necessary to do so.
If the UK, in a changing world order, wishes to retain its seat at the top tables, NATO and UN security council it must partake fully in attempting to resolve international conflicts, prefereably before they arise. This requires force projection, of a capable and fully intergrated expeditionary joint forces. By fully intergrated we must be able to operate in multinational coalitions. Our recent contributions to recent operations have not been significant when compared to our principle ally. How can we expect to have a significant vote when we contribute less than 10% of the forces within theatre? On an international stage when other nations (India and Pakistan) are providing more forces to UN peacekeeping missions again the question of the UKs contributions are brought into question. Our positions in international orgnaisations will coe under ever increasing scrutiny.
Investment is the key, and this is unlikely to happen, the armed forces will be victims of considered cuts once more. This will further reduce the operating capabilities. If we are serious about looking at the defense review every facet of defense will be open to discussion and not simply the usual characters. Nuclear deterance is the obvious candidate. Nuclear capable cruise missiles offer a potential alternative to our Trident fleet. Procurement requires another overhaul, the defense industry is ill-suited to the rapidly evolving demands of operational environments. Technically advanced advisaries can find gaps in our equipment and exploit them. The military industrial complex must be geared to match a technologically capable and rapidly evolving enemy, no easy task. Our new equipments must be prepared to undergo several upgrades in much shorter time. This will be exceedingly expensive.
Our forces are not shaped to meet the current or future threats. We are stuck in conventional mindsets. Expiditionary warefare requires force projection; this comes either with a navy or with air transportation. Both of which are under threat; the carriers and the A400 project. Airpower is important but UAS and missile technologies are advancing at such a rate that conventional air systems are endangered. UAS can provide Close Air Support and Interdiction Attack, accepting a slight loss in localised situational awareness, but networked systems may compensate for this loss. In short in the air we must invest in hi-tech platforms to remain current and competitive. The Navy must receive its carriers and a range of amphibious craft to allow us to be expeditionary, the littorals will become increasingly important.
On the ground we must expand our deployable assets, a Brigade simply isn’t adequate. We must be able to deploy (in a sustained manner) properly equipped Divisional sized organizations. This must be augmented, in stability operations, with elements of soft power. DFID must come to the party, how can a national organisation refuse to support national interests with a lack of personnel and investment? Lastly we must ensure the support of the nation. We must define our strategic goals, resource our IO campaign and ensure that the public understands our defense stratergy. The future security environment will see a rise of unconventional forces attack us in a protracted manner in an effort to attrite the national will. The battle will be focused just as much on the home front as it will whever we so happen to be.
Sir,
It is difficult to think about Strategic requires of our defence force when it is not yet clear what we are trying to achieve and in what order. The comprehensive approach must be fully adopted and all Gov’t departments must have their say in Defence requirements. Key players in this are DIFD and the Home Office, who were not mentioned in your strategy unit. You could either put these short to long term or in order of overwhelming priority i.e: (caveat: these are off the top of my head; I am writing them as an example, not as I believe them to be an exhaustive list of our defence issues)!
Short term:
1. Home defence against traditional (Military) and non-trad (terror) attacks.
2. Success in Afghanistan.
3. Influence US decision making.
4. Prevention of terrorist attacks abroard.
Medium Term:
1. Afghanistan’s transition to a stable state.
2. Influential bridge and link between US and EU.
3. Retain & Develop influence in UN.
Long Term
1. Retain permenant membership of the UNSC.
2. Leading nation in EU; mil/socio/pol link between EU/US
3. Influence Emerging Nations. Poss role as bridge and link between China & India.
From these demands (which in reality would be much longer and far less succint) the requirements for the next 10 – 20 years will fall out. MoD should then be consulted on Afghanistan, troop numbers will need to be reviewed and adjusted. Are the Forces required to have a credible Military capable of withstanding invasion or are we to throw all our eggs in the Afghan basket?
Do we wish to retain/upgrade trident to retain our permenance on the UNSC (Will we be willing to share a seat under the EU banner when India want a seat at the table?) be etc. How are the MoD, FCO and DFID going to stabilise Afghanistan? How are the Home Office, Police and MoD going to work together to prevent Militant islam attacking the UK? These relationships have not proerly been formalised and have been forced together. It now needs to be part of every agenices mission statement, where applicable, and their job needs to be outlined to them.
Defence is only one small part of a large, disjointed pan-govermental problem.
Paul – it’s fine to draw up a list of priorities over time, that’s a good way to approach things. But ‘home defence’? Invasion? Which century are you living in? That wasn’t a realistic prospect in the 18th century, let alone the 21st!! It’s this sort of anachronistic thinking which clouds the whole issue.
Please can we be clear, the reason we retain conventional high-intensity armed forces is NOT, repeat NOT connected to the threats we face but to maintaining (as you rightly point out) our position on things like the USNC which is a part of our position as a power on the world stage.
It’s all very well to talk about pan-governmental initiatives and co-operation, but you need to understand the means by which bureaucratic politics works. Each department is fighting for budget share against the others and the Treasury. DFID will claim it’s the means to solving the problem so give it the money, the Home Office will say it’s the Police and so forth. This is the problem with ‘threat-orientated’ thinking and the obsession with Islamic militancy as a central problem for defence policy. It simply isn’t a substantial issue for defence and it isn’t the basis on which to conduct a review of our strategic or foreign policy posture. Conflate the two and the important aspects of defence will lose out because it’s not well placed to solve such an issue, as we’ve seen.
