As many of you will know the UK MoD is at work now on the preparation of a Green Paper leading up to a full (and overdue) defence review next year. We have been discussing many of the key issues in British strategy here on this blog for two years already. I think it speaks well of the informed and thoughtful KOW readership that the MoD Strategy Unit is now reaching out to this little corner of the defence blogosphere to engage with us on such matters. Below I am posting a note from Vincent Devine, who heads the Strategy Unit, which is intended to kick off a debate here on these pages on issues of mutual concern. I am personally chuffed that we have been asked. More importantly, I welcome the spirit of openness to debate and alternative views which the gesture represents. Across the pond they have been better at this, see The Army Needs Your Help, for instance, and I think they have realized better policy and strategy in the doing. I could quote a bunch of clichés here about ‘sunlight being the best detergent’, or ‘a problem shared is a problem halved’ but, really, it’s self-evident isn’t it? Here in the UK we’ve ground to make up and not a lot of time and resource to waste and so I find this development highly encouraging.
Before I yield the ‘floor’ (as it were) to the Strategy Unit I’d like to affirm that neither I, let alone KOW corporately, are endorsing any of the views which the Strategy Unit may present; indeed, that would defeat the point of the exercise. Reader, be as critical as you like in the comments. I only wish to remind you of the simple founding rules of this blog:
1. Be sensible.
2. Be polite.
Ideally, what we say here will also be constructive. Need I point out that, ultimately, we all have the same aim—the betterment of UK defence and security?
From here down it’s Vincent Devine talking:
I’m grateful to David Betz for letting the UK Ministry of Defence Strategy Unit engage with Kings of War to gather views about the future of the UK’s defence policy.
The Strategy Unit, which I lead, is a small team of military officers, MoD and FCO officials and international exchange officers. We are pulling together the new Defence Green Paper, which will set out some of the key defence issues before a full defence review next year. As we prepare the Green Paper we want to take advantage of the very active academic and think-tank debate on defence issues, and ideally provoke some of this discussion ourselves. We running a series of traditional, real-world seminars and meetings with experts. Via Kings of War we also want to plug into the informed and interested defence blogosphere, hoping to reach a wider and (possibly) fresher audience.
This is, as far as I know, the first time the Ministry of Defence has done this, and it is something of an experiment. Depending on your reactions, we plan to post on several occasions between now and the end of the year. We’d like each time to pose one of the defence policy questions we’re considering, and ask for your views. We won’t plan to respond to each comment as it comes in (though we might chip in if any particularly live discussion kicks off), but will offer a set of reactions and impressions to wrap up the exchanges after about a week. And we want to be able to share with you some of our emerging thinking.
We hope the process will mirror the overall Green Paper approach: it’s about identifying the key questions, rather than trying to answer them now; it firmly places our defence policy within our wider international and security policy; and it’s based on the assumption that we may need to make some tough choices. If you want more background about the Green Paper process, you can find the Defence Secretary’s Parliamentary statement here , and of course some of you may have heard his speech at King’s on this last week.
We have agreed with David some ground rules for our participation in KoW, intended to help keep the debate lively. We are contributing as the MoD Strategy Unit, rather than trying to speak for the Ministry as a whole – we therefore won’t need to have all our contributions chiselled in stone before we submit them. Neither the Strategy Unit nor KoW make any commitment to agree with or support the views of the other – which indeed would undermine the whole point. We (genuinely) want to encourage people to say what they think – the most useful comments will be those which are informed, grounded and focused.
Finally, I’d like to suggest an open question to start the discussion: as we look at setting our future defence policy, what are the greatest problems we need to tackle and – equally important – what are the greatest advantages we can exploit?
There’s been a lot of good writing on this recently, including of course from David himself and Anthony Cormack, and from Theo Farrell, Malcolm Chalmers, Paul Cornish, Andrew Dorman, Hew Strachan and others. They’ve looked both at tactical/operational issues and at the overall strategic picture. Some see the glass half-full, some half-empty. Some focus on the need for success in current operations, others on the state of the whole defence machine. They identify a very broad range of issues: which of these are causes rather than symptoms, and which show grounds for optimism, which pessimism?
I look forward to seeing what you have to say.
Vincent Devine
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MF – oh dear! No, I didn’t take your comments as critique at all, or Jeff’s, which is exactly why I said they were useful and insightful and I basically agreed with them. We do indeed ultimately agree on most points, although I think we can look beyond the confines of the North Atlantic.
