By way of introduction, I thought I would bleat for a bit about my favourite blog topics – Iraq and AFG. Basic argument, I’ve made time and again, and again, runs like this:
(a) Iraq has gone to hell is going through a difficult period of adjustment right now. There’s little really the British military can do about it. Sad to say, but the civil war probably has to run its course for while: internal displacement, such a tragic feature of civil wars, seems to be necessary in order to stabilise things. All the British armed forces can do by sticking around is get shot at or blown up. So sooner we get out, the better.
(b) AFG is the war we can and must win. After a truly dreadful year of being stuck in forward firebases, our forces have recovered their mobility and are taking the fight to the Taliban. Here robust use of force by the coalition does hold promise. The AFG people are largely united in their dislike of the Taliban. Sure the central govt has limited remit beyond Kabul. Sure most regional govts are a rather uninspiring mix of corruption, incompetence and good old fashioned warlordism. Still, if the Taliban can be kept at bay, then progress is possible in AFG. And this is still an “if”. 
Only the US, Canada and Britain are fielding forces willing and able to take on the Taliban. The Germans and French have stayed out of the fight, and the Danes have hardly proven themselves in combat (one Danish garrison had to be rescued by a smaller force of Brits). The British brigade desperately needs more helicopters, more combat air support, more armour, more UAVs, and more troops. [This is turning into a problem for NATO - so much for NATO unity and indeed its Rapid Reaction Forces when only the usual crew can be trusted to actually fight - but that is a topic for another post.]
(c) Given (a) and (b) Britain should waste no time withdrawing from Iraq and re-deploying the additional forces and equipment to AFG. Don’t think anybody in Britain has been terribly keen on the whole Iraq thing except Blair. So now that he’s gone, is there any reason for our troops to hang around?
Update: 25 September
The other Browne has just hinted at a quick British withdrawal from Basra.
{ 4 comments… read them below or add one }
Hi Theo: Is there any reason for Britain to hang around? I’ll give you some.
First, a precipitate British withdrawal would hasten and strengthen the call for a US precipitate withdrawal which would be bad for Iraq, the rest of the Middle East, and for us. I’m too far away to know if The Surge is working or not, or to what extent either way, or with what degree of permanence. But I’m pretty sure if the Brits haul ass then the stopwatch in Washington which will end it regardless will tick all the faster. I’m sure this will not not be held against us by at least one half of the US political spectrum which quite possibly will hold political primacy soon. The Republicans will get over/forget about it too. Such is politics. But I can’t see how the US military will view this other than as a trusted comrade fleeing the foxhole at a crucial point saying ‘sorry mate, I’m off. And by the way I just took a dump on the fire-step so watch out for that that while you cover my arc. Y’all have a nice day!’ Such is not the stuff upon which special relationships are based. I think the military-military relationship matters and will suffer, to the detriment of all.
Second, Britain can take your advice and leave with its equipment and troops but only by leaving its dignity and honour in the dust. I don’t disagree that holed up where they are now they are probably about as useful as the proverbial tits on a bull except in so far as the perception of psychological momentum is concerned. Under the circumstances the stalemated situation in which they are at present is not the worst that could happen and the political cost to Brown is not great.
Third, your argument is based on the logic that what we pull out of Iraq we could put into Afghanistan. I think this is probably false, possibly irrelevant, and anyway cuts both ways. Probably false because what the Army is probably going to do with its 4500 troops is bring them home and lick their wounds–we’ve already got more in Afghanistan than Iraq and not nearly enough at home in training or reserve (not least for when the shit really hits the fan and suddenly there’s an urgent call for two or three battalions to be doing aid to the civil power in Leeds/Bradford or some such). Possibly irrelevant because all 4500 troops sent to Afghanistan would still not be enough to meet the total demand. And cuts both ways because the funds and support that is currently being funneled to the fight against the coalition in Iraq will just be funneled to the fight against the coalition in Afghanistan. Who is going to shift their efforts faster do you think, us or them?