MF – thanks for your valuable comments. There’s some terminology here that I perhaps used a little loosely. ‘Naval’ should be distinguished from ‘maritime’ in a Corbettian way. All the UK’s expeditionary forces are inherently maritime. Thus the projectile of ‘army’ and ‘air force’ needs to be effective also – that’s the traditional view. On a historical note, Fisher’s (not Grey’s I think) phrase was intended to put the proper perspective on the role of land forces in the defence balance.
Some caveats to that, however. Modern naval power projection allows and will increasingly allow naval forces to create effect from the sea, therefore we can integrate some of the elements of the projectile into the gun i.e. land and especially air forces can reduced in favour of naval forces within the mix. In your terms, the navy itself can increasingly be both projectile and gun.
In terms of the RN being ‘hollowed out’ – yes that’s a great danger. You’re slightly in danger of contradicting yourself if you argue that the projectile needs to be strengthened but at the same time (as you did earlier) that other allies can fulfil complementary functions such as providing the bulk of land forces. Our doing so will only further the hollowing out, so if that’s a real danger – and I’m ready to admit that it is – then it’s one that should be averted I agree. Indeed, there’s no point having carriers and no surface ships/submarines/MCM/RFA to support them. Turn that on its head though, and getting the carriers might (might) mean the RN can argue for those things as a logical extension. Carrying the metaphor further, what good is a projectile when you don’t have a gun to fire it from? But, let’s be realistic, there’s not much out there at the moment that can threaten our ability to project power so if the choice is between more of CVF/Ocean/JSF or more T-45/escorts then the former will win out, albeit a balanced fleet is needed. It’s sad that we have to make that choice because given the money that get’s wasted in all sorts of ways, it’s one we shouldn’t have to make.
Most importantly, by focusing on rather trifling issues like piracy and counter-narcotics and your you’ve ignored the main thrust of what I’ve said. Five carrier battle groups and fifty nuclear subs would be superb to have not because they fulfil a particular ‘national mission’ but because they deliver an enormous boost to a nation’s power political position and to uphold the world system in a manner favourable to ourselves and our national interest!! This is their ‘national mission’ – catching pirates or dropping bombs on Afghanistan is merely a by-product of that and a means of justifying the whole thing to the public. That’s why the US has all those ships. Why can’t this simple point be understood? Now, I’m not proposing we do have all of them – that would be to fall into the Soviet trap of bankrupting oneself in a bid to achieve world power – we need to be fiscally secure above all. But we need to recognise what the benefits are of merely having such a potent item of equipment in our arsenal (supported and made credible by the associated escorts etc) and what the costs of not having it are.
I would also argue that the costs of not having a sufficient maritime capability are far in excess of losing the war in Afghanistan, if that’s the choice. Good news from across the pond on that score, I think some reality is setting in.
I heartily approve of Corbettian thinking, and the Army could certainly do with some of it instead of reading other less useful stuff. But actually us Brits need to be equally Mahanian (gasp) in our thinking at the moment, something we’re deeply uncomfortable in doing. The Navy is the key component of our ‘big stick’ (or something that rhymes with that).
So, I think we substantively agree on what the outcome of a defence review should, but won’t be, but my arguments for that outcome are rather different and, in my view, rather more logically coherent than an argument based simply upon ‘threat’ or ‘challenge’. The only genuine threat or challenge is to our position as a power within the current system.
I did point out the subject I chose were merely examples as I wanted to make the point that the next review must be focused on our needs and aims, as well as the threat. I was not seriously suggesting that there was a threat of invasion hanging over the UK from another state!!!
I understand what you are saying about defence budgets and politk, but they need to work together, must work together. It is not simply acceptable to say thats the way it is. We are sinking in Afghanistan; the forces are too small.
At the operational level, there is no joined up thinking, DFID refuse to leave camp, FCO are following their own remit and agendas, military are running up and down Helmand trying to provide security, by killing terrorists.
My point was: If you want a coherent and plausible defence policy, you must be sure you are asking it what you want it to do. I take it you are worried that, by going for a threat orientated review based soley on Afghan, bean counters might be short sighted enough to cut the navy even further, further reducing our influence. That was exactly my point.
One-eyed navalist my comments were not meant as a critique merely as an extension. If you knew Jeff and myself you would know that we have a lot of time for maritime strategy. Personally I would like to have more ships as apart from being very partial to north Atlantic grey as a colour I also believe that more money invested into naval and maritime capabilities will pay off in the long term. Incidentally I was not advocating strengthening the projectile merely that it needed to be strong to have an effect so that despite being a seapower advocate I am not suggesting that infantry battalions be disbanded just for another frigate.
The counter-narcotics mission is far from trifling because it is a useful example to illustrate the different levels on which maritime forces can operate. As you have pointed out the anti-navy rhetoric has been rather simplistic and off the mark. Indeed there is a good MA dissertation to be written about the comparison I used. Our ‘failing’ within the naval camp is not to be able to convey self-evident truth to a wider audience. The Astute class is an incredible national asset, but in times of ‘The War’ in Afghanistan to level of debate on the merits of seapower needs to be more sophisticated to confirm its persistent utility. Even in perfect economic conditions we would be hard pressed as a national to be able to field to fully equipped carriers. Ultimately I think we agree on most points.
Re Mahan versus Corbett. I think there we need to agree to disagree. As you argue there are not current direct competitors at sea hence pursuing a Mahanian grasp, while not wrong in our eyes, is not compatible with the current climate. Mahan was not trying to sell a strategic vision he was trying to make a battlefleet paletable to a sceptical domestic audience.