I particularly agree with you that the RN et al hasn’t been that successful at get a public message out and that much of the ‘discourse’ has become obsessed with a relatively unimportant conflict at the expense of everything else. I should think there’s a good deal more than an MA dissertation – a massive press campaign indicting our defence policy would be just the ticket!
Where I don’t agree is this. I AM prepared to sacrifice infantry battalions if we need a frigate or submarine, if we think that the frigate or submarine is more critical to our power political position than an infantry battalion. I’m deliberately not being specific there, that’s a general point. When the chips are down that’s the choice for the UK. We need infantry battalions to fight COIN in Afghanistan – we need frigates and submarines (and carriers and assault ships) to uphold our position in terms of global power. I prioritise the latter.
On the counter-narcotics etc missions. No, they’re not trifling, they are RELATIVELY unimportant and a by-product of the main role of defence. If you remember, I raised the issue as a demonstration of flexibility in the first place! Of course, they’re not even a particularly effective solution – one could make a case that they’re counter productive by pushing up coke prices but still, it’s the best we can do. If they were the main role we’d have lots of smaller surface vessels – counter-narco can be done from an RFA auxiliary e.g. Great, but not valuable for GLOBAL POWER POLITICS. The counter-narco role is in many senses a means of selling the RN’s case.
I don’t agree that we would be hard-pressed to field fully-equipped carriers, it would mean re-prioritising money away from some areas of defence which have less utility (e.g. £20bn of Eurofighter) or some areas of government which has less utility (e.g. DFID, welfare etc etc). That might I admit not be within the realm of pratical politics, alas.
Lastly, on Mahan and Corbett. We’re going to end up sounding like the Judean People’s Front here. Or is it the People’s Front of Judea? Firstly, the two complement each other so it’s not, as I said, a case of one ‘versus’ the other. Secondly, you’ve made my point precisely. I quote ‘Mahan… was trying to make a battlefleet paletable to a sceptical domestic audience.’ OK, change the phrasing because now we don’t have a battlefleet but Carrier and Amphibious Battlegroups might be the modern equivalent. But that’s EXACTLY the point isn’t it? We need to sell this concept to a sceptical public who think all defence is about Afghanistan and don’t realise that maritime power is the key to it all. Mahan did that for the US (and others) and helped to persuade them to build a Navy as a power-political instrument. Why would the Russians, Indians, Chinese, French, Brazilians, Americans etc want to have as many carrier battle groups as they could afford? It’s exactly the same principle. We need to do for our country now what he did for his then. Sadly, while Mahan merely added his voice to many, we’d have to prompt a total revision of the way in which defence is perceived in the public eye. Fortunately, I do think that some in government/defence circles do see this.
If I may briefly follow on from MF’s remarks I would like to clarify a couple of points with regards the Royal Navy. As far as the UK defence debate is concerned, of course the tri-service aspect should be examined as a whole and not just as a sum of its parts. However, that may very well be the case from a purely theoretical perspective, but in the context of the current debate on the future of British military power, or at least the perception of that power, it is nevertheless essential to give special attention to the Army, rather than the RN or RAF. Speaking from an American perspective, the strength of Britain as a ‘military’ ally is almost entirely that of an ally who can provide a competent ground component (hence the need to ensure the UK maintains a sizable expeditionary ground component for future contingencies). By contrast, there is only so much value-added to be derived from the Royal Navy, and next to none from the RAF. From a European perspective this argument changes somewhat as the RN still ranks among the top tier of European naval powers, and will likely continue to do so if properly funded, especially when it comes to the new carriers and the various pieces of kit on board. But what is the measure of a top tier naval power (please forgive the use of the word ‘naval’ instead of ‘maritime’ here)? Fighting pirates, searching for ‘terrorists’ on the high seas, supporting humanitarian ops in Sierra Leone and Lebanon, and counternarcotics missions, is one thing. Having a Navy that can defeat another Navy (it would be interesting to do a modern-day Falklands scenario to test this), or to defeat an enemy’s naval/coastal defences and project hard military power ashore is quite another. Among the problems I see for the RN today is that it is devaluing its own worth by latching onto the issue of the moment rather than engaging in an adult-level strategic discourse. This can clearly be seen in the RN’s constant references to the Mumbai terrorist attack last year. I’ve lost count of the number of times RN officials have employed this analogy despite the fact that by doing so they are really arguing that the RN become a Coast Guard (perhaps advocating the UK revert to isolationism with the RN protecting the Thames from terrorist infiltration) rather than an expeditionary force (unless of course they are secretly arguing for launching Tomahawks against LeT training camps in Pakistan which I very much doubt they are). Similar to MF, I’d be