Ever read something so badly conceived and written that you just want to spit? No? Well, hey there, try this on for size. Somehow the author seems to invent a strawman version of Clausewitz and then struggle to take him down. I’ll refrain from further comment and pick up the discussion in the comments. For those in need of a hint as to where to begin, try looking at the 5 ‘sub-postulates’ invented by the author.
"This guy is just plain wrong." Discuss.
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{ 5 comments… read them below or add one }
I agree. For example:
“the warriors of al-Qaida, Hezbollah, Hamas, Taliban and other sects that fight us do not view war as an instrument of policy. Other cultural, biological and religious factors motivate them. They are not following the script of “On War.” They are not Clausewitzians.”
Which must be why a copy of Clausewitz’s On War was found in the caves of Tora Bora, and why al-Qaida theorists incorporate Clausewitz into their strategic doctrine.
Also, the author does not grasp the multiple meanings of ‘Politik’, which means more than policy, nor Clausewitz’s own recognition of the power of primordial passions or friction.
Clausewitz shouldn’t be fetishised. But his critics should read what he said. And just because we shouldn’t ‘mirror image’ our enemies, doesn’t mean that our enemies fight wars with politics left out.
Clausewitz-hatred: the signature tune of the blowhard.
I am also in agreement. From my viewpoint, the author exhibits the limited thinking of this time and place in historical process. Clausewitz is much more universal and easily applied to conditions over the centuries than the author believes–and his reasons for debunking the Prussian general are not fully developed in this sense. Furthermore, the idea that Clausewitz does not apply to most conditions that have led to war, most notably the conditions that motivate Al-Qaida and other terrorists groups, is absurd. The political considerations of these groups differ little from the Realpolitik of Bismarck; time, place, objectives and other conditions are different, but in each case each group or individual was driven by his/their objectives, and the choice to make war was made for essentially the same purposes; considered self-interest which, by its very nature, is political. It is only the manner in which war was/is being made that is fundamentally different. I am in a hurry right now, so I can’t develop my ideas fully. I hope I made sense.
The article sparked some debate here, with interesting comments & replies : http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/forums/showthread.php?t=3599010
Like you say it, Meilinger just make a strawman to beat it more easily, as historians like Martin Van Creveld and John Keegan have unconvincingly tried to do it before him.
I’m surprised Chris Bassford hasn’t replied to this papier yet on Clausewitz.com – maybe he doesn’t deem it worthy ?
Did he bother to read the book, it takes to a lot of ignorance to say that Clausewitz “largely ignored” partisan war.There’s an entire and fairly intresting chapter on it.Ok, his conclusion was wrong but he certainly didn’t “ignore” it.
And apparently he believes that good moral in face of great odds means that Clauswitz don’t apply.huh? I think Clausewitz was pretty clear on the role of moral:war is a “contest of will”.
And the last two parts of the article are very, very, very wrong.It’s absolutely awful.He almost reduce our enemies motivations to some sort of testosterone induced dellusion.Because surely they idea that they have a coherent ideology and the will to apply it is ridiculous.Right?I mean those guys lives in caves?There’s no way they could have a rational motive for fighting the mighty US…Mmmh.
Very silly indeed.
On the plus side, kudos for managing to describe the US attitude towards the Vietnam war as ‘disgruntled’.