Anyway, the problem in Afghanistan as you point out is that besides Canada, Britain, the US, and a few others the rest of NATO is not exactly lending a hand. And if Iraq ends in defeat why should they do more. Who backs a loser? Defeat tends to be habit forming.
My two cents worth. I shall now have to get off my behind and do a post of my own instead of sniping at yours!
David
I was reading JJA Wallace’s ‘Manoeuvre Theory in Operations Other Than War’ (from Reid, ref below) last night and was intrigued by the ideas quoted from Arthur Grant regarding the relative cost of ‘winning’ and how ‘the essential differences between general and limited war and OOTW is that ‘defeat may be a legitimate outcome’.’ (Grant, 1991).
Again, I was reminded of earlier discussions regarding the comparative relation of liability versus commitment between the insurgents et al and those who seek to counter them and how in turn this might lead to an inappropriate account of perceived performance (eg the comparison of like with like). ‘Win’ or ‘lose’ are therefore inappropriate measures of any end state. What may be more important is the extent to which favourable wider conditions have been maintained or adjusted to suit any friendly aims. As ever, the trouble has been that in the absence of clear and honest agenda, conditions had not been set, the requisite activities have thereby not been appropriately resourced, inadequate means of audit had been founded and results have therefore been presented with only limited consideration of how best to exploit them.
Holden Reid, Brian (1997), Military Power: Land Warfare in Theory and Practice (Fank Cass: London)
Grant, Arthur (1991), ‘Strategic Decisions: The Mire of Low Intensity Conflict’, Comparative Strategy 10, pp 167-8
Ah David, you poor misguided fellow. I can see that our debate is bound to continue. To answer your points:
(1) “UK withdrawal might hasten a US withdrawal.” Good if it does. Your other point that it would affect how the US view us, as “reliable allies” (or not) is well taken. I think this is especially important in the Congress. Apparently, in drumming up support among sceptical members of Congress for the new US-UK Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty, John Reid (as Sec of State for Defence) played this card: “you don’t trust us with defence technology yet we are fighting alongside you in Iraq?” So this is a consideration, but not enough in my view to justify sticking around in Iraq.
(2) “In withdrawing, we would leave behind our honour and dignity.” Not so sure. We put up a damn good fight and stuck around longer than most allies.
(3) “It’s unlikely to help in AFG, either b/c the troops won’t be redeployed to AFG or b/c one additional brigade won’t make much difference. Don’t agree. Our forces need all the additional troops and equip they can get: an extra batt would be handy – an extra bde would be bloomin’ marvelous. And for reasons I have gone on at length, I believe this war is “winnable” (in terms per discussion below).
And hi Nick. As for your observation:
“‘Win’ or ‘lose’ are therefore inappropriate measures of any end state. What may be more important is the extent to which favourable wider conditions have been maintained or adjusted to suit any friendly aims.”
Fair point, well put. In the real sense, we’ve lost Iraq but, of course, we and/or our US allies could stick around for ages without admitting defeat. Equally, we outright victory in AFG is not on the cards. But something approaching creating the conditions for a desirable end state is.
Well, since we’ve been having this debate, more or less, for a year now I feel pretty confident that it will continue. But how do you square saying ‘In the real sense, we’ve lost Iraq but, of course, we and/or our US allies could stick around for ages without admitting defeat. Equally, we outright victory in AFG is not on the cards. But something approaching creating the conditions for a desirable end state is.’ with the lengthy testimony of Gen Petraeus that this is not the case? He more or less said defeat is a plausible outcome in Iraq, yes, but something approaching creating the conditions for a desirable end state is too. I support stubbornness. I’m not holding it up as an alternative to effective strategy, which has been noticeably lacking thus far, but the game is still in play. You don’t call in the bets when the stakes are so high. And BTW, putting up a damn good fight and sticking around longer than most allies may be the benchmark for some armies but not for Britain’s. If I were CGS this more than anything would concern me.