very much in favour or seeing an expansion of the RN, at the very least to ensure it is the undisputed naval leader in Europe (though being something of a realist I doubt this is in the cards any time soon). But being a naval leader necessitates having the means at hand to lead, rather than over reliance on a legacy. Needless to say, this sort of view needs to be backed up by both a more clearly articulated strategic vision as well as hard cash. Moreover, it must also be based on a realistic appreciation of what type of actions Britain could do fighting alone, with the US, with the Europeans, etc., as well as the types of ‘maritime’ defences that can be overcome versus those that cannot be. Of course, all of this, as some earlier posts highlight, cannot be calculated in isolation from the broader context of national interest. As such, if the ‘national interest’ is purely about securing the respect of the Americans in the near-term (say the next 5 years), perhaps redistributing resources to allow for an extra brigade that can be permanently sustained in a combat theatre would be the most worthwhile investment. If the ‘national interest’ is about leading European defence ten years from now, perhaps more emphasis on naval power might be in order, particularly with regards carriers. If the national interest refers to playing a lead ‘Commonwealth’ role, especially in Africa, then again a different mix of capabilities would need to receive priority. The bottom line is that unless we are clear what the ‘national interest’ is and what politicians expect from the armed forces as compared to the FCO or DFID, as well as knowing what the red lines are in relation to the use of UK military power, it is very difficult indeed to devise a new defence strategy. That being said, this is also not simply a matter of having a tabula rasa from which to write a perfect defence strategy. The other important factors to take into account are the legacy of the past (esp. the power projection mindset), problems of existing organization, the preferences and capabilities of the defence industry and associated lobby, public opinion, available financial resources and equipment, ongoing commitments, and so forth.
I would simply say, in response to the various comments that defence spending is necessary to enhance Britain’s prestige, status, etc, that this is a very, very, very poor justification for spending valuable resources which could be used on something else which gives solid, material benefits (it is important here to stress that prestige by itself is pointless if it does not provide such benefits). Does having armed forces really give Britain extra prestige which translates into practical benefits? I think that you would have very great difficulty proving that it does. The prestige argument is merely an assertion, unbacked by any solid evidence. (And is it legitimate to “sell” defence acquisitions to the British voter on what are known to be false grounds, on the basis that one knows better?)
One-eyed navalist is right in one respect – the threats to the UK are very small, and provide no justification for the mass of defence spending; nor do most of the other arguments he rightly dismissess. But he then fails to draw the correct conclusion. If there is no practical use for the armed forces, then the armed forces should be cut!!!!!!
Paul
I think that there is a middle ground to be reached between ‘little’ Britain and ‘great’ Britain. Tony Blair’s idea of an ethical foreign policy was broadly correct: the UK should underpin its foreign affairs with a moral framework that derives from its status as a liberal democracy. However, the maximalist interventionism that derived from this position is clearly unsustainable given our current resources, and needs to be curbed with a pragmatic approach to intervention. As stated by others, the UK has a large reserve of “soft” power that could be put to good use, where our military spending is insufficient.
Therefore, I would like to see a Defence Review that examines how the UK can most efficiently pursue a foreign policy agenda. In short, it needs to address the ability of other governmental institutions to contribute to the defence of the country by helping to create a more stable world.
I don’t think the UK will be able to take the lead, or even be a junior partner, in many situations, we should relinquish the aspiration to be involved everywhere at all times. However, I would argue that it is most certainly in our interests to continue to intervene in situations that we stand a good chance of solving or stabilising. In order to do this, we will continue to depend on NATO for our security, therefore fulfilling any commitments to that organisation would be a baseline, beyond which I think the development of surgical force projection rather than the ability to fight major wars overseas should be our primary concern. In future, I think the UK should be more focussed upon interventions like Sierra Leone, rather than Iraq, regardless of the moral arguments for and against the latter. Small and medium scale interventions for morally justified causes that are beneficial to our interests with a higher chance of success than full blown nation building. We should leave primacy for global issues to institutions like the UN and the EU, as well as major powers like America, investing forces and resources as necessary to fulfill commitments requested of us. Our real strength should be put towards propping up weak states with technical governance assistance, development and trade. That’s where we’re most likely to see results, and that’s where we are most likely to benefit from such results.
I know that morality in international affairs has taken a hit or two in the last ten years, but what I refer to is almost a self-serving morality (in truth, a set of principles rather than an ethical argument). I do think that we have a responsibility to protect, in the broadest sense of the phrase, threatened people. At the same time, I don’t think that anybody has the right to demand our action to help them. Working from this, the UK should pick and choose where to intervene, and not commit itself to the intervene-anywhere-and-anytime moralist maximalism that is demanded by some proponents of the human security paradigm. By reconnecting with a sense of “doing good” and benevolence in international relations, I think the UK’s foreign policy would find far much support in a country that is at times wholly confused by and disinterested in the absolutist arguments for intervention in far flung places.
As a P5 and G8 member, and nuclear power, we can reserve the right to intervene globally, however this does not mean that we have to, or indeed should aim to. It would not require a statement sacrificing our global intentions to retrench in such a manner. A defence review that retains the capability to intervene world-wide in collaboration with partners (or on a small scale alone) would be a re-affirmation of the UK’s position as a global power. Our soldiers are some of the best in the world, and, equipment issues aside, if we retain the ability to get them around the world in some form of transport or another, they can be relied upon to do a good job as long as the political objectives set for them to achieve are not unrealistic and they are not deployed in insufficient numbers.
In terms of the specifics being mooted, I think trident should be retained, at least for the next cycle, since I reckon there will be at least as much change in the next twenty years as there has been in the last. I think that the navy should probably get one carrier rather than two, fast jet development can be mothballed for this cycle and the army should have a serious think about cutting down the number of tanks it needs to prance about Salisbury plain and instead focus on infantry and engineers. I mention the engineers because the current debate seems to focus upon the cuts required between a few major weapons platforms, and I think this is a false dichotomy. All these obsolescent programmes should be hacked to the bone or killed (though this may be difficult because it is hard to see an admiral wanting to exist without a big capital flag ship, an air force general without spanking new fast planes and an army general without tanks to push across a map), but that would leave some money for re-investment in the kind of flexible troops and multi-purpose platforms that will give us more for our money and be easier to adapt to situations that may arise. In my mind, the UK armed forces should keep on standby a small but visible rapid reaction corps specifically designed for non-conflict situations. Our security would be enhanced by having a “stabilisation corps” that we could parachute into disaster zones to help with initial rescue and reconstruction efforts that would ameliorate or avert the security threats that can be caused by such situations. Again, we might not use it everywhere, but it would be a damn sight more effective than excess tanks being trained for a russian invasion that will never come.
Jack,
The military has already started to try and shift its focus from that form of thinking. The operational imperative of Afghanistan has forced it to. And now I am about to commit military heresy: the military are not, perhaps, the best people to take the lead in Afghanistan and are only doing so because of a pan-governmental leadership vacuum.
The situation has forced Miltiary Commanders to learn that the objective and mission statement is not to engage the enemy in some form, but to effect the individual or people. Bumping into the Taliban is more of a contingency plan now, with the main focus being on the civilians who can aid us in our golas of stabilising the area and delivering security. The problem is there is no guiding authority linking it together and guiding a multi-agency multi country coaliton in one direction. Not having full SDR has lead to a lag in planning principles across the board and the majority of the Army, particualrly UK based, has not made the transition to contemporary sphere of engagements.
The Defence Review should look at maintaining our place on the P5. Delivering the fabled comprehensive approach, not only in the field but in Whitehall/NATO also. All government departments should have a say in what they expect of the Military. To only include the FCO will mean that a lot of work the military currently does, will go unrecognised and thus underfunded.
We must understand what we want the SDR to achieve on a cultural, economic, influential and militartistic viewpoint. For example:
1. Maintaining a seat on the P5. Do we want this or are we happy to share one with France and Germany under the EU banner? If not, then how do we, a small and virtually bankrupt country do this?
a. Do we increase / improve the size of the RN?
i. If so, is it neccesary that they need a vessel of the type and cost of a Type 45 to do it, or will a much cheaper, less effective vessel project the global influence?
ii. What job do we want them to do? Pirates and drug dealers or something more substantial. Again do they need Type 45s to do this or a boat which has an HLS?
b. Maintain the nuclear deterent. Will this give us the required influence and at what cost?
2. Success in AfPak? A requirement or a nice to have? Gen Dannatt recently described this as a Total War. Is it really? If so, again, at what cost and what financial weighting does this facet take against item 1. More or less important?
And so on and so forth. Until those strategic decisions are made and catch up with the operatioanl level shift to soft effects, and thus funded accordingly, the organisations and structures that are still not being guided, will not change and the military will want to fight in Afghanistan, because that is how the Army is set up, and conduct on the battlefield is how it is judged.
Key question: What is it the various government agencies want us to do? (It would be well advised for DFID to have a similar soul searching experience, and then re-organise accordingly, before a large chunk of their money is given to the military by a future Conservative government.)
‘Tony Blair’s idea of an ethical foreign policy was broadly correct: the UK should underpin its foreign affairs with a moral framework that derives from its status as a liberal democracy. ‘
Why? What does that even mean?
And why does this inevitably equate to maintaining ‘surgical force projection ‘?
We need some new thinking, not the same old tired, abstract presuppositions.
I sense there is element that is underexplored here that matches the demands for economic efficiency, rapidly evolving threats and shortening Technology lifecycles. Only “Agility” of supply (think of Nokia’s problems in maintaining its place in the phone market) responds to all of these. A national Defence Strategy should therefore perhaps influence and reflect on progress to more agile supply of defence capability.
This can provoke across the board but I will chose naval examples to cover the broader challenge.
Do big clunky assets like carriers dependant on huge technically specialised industry assets and lengthy planning design times increase agility or diminish it?
Do we need to redefine what permanent purely “military” assets are truly needed in the coming age of autonomous equipment?
If a freighter in the Atlantic can move (if supplied with the right boxes) enough sophisticated remotely launchable weaponry to influence any modern state, what is the advantage of painting it grey and filling it with military targets (ie navy sailors)?
To clarify what I think is missing from this debate:
In attempting to revisit strategy, we are inevitably hypothesizing from the abstract to the concrete via a dialectical process.
There’s not much use having this debate however, if we load it down with presuppositions about which technological platforms are more important and what being a liberal democracy ‘inevitably’ means for our foreign policy. Let’s suppose instead that you gave me a pen and a blank piece of paper and asked me to draw a shape.
Spinoza distinguishes between the MODE OF ORIGIN of an idea (and hence it’s essence) from mere QUALITIES or PROPERTIES that it may possess. Thus with a circle for example-one of it’s PROPERTIES is that all straight lines drawn from the centre to the circumference are equal, but it’s ESSENCE is that it constitutes ‘the figure described by any line whereof one end is fixed and the other is free.’
So far I’m concerned that we’re mostly discussing properties rather than essence. Thereby when sitting in front of that hypothetical blank sheet of paper and told to draw something, it’s as if I’m also being immediately told ‘but it must also have all these QUALITIES’, even whilst I’m banned from discussing or debating it’s essential essence.
“the threats to the UK are very small, and provide no justification for the mass of defence spending; nor do most of the other arguments he rightly dismissess…Of there is no practical use for the armed forces, then the armed forces should be cut!!!!!!”
just because there aren’t compelling threats today, doesn’t mean there won’t be tomorrow, or on the horizon. beware of presentism. things can change.
for me its not the make-up of the armed forces that’s the problem. its the promiscuous over-use of them, deployed endlessly in the naive belief that force can be ‘surgical’, a routinely used instrument of a militarised foreign policy. we need a smaller foreign policy, not a smaller military.
Pericles,
I completely agree and that was my point. It requires a fresh start; a blank sheet. The examples I gave were exactly that. I was trying to highlight the process; rather than use this as a forum to highlight my opinion on what should be changed or cut.
My idea was an attempt to highlight the comprehensive approach, which we are allegedly adopting. Today’s military reflects the needs of the whole government, rather than Defence Policy following Foreign Policy. That line of thought is outdated and clumsy in the current environment.
Paul
I think we’re actually mostly in loud agreement. It was some of the other discussion which disturbed me. There is a natural default position in these debates to talk about tools, operatonal level issues and to fall back on existing assumptions. There is also a natural inclination to jump onto the bandwagon of the latest ‘silver bullet’ solution-the ‘comprehensive approach’ or ‘Strat Comms’. By all means let’s debate qualities, but let’s not rule out discussing essence as well. Dictating to me the qualities of a circle is not much use if I decide that I actually want to draw a square.
Hi Pericles – the assumption is that our approach to defence should be driven by threats and opportunities. At least that’s the approach Vincent Devine has asked us to follow. Should it?
Earlier i argued that this was almost impossibly difficult given the forecasting problems and the tendency of war to emerge from the Rumsfeldian domain of unknown unkowns.
If not threats, then what? Some options might be: Tradition/inertia/nostalgia; an idea of the sort of values we want to promote, and how much effort we put into promoting them; and, of course, affordability.
If those are the key drivers of defence planning, I wonder whether we’ll end up with a predictable sort of review. Highlights might include three salami sliced services; talk of expeditionary capabilities, talk of being a ‘force for good’ or equivalent.
‘Threats vs. opportunities’ means nothing if we’re not willing to revisit the entire conceptual framework of where we are, what we want, and how much we can afford to spend in order to achieve it. As a base line of security for example, I don’t think the public are much convinced that the UK streets are made safer by the war in Helmand. There may be other reasons to do-or not do-what we’re engaged in there, but the stated reason is patently non-credible as the ‘essence’ of our strategy. If on the other hand the conceptual framework remains entirely dictated by existing ‘sunk cost’ spending programs, the ‘expeditionary warfare’ paradigm (the same as before please, but with less money-sorry, ‘increased efficiency savings’), and Britain as ‘global hub’ concept, then we’ll not only not have a real review, we’ll be doomed in practice to the inertia that you describe as a potential real shaping factor.
Pericles,
I would say that the “ethics” (as I pointed out, principles rather than abstract moral arguments) should be rather self evident. The problem, as I see it, with Tony Blair’s Wars and the neo-conservative approach to foreign policy was that it sought to re-fashion the world through the use of power and force to adhere to a set of principles rooted in Western Democracy (amongst other influences). I would argue that what is required is principled pragmatism. We should “do good” where we can, because it is in our best interests to do so. I do not ascribe to the human security approach, nor do I think that “what’s right” or the “rights agenda” should win over security concerns. But, and I may be biased here because my phd is on ungoverned space and weak states, I think that the security threats to the UK are likely to result from weak states, bad governance and adaptive non-state groups. Since all three are in the realm of foreign policy, I believe we need to retain an interventionist foreign policy that reserves the right to act where necessary.
Given the limited amount of force it will be able to project in the future, it is critical that the UK is able to explain the use of power in an ethical sense. Were we to run around the world backing up authoritarian regimes, the use of force would be unpopular and divisive, and therefore unlikely to succeed. This is what I mean by “ethical foreign policy”: we don’t actively support abhorrent human rights violators, warlords and other nefarious types. But the pragmatic element means that it is not incumbent upon us to run around the world deposing them as we see fit. I think the UK should be aiming for “low hanging fruit” in its foreign policy objectives: providing transitional security to fragile states and nascent democracies, utilising soft power to help open up closed societies and states. I fully understand that this position is probably disliked by both sides of the argument, on the one hand, some would want to retain our capacity to participate in major wars overseas, on the other, the fact that I would advocate leaving places like Zimbabwe well alone until the chances of our intervention and pressure have a good chance of success is similarly distasteful. The point is we should be seeking to maintain democracy in the world, because democratic states threaten us least. Below this, we should be seeking to maintain stable states in the world, because functioning states are preferable to civil wars and international dischord. There is no point in pressurising a state on ethical grounds if that pressure causes the collapse of a state and we are unable to fix it or help it transition into a different form of state.
As I stated before, one of our key security guarantees is to remain a NATO partner, regardless of level, therefore we have to keep to the spending commitments that such membership requires. Were it not for the article 5 guarantee, the UK would no doubt have to spend substantially more on defence to ensure our security, or resign itself to the status of Switzerland in the realm of foreign policy. Therefore since we need to spend the money on military forces, we need to make sure that the money that is spent delivers the most efficient form of military power for the use by the UK.
I used the phrase “surgical force projection” to differentiate from the “force projection” envisaged by America, which feels the need to be able to project brigades into far flung corners of the planet as it feels like it. We need a more limited type. The UK should not focus on retaining the capability to help in another Iraq (in the event that such a conflict occurs, we would be fighting in parallel with allies at any rate) we should instead be developing the more flexible parts of our armed forces that provide the capability to adapt to developing and emerging threats. In my mind this means retaining a strong professional infantry force with mechanised support, air power that could be utilised against warlords and non state actors (ie: focussed mainly on intervening in civil wars and suchlike where we are unlikely to face advanced fighter jet fleets) and a navy that allows us to project such power globally, albeit in a limited, expeditionary fashion.
Paul,
On the P5 issue, I would say that we retain the seat until we are either kicked out of the security council, or it enlarges to accomodate us. Personally I would be in favour of enlarging the security council, but I would rather put my faith in bureaucratic inertia to retain the seat as long as possible.
Regarding Afghanistan, as per my “principled pragmatism” outlined above, I think our end goals should be modified to leaving some form of stable state that won’t tolerate terrorist training camps within its borders. In my mind that would be the most efficient end game, since the resources we would have to invest in order to create a strong democratic society in central asia (all the while contested by ethnic groups and religious insurgents) would be an inefficient use of our shrinking resources.
I do agree that the SDR does need to address the problem of inter-departmental cooperation.
Pericles has it. At last. Finally.
But he is both right and wrong. Philosophically right but, sadly, practically wrong in the context of a question being posed by a member of the MOD ‘Strategy Unit’, who for the reasons I state below will only ever start the debate based upon the pre-existing qualities, even if he does so unwittingly.
Whether contextually right or wrong however, If the moderator could, Pericles’ comments about the essence over the qualities should be elevated to the top of this board and interrogated as the start point, not Mr Devine’s ‘open question’.
Vincent Devine framed his intellectually lazy SWOT analysis in the way he did either because it is the standard tool used in many government departments or because he already knows that debating and framing the essence is a. beyond his power in terms of potential realisation and therefore futile and career risky and b. too late.
I am disappointed Kenneth that this blog, which has impressed me several times with its quality, has compromised itself by allowing Mr Devine to get away with posing the question in the way he did. That is why these comments are such an unholy and largely irrelevant mess. Can we start again please?
Rather than using ‘threats’ to determine defence priorities, perhaps a consideration of the ‘tasks’ the MoD (and Whitehall) may face in today’s and tomorrow’s world is a better way of approaching the problem (whatever our foreign policy may be).
Properly aligning for these tasks and extrapolating current trends while allowing for shocks to the system should lead to appropriately structured and agile military forces, a flexible defence industry and a highly adaptable Whitehall able to embrace new problems with appropriate skill sets. My hunch is that the MoD will continue to engage, in a variety of forms, in unconventional tasks for some time to come. Even the worst case scenario will probably require unconventional strategic tasks. For that reason, MoD should consider massive investment in computer network defence and attack.
Jeff M: “By contrast, there is only so much value-added to be derived from the Royal Navy, and next to none from the RAF.”
I very much agree with your thrust that boots on the ground tends to give the greatest influence within coalition operations, especially in these days of COIN as the primary emphasis. However, with the greatest respect may I take a small issue with a particular point extracted from a previous post?
I believe that the RN (and Australian, French, Italian, Netherlands, etc, navies) get extra credit or influence primarily because of the command and control methodology that all navies tend to employ, with a mixture of commanders being appointed to the different Task Forces, Task Groups, and Task Elements, along with the individual warfare commanders within each of the geographically dispersed Task Groups. This means that various nations are appointed to various command positions within (for example) a US lead nation operation. On the ground, they tend to divvy up the space in geographical sectors, normally under the leadership of a particular lead nation. This decentralized approach serves to highlight various national contributions.
That doesn’t occur within the air construct, mainly because they employ centralized control and decentralized execution for their command and control methodology. As opposed to the decentralized control that the Army and Navy tend to employ, it just does not leave that many visible positions available for other nations. Taking the invasion of Iraq for an example, the RAF contributions did not lead to a British officer being appointed as the CFACC, nor the deputy CFACC (supporting your statement above). But they did have a RAF Group Captain running one of the Current Operations shifts on the floor of the CAOC (One of three positions). Additionally, the RAF AWACS aircraft filled the western orbit, (again 1 of 3 total AWACS orbits) in effect controlling all air support for the special operations forces active in the western desert.
I would argue that the RAF, by creating their UKJFACC organization, and making it an unit capable of ‘plugging and playing’ into both US and NATO CAOCs as fully trained augmentees to those organizations, has positioned itself to be very influential in future and current multinational air operations. This is in addition to the RAF being in the position to bring unique capabilities to an air operation, like Storm Shadow and Paveway IV (combined laser/GPS), as well as High Demand/Low Density (HD/LD) assets like AWACS and big wing drogue tankers. I suspect that most of the driving force for your statement stems from current operations, where the influence of both the maritime and air contributions tend to be overshadowed by the ground forces in the coalition perspective. That could change based on future operations and Britain should retain the capability to command and control a national operation, lead a coalition operations, and contribute both with assets and C2 capabilities in a multinational operation under the leadership of another lead nation.
That’s it. I give up.
Steve,
I’m confused. Did you want to chop a Frigate, Typhoon tranche and a Scottish Bn or not?
P
Paul,
Excellent.
Steve
Paul,
Exactly.
Jay,
Many thanks for the points you raise in your excellent post. I completely agree that the RAF has some very useful roles to play, particularly in the sorts of scenarios you envisage. Perhaps a comment or two clarifying my earlier remarks regarding the perceived utility of the RAF compared to the British Army or Royal Navy are in order first. My main point was that from an ‘American perspective’ the value-added from the British Army far outweighs that of the Royal Navy or RAF, and I believe this to be the case whether we are talking about conventional operations, such as Ira 2003, or in the case of current ‘COIN’ operations, with the emphasis on lots of ‘boot on the ground’. As you’ve already made the point about the latter type of conflict, I’d briefly go back to the former and take issue with you slightly. When we think back to 2003, surely the US was much more concerned about the potential loss of I (UK) Armoured Division from the order-of-battle than it was by the loss of the RAF contingent. Surely USAF and USN aviation could have easily taken up the slack, whereas loss of the ground element would have been much harder to make good. While I am willing to concede the RAF made a useful contribution, it is hardly one the US could not have done on its own.
In contrast to the American perceptions of UK armed forces’ utility in both conventional and irregular conflicts, is the European dimension, which is what I was referring to in relation to the Royal Navy and RAF. Just to reiterate, the point I was trying to make was that in conflicts that European forces (without US help) would likely be engaged in, which are very different from those in which the US has the capability to deal with, the value-added of the Royal Navy (pre-supposing it has two new carriers) would outweigh that of the RAF.
When one looks at the capabilities of European air forces (here I would highly recommend reading Christian Anrig’s piece in the Spring 2009 Air Power Review entitled: ‘The Quest for Relevant Air Power -Continental Europe’) versus those that you mentioned, I’m not entirely convinced (though I am willing to concede on this point) that the RAF’s contribution in a European operation warrants the cost relative to improvements in other areas (again, assuming trade-offs have to be made). One obvious reason for this is the nature of operations European forces would be engaged in, which I highly suspect would not really require large amounts of local land-based air support, whereas the naval power projection capability would be crucial. Hence my argument that in the European context, naval power will be of greater utility than that provided by the RAF.
Your points about the sorts of capabilities the RAF should maintain, as well as their ability to give the UK influence in future operations, are definitely ones I would agree with in principle. Nevertheless, we need to keep things in perspective. For instance, when you write that the UK needs to be able to organize and do C2 for a national operation, it is important to recognize what a UK operation (in other words, the UK operating alone) would look like, who the adversary would be, etc. In this sense, I think it would be a bit misleading to look at examples like Sierra Leone as this was very small-scale indeed (if I’m not mistaken, less than 2,000 UK military personnel were involved). Yet apart from an operation on this scale, against an adversary such as the West Side Boys, what sort of adversary could the UK take on by itself, or at least be willing to take on with a relative certainty of success? And in such a scenario, of the three UK services which will likely be the most necessary. In my opinion, without having naval forces, one simply cannot do power projection, nor do I believe the history of bombing with no ground forces around, has much of a successful history. Thus I’m not arguing that the RAF doesn’t have a role and that we need to scrap it tomorrow (although admittedly some of its functions could be merged with the Army or Navy), but rather that in the debate over where to concentrate limited resources (get the most bang for the buck), the Army and Navy should receive the bulk of attention.
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